

### Hegel on Logic as Metaphysics

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### Abstract and Keywords

In the last twenty years, the question of Hegel's view of metaphysics has become a contested question. Especially important is the issue: what does Hegel mean when he says, not that metaphysics requires an unusual, speculative logic for its exposition, but that "metaphysics coincides with logic" (Die Logik fällt daher mit der Metaphysik zusammen."EL §24). The aim of this chapter is to offer an interpretation of this claim, with special attention to Hegel's understanding of Kant's transcendental logic, which Hegel both highly praises and sharply criticizes, and to his equally important attention to Aristotle, the originator of the view that logic itself has metaphysical implications.

Keywords: Hegel, metaphysics, logic, transcendental, Kant, Aristotle

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PARAGRAPH §24 of the *Encyclopedia Logic* raises the first and most important issue one faces in trying to determine what Hegel thinks a *Science of Logic* is. It is also a claim that lands one in the middle of a number of long-debated interpretive controversies.

Thus *logic* coincides with *metaphysics*, with the science of *things* grasped in *thoughts*, which used to be taken to express the *essentialities of the things*. (T)  
[Die Logik fällt daher mit der Metaphysik zusammen, der Wissenschaft der Dinge in Gedanken gefaßt, welche dafür galten, die Wesenheiten der Dinge auszudrücken].

(E §24)<sup>1</sup>

It is especially important that Hegel does not say that metaphysics has a subject matter that requires a speculative logic in the Hegelian sense, but that this new metaphysics *is* logic. However, what he means by implying that logic can only *now* coincide with metaphysics, after we have somehow passed beyond the traditional metaphysical view that 'thoughts [*Gedanke*]' are to be considered the 'essentialities of things [*Wesenheiten der Dinge*]' is quite a compacted claim, to which we shall return. But there is first the large issue of the logic-metaphysics relation itself.<sup>2</sup> What I propose to do is to say something

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first about the historical context of logic in and after Kant, and present a few of the terms of art with which Hegel explains the substance of the claim that logic is now (p. 200) metaphysics; then I speculate on what he might thereby mean by metaphysics, propose an interpretation of the substantive identification of logic with metaphysics by contrast with Kant, and briefly assess some of the implications of this way of looking at things for an interpretation of *The Science of Logic* as a whole.

### 9.1. The ‘Logic’ in ‘Logic as Metaphysics’

We need to say something first about the historical context into which Hegel’s §24 claim must be located. And that concerns the central issue introduced into theories of logic by Kant: the relation of concept to object.<sup>3</sup> Then there is the question of Hegel’s relation to that innovation.

The innovation is Kant’s most famous and important, and concerns general logic [*allgemeine Logik*] understood as an a priori reflection on the relations of ideas. Kant’s view is a critique of past claims made on behalf of that reflective activity. Logic emerged in Kant as something much more than the study of valid forms of inference, but very different from an account of the laws that thinking does or ought to obey (as in the *Port Royale Logic*), or as transparently reflecting the basic ontological structure of reality (as in Wolfian and scholastic accounts of logic). For Kant, logic states the conditions of any possible sense, the distinctions and relations without which sense would not be possible, and so covers not only truth-functional assertions, but also imperatives and aesthetic judgments.

So where should we place Hegel? In this, as in so many other respects, he is, I would argue, firmly in the post-Kantian world, something already indicated by his distancing himself in §24 from how metaphysics had been understood—that is, simply (or non-speculatively) identifying thoughts with the ‘essentialities’ of things, as if empirically unaided thought were transparent to the conceptual structure of the real. There is no question that this is how Hegel viewed himself. As he states in the *Logic*’s Introduction:

I should point out that in this work I make frequent references to the Kantian philosophy (which to many might seem superfluous) because, whatever might be said here or elsewhere of its distinctive character or of particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the foundation and the starting point of the new German philosophy, and (p. 201) this is a merit of which it can boast undiminished by whatever fault may be found in it. An added reason for these frequent references in the objective logic is that Kantian philosophy delves deeply into important, *more specific* aspects of the logic, whereas later philosophical expositions have paid little attention to these aspects and in some instances have even expressed crude—though not unavenged—contempt for them.

(SL 21.47/40)

Another typical and even stronger remark from the *Encyclopedia Logic*:

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Nowadays, the Kantian philosophy has been left behind, and everybody wants to be at a point further on. To be further along, however, has a double meaning: both to be further ahead and to be further behind. Looked at in clear light, many of our philosophical endeavors are nothing but the method of the old metaphysics, an uncritical thinking along in a way everyone is capable of.

(E §41RA)

Although it seems to have become oddly controversial among some Hegel scholars, I will assume that Hegel means what he says when he rejects this 'old metaphysics', that is, "the former metaphysics which was supposed to be the scientific edifice of the world as constructed by thoughts alone" (SL 21.48/42), and that he is proposing a speculative logic as a new metaphysics.

With general logic understood as it was in the Port Royal and the Wolffian traditions, and so with metaphysics understood as based on conceptual relations of 'containment', or analysis,<sup>4</sup> Hegel agrees that logical reasoning, understood *in that way*, does not provide knowledge of objects. He especially agrees that reason and the understanding are discursive activities, not passively 'illuminated' by means of a distinct, separate faculty. As "that great foe of immediacy," in Sellars's phrase, there is no mention of or reliance on such a distinct, intellectually receptive intuition in an a priori enterprise.<sup>5</sup>

Hegel also says such Kantian things as "the concept is the ground and the source of all finite determinateness and manifoldness" (SL 12.23/520),<sup>6</sup> and, given that he accepts that there is no way that a determination of the logically possible alone can contribute to any (p. 202) knowledge about what is 'other than thought', whether a determination of what exists, or of that by virtue of which anything can be the determinate thing it is, he must understand that claim in a revised post-Kantian way, or at the very least not as an appeal to any 'conceptual truth', as it would have been understood by Descartes or Wolff.

Finally, for both Kant and Hegel, the unit of significance for any logic is not the proposition or any static formal structure, but acts of reasoning and assertion, and so the logic that is a model for both transcendental logic and Hegelian science is still a judgmental logic, raising as an inevitable question the status of 'subjectivity' (or 'psychology') in logic, the issue that so bothered Frege.

Here, then, is a typical account by Hegel of the subject matter of *The Science of Logic*. Hegel tells us only that the work concerns "the science of pure thinking" and he goes on in that passage to say that it is

... (t)he science that has *pure knowledge* for its principle and is a unity which is not abstract but living and concrete, so that the opposition of consciousness between *a being subjectively existing for itself*, and another but objectively *existing such being*, has been overcome in it, and being is known to be in itself a pure concept and the pure concept to be true being. These, then, are the two *moments* contained in logic. But they are now known to exist *inseparably*, not as in con-

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sciousness, where each *exists for itself*; it is for this reason and this reason alone, because they are at the same time known to be *distinct* [*unterschiedene*] (yet not to exist for themselves), that their unity is not abstract, dead and inert, but concrete.

(SL 21.45/38–39)

Everything distinctive about Hegel's approach is contained in that paragraph, so we should proceed slowly, especially with respect to its key claim, which comes in two parts: (1) first, a double claim of identity—that being is itself a pure concept, and such a pure concept is being. That would certainly establish a relationship between logic and metaphysics—one of identity. Yet, this is supposed to be so even as (2) he warns us that this identity is of quite a special sort, one paradoxically compatible with their continuing distinctness. Such an insistence on distinctness at least makes it immediately clear that he cannot be saying that what there is is an abstract, immaterial entity or entities, in the way a realist might understand universals, or an idea-monist or a pantheist would understand everything, or a Platonist might understand ideas (i.e., that in thinking pure thinkings [*Gedanke*] we are thinking what there is, such ideal entities). Then there would just or only *be* such universals or ideas, or mind, really or in truth; there would be no continuing 'distinctness', nothing '*unterschiedene*'. (Not to mention that this identification would be exactly what Hegel has explicitly rejected: "the [supposed] scientific edifice of the world as constructed by thoughts alone.")

An earlier specification in the *Logic's* Introduction of this identity gives us a deeper clue about how to proceed and raises a theme that is interwoven everywhere in the *Logic*, but which, I would claim, still has not been successfully interpreted. The passage involves a much more Hegelian specification of what he meant by 'being' in that 'being-concept' identity claim: (p. 203)

**As science, truth is pure self-consciousness as it develops itself and has the shape of the self**, so that *that which exists in and for itself is the known* [*gewußte*] *concept and the concept as such is that which exists in and for itself*.

(SL 21.33/29, my bold)<sup>7</sup>

"[W]hich exists in and for itself" obviously introduces many more complications than reference to mere 'being'. What could it be for something to exist 'for itself'? That alone is supposed to be what is identical to the 'known [*gewußte*] concept'? And what does he mean by adding that 'known' to the 'concept'? (Why not just say identical to the concept, as he would if he were a concept realist?)

The situation is immediately quite complicated. To some extent, part of Hegel's debt to Aristotle emerges here. (In general terms, so general they are not immediately helpful, *an sich* and *für sich* are Hegel's translations of *dynamis* and *energeia*.) Entities are the determinate entities they are 'in terms of' or 'because of' their concept or substantial form or true actuality (their formal causes).<sup>8</sup> Such a form accounts for such determinacy. Such en-

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tities embody some measure of what it is truly to be *such* a thing, and instantiate such an essence to a greater or lesser degree. A wolf is not simply, in itself, a wolf, but to some degree or other; if one is more Platonically inclined, a better or worse exemplification of such a concept 'for itself'; or in a more Aristotelian vein, the organic being is 'on the way' toward its full mature realization, or to becoming a weaker such realization with age. The main point is this: the object is not just 'as it is'; it is 'for' (here, in some sense of, 'for the sake of') its concept and thereby itself. A merely 'existing' particular wolf about which we can make a number of empirical claims will not tell us what an 'actual' wolf is. The latter would involve truly being in and for itself, the realization of wolfness. Hegel will tell us later that the subject matter of the *Logic* is 'actuality' [*Wirklichkeit*], not existence, and that will be treated later.<sup>9</sup> To say that an object is 'for its form' is just to say that there is an intelligible dynamic in its development, in its striving to become what it is. This intelligible dynamic is its concept and is not something that 'exists' separate from or supervening on some physical attributes and on efficient causation. It is just *the intelligible way* a development develops; there is nothing 'over and above' the development.<sup>10</sup> We also come close here to the most important general claim made in the *Logic*. Rendering a thing intelligible has many interconnected moments and depends on the sort of thing it is, the sort of account-giving appropriate to it. These are the differences between the different modalities of judgment, different forms of thought—between the intelligibility of atomic particulars in their qualitative and quantitative distinctness, particulars as (p. 204) appearances of essence, and particulars judged 'according to their concept'. Hegel wants to understand both the distinctness and the interrelation of 'that horse is brown'; 'horses have four legs'; and 'that is a good horse.' In this last case, the concept has become reflexively transparent to itself, a particular is considered 'for itself' explicitly in the light of its concept, within an overall reflection about conceptual determination itself. This is the basis of the three books of the *Logic*.<sup>11</sup>

So we are trying to understand in what sense Hegel means us to understand a speculative identity between 'that which exists in and for itself' and 'the concept'. The dimension that we are on about now, about actuality and philosophy, is an unusual but still familiar claim about philosophy and we should pause to consider it for a while.

That is, whenever Hegel tries to explain the subject matter of the *Logic*, he makes clear that he is not talking about deducing the great multitude of empirical content, the intuited manifold, or just about thought-content in the sense of logical content, like subject-predicate. He says the following:

By thus introducing content into logical consideration, it is not the *things*, but what is rather *the fact* [*Sache*], the *concept* of the things, that becomes the subject matter.

(SL 21.17/19)

'Fact' doesn't help much as a translation; he doesn't seem to mean anything like *Tatsache*, or what is the case. He is moving in the opposite direction from anything empirical, any-

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thing having to do with particular things, or facts about existence. He becomes a little clearer when he says about the concept of such a content,

This concept is not intuited by the senses, is not represented in imagination; it is only subject matter [*Gegenstand*], the product and content of *thought*, the fact that exists in and for itself [*die an und für sich seyende Sache*], the logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of what we call things; it is least of all the logos that should be kept outside the science of logic.

(SL 21.17/19)<sup>12</sup>

This “reason of that which is” means that Hegel cannot be talking about logical content (like ‘subject term’, ‘disjunct’, or ‘antecedent’), and that is stressed in other ways throughout SL and in the EL. (p. 205)

When thinking is taken as active with regard to objects as the thinking over [*Nachdenken*] of something—then the universal, as the product of this activity—contains the value of the matter [*Wert der Sache*], what is essential [*das Wesentliche*], inner, true.

(E §21)

This is the kind of issue that arises when we ask if some practice is ‘actually’ religious—peyote smoking, say, or Scientology. We don’t doubt that the practice exists; we want to know its ‘essentiality’, *Wert, Sache an sich selbst*, and so forth. We don’t doubt that animals exist and have various capacities; we want to know if they are actually rights-bearers. We know computers can play chess and win, perhaps one day could even pass Turing tests, but we want to know not whether these *facts* are true, but whether the computer is actually thinking. A gallery opens and some objects, clothes strewn around a floor, are displayed. Is it actually art? (And of course: What ‘actually’ is an object of experience? What is its actuality? Perhaps, “that in the concept of which the manifold is united.”) As Quine pointed out, the answer to the question “What is there?” is easy: everything. But not everything is an actuality.

With the right qualifications in place, what Hegel means by actuality and all its synonyms is congruent with what Kant meant by categoriality (at that level of generality, in other words), and that helps explain his otherwise bewildering claim that the concept (in this sense) *gives itself* its own actuality. This has nothing to do with some neo-Platonic self-causing process, out of which concepts pop, like toast from a toaster. The claim means that the sort of questions posed in the preceding are in no sense empirical questions, answerable by some fact of the matter. If that is so, there is no reason we cannot speak Hegelese, and say that thought determines for itself what is actual—gives itself its own actuality. How then to account for the *determinate* actualities treated in the Logic? In answering this, Hegel seems to place a lot of faith in some sort of derivability of such essentialities from the conditions for the possibility of discursive intelligibility as such. The paradigmatic form of such sense-making is predicative, but only paradigmatically, not exclu-

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sively, assertoric categorical judgments. (A similar form of reasoning in Frege: a language *cannot* contain a representation of objects, unless it also contains predicative expressions. This also means that an intellect cannot have the power of apprehending objects unless it has the power of thinking something of them, of apprehending Fregean concepts.<sup>13</sup> This is already a metaphysics of objects and concepts. Frege will add relations and down the line, numbers.)<sup>14</sup>

We shall see how and why his attempt differs a great deal from Kant's similar one in the Metaphysical Deduction, but the point now is the similarity. The Concept gives itself (p. 206) its own actuality. The answers to any type of question like those posed earlier are not empirical. Empirical questions depend on, would not be possible without, the determination of the intelligibly actual.

I have said that Hegel agrees with Kant that thinking is basically discursive. Again, a science of logic is a 'science of pure thinking'. What any thinking does is to render something intelligible, a task that has many different dimensions. But to say what something is, or to explain why something happened, or to understand the point or purpose of anything, is not just to present a picture or grasp a content, is not an intuitional grasp. It is to assert something that is always open to challenge and interrogation. This means that a science of thinking is also a science of 'reasons', of ways of giving reasons in rendering anything genuinely or properly intelligible. But this agreement about discursivity has to be immediately qualified. Understood as Kant does, it means that thought can give itself *no* content, *only* think about content 'supplied' *extra-conceptually*. Thinking is not, for him, a receptive power. Kant reasoned that the only available sort of extra-conceptual receptivity known to us is sensible; hence the fundamentality of the concept-(sensible) intuition divide. If that is the inference, then '*the discursivity of thought thesis*' immediately prohibits anything anywhere near the neighborhood of a '*concept gives itself its own actuality*' thesis, even if interpreted in the way suggested in the preceding. Such a prohibition is the whole point of the discursivity claim. (This would all not exhaust all the alternatives if by thinking, thought could produce, in the sense of create, its own objects—if there were 'intellectual intuition', something Kant reserves only for God. It is thus understandable that for some commentators what Hegel must mean by concepts giving themselves their own actuality must refer to such a power by Absolute Spirit. But this is not Hegel's view.)

But for Hegel, Kant had already himself indicated that discursive thought must have an 'intuitive moment' in itself in being able to lay out the elements of the Metaphysical Deduction. Thought must be able to determine its own determinate moments or form, not conceptualize an alien content. There can be no great tension in the two claims, because Kant is quite interested in what he says our "cognitive faculty ... provides out of itself."<sup>15</sup> According to Hegel, Kant did not have a handle on his own thinking and seemed to pick up the categories from logic textbooks, but the fact that the concept of judgment itself could, at least putatively, "determine itself" in these moments, already gives Hegel his stalking horse. This moment is not anything like the 'seeing' of thought's nature as an ob-

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ject; it is, rather, spontaneous, productive. But neither is it the discursive application of a predicate to an object.

It is also the case that Kant himself had already shown, had made the 'logical point' in his account of space and time as both forms of intuition and pure intuitions, that a form could be a form of apprehension and itself a content at the same time. In the Addition to E §41, Hegel remarks that Kant himself, in formulating reason's critique of itself, treats forms of cognition as objects of cognition, thus being committed to the unity of "the activity of the forms of thinking" and "the critique of them." He calls this feat 'dialectic'. (p. 207) Mathematical construction in mathematical proof makes essentially the same point, although the points about pure intuition are only analogues of the general point Hegel would want to make; they are not invoked as such in the *Logic*. And most suggestively for the entire enterprise of the *Logic*, practical reason can determine the form of a rational will that is also itself a substantive content. The self-legislation of the moral law is not volitional anarchy, but practical reason's knowledge of 'what' to legislate.

So it is perfectly appropriate to say that for Hegel reality "has a conceptual structure" or that "only concepts are truly real," as long as we realize we are not talking about entities, much less separable, immaterial abstract entities, but about the 'actualities' of beings, their modes or ways of being what determinately and intelligibly they are.<sup>16</sup> It is hard to understand what Hegel means by claiming that the determination of such actuality is a product of thought's self-determination, and that it is non-empirical, but at least we know he is not talking about the divine intuition of existences, and that his case is one parallel to, not orthogonal to, Kant's demonstration that actuality (but only phenomenal actuality) must have a causal structure, say.

And here again, Hegel's model of metaphysics, as is indicated by his frequent invocation of this German term for *energeia*, *Wirklichkeit*, is Aristotelian. And Aristotle's metaphysics is not modern dogmatic metaphysics, does not concern a 'supersensible' reality knowable only by pure reason. In many respects it is a metaphysics of the ordinary: standard sensible objects, especially organic living beings, and artifacts. This means that in many respects Kant's critique of rationalist metaphysics in effect 'misses' it, or intersects with it only marginally. Aristotle, for the most part, is not interested in the special, non-sensible objects that Kant was concerned with, but about the intelligibility conditions of ordinary objects. To say this is not to say that he is interested just in epistemology or the priority of epistemology. It is to say, as Hegel would, that he is interested not simply in how we make sense of things, but how things are such that they can be made sense of; and how could the questions be separated? Hegel's project, I am trying to suggest, has much more to do with this enterprise than either a neo-Platonist theory of ultimate reality, or an attempt to determine the furniture of the universe available only to pure reason, like a monistic substance or monads or ideas.

He has his problems with Aristotle, serious ones, the pursuit of which would take us far afield. He would not say that the mind can in some way 'become all things', or he has dif-



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faculties with any sort of passive intellectual intuition, but the similarities are much more important for our purposes here.<sup>17</sup>

Returning now to the main theme: we should of course be wary of attributing to Hegel psychologism or subjective idealism, but we should not be so wary that we lose touch completely with the fact that *The Science of Logic* is the science of such acts, construed (p. 208) ‘logically’, that is, with respect to rendering anything properly intelligible, giving its proper sufficient reason to be as it is. There are of course many various sorts of such sufficient reasons, and so the task of the *The Science of Logic* must be quite ambitiously comprehensive, especially since Hegel will object to any claim of radical incommensurability among such grounds. Hegel is a monist in this sense—a logical monist. There are no incommensurable spheres of rational intelligibility—cognitive, moral, aesthetic—as there are, say, in Kant.<sup>18</sup> (And even Kant struggled to appeal to the same general logical framework of intelligibility in presenting both the second and third critique.) But the initial, simple point at issue now is that anything’s being at all would be mere indeterminate and indistinguishable being, were it not conceptually determinate, articulable—in the simplest sense, an instance of a concept. As in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, to be anything is to be a determinate something, and that principle of determination can be considered ‘for itself’. It is what Hegel calls ‘the Concept’ (what Aristotle called ‘substantial form’). And this raises Hegel’s main question in the *Logic*: how to account for conceptual content (or as he would put it, conceptual determinacy), given the variety of ways of objects’ being intelligible as what they are in themselves.

## 9.2. The ‘Metaphysics’ in ‘Logic as Metaphysics’

So, to return to the identity claim, what could we mean by ‘metaphysics’, given what has just been shown about logic, and about what Hegel has rejected? Adrian Moore has recently suggested that, given the variety of metaphysical projects, we define the subject matter as capaciously as possible, and he suggests, as a working definition of metaphysics: “the most general attempt to make sense of things.”<sup>19</sup> And he rightly notes that this is the way Hegel describes his enterprise. For example,

... metaphysics is nothing but the range of universal thought-determinations, and as it were, the net [*das diamantene Netz*] into which we bring everything to make it intelligible [*verständlich*].

(E §246A)

And Moore appropriately notes that the notion of making sense can range widely (as it does in Hegel, especially given the various ‘logics’ and their different assumptions) over “the meaning of something, the purpose of something, or the explanation for something,”<sup>20</sup> or in Hegel’s most ambitious version, it can include an account of the

(p. 209) determinate identifiability of anything as just what it is and not anything else.

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And, understood in this way, it is clear that metaphysics, while it has adequacy or satisfaction conditions, does not have the kind of truth-conditions that a matter of fact assertion has. Determining *when sense has truly been made* is not of the same order of tasks as “what caused the fire to start?” or “why does water freeze?”. And finally, obviously, not every attempt to make sense of something is metaphysics. We must be talking about ways of making sense (understanding the possibility of determinate intelligibility) at the highest level of generality, without which nothing else would make sense: the sense of identity through change, individuality within common class membership, the relation of discrete moments to their continuum, and so forth. This formulation by McDowell captures well the general point:

The concepts of propositional attitudes have their proper home in explanations of a special sort: explanations in which things are made intelligible by being revealed to be, or to approximate to being, as they rationally ought to be. This is to be contrasted with a style of explanation in which one makes things intelligible by representing their coming into being as a particular instance of how things generally tend to happen.<sup>21</sup>

Being revealed to be a manifestation of some order of reason will require that we understand how there could be such an order of reason and what it consists in. That is the task of *The Science of Logic*.

For our purposes, what is also interesting is that Moore goes on to distinguish between making sense of things (rendering them intelligible, something we have to work at in any of the modalities described) from *making sense of sense*, which he ascribes to logic and the philosophy of logic. And this fits Hegel’s ‘logic’ to some degree on this reading. He is also making sense of how we make sense of things, but, given that he does not think of such sense-making as a species-specific ‘subjective’ capacity, but as constitutive of possible sense, he would not say that this is irrelevant to or even separate from ‘making sense of things.’ Logic has emerged in Kant as stating the conditions of possible sense, the distinctions and relations without which sense would not be possible. The questions that emerge from Hegel’s ‘expansion’ of Kant’s logic are how we determine what those conditions are and whether they can be rightly confined to what the avoidance of logical contradiction will allow, whether the ‘emptiness’ that Kant ascribes to these forms can be maintained.

*This*—the inseparability of the questions, the fact that we cannot *make sense of sense-making* without it being the case that ways of making sense have actually *made sense of things as they are*—is, I want to propose, what he means by saying that logic *is* metaphysics, or that being in and for itself *is* the concept. Once we understand the role of, say, essence and appearance as necessary ways of making sense, we have *thereby made sense* of essences and appearances, and therewith, the world in which they are indispensable. (p. 210) (We have not made sense of some species-specific feature of human sense-makers, but of the sense the world could make.)

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The basic unit of sense-making, in Aristotle, in Kant, and in a revised way in Hegel, is the predicative act. In making sense of *this* way of sense-making, its presuppositions and implications, we *are* making sense of what there is, the only sense anything could make. What there is must be determinate, and its ‘determinations’ are just its predicates, the content of which depends on their roles in possible judgments, the forms of which begin the cumulative moment of the *Logic*.<sup>22</sup>

Now, this level of abstraction can obscure a number of important differences. One sense of ‘making sense of sense’—and this may be what Moore is thinking of—could involve only that notion of logic as contentless in Kant’s sense, perhaps tautologous in the early Wittgensteinian sense, the minimum structure of any logical grammar of possible sentences, the negation of which is not in any carefully considered sense *at all* conceivable.<sup>23</sup> When Kant called logic “the science of the rules of understanding in general”<sup>24</sup> he also meant to set out what constitutes *possible thought as such*, not what we, as human beings, could make sense of, or the rules we ought to be following, but just what *could be* sense. But what interests Hegel about any such delimitation is what interests Kant, too: it is the general idea of the suitability of such absolutely universal forms of sense, no matter our actual theory of formal or mathematical logic, for a consideration of any possible thought of objects (in Kant the relation between General and Transcendental Logic). (Here again, the importance of their commitment to a judgmental logic, and so the conditions for possible sense-making, and not mere logical architecture, is crucial.) This involves the immediate bearing of such logical form on the question of any possible thought of objects: the bearing, say, of the subject-predicate form for the thought of substances and properties; the bearing of antecedent-consequence relations for the thought of necessary connections among events. This notion of such an immediate bearing is proposed by Kant independently of any transcendental deduction, and one can understand a great deal of Hegel as emanating from a claim about Kant’s so-called Metaphysical Deduction—to wit, that there is a lot of philosophy already involved in such a ‘deduction’ and that it is an achievement. This means that for Hegel, the direct bearing of a General Logic on any possible Transcendental Logic is actually another way of stating the identity claim in §24 of the EL, and is not a mere restating or reorganizing of logical facts of the matter. (In Kantian language, the claim of EL §24 would be that functions of judgment *are* categories, *the* forms of the thought of any object.) It involves (p. 211) the intimation on Kant’s part of the speculative ‘identity’ Hegel had announced, quoted earlier, and so it is of much greater importance than Kant admitted to understand the proper philosophical specification of these forms of thought, especially in their interrelation to each other. (Or it can be so read when we realize that the ‘subjectivity’ referred to in the “conditions for the possibility of experience” clause refers to what Hegel would call an ‘absolute’ subjectivity, one that refers to an unlimited or unbounded notion of subjectivity, not Kant’s official ‘finite’ subjectivity.)<sup>25</sup>

So it is of some significance in Kant that the forms of possible thought already determine, already in some sense are, the only possible forms of the thought of things, that the logical constitution of possible sense is the form of the only possible sense that can be made of things; or of some direct significance that the subject-predicate form should have any-

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thing to do with substances and properties in the world. It is, let us say, the intimacy, or even inseparability between General and Transcendental Logic that interests Hegel.<sup>26</sup> Ultimately, Hegel will want to claim that it is not the case that General Logic as Kant understands it should be seen as something like a basic form to which content is ‘added’. Rather, the basic form of possible thought, rendering intelligible, is content-directed, even content-determining, and any General Logic is an abstraction *from* such modes of thinking.

Stated in Kant’s terms, the Metaphysical Deduction can be established before we supposedly learn, as a result of the Deduction, that given our sensible forms of intuition, all that being a substance bearing properties could be ‘for us’ is the permanent in time undergoing temporal alterations, or all that necessary connection between events could amount to ‘for us’ is necessary succession according to a rule. And Hegel will give us other reasons for thinking of the relation between General and Transcendental Logic; in Moore’s terms, making sense of sense, and making sense of things, is much more an interrelation than had been realized.

### 9.3. Kant and Transcendental Logic

Kant’s notion of the emptiness of logic does not of course mean that the notions in a general logic are or could be treated as mere uninterpreted symbols; Kant’s logical functions of judgments are clearly determinate kinds of discrimination and affirmation (How much? Of what sort? Is so or is not so? Either so or not so? If such and such, then this (p. 212) or that)<sup>27</sup> but their domain is completely unrestricted, not tied to any sort or range of objects. But this already complicates that relation between general logic and “the forms of thought considered with respect to any possible experiential object,” or transcendental logic, because it is part of Kant’s epistemology, not a theorem in his logic, that content can only be provided receptively for finite knowers, and for us that means sensibly.<sup>28</sup> (Although he is relying on Aristotelian logic, this is not a distinction that would have occurred to Aristotle. *The basic kinds of being there are* just show up in sortal predications, in the way ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘that is a stone’, sort *substances*, and ‘is white’ and ‘is musical’ designate *quality*, the qualitative *modes of being*. This may have been what Hegel meant by saying that the old metaphysics simply assumed that thoughts were the ‘essentialities’ of things, or that things were substantial entities.)<sup>29</sup>

In the traditional reading of Kant, it would appear that Kant wants to introduce a step here, as if skeptical about why ‘our’ ways of sorting things should have anything to do with ‘sortal realism’, in the world. But this way of looking at Kant’s treatment of the relation between General and Transcendental Logic—which we are exploring as a possible perspective on that §24 identification—is implicated in a much broader set of interpretive claims that themselves raise problems of major dimensions.

The issue will be familiar to anyone familiar with a textbook Kant; call it the two-step picture. On this picture, there must ‘first’ be sensible receptivity (according to ‘our’ distinct, non-conceptual pure forms of intuition), and ‘then’ there is conceptual articulation/syn-

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thesis, which is possible because of the a priori ‘imposition’ of categorical form.<sup>30</sup> To some extent, this requirement can seem a consequence of Kant’s view of judgment—that some component of the judgment must be a way of referring to objects, and another a way of saying something about the object. But since, for Kant as well as for Frege, interpreted concepts determine extensions, this picture of strict separability and independent contributions to knowledge looks problematic. That is, if this idea of some possible independent contribution from sensibility is dubious, either as a reading of Kant or in itself (if the two sources of knowledge are notionally distinct, but inseparable), then the general/transcendental logic distinction, which depends on this understanding of ‘contentless’ versus (p. 213) ‘having content’ or ‘being provided with content exogenously’ would have to be rethought as well.<sup>31</sup>

By the need to rethink the general/transcendental logic distinction, I mean the following. None of what we have seen about General Logic amounts to a theory of what would be recognized today as a theory of logical truth or falsity. It is, in the sense already sketched for Hegel, a logic of general intelligibility. (Failing to observe the ‘norms of thinking’ is not mistakenly thinking, making an error in thinking; it is not thinking at all, not making any sense. The prospect of objects ‘outside’ something like the limits of the thinkable is a non-thought, a *sinnlose Gedanke*.)<sup>32</sup> But just because it is, the strict distinction between a prior, content-free general logic and an a priori transcendental logic, the forms of possible thoughts about objects, can hardly be as hard and fast as Kant wants to make it out to be.<sup>33</sup> For one thing, as just noted, that depends on a quite contestable strict separation between the spontaneity of thought (as providing formal unity) and the deliverances of sensibility (as the sole ‘provider of content’).<sup>34</sup> If that is not sustainable, and there is reason to think even Kant did not hold it to be a matter of strict separability, then the distinction between forms of thought and forms of the thought of objects cannot also be a matter of strict separability.<sup>35</sup> To consider beings in their intelligibility (what Hegel called “the science of things in thought”) is not to consider them in terms of some species-specific subjective capacity, anymore than considering truth-functional relations between sentences in a logic is a consideration of how we happen to go on with sentences. To be is to be intelligible—the founding principle of Greek metaphysics and philosophy itself.

So to put Hegel’s idealism in summary form. Logic is the science of pure thinking. Pure thinking’s object is, and only is, itself. But this “object” is not a nature, an object. The *Logic* has nothing to do with “the mind” as a substance or thing. (Hegel is following *both* Aristotle here when he says that mind has no actual existence before it thinks, *and* Kant, for whom the claim that the “I think” must be able to accompany all my representations is a logical point, expresses the form of thought, is not a claim about how the mind operates.) If that were the case, and Hegel were making a claim about the mind’s nature, knowledge would (p. 214) be limited by its “instrument,” something Hegel had been denying since the Introduction to the *Phenomenology*. In knowing itself what pure thought knows is the intelligibility, the knowability, of anything that is. But the intelligibility of anything is just what it is to be that thing, the answer to the “what is it” (*tode ti*) question definitive of metaphysics since Aristotle. So in knowing itself, thought knows of all things, what it is to be anything. Again, as for Aristotle, the task of metaphysics is not to say of

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any particular thing what it is. It is to determine what must be *true* of anything at all, such that what it is in particular *can* be determined (or: what is necessarily presupposed in any such specification).

Now, this all places enormous pressure on what amounts to a kind of operator in Hegel's *Logic* on which all the crucial transitions depend; something like "would not be fully intelligible, would not be coherently thinkable without..." What follows the 'without' is some more comprehensive concept, a different distinction, and so forth. Excluding logical contradictions would be one obvious instantiation of the operator. But—and here everything in the possibility of Hegel's logical enterprise depends on this point—the *range of the logically possible is obviously far more extensive than the range of what Kant called the 'really possible'*. The latter is what we need if we are to have a logic of the real. And Hegel cannot avail himself of Kant's non-conceptual forms of intuition to establish a priori the sensible conditions that set the boundaries of 'the really possible'. However, to pick a strange ally at this point, Strawson, in *The Bounds of Sense*, showed how to demonstrate that the really possible *can* be determined without what he considered Kant's subjective idealism (the subjective forms of intuition), and this—revealingly for our purposes—by a reflection on whether a candidate notion of experience *could be said to make sense*.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, the key issue in Hegel's account is not logical contradiction and logical possibility, but the possibility of the intelligible determinacy of non-empirical conceptual content presupposed in the determination of empirical content. He would also point out that it is already the case in Kant that he seems to assume that he is showing how the minimal intelligibility of judgment could not be possible without his version of the necessary logical functions, the twelve moments of the Table of Pure Concepts. That is already a kind of determination of the really possible.

This all would not of course mean that we could not still artificially mark out a formal logic in the modern sense of, say, forms of valid logical inference, which, when instantiated by variables, will yield valid results. It is just to say that the link between inferential and conceptual forms in general and forms of the thought of objects is an intimate and a priori one. That deeper connection means that such forms are, *at the same time*, possible forms of well-formed judgments and proper inferences, *and* forms of the thought of objects, of objects considered in their intelligibility. These latter constitute all that objects could be. They are the forms of objects, and without Kant's 'only for us' restriction (without his reliance on non-conceptual forms of sensibility to establish that claim).

By contrast, Kant seems to think that he is faced with two exclusive alternatives. Either concepts, qua concepts, have objects, or their objects are provided exogenously. Hegel is providing a third alternative: that a strict separability between concept and intuitively apprehended object is impossible, even though the moments are distinguishable. The (p. 215) forms of the thought of an object can be considered the forms of objects (in Kantian language, the forms of sensibility) if it can be shown that the thought of anything at all, any way of making sense, would fail without some form or other. And so Kant's appeal

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to the form of the extra-conceptual as if to a distinct contributor is misleading and unnecessary.

He agrees with this remark by Kant, in other words, but merely disagrees that Kant must then go on to prove that there must be such manifolds.

The pure categories, however, are nothing other than presentations of things insofar as the manifold of their intuition must be thought through one or another of these logical functions.<sup>37</sup>

Kant of course wants that reference to the ‘manifold of intuition’ to be doing some necessary, extra-General Logic work, especially in the Transcendental Deduction of the second edition. For example, when we realize that such a manifold has a pure, non-conceptual form—time—we have a way of showing how categories provided by the understanding from itself could be the forms of objects that exist independent of thought. By being modes of time-consciousness, they are thereby the forms of any intuitable content, and can be considered extra-conceptually as a way of getting into view all possible sensible content. But for Hegel this specification by thinking of the temporal modality of its forms must be a *further specification by thought of its own activity*.<sup>38</sup> Otherwise the relation to objects in question turns out to have a quasi-empirical answer. The answer would have to be: in what sense the forms of thought relate to objects “for creatures built like us.”<sup>39</sup> More broadly, we can say that Mary Tiles is right that “categories [and for me this means categories *alone*, *RP*] are the concepts which *frame* objects in this way,” and they do this already, as forms, without reliance on extra-conceptual forms of sensibility.<sup>40</sup>

Kant’s view seems to be that, first, all thinkings, all representations, have intensional content, so it is possible to consider pure thinkings in terms not just of intensional content (that *logical content*, like ‘the subject-predicate form’), but also in terms of real or objective extensional content (substances and properties). We can thus formulate ‘categories’. For Hegel we are thereby already in the heart of speculative philosophy. But since we are for Kant dependent in experience on non-conceptual forms of intuition, these must be *merely putative categories*. We cannot know without further ado that or how such ‘transcendental content’ bears on content so enformed. (Because of the (p. 216) independent status of pure forms of intuition, there is supposed to be no guarantee that sensible objects *can* be possible objects of the pure understanding, whatever the understanding’s ‘own’ content is.) The ‘further ado’ (in this traditional way of reading Kant) is the transcendental deduction, after which we supposedly know that in our experience there are, must be, substances in the sense of that which is permanent through time and alterations, underlying such change, in which properties inhere. This, supposedly, proves that transcendental content is not *merely* intensional—that objects sensibly apprehended correspond to it. But again, if Kant’s own indications that there cannot be any strict separability between concept and intuition hold, such a strategy is misconceived. This is Hegel’s claim, and partly explains why the *Logic* looks the way it does.<sup>41</sup> Kant thinks: we cannot know *that there is anything* that instantiates what the pure categories determine (substances, say). We need the Deduction to establish that there are. But for Hegel, since the

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forms of thought cannot but determine what *could be* an object, Kant's question is simply asking how we know there are objects at all, and that is not a question either Kant or Hegel is interested in. It is a question that depends on assumptions they would both reject.

Finally, it is often pointed out by those who object to an interpretation of Hegel as what has come to be called, after Klaus Hartmann,<sup>42</sup> a category theorist, that Hegel's aim in the Logic is *truth*, understood in the so-called ontological sense.<sup>43</sup> His interest is in what really is, what there is 'in truth', what '*wahhaftes Sein*' is, not what we are in general committed to in understanding the finite empirical world. And, according to Hegel, what there is in truth, that is, what 'the Absolute' is, is the Idea, understood as the unity of concept and reality, or true actuality (*Wirklichkeit*). I have suggested that Hegel has an Aristotelian model for the metaphysics involved, and a post-Kantian model of logic (apperceptive judgment and therewith actuality self-determined by thought, the latter of which requires a great deal more exposition).<sup>44</sup> Finite existent objects do not count as 'what there is in truth' because they do not fully correspond with their concept, and in that sense are incompletely intelligible. A 'bad' house (and even any merely finite house, because always 'bad' in some sense) is not adequate to its concept. But it also is in some way, or it would not be a house. It is in this sense, that it is both identical with itself, is what it is, and not identical with itself, is not what it actually is, that it exists in a kind of contradiction.<sup>45</sup> (As Theunissen points out, this is already an indication that Hegel's famous notion of contradiction does not violate Aristotle's law of non-contradiction.)<sup>46</sup> And this suggestion of true reality residing in a thing's concept—and, since each finite concept, (p. 217) by virtue of being finite, does not perfectly express conceptuality (intelligibility) itself—seems to indicate that we have in Hegel a recognizable 'degrees of reality' Platonism.

But the point of Hegel's denying to finite, empirical reality the gold standard badge of true actuality, is not to say that it 'possesses' a lesser degree of *existence*, whatever that might mean. It is to say that finite objects *viewed in their finitude* can never, so isolated and interrogated, reveal the possibility of their own intelligibility. An empirical attention to the finite details will provide us only with lists of properties, successions of events, mere associations, nothing that would get us close to the basis of the possibility even of identifying those determinate properties and events. For that we need to understand such finite objects in the light of the concepts required for their intelligible apprehension and explanation, and we will never achieve that in empirical observation, and, given Hegel's attack on immediacy in all its forms, not by any intellectual intuition either. This process of thought's determination of its own possibility may still be, is, pretty vague, and the isolation and identification of the *necessary* moments of such self-determination will place a great deal of stress on that notion of necessity (and so on the process of internal self-negation by which they are identified), but those problems amount to the task Hegel's approach gives us. And this sort of interpretation allows one to see one sense in which it is close to Kant on the a priori specification of content by, exclusively 'thought', but without distinct, separable forms of receptivity, and without any appeal to an intuitive intellect



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'creating' everything it thinks by thinking. At any rate, this is all we need for a beginning in trying to understand Hegel's *Science of Logic*.

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### Notes:

(<sup>1</sup>) T will indicate alterations in the translation listed in Works Cited.

(<sup>2</sup>) This topic can obviously get very complicated very quickly, because the question of the nature of metaphysics is controversial in itself. In this chapter I want to put Hegel in conversation mainly with Kant and Aristotle, and more generally with the tradition of philosophical logic. But as Koch, "Metaphysik und Spekulative Logik," has clearly shown, it can also be illuminating to compare and contrast Hegel's approach with contemporary versions of metaphysics, like David Lewis's, Peter van Inwagen's and Donald Davidson's. (Because of the many ambiguities in the notion of 'metaphysics', and because Hegel announces himself as a critic of modern rationalist metaphysics, and because Hegel's new understanding of metaphysics will include his *Realphilosophie*, the Philosophy of Nature and of Spirit, Koch suggests that it might be better to think of Hegel's speculative project as 'first philosophy'.)

(<sup>3</sup>) Förster (*The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy*) has recently argued for the importance of distinguishing the early critical question of the possible relation between pure concepts and objects, and the later formulation of the problem of synthetic a priori judgments. They are certainly two different questions: How could a predicate not analytically contained in the subject be attributed to the subject a priori? vs. Does a pure concept have an object? But at the end of the day, the 'third thing', as Kant puts it, the 'condition', that allows that connection is a relation to an object, via the pure forms of intuition, and this to all possible sensible objects. The issue of whether this is an important distinction for the moral and aesthetic philosophy is too complicated for treatment in this context.

(<sup>4</sup>) This is the heart of the 'metaphysics' Kant attacked, and extends to all attempts to derive 'object-implicating' conclusions from such conceptual relations alone. (This is how Anderson, *The Poverty of Conceptual Truth*, characterizes the strategy of the pre-Kantian tradition.) What I am trying to show in this chapter and in the book project of which it is a part is that Hegel wholeheartedly accepted the Kantian critique of *that* tradition, but argued that that form of inquiry hardly exhausted what could properly be called a 'speculative' metaphysics.

(<sup>5</sup>) Ultimately, Hegel wants to show that the abstract opposition between the intuitive and the discursive is overcome in speculative thought. Overcoming a strict opposition is not the same as obliterating or collapsing a distinction, though. Understanding properly the

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inseparability of these moments in such a form of thought is the supreme desiderata in trying to understand anything in Hegel's philosophy.

(<sup>6</sup>) I agree with Peter Rohs, when he notes that this formulation is the counterpart to Kant's claim at B130 in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that all combination should be understood as an "activity of the understanding," a *Verstandeshandlung*. Rohs, *Form und Grund*, 4. It is apparently necessary to note, when one highlights these Kantian passages, that this will not lead Hegel to any form of subjective idealism or noumenal skepticism.

(<sup>7</sup>) There are passages like this from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: "was *gedacht* ist, *ist*; und daß, was *ist*, nur *ist*, insofern es *Gedanke* ist" (E ¶465). But it is clear that by this point in the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel is not talking about what merely exists, and suddenly turning into Bishop Berkeley by claiming *esse est percipi*. What a thing truly is, is its concept, and a concept is not a self-standing 'thought' but a moment in a network of mutually inter-defining rules of determination.

(<sup>8</sup>) That is, each depends on its own individual form and its species form to be what it intelligibly is, and so on form itself, on such formality in various dimensions. The latter (what such formality amounts to) is the subject matter of the *Logic*. The *Logic* thus concerns The Concept, not individual concepts.

(<sup>9</sup>) The unity of concept and 'Realität' is what Hegel means by *Wirklichkeit*, actuality. See E ¶215.

(<sup>10</sup>) See Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle*, 41–42.

(<sup>11</sup>) Koch, "Metaphysik und Spekulative Logik," 49 is helpful here in distinguishing the first two books of the *Logic* as an *Objektlogik*, the heart of traditional metaphysical account of object determinacy, and the Concept Logic as a *Hintergrundlogik*, a meta-theory of the theoretical determinations in the earlier books.

(<sup>12</sup>) Cf. "This objective thinking is thus the *content* of pure science. Consequently, far from being formal, far from lacking the matter required for an actual and true cognition, it is its content which alone has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to make use of the word 'matter,' which alone is the veritable matter—a matter for which the form is nothing external, because this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself" (SL 21.34/29).

(<sup>13</sup>) These are Thompson's formulations. Thompson, *Life and Action*, 56–57.

(<sup>14</sup>) In this respect, compare Davidson, "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," on the general problem we are discussing, expressed in his linguistic terms ("Why must our language—any language—incorporate or depend on a largely correct, shared view of how things are?" 199), on the task of "ontology ... forced into the open" through an analysis of language (210), and on the specific example of the relation between the functioning of ad-

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verbs and an ontology of events (212). There is a useful discussion of the Davidson-Hegel relation in Koch, "Metaphysik und Spekulative Logik."

(<sup>15</sup>) Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B1.

(<sup>16</sup>) See Falk, *Das Wissen in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik*, for a good statement of this point, 170–171.

(<sup>17</sup>) Hegel admires what he takes to be the Aristotelian identification of 'thought' with 'objects in their truth' (or *Wirklichkeit*), but he complains that Aristotle's account of this identity is imprecise and confusing. So we never know, in thinking about the thoughts by virtue of which reality is determinately what it is, whether we are thinking the thoughts (the thought that ...), or what the thoughts are about. See the important discussion in Redding, "The Role of Logic," 3–6.

(<sup>18</sup>) This is not to say that there are not distinct modalities of intelligibility for Hegel (philosophical, aesthetic, and religious, for example), just that they are not incommensurable. See the discussion in Pippin, "Reason's Form," for the aesthetic dimension's 'modality'.

(<sup>19</sup>) Moore, *The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics*, 6.

(<sup>20</sup>) Moore, *The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics*, 5.

(<sup>21</sup>) McDowell, "Functionalism and Anomalous Monism," 328.

(<sup>22</sup>) The judgment is the basic, or most familiar unit of significance. It is ultimately significant itself in a way that depends on its possible roles in inferences, and these inferences are to be understood in their systematic interconnection. So the ultimate unit of significance is 'the whole'. But for the most part, the inferential and systematic implications are not necessary for the sense required in any local context to be made out. Finally, what Hegel famously calls 'the speculative sentence' is not formulable in any fixed, standard logical form.

(<sup>23</sup>) In the senses (in Kant, Frege, and Wittgenstein) traced by Conant, "The Search for Logically Alien Thought."

(<sup>24</sup>) Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A52/B76.

(<sup>25</sup>) The actual Kantian statement of this 'identity' is The Highest Principle of Synthetic Judgments and it invokes the same thought: that the conditions for the possibility of experience *are at the same time* the condition for the possibility of objects of experience. See the discussion in Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, on 'Identity theory', 79–88.

(<sup>26</sup>) It is also what gets Kant into trouble with some commentators and historians, as if it is already 'contaminating' logic as such. See Kneale and Kneale, *The Development of Logic*: "For it was he [Kant] with his transcendentalism who began the production of the curi-

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ous mixture of metaphysics and epistemology which was presented as logic by him and other idealists of the nineteenth century” (355).

(<sup>27</sup>) Another way of putting what Kant is doing: he takes the logical constants essential for evaluating the success of any inference—all, one, some, is, is not, is-non, if-then, either/or—the so-called syncategorematic expressions, and understands them as *terms* (categorematic, or having referential significance), or ‘pure concepts of the understanding’. This sets him up for a ‘move’ Hegel thinks is already just thereby made: how to get from the table of logical functions of the understanding to the table of categories, concepts of possible objects.

(<sup>28</sup>) This is stressed by McFarlane, “Frege, Kant and the Logic of Logicism.” The innovation in question—that for Kant, general logic was ‘empty of content’—is not straightforward, however, as I discuss in a moment, and the claim that for ‘pre-Kantian’ logicians logic simply coincided with ontology (rather than being about a special object—thinking) is controversial (with regard to the Port-Royal logicians anyway). I am indebted here to Clinton Tolley (correspondence).

(<sup>29</sup>) Cf. the discussion of Aristotle as the founder of the science of logic in the Addition to E ¶20.

(<sup>30</sup>) For a rejection of this two-step and impositionist interpretation as the correct interpretation of Kant, in either his practical or theoretical philosophy, see Pippin, “Reason’s Form.”

(<sup>31</sup>) We should also heed here the warning of Michael Wolff. He notes that just as we should not over-interpret Kant’s claim that general logic has *no* content, we should be careful about Hegel’s positive claims about logical content. The *Science of Logic* is not, does not have the content of, the philosophy of nature of the philosophy of spirit (another reason not to think of it as substantive, ‘furniture of the universe’ metaphysics). Wolff, “Science of Logic.” For very strong (and I think, compelling) formulations of the interpretation that holds that Hegel has no doctrinal position of his own, no substantive metaphysics, see Falk, *Das Wissen in Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik*, and Koch, “Metaphysik und Spekulative Logik.”

(<sup>32</sup>) I am convinced here by Tolley, “Kant on the Nature of Logical Laws.” For more on the same point, see Wolff, “Der Begriff des Widerspruchs,” 186. And on the mere ‘Schein’ of sense, see Conant, “The Search for Logically Alien Thought.”

(<sup>33</sup>) This is noted, for different reasons, by Wolff, “Science of Logic.”

(<sup>34</sup>) I hasten to note that the denial of strict separability is not a denial of distinguishability, as if Hegel thought there was no sensible receptivity, no intuitions, there were infima species or ‘concepts’ of individuals. See Pippin, “Concept and Intuition.”

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(<sup>35</sup>) Wolff suggests that we think, with Hegel, of the relation between formal or general logic and transcendental logic not as *'vorgeordnete'* but as *'beigeordnete'* and that seems wise. "Der Begriff des Widerspruchs," 196. He also suggests that the general-logical formulation of 'the law' of non-contradiction' means it cannot have unconditional, but only conditional validity.

(<sup>36</sup>) Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*.

(<sup>37</sup>) Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A245/B303.

(<sup>38</sup>) John McDowell, "Hegel's Idealism as Radicalization of Kant," has argued that Kant did not need 'completion' by Hegel to see this point himself, that in the B Deduction "[t]he essential move is to deny that the Transcendental Aesthetic offers an independent condition for objects to be given to our senses" (73). I think there are passages that certainly suggest that Kant saw the problems caused by too strict a separation between intuition and concept but that by and large he bit the separability bullet, and accepted the 'subjective' idealism, the ignorance of things in themselves idealism Hegel charged him with.

(<sup>39</sup>) This is what McDowell calls Kant's tendency to refer to our forms of intuition as "brute facts" about us. "Hegel's Idealism as Radicalization of Kant," 76.

(<sup>40</sup>) Tiles, "Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic," 109. See also her interesting suggestion that a transcendental logic understood this way could count "delimitation of domains of possible interpretation as being within its scope" Ibid.

(<sup>41</sup>) See Kant, *Prolegomena* §9, for clear formulations of the issue in these terms.

(<sup>42</sup>) Hartmann, "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View."

(<sup>43</sup>) Horstmann, *Ontologie und Relationen*, 45.

(<sup>44</sup>) It is not lost on me that trying to integrate the Kantian conception of logic without independent forms of sensible intuition, and with thinking understood as spontaneity, with an Aristotelian conception of first philosophy, without reliance on *noesis* or any receptive intellect, is like trying to square two circles at one time. But that is the problem Hegel poses for himself (and for us).

(<sup>45</sup>) Theunissen, "Begriff und Realität," 348.

(<sup>46</sup>) The sense in which a man is not a man (not fully or perfectly what a man is) is not the same sense in which he is a man (the individual may be subsumed under that concept). Ibid.

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## Hegel on Logic as Metaphysics

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