

*Lectures on the philosophical doctrine
of religion*

Editor's introduction

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* was the leading text of Wolffian rationalism in the late eighteenth century. Kant lectured nearly every year on the *Metaphysica*, whose fourth part is on natural theology. But he did not often lecture on natural theology by itself. During this critical period he announced lectures on this topic only once, in the winter semester of 1785–86,^a but J. G. Hamann reports that he lectured on theology to an “astonishing throng” in the winter semester of 1783–84.^b

Transcriptions from one or both sets of these lectures came into the possession of Friedrich Theodor Rink, the editor during Kant's lifetime of Kant's lectures on physical geography (1802) and pedagogy (1803). After Rink's death in 1810, these materials were purchased, along with other transcriptions of Kant's lectures on metaphysics, by Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz, who first published the *Vorlesungen über die philosophische Religionslehre* in 1817 (second edition, 1830), followed four years later by the *Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik* (1821).

Kant used three texts in his lecture course: the theology section of Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*; the *Vorbereitung zur natürlichen Theologie* by Johann August Eberhard, with whom Kant was involved in a polemical exchange in the early 1790s; and Christoph Meiners, *Historia doctrinae de uno vero Deo* (1780). The introductory section of the lectures seems to refer mainly to Eberhard (see AK 28:1033), but the lectures as a whole are mostly a commentary on Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* §§ 815–982.

In many ways it is evident that the lectures on the philosophical doctrine of religion postdate the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). Not only do several passages paraphrase the *Critique*, they also show detailed knowledge of Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, which was first available in German translation in 1781. Eberhard's *Vorbereitung* was published the same year. It appears that at least a sizeable portion of Kant's text must date from 1783–84. The other two manuscripts of Kant's lectures on natural theology published in AK 28 are dated 13 November 1783 and 19 July 1784.^c Further, Erich Adickes dates the *Nachlass* mate-

^a According to the reports of Emil Arnoldt. See W. B. Waterman, “Kant's Lectures on the Philosophical Theory of Religion,” *Kant-Studien* 2 (1899), p. 306.

^b Karl Vorländer, *Immanuel Kants Leben* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 121.

^c AK 28:1363.

rial on Eberhard's *Vorbereitung* at 1783.^d But there are a few indications that at least parts of them may be later, perhaps dating from Kant's announced series of lectures in 1785–86. Kant's use of the phrase "realm of ends" (AK 28:1088, 1100, 1113, 1116) suggests that the lectures may postdate the *Groundwork* (published early in 1785); and some remarks in Kant's discussion of evil (AK 28:1077–80) are reminiscent of the *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786).

These lectures provide us with a valuable source of Kant's views on many topics relating to Kant's thought about religion and natural theology; it is our principal source about his views on the concept of God and traditional scholastic questions about the divine nature and attributes.

^d AK 18:504.

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Introduction

Human reason has need of an idea of highest perfection, to serve it as a standard according to which it can make determinations. In human love, for example, we think of the idea of highest friendship in order to be able to determine the extent to which this or that degree of friendship approaches or falls short of it. One can render friendly service to another but still take one's own welfare into account, or one can offer up everything to one's friend taking no account of one's own advantage. The latter comes nearest to the idea of perfect friendship. A concept of this kind, which is needed as a standard of lesser or greater degrees in this or that case, regardless of its reality, is called an idea. But are not these ideas (such as Plato's idea of a republic, for example) all mere figments of the brain? By no means. For I can set up this or that case so as to accord with my idea. Thus a ruler, for example, can set up his state to accord with the idea of the most perfect republic, in order to bring his state nearer to perfection. For such an idea, three points are required:

28:993

1. Completeness in the determination of the subject with respect to all its predicates (for instance, in the concept of God all realities are encountered);
2. Completeness in the derivation of the existence of things (for instance, the concept of a highest being which cannot be derived from any other, but which is rather that from which everything else must be derived);
3. Completeness of community, or the thoroughgoing determination of community and connection of the whole.

The world depends on a supreme being, but the things in the world, on the contrary, all depend mutually on one another. Taken together, this constitutes a complete whole. The understanding seeks to form a unity in all things, and to proceed to the maximum. Thus for instance we think of heaven as the highest degree of morality combined with the highest degree of blessedness, and of hell as the highest degree of evil combined with the greatest degree of misery. We think of evil, when we think of the highest degree of it, as an immediate inclination to take satisfaction in evil with no remorse or enticement, and to carry it out with no consideration of profit or advantage, *merely because it is evil*. This idea we form in order to determine the intermediate degrees of evil according to it.

28:994

How does an idea of reason differ from an ideal of imagination? An idea is a universal rule *in abstracto*, whereas an ideal is an individual case which I bring under this rule. Thus for example Rousseau's Emile and the education to be given him is a true idea of reason. But nothing determinate can be said about the ideal. A person can have every excellent attribute applied to him regarding the way in which he should conduct himself as ruler, father or friend, but this will not exhaust the account of what these attributes amount to in this or that case (an example of this is Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*).¹ The cause of this demand for completeness lies in the fact that otherwise we could have no concept of perfection. Such is the case, for instance, with moral perfection. Human virtue is always imperfect; but for this reason we must have a standard in order to see how far this imperfection falls short of the highest degree of virtue. It is the same with vice. We leave out of the idea of vice everything which could limit the degree of vice. In morality it is necessary to represent the laws in their moral perfection and purity. But it would be something else again for someone to realize such an idea. And even if this is not completely possible, the idea is still of great utility. In his *Emile*, Rousseau himself admits that a whole lifetime (or the better part of it) would be required to give one single individual the education he describes.² – This leads us to the idea of the highest being. We represent to ourselves:

28:995

1. a being which *excludes every deficiency*. (If, for example, we imagine a man who is at once learned and virtuous, this may be a great degree of perfection, but many deficiencies still remain);
2. a being which contains all realities in itself; only in this way will the concept be precisely determined. This concept can also be thought of as the most perfect nature, or the combination of everything belonging to a most perfect nature (for example, understanding and free will);
3. can be considered as the highest good, to which wisdom and morality belong. – The first of these is called transcendental perfection, the second physical perfection, the third practical perfection.

What is theology? It is the system of our cognition of the highest being. How is common cognition distinguished from theology? Common cognition is an aggregate, in which one thing is placed next to another without looking to combination and unity. There is system where the idea of the whole rules throughout. The system of cognition of God signifies the sum total not of all possible cognitions of God but of what human reason encounters pertaining to God. The knowledge^a of everything in God is what we call *theologia archetypa*, and this occurs *in him*. The system of

^a *Kenntniß*

cognition of that part of God which lies in human nature is called *theologica ectypa*, and it can be very deficient. It does constitute a system, however, since all the insights which reason affords us can always be thought in a unity. — The sum total of *all possible* cognition of God is not possible for human beings, not even through a true revelation. But it is one of the most worthwhile considerations to see how far our reason can go in attaining cognition of God. Rational theology too can be brought to completion in the sense that no human reason has the ability to achieve a more extensive cognition and insight. Hence it is an advantage for reason to be able to point out its boundaries completely. It is in this way that theology relates to the capacity for all possible cognition of God.

All our cognition is of two kinds, positive and negative. Positive cognition is very limited, but this makes the gain of negative cognition so much the greater. As regards positive cognition of God, our cognition is no greater than common cognition. But our negative cognition is greater. Common usage does not see the sources from which it draws its cognition, hence it is uncertain whether there are not more sources from which it can draw it. This comes about because it is not acquainted with the boundaries of its understanding. — What interest does reason have in this cognition? No speculative interest, but a practical one. The object is much too sublime for us to be able to speculate about it. In fact we can be led into error by speculation. *But our morality has need of the idea of God* to give it emphasis. Thus it should not make us more learned, but better, wiser and more upright. For if there is a supreme being who can and will make us happy, then our moral dispositions will thereby receive more strength and nourishment, and our moral conduct will be made firmer. Yet our reason finds a small speculative interest in these matters, which, however, is of very little worth in comparison to this practical one. Our reason always has need, namely, of a highest in order to measure off the less high, and to make determinations. —

28:996

We sometimes ascribe an *understanding* to God. To what extent can we do this? If we do not know the boundaries of our own understanding, then even less can we think of the divine understanding. But here too we must have a maximum, and we can obtain it only by removing all limitations, and saying thus: Our understanding cannot cognize things otherwise than through certain general marks; but this is a limitation of the human understanding, and this cannot occur in God. Thus we think of a maximum understanding, that is, an intuitive understanding. This gives us no concept of all, but such a maximum serves to make the lesser degrees determinate, for the maximum is determinate. If, for example, we want to determine human benevolence, we can do it only by thinking of the highest benevolence, which is found in God. And then it is easy to determine the intermediate degrees according to it. Thus in our cognition the concept of God is not so much extended as determined, for the maximum

28:997 always has to be determinate. For instance, the concept of right is wholly and precisely determined, just as the concept of equity is, on the contrary, indeterminate. For it means that I should forgo my right to some extent. But how much? If I forgo too much, I violate my own right. – Thus in morality too we are referred to God; for it tells us to aspire to the highest idea of morality in conformity with the highest being. But how can we do this? To this end we must see to what extent our morality falls short of the morality of the highest being. In this way the concept of God can be of service to us, and we can also make use of it as a gauge by which we are able to determine the smaller differences in morality. Thus we do have a speculative interest here too. But how insignificant it is! For it is no more than a means enabling us to represent in a determinate way whatever is to be found between the maximum and nothing. How small, then, is this speculative interest compared to the practical interest which has to do with our making ourselves into better human beings, with uplifting our concepts of morality and with placing before our eyes the concepts of our moral conduct!

28:998 Theology cannot serve to explain the appearances of nature to us. In general it is not a correct use of reason to posit in God the ground of anything whose explanation is not immediately evident to us. On the contrary, we must first gain insight into the laws of nature in order to be able to cognize and explain its operations from them. In general it is no use of reason, and no explanation, to say that something is due to God's omnipotence. This is a lazy reason, and we will have more to say about it later.³ But if we ask who has so firmly established the laws of nature and so limited its operations, then we will come to God as the supreme cause of the entirety of reason and nature. Let us ask further: Why does our cognition of God, or our rational theology have dignity? Not because it concerns itself with the highest object; not because it has God as its object;⁶ let us rather ask: do we have a cognition of the object which is appropriate to its dignity? In morality we see that not merely the object has dignity, but that the cognition contains dignity too, so theology has absolutely no cause to boast just because the object of its cognition is a being of highest dignity. In any case our cognition is only a shadow in comparison with the greatness of God, and our powers are far transcended by him. The real question is: Does our cognition have dignity just the same? Yes, insofar as it has a relation to religion. For religion is nothing but the application of theology to morality, that is, to good disposition and to a course of conduct well-pleasing to the highest being. *Natural religion is thus the substratum of all religion, the firmest support of all moral principles*, and insofar as it is the hypothesis of all religion, and gives weight to all our concepts of virtue and

⁶ Objekt

uprightness, to this extent natural theology contains a worth raising it above all speculations.

Are there scholars of the divine^c in natural theology? There is no such thing as being a scholar of nature. In revealed religion there is a place for scholarship; revealed religion requires that we become acquainted with it. But in natural religion there is no place for scholarship. For here there is nothing to be done but to prevent errors from creeping in, and this is fundamentally not a kind of scholarly learning. In general no cognition of reason a priori can be called learning. Learning is the sum total of cognition which must be taught. – The theologian or divine scholar must have true learning, since he must interpret the Bible, and interpretation depends on languages and much else which can be taught. In the time of the Greeks, philosophical schools were divided into *physicas* and *theologicas*. But the latter must not be understood as schools in which contemporary religious usages were studied, or in which their sacred formulas and other such superstitious stuff were learned; rather, that is what the inquirers of reason were called. They saw which concepts of God lay in their reason, how far reason could proceed in the cognition of God, where the boundaries in the field of cognition were, and so on. Here it was a matter only of the use of reason; but in the cognition of God it was a matter of scholarly learning.⁴

Now let us ask: What is the minimum of theology required for religion? What is the smallest useful cognition of God that can accordingly move us to have faith in God and thus direct our course of life? What is the smallest, narrowest concept of theology? It is that we need a religion and that the concept is sufficient for natural religion. There is this minimum, however, if I see that my concept of God is *possible* and that it does not contradict the laws of the understanding. – Can everyone be convinced of this much? Yes, everyone can, because no one is in a position to rob us of this concept and prove that it is impossible. Hence this is the smallest possible requirement for a religion. Provided that this alone is made a ground, there can always be religion. But the possibility of the concept of God is supported by morality, since otherwise morality would have no incentives. Moreover, the mere possibility of such a being is sufficient to produce religion in the human being. But this is not the maximum of theology. It would be better if I knew that such a being actually existed. Yet it is believed that the Greeks and Romans of antiquity who devoted themselves to an upright life had no concept of God other than the possibility of this concept. And this was sufficient to move them to a religion. – We now have sufficient insight to tell that we will be satisfied from a practical standpoint, but from a speculative standpoint we will find

28:999

^c *Gottesgelehrten*; *gelehrt* = “learned”; *Gelehrte* = “scholar.” *Gelehrtheit* will be translated either as “scholarship” or as “learning.”

little satisfaction. As we strive to present the concept of God we will guard ourselves from errors and contradictions from a speculative standpoint, and we must hold our reason very much in check if we are to be safe from the attacks of the foes of theology. But from a moral point of view we first of all have to guard ourselves against any errors which might have an influence on our morality.

Natural theology is twofold: (a) *theologia rationalis*, which is opposed to (b) *theologia empirica*.⁴ But since God is not an object of sense and hence cannot be an object of experience, we can be capable of a *theologia empirica* only through the help of a divine revelation. *But from this it follows that there are no kinds of theology but those of reason and revelation.* The theology of reason is either *speculative* (with theoretical science as its ground) or *moral* (with practical cognition as its object). The first could also be called *speculative theology* and the latter, which we draw from practical principles, would then be called *moral theology*. Speculative theology would further be either:

1. *transcendental*, having its origin independently of all experience, merely from pure understanding and reason;
2. *natural*. The former is distinguished from natural theology because according to the latter we are able to represent God in comparison with ourselves wherever there is something in us founded on a nature from which we can draw attributes applicable to God. But in natural theology there is never the purity of concepts found in transcendental theology, where all concepts are taken from reason alone –

Nature is the sum total of objects of experience. I can consider nature either as the nature of the world in general or as the constitution of everything present. Natural theology can be twofold:

1. a *cosmotheology*. Here I can consider the nature of a world in general and argue from it to the existence of an author of the world;
2. and a *physicotheology*, where I cognize a God from the constitution of the present world. –

9:1000 This is the division wholly according to logical rules. But to be precise, we should divide rational theology into (a) *transcendentalem*, (b) *naturalem* and (c) *moralem*. In the first I think God from transcendental concepts alone; in the second from physical concepts, and in the last I think God from concepts taken from morality. Now if we want to determine this more closely, we will think of God as the original being, which 1) is no *derivativum*, no being determined from and dependent on another; 2) is the cause of all possible and existing beings. Thus

⁴ (a) Rational theology; (b) empirical theology.

1. I will think of him as the *ens originarium*,^e as the *ens summum*^f when I compare him with all things in general and consider him as the highest of all beings and the root of all possible things. The concept of an *ens originarium* as an *ens summum* belongs to transcendental philosophy. This transcendental concept, in fact, is the foundation of transcendental philosophy and there is a special theology in which I think of the original being as the *ens originarium* to which belongs the properties of not deriving from any other thing and of being the root of everything.
2. the *ens originarium* as *summa intelligentia*,^g which means the highest being considered as the highest rational being. Whoever thinks of God merely as the *ens summum* leaves undecided how this being is constituted. But whoever thinks of God as the *summa intelligentia* thinks of him as a *living* being, as a living God, having cognition and free will. He thinks of him not as a cause of the world, but as an *author of the world*, who had to apply understanding to the production of a world and who also has free will. These first two points are in *theologia rationalis*. – Finally, follows
3. the representation of the *ens originarium* as the *summum bonum*, as the *highest good*, i.e. one must think of God not only as the highest power of cognition but also as the highest *ground* of cognition, as a system of all *ends*; and that is *theologia moralis*.^h

28:1001

In transcendental theology we represent God as *cause of the world*; in natural theology as *author of the world*, i.e. as a living God, as a free being which has given the world its existence as a free being, out of his own free power of choice, without any compulsion whatever. And finally in moral theology we represent God as *ruler of the world*. For he could indeed produce something from his free power of choice, but without having set any further end before himself; but here we consider him as *lawgiver for the world*, in relation to *moral laws*.

DIFFERENT TERMS FOR THE SUBJECTS OF THESE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF COGNITION

Whoever acceptsⁱ no theology at all is an *atheist*. Whoever accepts only transcendental theology is a *deist*. The deist will certainly concede that there is a cause of the world; but he leaves it undecided whether this cause is a freely acting being. In transcendental theology we can even apply

^e original being^f highest being^g highest intelligence^h moral theologyⁱ annimmt

28:1002

ontological predicates; for instance, that it has reality. But whoever accepts a *theologia naturalis* is a theist. E.g., The terms “deist” and “theist” are nearly indistinguishable except that the former is of Latin origin and the latter is of Greek origin. But this difference has been taken as the sign distinguishing two species. *Theism* consists in believing not merely in a God, but in a *living* God who has produced the world through knowledge and by means of free will. It can now be seen that *theologia transcendentalis* is set up by pure reason alone, wholly pure of any admixture of experience. But this is not the case with *natural theology*. In it some kinds of experience must be mixed in, since I must have an example such as an intelligence (for instance, the human power of understanding, from which I infer the highest understanding). But transcendental theology represents God to me wholly separate from any experience. For how could experience teach me something universal? In transcendental theology I think of God as having no limitation; there I extend my concept to the highest degree and regard God as a being infinitely removed from myself. But do I become acquainted with God at all in this way? – Hence the deist’s concept of God is wholly idle and useless and makes no impression on me if I assume it alone. But if transcendental theology is used as a propaedeutic or introduction to the two other kinds of theology, it is of great and wholly excellent utility. For in transcendental theology we think of God in a wholly pure way; and this prevents anthropomorphisms from creeping into the other two kinds of theology. Hence transcendental theology is of the greatest negative utility in keeping us safe from errors.

But what are we to call the kind of theology in which God is thought of as the *summum bonum*, as the highest moral good? Up to now it has not been correctly distinguished and so no name has been thought up for it. It can be called *theismus moralis*,^j since in it God is thought of as the author of our moral laws. And this is the real theology which serves as the foundation of religion. For if I were to think of God as the author of the world but not at the same time as the ruler of the world, then this would have no influence on my conduct. In moral theology I do not think of God as the supreme principle in the realm of nature but rather as the supreme principle in the realm of *ends*. – But *moral theology* is something wholly different from *theological morality*, namely, a morality in which the concept of obligation presupposes the concept of God. Such a theological morality has no principle;^k or if it does have one, this is nothing but the fact that the will of God has been revealed and discovered. Morality, however, must not be grounded on theology, but must have in itself the principle^l which is

^j “moral theism”; but Kant apparently goes on to use the term *moralische Theologie* (moral theology) as a German equivalent to *theismus moralis*.

^k *Princip*

^l *Princip*

to be the ground of our good conduct. Afterward it can be combined with theology, and then our morality will obtain more incentives and a morally moving power. In theological morality the concept of God must determine our duties; but this is just the opposite; for here one pictures in one's concept of God all sorts of terrible and frightening attributes. Now of course this can generate fear in us and hence move us to follow moral laws from coercion or so as to avoid punishment, which, however, does not provide any interest in the object.^m For we no longer see how abominable our actions are, but abstain from them only from fear of punishment. Natural morality must be so constituted that it can be thought independently of any concept of God, and obtain zealous reverence from us solely on account of its own inner dignity and excellence. But further it serves for this if, after we have taken an interest in morals itself, to take an interest also in the existence of God, a being who can reward our good conduct; and then we obtain strong incentives which determine us to observe moral laws. This is a highly necessary hypothesis.

Speculative theology can be divided into: (1) *ontotheology*, (2) *cosmotheology* and (3) *physicotheology*. The first considers God merely in terms of concepts (and it is just *theologia transcendentalis*, which considers God as the principle of all possibility). Cosmotheology presupposes something existing and infers a highest being from the existence of a world in general. And finally, physicotheology makes use of experience of the present world in general and infers from this to the existence of an author of the world and to the attributes which would belong to its author as such.

Anselm was the first to try to establish the necessity of a highest being from mere concepts, proceeding from the concept of an *ens realissimum*. Even if this theology is of no great utility from a practical standpoint, it still has *the one* advantage of purifying our concepts and cleansing them of everything which we as human beings belonging to the world of sense might ascribe to the abstract concept of God. It is the ground of every possible theology. – Cosmotheology has been treated primarilyⁿ by Leibniz and Wolff. In this kind of theology it is presupposed that there exist some object of experience and then the attempt is made to establish the existence of a highest being from this pure experience. Wolff asserted that the existence of a being containing the ground of all possibility can be proved merely from the concept of such a being; accordingly, he said: Something exists; now it must either exist through itself^o or have a cause as the ground of its existence. The first cause must be the being of all beings. – Hence we see that cosmotheology is just as abstract as ontotheology, for it does not help me much to be told that something exists

^m . . . die aber den Gegenstand nicht interessant machen.

ⁿ zuwörderst

^o für sich selbst

which either exists for itself or has another cause as the ground of its existence. And if we investigate whether this cause contains every perfection in itself, the result is the concept that there must be a being of all beings, an original being which depends on nothing else.

28:1004 All the world aims at popularity and tries to provide insight into concepts by means of easily grasped examples. So there is good cause to seek an intuitive grasp even as far as the highest concept. But in order to keep a sure foothold as well, and not to wander in labyrinths outside the field of experience, it is also demanded with right that it be possible to represent the absolute idea *in concreto*. This is why we come to physicotheology. It has been treated by many, and it was already the foundation of the teachings of Anaxagoras and Socrates.⁵ Physicotheology has the utility of presenting the highest being as the highest intelligence and as the author of purposiveness, order and beauty. It is adapted to the whole human race, for it can provide an intuitive element, and shed light on our concepts of God. But it must also be remarked that physicotheology cannot have any *determinate* concept of God; for only reason can represent completeness and totality. Here I see power; but can I say determinately: This is *omnipotence* or the highest degree of power? I cannot, therefore, infer a perfection of the highest kind.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF

28:1005 This gives me ontotheology, in which I can think of the highest perfection as determined in all its predicates. But the judgments our reason makes about things are either affirmative or negative. That is, when I predicate something of a thing, this predicate I apply to the thing expresses either that something is (or is encountered) in the thing, or else that something is not in it. A predicate which expresses being in a thing contains a reality; but one which expresses nonbeing contains its negation. Every negation presupposes some reality. Therefore I cannot cognize any negation unless I cognize the reality opposed to it. For how could I perceive a mere deficiency without being acquainted with what is lacking? – Every thing in the world has realities and negations in it. Something composed only of negations and lacking in everything would be a nothing, a nonentity. Hence every thing, if it is to be a thing at all, must have some realities. Every thing in the world, however, also has some negations, and it is just this relationship between reality and negation that constitutes the difference between things. But we find some negations in things whose corresponding realities are encountered nowhere in the world. How are these negations possible, if they are nothing but limitations on reality? Or how can we judge the magnitude of reality in these things and determine the degree of their perfection? If *that* is what reason wants to do, then since according to the principles of its own nature it can only infer the particular from the universal, it must think of

some maximum of reality from which it can proceed and according to which it can measure other things. A thing of this kind, in which all realities are contained, would be the only complete thing, because it is perfectly determined in regard to all possible predicates. And just for this reason such an *ens realissimum*^p would also be the ground of the possibility of all other beings. For I need only think the highest reality as limited in infinitely many ways and I thereby also think the possibility of infinitely many things. If I retain a certain reality but limit it – totally abstracting from the rest – then I have a thing, which has both reality and negation, and whose limitations presuppose some greater reality. For instance, we can think of a single light, and also of infinite modifications of it by mixing shadow with the light. Here light would be the reality and shadow the negation. Now I can think of much light and little shadow or little light and much shadow, and there will be aspects and modifications in proportion as I think more or less of each. – This is how copper-engraving and etching arose. Just as here the light contains the ground of the possibility of all the modifications arising from it by our mixing shadow with it, so in the same way the *ens realissimum* contains the ground of the possibility of all other things when I limit it so that negations arise. This pure concept of the understanding, the concept of God as a thing having every reality, is to be found in every human understanding; only it is often expressed in other formulas.

But is the object of this concept actual? That is another question. In order to prove the existence of such a being, Descartes argued that a being containing every reality in itself must *necessarily exist*, since existence is also a reality.^q If I think of an *ens realissimum* I must also think of this reality along with it. In this way he derived the necessary existence of such a being merely out of a pure concept of the understanding. And this would certainly have been a splendid thing, if only his proof had been correct. – For then my own reason would compel me to accept^r the existence of such a being, and I would have to give up my own reason if I wanted to deny its existence. – Further, I could then prove incontrovertibly that there could be only one such being. For I could not think of more than one being which includes everything real in itself. If there were several such beings, then either they would not be *realissima*^r or else they would have to be one and the same being. –

28:1006

THE COSMOLOGICAL PROOF

Here I **presuppose** that something exists, hence an experience, and thus the proof **built** on this presupposition is no longer derived from pure

^p most real being

^q *annehmen*

^r most real

reason, as was the transcendental proof already discussed. It is, however, the simplest experience that I can presuppose: the experience *that I am*. Now I infer with Leibniz and Wolff:⁷ I am either necessary or contingent. But the alterations which go on in me show that I am not necessary; therefore I am contingent. But if I am contingent, then there must be somewhere *outside me* a ground for my existence, which is the reason why I am as I am and not otherwise. This ground of my existence must be absolutely necessary. For if it too were contingent, then it could not be the ground of my existence, since it would once again have need of something else containing the ground of its existence. This absolutely necessary being, however, must contain in itself the ground of its own existence, and consequently the ground of the existence of the whole world. For the whole world is contingent, and hence it cannot contain in itself the ground why it is as it is and not otherwise. But a being which contained in itself the ground of the existence of all things would also have to contain in itself the ground of its *own* existence; for there is nothing from which it could be derived. – And this is God! – Now from the absolute necessity of such a being Wolff inferred its highest perfection. – Except for what pertains to its primary source, this cosmological proof is fundamentally just as abstract as the transcendental one; for this source is empirical, but beyond it we have to do here too only with pure concepts. – One easily sees that in the cosmological proof the transcendental proof is presupposed as correct and gives the cosmological proof all its strength, that conversely if the earlier proof is incorrect, this second proof breaks down of itself; for it is only in case I am able to prove that a most perfect being must necessarily exist that I can infer conversely that an absolutely necessary being must be a most perfect being.

28:1007

THE PHYSICOTHEOLOGICAL PROOF

The physicotheological proof is the one in which we infer from the constitution of the present world to the nature of its author. This proof is nearly identical with the cosmological one; the only difference is that in the cosmological proof the concept of an author of the world is abstracted from the concept of a world in general, whereas in the physicotheological proof it is abstracted from the *present* world. The source of this proof is wholly empirical and the proof itself very popular and appealing, whereas the ontological and cosmological proofs are rather dry and abstract. – Here we must introduce a correction relating to the systematic application of the proofs for God's existence, and this is necessary because we have not expressed the matter precisely enough above. This correction consists in pointing out that the ontological and cosmological proofs both belong to transcendental theology because both of them are derived from *principii a priori*.⁸ This has already been made sufficiently clear as regards the

ontological proof. But in considering the cosmological proof it might appear as if it were borrowed from experience, as was asserted above. But on closer inspection we find that no experience of a world really need be presupposed in this proof, but rather that it may assume the existence of a world merely as a hypothesis. I infer: If there is a world, it must be either contingent or necessary, etc.; but not: There exists a world, etc. Thus in this inference I need no experience of the world at all, or of the manner in which it is constituted, but I rather make use of the mere concept of a world, whatever sort it might be, the best or the worst. Thus the whole cosmological proof is built on pure concepts of understanding and to this extent it belongs to transcendental theology, which infers from *principia a priori*. But the physicotheological proof is derived wholly from empirical principles, because here I use my actual perception of the existing world as its ground. But if transcendental theology does not succeed, physicotheology will not succeed either. For physicotheology can never give a determinate concept of God without transcendental theology, and an indeterminate concept doesn't help at all. The precise concept of God is the concept of a most perfect thing. But I can never derive such a concept from experience, for the highest perfection can never be given me in any possible experience. For example, I could never prove God's omnipotence through experience, even if I assume a million suns surrounded with a million universes in an immeasurably immense space, with each of these universes occupied by both rational and irrational creatures. For a great power could have produced even a hundred million and a thousand million suns. From anything made¹ I could infer only a great power, an immeasurable power. – But what is meant by an “immeasurable power”? A power which I have no capacity to measure, over against which my power is extremely² small. That, however, is still not omnipotence. – Likewise, even though I may wonder at the magnitude, order and chainlike combination of all things in the world, I cannot conclude that only one being has produced them. There could just as easily have been several powerful beings, each taking pleasure in working its own field.³ Or at least I cannot refute this supposition from my experience of the world. This is why the ancients, who founded their proofs of God on what they experienced of the world, produced such contradictory results. Anaxagoras, and later Socrates, believed in one God. Epicurus believed in none, or believed that if there is one, he has nothing to do with the world. Others believed in many gods, or at least in one supreme good and one evil principle.⁴ This happened because each considered the world from a different point of view. One saw an order of the highest harmony derived

¹ *Faktum*² *ganz*⁴ *Principium*

28:1009

from an infinite understanding, and the other perceived everything only according to the physical laws of coming to be and perishing. Yet another took notice of wholly contradictory purposes, for instance, earthquakes, fiery volcanoes, furious hurricanes, and the destruction of everything so excellently set up. – The abstract of concepts of God from these empirically founded perceptions can generate nothing but contradictory systems. Our experience of the world is too limited to permit us to infer a highest reality from it. Before we could argue that the present world is the most perfect of all possible ones and prove from this that its author is the highest perfection, we would first have to know the whole totality of the world, every means and every end which is reached by it. The natural theologians have certainly had insight into this; so they follow their proof only *up to that point*, only to where they believe it has been thoroughly established that there exists a *prima causa mundi*,^v and then by a leap they fall into transcendental theology and prove from it that the *prima causa mundi* (the *ens originarium*)^w would have to be absolutely necessary, and hence an *ens realissimum*^x as well. From this we see that physicotheology rests wholly on transcendental theology. If it is correct and well-founded then physicotheology does an excellent service, and all the objections against the highest perfection based on the conflicts in nature will collapse of themselves. For then we already know to the point of complete conviction that the *ens originarium* is an *ens realissimum*, and consequently we know that everywhere he must have left the imprint of his highest perfection. And we know that it can be due only to our limitation and shortsightedness if we do not see the best everywhere, because we are not in a position to survey the whole and its future consequences from which the greatest and most perfect result would certainly have to arise.

There are no speculative proofs of the existence of God except these three. For as to the ancients' concept of the *primo motore*^y and the necessity of its existence due to the impossibility of matter's having moved itself first, this proof is already contained in the cosmological proof, and in fact it is not even as general, since the cosmological proof is founded on the thoughts of alteration and contingency and not merely on motion in the corporeal world. If, however, one wanted to prove the existence of God from the *agreement of all nations* in believing in him, a proof of this kind would not work at all. For history and experience teach us equally well that all nations have believed in ghosts and witches, and still believe in them.¹⁰ –

Thus all speculation comes down in substance to the transcendental

^v first cause of the world

^w original being

^x most real being

^y first mover

concept. But if we suppose that it is not correct, would we then have to give up the cognition of God? Not at all; for then we would only lack the knowledge that God exists, but a great field would still be open to us, and this would be the belief or faith^c that God exists. This faith we will derive *a priori* from moral principles.^a Hence if in what follows we provoke doubt about these speculative proofs and take issue with the supposed demonstrations of God's existence, we will not thereby undermine faith in God; but rather we will clear the way for practical proofs. We are merely throwing out the false presumptions of human reason when it tries from itself to demonstrate the existence of God with apodictic certainty; from moral principles,^b however, we will accept^c a faith in God as a principle^d of every religion.

Atheism (godlessness, denial of God) is divided into *skeptical* or *dogmatic*. The former disputes only the proofs for the existence of a God and especially their apodictic certainty, but not God's existence itself, or at least its possibility. Hence a skeptic can still have religion, because he sincerely admits that it is even more impossible to prove that there is no God than to prove that there is one. He denies only that human reason can ever prove God's existence with certainty through speculation; but he sees with equal certainty on the other side that it can never establish that God does not exist. Now the belief in a merely possible God as ruler of the world is obviously the minimum of theology; but it is of great enough influence that it can occasion morality in any human being who already recognizes the necessity of his duties with apodictic certainty. It is entirely otherwise with the dogmatic atheist who directly denies the existence of a God, and who declares it impossible that there is a God at all. Either there never have been such dogmatic atheists, or they have been the most evil of human beings. In them all the incentives of morality have broken down; and it is to these atheists that moral theism stands opposed.

MORAL THEISM

Moral theism is of course critical, since it pursues all the speculative proofs for the existence of God step by step, and recognizes them to be insufficient; indeed, the moral theist asserts absolutely that it is impossible for speculative reason to demonstrate the existence of such a being with apodictic certainty; but he is nevertheless firmly convinced of the existence of this being, and he has a faith beyond all doubt on practical

^c *Glaube* means either "belief" or (in religious contexts) "faith."

^a *Principien*

^b *Principien*

^c *annehmen*

^d *Princip*

grounds. The foundation on which he builds his faith is unshakeable and it can never be overthrown, not even if all human beings united to undermine it. It is a fortress in which the moral human being can find refuge with no fear of ever being driven from it, because every attack on it will come to nothing. Hence his faith in God built on this foundation is as certain as a mathematical demonstration. This foundation is *morals*, the whole system of duties, which is cognized *a priori* with apodictic certainty through pure reason. This absolutely necessary morality of actions flows from the idea of a freely acting rational being and from the nature of actions themselves. Hence nothing firmer or more certain can be thought in any science than our obligation to moral actions. Reason would have to cease to be if it could in any way deny this obligation. For these actions do not depend on their consequences or circumstances; they are determined for the human being once and for all simply through their own nature. It is only through setting his end in them that he becomes a human being, and without them he would be an animal or a monster. His own reason bears witness against him when he forgets himself so far as to act against them and makes himself despicable and abominable in his own eyes. But if he is conscious of following them, then he is certain that he is also a member of the chain of the realm of ends, and this thought gives him consolation and comfort, makes him most inwardly noble and worthy of happiness, raising him to the hope of constituting a whole with all rational beings in the realm of morality, just as all and each are connected to one another in the realm of nature. Now the human being has a secure foundation on which he can build his faith in God; for although his virtue must be without any selfishness, even after denying the many claims of seductive temptations he still feels in himself a drive to hope for a lasting happiness. He tries to act according to the duties he finds grounded in his own nature; but he

28:1012 also has senses which present the opposite to him with an blinding bedazzlement, and if he had no further incentives and powers to resist it, then he would in the end be blinded by their dazzle. Hence in order that he may not act against his own powers, he is set by his own reason to think of a being whose will is those very commands which he recognizes to be given by themselves^c *a priori* with apodictic certainty. This being he will have to think of as the most perfect, for otherwise his morality would not obtain reality through it. It must be *omniscient* of it is to know the smallest stirrings of his innermost heart and all the motives and intentions of his actions. And for this merely much knowledge will not suffice, but only *omnipotence*. – It must be *omnipotent*, so that it can arrange the whole of nature to accord with the way I act regarding my morality. It must even be *holy* and *just*; for otherwise I would have no hope that the fulfillment of my duties would be well-pleasing to it. From this we see that the moral theist

^c *für sich*

can have a wholly precise and determinate concept of God by setting up this concept to accord with morality. And he thereby renders superfluous everything that the skeptical atheist attacks. For he needs no speculative proofs of the existence of God; he is convinced of it with certainty, because otherwise he would have to reject the necessary laws of morality which are grounded in the nature of his being. Thus he derives theology from morality, yet not from speculative but from practical evidence; i.e. not through knowledge but from faith.^f But it is a necessary practical hypothesis in respect of our practical knowledge^g what an axiom is with respect to speculative knowledge. Hence the existence of a wise governor of the world is a necessary *postulate of practical reason*.

^f *nicht durchs Wissen, sondern durch den Glauben*

^g *Kenntnisse*

First part:

Transcendental theology

In this cognition of God from pure concepts we have three constitutive concepts of God, namely:

28:1013

1. as *original being* (*ens originarium*). Here I think of God in general as a thing which is not derived from any other, as the original being, the sole one which is not derivative. I represent God as completely isolated from all, as a being that exists for himself and from himself and stands in community with no other being. This concept of an *ens originarium* is the foundation of cosmotheology. For it is from this concept that I infer the absolute necessity and highest perfection of God.
2. as the *highest being* (*ens summum*). Here I think of God as a being that has every reality, and derive precisely from the concept of such an *ens realissimum*, and from its attributes, its originality and absolute necessity. This concept of God, as an *ens maximum*^h is the foundation of ontotheology.
3. as the *being of all beings* (*ens entium*). Here I think of God not only as the original being for itself which is derived from no other, but also as the highest ground of all other things, as the being from which everything else is derived. This we can call God's *all-sufficiency*. These three concepts of God as the original being, the highest being and the being of all beings are the foundation of all the rest. We will of course ascribe various other predicates to God in what follows, but these will be only *individual*ⁱ determinations of those fundamental concepts.

First section: Ontotheology

In ontotheology we consider God as the *highest being*, or at least we make this concept our ground. But how will I be able to think of a highest being through pure reason, *merely as a thing?* – Every thing must have something

^h greatest being

ⁱ *einzelne*

positive which expresses some being in it. A mere not-being cannot constitute any thing. The concept *de ente modo negativo* is the concept of a *non entis*.^j Consequently, since each thing must have reality, we can represent every possible thing either as an *ens realissimum*^k or as an *ens partim reale, partim negativum*.^l But in the case of any thing which has only some reality, something is always still lacking, and hence it is not a complete thing. A highest thing, therefore, would have to be one which has all reality. For in this one case I do have a thing whose thoroughgoing determination is bound up with its concept, because it is thoroughly and completely determined with respect to all possible *praedicatus opposites*.^m Consequently, the concept of an *ens realissimum* is the very concept of an *ens summum*;ⁿ for all things except this being are *partim realia, partim negativa*^o and just because of this their concepts are not thoroughly determined. For example, in the concept of a most perfect human being as human it is yet undetermined whether this human being is old or young, tall or short, learned or unlearned. Hence such things are not complete things because they do not have all reality, but are instead mixed with negations. – But what are negations? Nothing but limitations of realities. For no negation can be thought unless the positive has been previously thought. How could I think of a mere deficiency, of darkness without a concept of light, or poverty without a concept of prosperity? Thus if every negative concept is derivative in that it always presupposes a reality, then every thing in its thoroughgoing determination as an *ens partim reale, partim negativum*^p also presupposes an *ens realissimum* with respect to its realities and negations, because they are nothing but limitations of the highest reality. For when I entirely remove some realities from the concept of an *ens realissimum*, there arise negations which give me the concept of an *ens partim reale, partim negativum* when I combine them with the remaining realities; hence the concept of an *ens realissimum* contains simultaneously the ground for every other concept. Consequently it is the fundamental measure according to which I have to think or even judge all other things. Thus for instance I can think of something which does not know only if I previously thought of a being which knows everything and then entirely removed this reality. – From this it equally follows that the concept of an *ens realissimum* is at the same time the concept of an *ens originarium* from which all the concepts of other things are derived. But obviously this is only an *ens*

^j The concept of a being negative in every mode is the concept of a non-being.

^k most real being

^l a being partly real, partly negative

^m opposed predicates

ⁿ highest being

^o partly real things, partly negative things

^p a being partly real, partly negative

28:1015

originarium logice tale,⁹ a being whose concept cannot be derived from any other concept because all other concepts of things must be derived from it. Thus an *ens realissimum* is also an *ens logice originarium*.⁷ On the contrary, *omne ens limitatum* is also an *ens derivativum*.⁸ If one speaks of "mixed realities," one is using an improper expression.¹¹ For a mixture of a reality and a negation, of something and nothing, cannot be thought. If I am to mix something with something else, then I must have something actual; but negations are mere deficiencies. Hence if a thing has something negative along with what is real (for example, a darkened room, etc.) then in this case there is no mixing in of the negation, but rather a limitation of the reality. Thus in the case cited I could not mix the negation darkness in with the light as something real, but rather the negative darkness arose when I reduced and limited the reality light. But the *logical* mixture of concepts is something wholly different. Here I can certainly say that the concept of a negation is mixed in with my concept of reality, for my concept of something negative is a concept every bit as much as my concept of something real is a concept. Hence here I have things which can be mixed with one another; yet this is not the case with the object¹ itself, but only with my idea of the object.¹²

More important than this is the thesis of those *scholastic theologians* who said that every attribute of God is in fact God himself.¹² Expressed completely and precisely, the thesis is this: any single reality considered as ground without limitation is at the same time my whole concept of God. If we examine this thesis, we find that it is actually well grounded. Every reality, if I think of it without limitation, is God himself, e.g. the Omniscient, the Omnipotent, the Eternal. Here I have only single realities without limitation and I represent God wholly under each of them, because I think of each such unlimited reality equally as a ground from which I understand every other unlimited reality. For example, when I represent omniscience, I equally regard it as a ground through which I posit omniscience, omnipotence, etc., and I rightly infer that the being to which this single reality belongs without limitation is a being to which all the other realities also belong; and hence arises the concept of God. God is a necessary idea of our understanding, because he is the substratum of the possibility of all things. This was already established above in detail. But now the question is whether this idea of ours also have objective reality, that is, whether there actually exists a being corresponding to our idea of God. Some have wanted to prove this because in our concept there

⁹ an original being for logic

⁷ a logically original being

⁸ Every limited being is also a derivative being.

¹ Objekt

¹² Objekt

is nothing which contradicts it. Now this is obviously true, for our whole concept of God consists of realities. But it is impossible for one reality to contradict another, since a contradiction requires that something be and also not be. This not-being, however, would be a negation, and nothing of this kind can be thought in God. Yet the fact that there is nothing contradictory in my concept of God proves only the *logical possibility* of the concept, that is, the possibility of forming the concept in my understanding. For a self-contradictory concept is no concept at all. But if I am to give objective reality to my concept and prove that there actually exists an object corresponding to my concept – for this more is required than the fact that there is nothing in my concept that contradicts itself. For how can a concept which is logically possible, merely in its logical possibility, constitute at the same time the real possibility of an object?¹² For this not only an analytic judgment is required, but also a synthetic one, i.e. I must be able to know that the effects of the realities do not cancel one another. For instance, decisiveness and caution are both realities, but their effects are often of such a kind that the one cancels the other. Now I have no capacity to judge *a priori* whether the realities combined in the concept of God cancel each other in their effects, and hence I cannot establish the possibility of my concept directly; but on the other side, I may also be sure that no human being could ever prove its impossibility.

28:1016

If we now ask how we come to the concept of a maximum of all realities, then insofar as the reality is finite we must leave every limitation out of its concept if we want to apply it to the concept of a *realissimum*. For fundamentally we can think of God only by ascribing to him without any limitation everything real which we encounter in ourselves. But it is often very difficult to separate out every limitation, because we ourselves are limited creatures and are often unable to represent the real except under limitations. In such a case, where we are not in a position to remove all the limitations from our concept, we still do not need to give up the reality itself; rather we can say that we do ascribe it to God, only without any limitations, because in fact it is grounded on something real. Thus for example it is very difficult for us to think of eternity without any limitations; but we must nevertheless have it in our concept of God, because it is a reality. So we ascribe it to God and admit the inability of our reason to think it in an entirely pure way. – As to God's *understanding*, we must think of it as intuitive, as opposed to our discursive understanding, which is able to make concepts of things only from universal marks. But this is a limitation which must be left out of the reality of understanding if I am to apply this reality to God. Hence God's understanding will not be a faculty of thinking but a faculty of intuiting. – The concept of the infinite is taken from mathematics, and belongs only to it;¹³ for this concept never deter-

28:1017

¹² Objekt

28:1018

mines an absolute magnitude, but always only a relative one. It is the concept of a magnitude which in relation to its measure as unity is greater than any number. Hence infinity never determines *how* great something is; for it does not determine the measure (or unity) and a great deal in fact depends on this. For example, if I represent space as infinite, I can assume either miles or diameters of the earth as the measure or unity with respect to which it is infinite. If I assume miles as the measure, then I can say that universal space is greater than any number of miles, even if I think of centillions of them. But if I assume diameters of the earth as my measure, or even distances, to the sun, I will still be able to say here that cosmic space is greater than any number, in this case, of diameters of the earth and distances to the sun, even if I think of centillions of them. But who does not see that in the last case infinity is greater than in the first, because here the unity with respect to which cosmic space is greater than any number is much greater than it was before? But from this we also see that the concept of infinity expresses only a relationship to our incapacity to determine the concept of magnitude, because the magnitude in question is greater than every number I can think of, and hence gives me no determinate concept of the magnitude itself. Fundamentally, therefore, when I call an object infinite the only advantage this gives me is that I gain an insight into my inability to express the magnitude of this object in numbers. I may be very impressed and astonished at the object^u in this way, but on the other side I can never learn to recognize its absolute magnitude. Thus the concept of infinity can always have much aesthetic beauty, because it moves me deeply. But it does not help me at all to say with precision how great the object itself is. Moreover, if I am to assume an object^x to be infinite, I must always assume that it is homogeneous with something else. For instance, if I call the divine understanding "infinite" I must assume my understanding as a measure of unity and then admit that the magnitude of the divine understanding is greater than everything I can think of as an understanding. But this does not help me in the least to be able to say determinately *how great* the divine understanding is. Thus we see that I cannot come a single step further in my cognition of God by applying the concept of mathematical infinity to him. For through this concept I learn only that I can never express the concept of God's greatness in numbers. But this gives me no insight into God's absolute greatness. I cannot even find any measure for it; for where is a unity which is homogeneous with God? – Might we perhaps succeed in finding this measure by means of the concept of *metaphysical* infinity? But what is the meaning of "metaphysical infinity"? In this concept we understand perfections in their highest degree, or better yet, without any degree. The

^u Objekt^x Objekt

omnitudo realitatis^y is what is called metaphysical infinity. Now it is true that through this concept we do gain a precise concept of God's greatness. For this total reality does determine only his absolute greatness. But here I need no homogeneous measure, no unity to be compared with God from which to bring out his greatness relative to it. Rather I have here a determinate concept of this greatness itself. For I see that everything which is truly a reality is to be encountered in him. But the concept of totality is always completely precise, and I can never think of it as more or less than it is. On the other side, I cannot see why I ought to express an ontological concept (the concept of totality) in terms of mathematical infinity. Should I not rather use a term congruent with the concepts of this science, instead of permitting an ambiguity by usurping an expression from another science, thus running the risk of letting an alien concept creep in as well? Hence in theology we can easily dispense with the term *metaphysical infinity*, since the ontological concept expressed is not suitably rendered by a term of mathematical origin, and would be better signified by the term "All of reality." But if we want a special term for this concept, we would do better to choose the expression *all-sufficiency* (*omnisufficientia*). This expression represents everything real in God to us as a ground (*ens entium*),^z because *sufficientia* always expresses the relationship of a ground to its consequences. We would also do better to be satisfied with the pure concept of our reason, *omnitudo realitatis*.^a For this concept is the fundamental measure by which I can determine the absolute greatness of God. —

28:1019

Above we have already firmly established the universal concept of God, namely that he is an *ens realissimum*. This is the ideal our reason needs as a higher standard for what is less complete. We have further seen that this concept of a most perfect being has to be at the same time the concept of a highest being. Now the question is: Which predicates will we ascribe to this being, and in what way must we proceed in arranging these predicates of God's so that they do not contradict the concept of a being which is the most primary of all?^b Here we still have to do only with mere concepts, without troubling ourselves whether there is an object^c corresponding to these concepts! We have thought of a being as the substratum of the possibility of all other beings, and now we are asking how this ideal must be constituted. Hence we want to see which predicates can agree with the concept of this highest and most perfect being. This investigation is most necessary, because otherwise the whole concept is of no help to us and cannot in general

^y All of reality^z being of beings^a All of reality^b *allerersten*^c *Objekt*

be rightly thought by us unless we determine the predicates which are congruent to it. But this investigation will also be of great utility to us in that it teaches us to cognize God as far as human reason is capable of this cognition. It gives us handy rules for speaking of God, and what we are to assert of him; and it will recommend care and caution to us, so that nothing creeps into our concept of God which is contrary to his highest reality.

28:1020 What predicates, then, can be thought in an *ens realissimum*?^d What are its attributes? We have already seen this much, that nothing can be predicated of the concept of an *ens realissimum* except realities. But where will we find these realities? What are they? And how can we – and how must we – ascribe them to God? Every reality is either given to me through pure reason, independently of any experience, or encountered by me in the world of sense. I may ascribe the first kind of reality to God without hesitation, for realities of this kind apply to things in general and determine them through pure understanding. Here no experience is involved and the realities are not even affected by sensibility. Hence if I predicate them of God I need not fear that I am confusing him with an object of sense. For in this case I am not ascribing anything to him but what is true of him as a thing in general. It already lies in my concept of an *ens realissimum* that he must be a thing, and therefore I have to ascribe to him every reality which can be predicated of him as a thing. Now since these *a priori* realities refer to the universal attributes of a thing in general, they are called *ontological* predicates. They are purely transcendental concepts. To this class of realities belong God's possibility, his existence, his necessity, or whatever kind of existence flows from his concept; also the concept of substance, the concept of unity of substance, simplicity, infinity, duration, presence, and others as well. But these concepts determine only *the concept of a thing* in general. They are only predicates *in abstracto* which the deist ascribes to God. It is impossible for us to be satisfied with them alone, for such a God would be of no help to us; he would indeed be a thing, but one wholly isolated and by itself,^e standing in no relationship to us. Of course this concept of God must constitute the beginning of all our cognition of God, but it is useless when taken only by itself, and quite superfluous to us if we could not cognize more of God than this. If this concept of God is to be of utility to us, we must see if these ontological predicates cannot be applied to examples *in concreto*. The theist does this when he thinks of God as the *supreme intelligence*. If we are to ascribe predicates to God *in concreto*, we must take materials for the concept of God from empirical principles^f and empirical information.^g But in the

^d most real being

^e *für sich*

^f *Principien*

^g *Kenntnissen*

whole of our experience we find nothing which has more reality *than our own soul*. Hence *these* realities too will have to be taken from the cognition of ourselves; they will be psychological predicates which can be ascribed to God along with his ontological predicates. But since all these predicates are borrowed from experience, and since in the whole of experience we encounter nothing but phenomena, we must exercise great care here not to let ourselves be blinded by a mere show and ascribe predicates to God which can be true only of objects of sense. Hence we must note the following rules of caution:

28:1021

1. *Regarding the choice of predicates themselves*: What kinds of predicates shall we take from experience and be able to unite with the concept of God? – Nothing but pure realities! But in the whole world there is no thing that has *pure* reality, but rather all things which can be given through experience are *partim realia, partim negativa*.^h Hence great difficulties arise here, because many of my concepts are associated with determinations which have some deficiency in them. But such negations cannot be ascribed to God; hence I must first proceed *via negationis*; that is, I must carefully separate out everything sensible inhering in my representation of this or that reality, and leave out everything imperfect and negative, and ascribe to God the pure reality which is left over. But this is extremely difficult, for often very little or nothing at all is left over after I reject the limitations; or at least I can never think of the pure positive without the sensible element which is woven into my representation of it. In a case like this I have to say that if I do ascribe this or that *realitas phaenomenon* to God, I do it only *insofar* as all limitations have been separated from it. But if the negative element cannot be separated without cancelling the concept at the same time, then in this case I will not be able to predicate the concept of God at all. Thus for instance I cannot ascribe extension to God as a predicate, because it is only a concept of sense and if I separate everything negative from it, nothing real at all is left over. Of the concept of matter, after I remove everything negative and sensible inhering in it I retain nothing but the concept of an externally active power, and of the concept of spatial presence if I leave out the condition of sense (i.e. space) nothing but the pure reality of presence. I will be able to apply to God, therefore, only the real itself, power and presence. – In this way I will be able to determine the quality of divine predicates *via negationis*;ⁱ that is, I can determine which predicates drawn from experience can be applied to my concept of God after all negations have been separated from them, but in this way I cannot come to

28:1022

^h partly real, partly negative things

ⁱ by the way of negation

cognize the quantity of reality in God; rather, the reality remaining in my concepts after all the limitations have been left out will be quite insignificant and small in degree. Hence if I meet with any reality in any of the attributes of things given to me through experience, I must ascribe this reality to God in the highest degree and with infinite significance. This is called proceeding *per viam eminentiae*.¹ But I cannot proceed in this way unless I have first brought out the pure reality *via negationis*.¹⁴ But if I have neglected this task and have not carefully separated everything negative from my concept, then if I predicate the concept of this reality as it is encountered in appearance with its limitations, then my concept of God will be wholly corrupt. This is how anthropomorphism arises. – Hence first the limits must be left out and only the pure reality which is left over must be ascribed to God; but it must be ascribed *via eminentiae*; for instance, not merely power but *infinite* power, and not merely an understanding but an *infinite* understanding. But we can never arrive fully at the attributes of God so as to be able to cognize *how they* might be constituted *in themselves*; for example, if we take the human understanding, it is not enough to magnify it infinitely *via eminentiae*; for it would still remain a limited understanding and would grow merely in the quickness of its cognition. Rather we must first leave out all the limitations inhering in it as an understanding that can cognize everything only discursively. Now since the purely real, which is then left over (i.e. understanding) cannot in general be comprehended by us at all, there is only one path still left open to us.

28:1023

2. *Regarding the way of proceeding, by which we are able to ascribe to God realities abstracted from concepts of sense:*

This is the noble way of *analogy*. – But what does this proceeding *per analogiam* consist in? Analogy does not consist in an imperfect similarity of things to one another, as it is commonly taken; for in this case that would be something very uncertain. Not only would we have bad predicates, because we would not be in a position to think of their reality without any limitations, but we could ascribe even these not wholly purified realities to God only insofar as he had something perfectly similar to them in himself. But how would that help me? Could it give me a sufficiently complete concept of God? If, however, we understand analogy to be the perfect similarity of relationships (not of things but of relationships), or in short what the mathematicians understand by *proportion*, then we will be satisfied at once; we can then form a concept of God and of his predicates which will be so sufficient that we will never need anything more. But

¹ by the way of eminence

obviously we will not assume any relations of magnitude (for this belongs to mathematics); but rather we will assume a relation of cause to effect, or even better, of ground to its consequence, so as to infer in an entirely philosophical manner.¹⁵ For just as in the world one thing is regarded as the cause of another thing when it contains the ground of this thing, so in the same way we regard the whole world as a consequence of its ground *in God*, and argue from the analogy. For instance, just as the happiness of one human being (the removal of his misery) has a relationship to the benevolence of another human being, so in just the same way the happiness of all human beings has a relationship to the benevolence of God. The primary ground of proof for the existence of God is the ontological one from pure concepts. But the real possibility of a most perfect being must be proven before I can prove its existence in this way.¹⁶ For the dogmatic atheist absolutely denies the possibility of a God and asserts that there is no God. But here, where we have to do only with pure reason, denying the existence of an *ens realissimum* and denying its possibility are fundamentally the same thing. Hence if the dogmatic atheist denies that there is a God, he takes upon himself the obligation to prove that God is impossible. For all our *a priori* cognition is of such a kind that, when I presume to prove from pure reason that something does not exist, I can do it only by proving that it is impossible for this thing to exist. The reason for this is that, since here I can borrow no proof from experience either for or against the existence of the being in question, it follows that I have no other path before me but to prove from the mere concept of the thing that it does not exist, and that means proving that it contradicts itself. Hence, before he presumes the right to assert that no *ens realissimum* exists, the dogmatic atheist must show that an object corresponding to our idea of such a being would contradict itself in the unification of its predicates. On the other side, if it occurs to us to want to demonstrate *a priori* that God does exist, then we too must undertake the duty to prove through pure reason and with apodictic certainty that God is possible. But there is no way we can do this except by proving that an *ens realissimum* does not contradict itself in the synthesis of all its predicates. But in his proof of the possibility of an *ens realissimum* Leibniz confused the possibility of the concept with the possibility of the thing itself. Namely, he inferred this way: In my concept of an *ens realissimum* there is no contradiction, because one reality cannot contradict another, because a contradiction necessarily requires a negation in order for me to say that something both is and is not. But where there are only sheer realities, there is no negation and hence no contradiction either. But if there is no contradiction in the concept of an *ens realissimum*, then such a thing is possible. He should have concluded, however, *only that my idea of such a thing is possible*. For the fact that there is nothing contradictory in my concept of a thing does not prove that it is the concept of something possible, but it does not

28:1024

28:1025

yet prove the possibility of the object^k of my idea. The principle of contradiction is only the analytic principle^l of possibility, by means of which it is established with apodictic certainty whether my concept is possible or impossible. But it is not the synthetic principle^m of possibility, i.e. by means of it we cannot at all prove whether or not the predicates of a thing would cancel each other in the thing itself. For by means of the principle of contradiction I cannot come to cognize the synthesis of predicates in the object;ⁿ for this there is required, rather, an insight into the constitution and range of each predicate as regards its operations. Hence if I undertake to prove the possibility of an *ens realissimum* (that is, to prove the possibility of the synthesis of all predicates in one object),^o then I presume to prove *a priori* through my reason and with apodictic certainty that all perfections can be united in a single stem and derived from a single principle.^p But such a proof transcends the possible insight of all human reason. Where will I get this cognition? From the world? Well and good, but in the world I will find realities only as they are distributed among objects; for example, a great capacity for understanding in one human being but a certain indecisiveness; in another, on the contrary, very lively affections but only an average amount of insight. In animals I note an astonishing fertility in propagation, but no reason; in human beings I find reason but much less fertility; in short, I see in these cases that where one reality is found in an object,^q some other reality is not present. Now obviously I cannot infer from them that the one reality cancels the other, and that for instance it is impossible that there is a human being who unites in himself every reality a human being can have; but on the other side I also have no insight as to *how* such a perfect human being could be possible; for I cannot cognize whether in the synthesis (the composition) of all human realities the effects of one perfection would contradict the effects of another. In order to have this insight I would have to be acquainted with all the possible effects of all human realities and their respective relationships. But I cannot, because in all human beings I perceive only individual realities, and consequently also only the effects of these individual realities, but not all possible effects of a synthesis of all human realities. Apply this to God, I must concede even more my incapacity to have insight into how a synthesis of all possible realities is possible with regard to all their effects. For how will my reason presume to cognize how all the highest realities operate, what effects would arise from them,

^k *Objekt*^l *Princip*^m *Princip*ⁿ *Objekt*^o *Objekt*^p *Princip*^q *Objekt*

and what relationship all these realities would have to have? – But I would have to cognize this if I wanted to have insight into whether all realities could be united together in one object,¹ and hence into how God is possible.

28:1026

On the other side, it is also impossible for human reason ever to prove that such a combination of all perfections in one thing is *not* possible; for this would also require an insight into the extent of all the effects of the All of reality, since the same grounds which make visible human reason's inability to assert the existence of such a being are also necessarily sufficient to prove the unworkability of every counter-assertion. – In short, it is impossible to prove that God is impossible. Rather, reason does not put the least obstacle in the way of my accepting the possibility of God, if I should feel bound to do so in some other way. Reason itself is not able to prove with apodictic certainty any such possibility (and *a priori* proofs must one and all have apodictic certainty, otherwise they are not proofs). For this would require an insight which far transcends the bounds of the human faculty of reason. But from this same inability of my reason follows the impossibility of ever proving that a most perfect being is not possible. And thus collapses the edifice of the dogmatic atheist. For if he wishes to deny God's existence and assert that there absolutely is no God, the atheist must first demonstrate the impossibility of God. But here reason forsakes him, and everything he may bring against the possibility of God will be only so much absurdity and nonsense. From all this we see that human reason can prove neither the possibility nor the impossibility of God, because it lacks the necessary insight into the domain and effects of all realities; but nothing prevents us from assuming the possibility of God, if we should be able to find convincing grounds for it in some other way.

Now just as we can refute the dogmatic atheist and reject his presumptuous assertions of the nonexistence of God before we ourselves have proven God's existence, so in the same way we can also render fruitless all the attacks of the skeptical atheist without previously giving a proof for the existence of a most perfect being. For since the latter doubts that there can be any proof at all just because speculative reason cannot prove to our satisfaction the existence of God, he also equally doubts at the same time the existence of God itself. The skeptical atheist can be refuted only if, granting him the insufficiency of all speculative proofs for the existence of God as an *ens realissimum*, we nonetheless feel an inner conviction on *practical grounds* that *a God must exist*. We must assume a God and we must believe in him, even though our reason may not venture to assume his possibility and his existence *a priori*.

28:1027

¹ Objekt

² anzunehmen

28:1028

The ontological proof for the existence of a God is taken from the concept of an *ens realissimum*. One infers, namely: An *ens realissimum* is one which contains all realities in itself. But existence is also a reality; hence the *ens realissimum* must necessarily exist. If one therefore asserts that God is not, then one thereby denies something in the predicate which lies already in the subject; consequently there is a contradiction here. The great simplicity of this proof by itself provokes a not unfounded suspicion. But we will let the critique of the proof take its course, and see whether the proof holds water. In this proof, everything unquestionably depends on whether the existence of a thing is in fact one of its realities. – But the fact that a thing exists does not by itself make the thing more perfect; it does not thereby contain any new predicate, but in such a way it is rather posited with all its predicates. The thing was already just as complete in my concept when I thought of it as possible as it is afterward when it actually exists; for otherwise, if existence were a special reality belonging to the thing, it would not be the same thing I had thought before, but more would exist in it than was included in the concept of the object. *Being* is thus obviously not a real predicate, that is, the concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing in order to make it still more perfect. It is only the positing¹ of a thing, or of certain determinations, in themselves. In its logical use, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition “God is omnipotent” contains sheer concepts which have as their objects God and omnipotence. The little word *is* is not a further predicate, but is only that which posits the predicate (omnipotent) in the subject (God). If I now take the subject (God) together with all its predicates, and say “God is” or “there is a God,” then I do not add any new predicate to the concept God, but rather only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and more specifically² the object in relation³ to my concept. Both the object and the concept must have the same content, and thus nothing can be added to the concept (which expresses mere possibility) by simply thinking its object as given (through the expression “it is”). Hence the actual contains no more than the merely possible. For example, one hundred actual dollars do not contain the least bit more than one hundred possible dollars. For the possible dollars signify the concept, and the actual ones the object of this concept and the positing of it as such. Hence in a case where the object contained more than the concept, my concept would not express the whole object, and thus would not be the suitable concept for it. For the object in its actuality is not contained analytically in my concept, but is added synthetically to my concept (which is a determination of my state) without this additional *being* external to my

¹ Position² zwar³ Beziehung

concept thereby increasing in the least the hundred dollars I am thinking of. Whatever our concept of an object may contain and however much it may contain, we must still go beyond it if we are to impart existence to the object. If I think in a thing every reality except one, the missing reality is not added if I say that this defective thing exists, but rather it exists with precisely the same deficiency I have thought in it, for otherwise what exists would be something different from what I was thinking of. Now if I think of some being as the highest reality (without deficiency), it is still an open question whether it exists or not; for it is just as thoroughly determined as an ideal as it would be if it were an actual object. From this we see how rash it would be to conclude that existence is included already in the concept of a possible thing. And thus collapses every argument which says that existence follows necessarily from the concept of an *ens realissimum*.¹⁷ –

The cosmological proof retains the connection of absolute necessity and the highest reality, but instead of inferring necessary existence from supreme reality, it infers from an already given unconditional necessity of some being to its unbounded reality. Leibniz, and later Wolff, called this the proof *a contingentia mundi*.¹⁸ It says that if something exists, then an absolutely necessary being must also exist. But at the very least, I myself exist; therefore, an absolutely necessary being exists. The minor premise of this argument contains an experience, and the major premise contains an inference from experience. This inference rests on the natural law of causality, which says that everything contingent has a cause, which if it is also contingent, must once again have a cause, and so on. This series of things subordinated one to another has to end in an absolutely necessary cause, without which it would not be complete. For a *regress in infinitum*,¹⁹ a series of effects *without* a supreme cause, is absurd. Everything which exists can exist in only one of two ways, either *contingently* or *necessarily*. The contingent must have some cause for its existing as it does and not otherwise. Now I exist (and even the world in general exists) contingently; hence an absolutely necessary being must also exist, in order to be the cause of my being as I am and not otherwise. Thus the proof really does begin from experience and so it is not carried out in a wholly *a priori* manner, or ontologically. And it is called the *cosmological* proof because the object of any possible experience is called a *world*. But since it abstracts from every particular attribute which distinguishes this world from any other possible world and grounds itself only on a world in general without regard to its constitution, the cosmological proof is distinguished in its denomination from the physicotheological proof, which makes use of observations about the *particular* constitution of the sensible world as

28:1029

¹⁷ from the contingency of the world

¹⁹ regress to infinity

ground of proof. Now the cosmological proof infers further from the existence of an absolutely necessary being to the conclusion that this being must also be an *ens realissimum*. The inference is thus: A necessary being can be determined in only one way: this is, with respect *to* all possible *praedicata contradictorie opposita*^y it must be determined by one of these opposed predicates, consequently it must be thoroughly determined by its concept. But there is only one possible concept of a thing which determines it thoroughly *a priori*, and this is the concept of the *ens realissimum*, since in every possible pair of *praedicata contradictorie opposita* only the reality always belongs to it. Hence the concept of a most real being is the only concept by means of which a necessary being can be thought; i.e. there exists an *ens realissimum* and it exists necessarily.

28:1030

This cosmological proof is based on experience and gives itself the appearance of arriving step by step at the existence of a necessary being in general. But the empirical concept can teach us nothing about the attributes of this being, but rather at this point reason says goodbye to experience and searches only among concepts. For if I ask, namely, what attributes a necessary being must have, the answer can be only: those attributes from which its absolute necessity flows. But reason believes that the requisites needed for absolute necessity are met with solely in the concept of a most real being. So it concludes that the absolutely necessary being is the most real being. But how could reason conclude this if it had not already *presupposed* that the concept of a being of the highest reality is fully adequate to the concept of absolute necessity? And what does this amount to except that it is possible to argue from the highest reality to an absolutely necessary being? This is the proposition which the ontological argument asserted, and the cosmological takes as a ground, even though there was an attempt to avoid it. – Now since we cannot succeed in proving from the concept of the highest reality the absolutely necessary existence of the object^z corresponding to this idea, it will also be impossible conversely to demonstrate successfully the supreme reality of a thing from its absolute necessity; for absolute necessity is an existence from mere concepts. If I say that the concept of an *ens realissimum* is a concept of this kind and in fact the only concept fitting and adequate to necessary existence, then I must also admit that existence can be inferred from the concept of a most real being. *It is thus really only the ontological proof* from sheer concepts which truly contains demonstrative power in the so-called cosmological proof, and *the alleged experience is entirely pointless*, [serving] perhaps to lead us to the concept of absolute necessity, but not to establish this concept as pertaining to any determinate thing. For as soon as this is our intention, we immediately leave all experience

28:1031

^y contradictorily opposed predicates^z *Objekt*

for the possibility of an absolutely necessary being. If it were correct to say that every absolutely necessary being is also a most real being, then it would also be possible to convert this proposition, as with every affirmative judgment, and say that every most real being is a necessary being. Now since this proposition is determined *a priori* from mere concepts, the mere concept of an *ens realissimum* must carry its own absolute necessity along with it, and this is what the ontological proof asserts. The cosmological proof does not want to recognize it, even though it secretly underlies its inferences just the same.¹⁸

But what sort of concept do we have of an absolutely necessary being or thing? – In all ages one has spoken of an absolutely necessary being, but human beings have taken less trouble to understand whether and how one could think of such a thing at all than they have rather to prove its existence. A nominal definition of this concept is quite easy to give: it is something whose nonexistence is impossible; but this makes us none the wiser as to the conditions which might make it impossible for such a thing not to be.¹⁹ For the human understanding cannot grasp how the nonexistence of a thing might be impossible,^a since it has a concept of impossibility only through the principle of contradiction. For every contradiction, two things are required, for a single thing cannot contradict itself. Hence there can never be a contradiction in the nonexistence of a thing, consequently also never a contradiction in the nonexistence of an *ens realissimum*. In his explanation of the absolute necessity of an *ens realissimum*, Wolff used examples of absolute necessity: that a triangle has three angles is absolutely necessary.²⁰ But the absolute necessity of this judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the matter or predicate in the judgment. The proposition in question does not say that three angles necessarily exist, but rather that under the condition that a triangle exists (is given), three angles exist along with it in a necessary manner. If in an ideal judgment I remove the predicate and retain the subject, a contradiction results. For example, to posit a triangle and remove three angles is contradictory. Hence I say that this predicate belongs necessarily to the subject. But if I remove the subject together with the predicate, then there is no contradiction, for nothing is left which could be contradicted. Thus, for example, there is no contradiction in removing the triangle together with its three angles. And this is exactly how it is with the concept of an absolutely necessary being. If I remove its existence, I remove the thing itself with all its predicates. So where can the contradiction come from? There is nothing external which would be contradicted, for the thing is not supposed to be externally necessary; but not internally either, for by removing the thing itself I have at the same time removed everything internal to it.

28:1032

^a Pölit's text reads *möglich*, but the sense seems to require *unmöglich*.

Example "God is omnipotent." This is a necessary judgment. Omnipotence cannot be removed as long as I posit a deity with whose concept this predicate is identical. Here I have logically unconditioned necessity. But now what would an absolute real necessity have to be? It would have to consist in the fact that it is absolutely necessary that God must be. But if I say, "God does not exist," then neither omnipotence nor any of his other predicates is given; for they are all removed along with the object,^b and this thought does not exhibit the least contradiction. It is no more possible for an internal contradiction ever to arise if I remove the predicate of a judgment along with the object^c – no matter what the predicate may be – than it is possible for me to form the least concept of a thing which would leave a contradiction behind if it were removed along with all its predicates; and without a contradiction I have through mere pure concepts *a priori* no mark of impossibility. Hence in this case it is possible that God does not exist. It costs speculative reason nothing at all to remove God's existence in thought. The entire task of the transcendental ideal depends on either finding a concept for absolute necessity or finding absolute necessity for the concept of some thing. If the one can be done, then the other must be able to be done as well; for reason cognizes absolute necessity only in what is necessary from its concept. But both tasks totally exceed every effort to satisfy our understanding on this point; yet at the same time they exceed every attempt to appease it on account of this incapacity. The absolute necessity which we indispensably need as the final ground of all things is the true abyss^d for human reason. Even eternity, as described in its dreadful sublimity by a Haller, does not long make a dizzying impression on the mind;²¹ for it only does away with the duration of things, but it doesn't sustain them. One can neither resist nor tolerate the thought of a being represented as the highest of all possible things, which may say to itself, "I am from eternity to eternity, and outside me there is nothing except what exists through my will; *but whence then am I?*" – Here everything falls away beneath us, and the greatest perfection, as much as the smallest, hovers without any support before speculative reason, and it costs reason nothing to let them both disappear, nor is there the least obstacle to this. In short, an absolutely necessary thing will remain to all eternity an insoluble problem for the human understanding. –

28:1033

Up to this point we have followed Eberhard in his *Propaedeutic to Natural Theology*. But now he proceeds immediately to the physicotheological proof, and it seems to us more systematic not to get to this quite yet, but instead, now that we have treated the concept of a highest being and the

^b Objekt^c Objekt^d Ground = *Grund*, abyss = *Abgrund*, i.e. as at a precipice, where the ground falls away.

proof for the existence of this being from pure reason, we will proceed to the *ontological predicates* of this being, so that we can have transcendental theology in its proper connection. The first thing here is the *possibility* of God, which no one either can deny or prove, because the cognition of it surpasses all human reason. As was shown above, the objective reality of the synthesis which generates this concept rests on principles^c of possible experience; for by "experience" we understand the sum total of all the objects of sense. But how am I going to have *a priori* insight into the possibility of this thing without being able to perceive the synthesis of its predicates? As long as my concept does not contradict itself, it is possible. But this principle of analysis (the principle of contradiction) is only the *logical mark* of possibility, by means of which an object can be distinguished from a *nihil negativum*!^f But how, from the possibility of a concept (logical possibility), can I straightway infer the possibility of a thing (real possibility)? – Let us now go on to the proof that the *ens realissimum* must also be the *ens entium*; or, as we expressed it earlier, that the most perfect being must contain in itself the ground of the possibility of all other things. This we have already established, because everything which is a *partim reale, partim negativum*^g presupposes a being containing all realities in itself and constituting these things through a limitation of its realities: for otherwise we could not think where either the realities or the negations in things come from, because even a negation always presupposes some reality and arises through the limitation of this reality. On this point rests the only possible ground of proof for my demonstration of God's existence, which was discussed in detail in an essay I published some years ago.²² Here it was shown that of all possible proofs, the one which affords us the most satisfaction is the argument that if we remove an original being, we at the same time remove the substratum of the possibility of all things. – But even this proof is not apodictically certain; for it cannot establish the objective necessity of an original being, but establishes only the subjective necessity of assuming such a being. But this proof can in no way be refuted, because it has its ground in the nature of human reason. For my reason makes it absolutely necessary for me to assume a being which is the ground of everything possible, because otherwise I would be unable to know what in general the possibility of something consists in. – Now from the fact that the highest being is also the original being, from which the essence of all things is derived, it follows that the order, beauty, harmony and unity which are encountered in things are not always contingent, but can rather inhere necessarily in their essence. If, for example, we find that our earth is flattened at the poles but

28:1034

^c *Prinzipien*^f "negative nothing," or an individual thing whose concept entails its impossibility^g partly real, partly negative thing

28:1035

elevated between the tropics and the equator, this follows from the necessity of its nature, that is, from the equilibrium of the fluid masses of which the earth was once composed.²³ Hence Newton could prove the shape of the earth reliably a priori and prior to experience, before the astronomers had measured its elevation at the equator, merely from the fact that it once must have been in a fluid state. But now this oblateness of the spherical earth has its great advantage, since it alone prevents the projections of solid earth (or even smaller mountains perhaps raised by earthquakes) from continuously displacing the earth's axis, perhaps to a noticeable degree over a long period of time; the rotation of the earth at the equator is such a mighty mountain that the vibration of all the other mountains will neer noticeably alter the earth's position in regard to its axis, or even be able to alter it. But wise as this arrangement is, I may not derive it straightway from the divine will, as something contingent, but I must rather consider it as a necessity of the earth's nature, just as has actually been demonstrated in this case. Yet this takes nothing away from God's majesty as creator of the world; for since he is the original being from whose essence the nature of all things is derived, the necessity of this natural arrangement is also derived from his essence, not from his will, for otherwise he would be only the world's architect, not its creator. Only the contingent in things can be derived from the divine will and its arbitrary directives. But now everything contingent lies in the *form* of things; consequently only the form of things can be derived from the divine will. To say this is not to make things themselves independent of God, nor is it to withdraw them in any way from his highest supreme power. For by regarding God as the *ens originarium* containing in itself the ground of all possible things, we derive their matter, in which their reality itself lies, from the divine essence. Thus we make the essence of things themselves derivative from God, that is, from his essence. For it is unthinkable that a special divine volition could be necessary to produce certain effects in a thing which follow necessarily from its nature; for instance, how could a special divine volition be necessary to give a spheroid shape to a fluid body revolving on its axis, when this is a necessary effect of the body's own nature? If we wanted to derive everything from the divine will, we would have to make everything inhering necessarily in the nature of things independent of God. We would have to recognize a creator for only what is contingent, that is only for the *form of things* and not for their matter or for what belongs necessarily to the things themselves. Hence if the laws and arrangements in nature which flow from the essence of things themselves are to be dependent on God (and they must be dependent on him, since otherwise we would be unable to find any ground for their possibility), then they can be derived only from his original essence. –

From everything that has been brought forth from pure reason thus far in favor of God's existence, we see that we are justified in assuming and

presupposing an *ens originarium*, which is at the same time an *ens realissimum*, as a necessary transcendental hypothesis; for to remove a being which contains the data for everything possible is to remove all possibility; such a most real original being is, because of its very relationship to the possibility of things, a necessary presupposition. For in addition to the logical concept of the necessity of a thing (where something is said to be absolutely necessary if its nonexistence would be a contradiction, and consequently impossible), we have yet another rational concept of real necessity. This is where a thing is *eo ipso* necessary if its nonexistence would remove all possibility. Of course in the logical sense possibility always precedes actuality, and here I can think the possibility of a thing without actuality. Yet we have no concept of real possibility except through existence, and in the case of every possibility which we think *realiter* we always presuppose some existence; if not the actuality of the thing itself, then at least an actuality in general which contains the data for everything possible. Hence every possibility presupposes something actually given, since if everything were merely possible, then the possible itself would have no ground; so this ground of possibility must itself be given not merely as possible but also as actual. But it must be noted that only the subjective necessity of such a being is thereby established, i.e. that our speculative reason sees itself necessitated to presuppose this being if it wants to have insight into *why* something is possible, but the objective necessity of such a thing can by no means be demonstrated in this matter. For here reason must come to know its weakness, its inability to soar over the boundaries of all possible experience. And insofar as it does presume to continue its flight beyond these boundaries, it only falls into whirlpools and turbulent waters, plunging it into a bottomless abyss where it is wholly swallowed up. – Hence the totality of what speculative reason can teach us concerning the existence of God consists in showing us how we must necessarily hypothesize this existence, but speculative reason does not show us how God's existence could be demonstrated with apodictic certainty. Even this much, however, is quite fortunate for us, since it removes every obstacle which might stand in the way of our assuming a being of all beings; indeed, if we can be convinced of such a being in some other way, we can believe in it firmly and unshakably. For even in the speculative use of reason, the highest being remains a faultless ideal, a concept which brings to a close and crowns the whole of human cognition.

All God's attributes (according to Baumgarten) are *quiescentes* or *operativae*.²⁴ *Perfectiones quiescentes* are those in which we think of an action which can be represented without a *nota actionis*;^h *operatives*, on the contrary, cannot be thought without a mark of activity. Let us first consider God's *perfectiones quiescentes*; for his ontological predicates belong to them.

^h mark of activity

In addition to God's possibility and actuality, which we have already treated as far as reason can teach us about them, we further maintain that God is a *substance*. This predicate belongs to God merely as a thing, since all things are substances. A substance is understood to be a reality existing merely for itself, without being a determination of any other thing. Substance is opposed to accident, which can exist only by inhering in another thing. *Accidentia* are therefore not particular things, but only different ways¹ or *modi* of the existence of substance. God, however, is a thing for itself and *eo ipso* a substance. If we would dispute God's substantiality, we would have to deny him thinghood as well, and thus remove the whole concept of God. But if God is assumed to be an *ens realissimum*, then it follows already just from the concept of a thing that God is a substance.

Another of God's ontological attributes is *unity*.²⁵ This follows from the concept of an *ens realissimum*; for God is thoroughly determined in that in each pair of *praedicatis contradictorie oppositis* only the reality belongs to him. Now this concept of a being having every reality can only be *singularis*, and can never be thought of as a species, for in every species the individuals must somehow be distinguished from one another if they are to be particular things. But this difference can take place only through a distribution of reality, or one thing must have something in itself which the others do not. But that contradicts our concept of a *realissimum*.

28:1038

From God's unity follows his *simplicity*.²⁶ For every *compositum reale*¹ is to be regarded as reality composed of substances external to each other yet standing *in commercio*.^k Hence if God were a *compositum*, he must consist of many parts, and then either each of them must be an *ens realissimum* (and then there would be many *realissima*, which is a contradiction) or else the parts would be *partim reale, partim negativa*. But then the whole which consisted in these parts would itself be only *partim reale, partim negativum*, consequently not a *realissimum*, consequently not God. For an unlimited reality can never arise out of many limited realities, because in order for a thing to have unlimited realities, all realities must be united in one subject. It is just this unification, therefore, which constitutes the form of an *ens realissimum*. But as soon as realities are distributed (and there must be such a distribution among the parts of the *compositum* if the *ens realissimum* is to be an *ens compositum*), then limitations arise. For whenever a reality is distributed among several things, the whole reality cannot be in each of them, and consequently each part lacks some of the missing reality. The unity of a *compositum* is always only a contingent unity of combination, i.e. the parts of every composite can always be presented separately; and if in fact they are combined, it still could have been

¹ *Arten*² composite of real things^k in reciprocal interaction

otherwise; but the unity of a simple substance is necessary. Thus the simplicity of the *ens realissimum* can also be proven from its absolute necessity. For if the *ens realissimum* were an *ens compositum*, then all its parts would have to be absolutely necessary if the whole is to be absolutely necessary, insofar as the whole cannot be constituted in a manner different from the parts of which it consists. But then there would be many *entia absolute necessaria*,¹ which contradicts the concept of absolute necessity. A third proof for the simplicity of God is derived from the fact that every *compositum* is also *divisibile*, in that it consists of parts. But divisibility always involves the inner alterability of a thing, since the relation between the parts of an *ens compositum* can always be altered. Every composite substance is thus internally alterable; but that contradicts the concept of an *ens realissimum*. – Now just because the most real being must be simple, it follows also that it must be immaterial as well; for matter is what constitutes the composite.

To God there further pertains *immutability*. This too belongs to his *perfectiones quiescentes*. But one must not confuse the *immutabile* as concept with the *immutabile* as thing. This difference Baumgarten has not duly observed; hence he infers the unalterability of God from the fact that every determination of a most real being is absolutely and internally unalterable.²⁷ But from this follows only the unalterability of the concept of God, which consists in the fact that God is thoroughly determined through his concept. – What is mutation? A succession of states. But alterations can be thought possible only in time, for only here is there succession. If we want to prove the unalterability of God, then we first have to prove that God is not in time. But this can be seen clearly from the concept of an *ens realissimum*; for if God were in time he would have to be limited. But now he is a *realissimus*, and consequently he is not in time. His real unalterability also follows from his absolute necessity; for if he were so constituted that something could arise in him which was not already actual in him, then it could not be said that he is necessary in his actual constitution, but rather that he could be otherwise than he is, since he could be sometimes in this state and sometimes in that one. From this highest immutability of God with respect to all his realities it follows that it is anthropomorphic to represent God as able to be gracious after he was previously wrathful. For this would posit^m an alteration in God. But God is and remains always the same, equally gracious and equally just. It depends only on us whether we will become objects of his grace or of his punitive justice. The alteration, therefore, goes on *within us*; it is the relationⁿ in which we stand to God which is altered whenever we improve

28:1039

¹ absolutely necessary beings

^m supponiren

ⁿ Relation

28:1040

ourselves, in such a way that, whereas previously our relation to God was that of culpable sinners to a just God, afterward, after our improvement, this relation is removed and the relation of righteous friends of virtue takes its place. It does not accord with the concept of an unchangeable God that God should be more effective in us just because we make moral improvement our end; rather, when we work for our own improvement it is we ourselves who are more susceptible to the influence of his power, and we participate in it to a higher degree. His influence itself does not become stronger or increase; for that would be a change *in him*; but rather, *we* feel it to be stronger because we no longer resist it; the influence itself remains the same.

The author next discusses polytheism.²⁸ It doubtless arose because human beings could not comprehend the apparent conflict of purposes in the world, the mixture of good and evil; so they assumed several beings as the cause of this conflict and assigned to each a special department. Nevertheless, in addition to these lower gods every heathen people has the thought of a special original source out of which they flowed. But they made this supreme principle in and for itself so blessed that it has nothing at all to do with the world. Examples of this are the Tibetans and other existing heathen peoples of inner Asia. And in fact they follow the course of human reason, which needs a thoroughgoing unity in its representation and cannot stop until it has reached the One which is higher than everything. Polytheism as such, not combined with a supreme original source, would be in conflict with common human understanding; for common sense teaches monotheism by taking as its supreme principle a being which is all in all. Thus one should not think that the doctrine of one God needs to be built on a very advanced degree of human insight; rather it is a need of the most common reason. Hence the insight was universal even in the beginning. But because human beings subsequently perceived many kinds of destructive forces in the world, they did not believe that these forces along with the agreement and harmony in nature could be derived from God, so they assumed various lower gods to which they ascribed those particular effects. And since everything in the world carries with it something which can be put under the rubric either of good or of evil, they assumed a *duality* of God, a *principium bonum et malum*.^o And that was *manichaeism*.²⁹ But this doctrine does not seem so wholly nonsensical and absurd if we consider that the manichaeans also posited a supreme principle^p beyond this duality from which it arose. For if they had made each of the two principles^q into a *realissimum*, then it would have been a contradic-

^o principle of good and of evil

^p *Prinzip*

^q *Principia*

tion that an *ens realissimum* should be a *principium malum*.^r Yet they did not think of either principle^s as a *realissimum*, but gave some realities to one and other realities to the other; consequently, negations could be thought in both. But above these *principia partim reales, partim negatives*^t they thought of an original source of everything, an *ens realissimum*. From this one can see^u that polytheism did not cancel monotheism, but both could be combined without contradiction, since different concepts were bound up with the word "God."

28:1041

Now we proceed to another ontological predicate of an *ens realissimum*, which is also one of its *perfectiones quiescentes*, namely that it is *extramundanum*.³⁰ To this belongs:

1. That God is an *ens a mundo diversum*, or that God is external to the world in an intellectual way. This proposition is opposed to Spinozism, for Spinoza believed that God and the world were one substance and that apart from the world there is no substance anywhere. This error flowed from his faulty definition of substance. As a mathematician he was accustomed to finding arbitrary definitions and deriving propositions from them. Now that works fine in mathematics, but as soon as one tries to apply this method to philosophy, one falls into errors.³¹ For in philosophy we must first seek out the marks themselves and acquaint ourselves with them before we can construct their definitions. But Spinoza did not do this; instead he constructed an arbitrary definition of substance. *Substantia*, he said, *est cujus existentia non indiget existentia alterius*.³² Assuming this definition he correctly inferred that there is only one substance, God. Everything in the world is an *accidens* inhering in this divinity, since each thing has need of God's existence for its own existence; consequently everything existing is in God and nothing can be thought as external to God. But that is as much as to say that *God and the world are one*. For the whole world is in God and nothing is outside him. Now this argument is just as mistaken in content as it is correct in form; for it is derived from a wholly false principle,^v from a faulty definition of a substance. But we have already given another definition of substance, and its correctness is clear because it is not assumed arbitrarily, like Spinoza's, but is derived instead from the concept of a thing itself. This concept of a thing in general, however, teaches us everything real which exists for itself, without being a determination of any other thing, is a substance; consequently all things

An alternate definition of "substance"

28:1042

^r principle of evil

^s Prinzipien

^t partly real and partly negative principles

^u einsehen

^v Principe

I am directly
conscious of myself
as a substance

are substances. For my own self-consciousness testifies that I do not^w relate all my actions to God as the final subject which is not the predicate of any other thing, and thus the concept of a substance arises when I perceive in myself that I am not the predicate of any further thing. For example, when I think, I am conscious that my I, and not some other thing, thinks in me. Thus I infer that this thinking in me does not inhere in another thing external to me but in myself, and consequently also that I am a substance, i.e. that I exist for myself, without being the predicate of another thing. I myself am a thing and hence also a substance. But now if I am a substance, then I must be either God himself, or God is a substance distinct from me, and hence also distinct from the world. The first is absurd, because it contradicts the concept of an *ens realissimum*; consequently there must exist apart from me some other thing existing for itself which is not a predicate of any other existing thing, i.e. a substance subsisting for itself. Indeed, there can be outside me still other distinct substances, because infinitely many things outside me are possible. But every thing, just because it is a thing, is *eo ipso* not the predicate of another thing, but it exists for itself and is thus a substance. All these things, however, will be distinct from one another, because otherwise they would not be particular things. Thus an *ens realissimum*, which is already considered as a thing having the highest reality, must also exist for itself and not be a predicate of another thing, i.e. it must be a substance, which is distinct from all others. The world comprehends things within itself which are all substances, because otherwise they would have to cease being things if they were mere determinations of another thing; consequently the whole world will not be a determination of God, but the *ens realissimum* has to be distinct from it.

2. that God is an *ens extramundanum*, i.e. he does not belong to the world at all, but is entirely external to it. This is opposed to the stoic proposition that God is the *world soul*. If this were so, then the two, God and the world, would have to stand *in commercio*, that is, each would have to have influence on the other; God would have to be not *only active*, but also *passive*. But this reciprocal effect would contradict God and the concept of him as an *ens realissimum* and *necessarium*. For an *ens absolute necessarium* is *independens*, hence also *impassibile* (not passive). If the world is to have influence on God so as to affect him, then *eo ipso* he would have to be dependent on the

28:1043

^w Pöhlitz's text reads: *Denn das Bewusstsein meiner selbst zeugt, dass ich alle Handlungen auf Gott, als auf das letzte Subject . . . beziehe . . .* But Kant's sense would seem to be the negation of this; so I assume that a *nicht* has been omitted from the sentence.

world. The human being, of course, can intuit an object only insofar as he has the receptivity enabling him to be affected by it; yet such an intuition cannot be predicated of God, because a limitation is comprehended in it. –

Thus God is isolated; i.e. not as if he stands in no connection with the world at all, but rather only this much: he does not stand in *the connection of a reciprocal effect* (of a *commercium*). Thus God has an influence on the world, he is active; but the world has no influence on him, that is, he is not passive. We have already dealt with God's *infinity* in the metaphysical sense, and it was shown above that instead of this one could better say that God has *all-sufficiency*; for the latter is a concept of the pure understanding, while the former is borrowed from mathematics and even belongs only to it. –

*Of the eternity of God.*³³ The magnitude of existence is duration; thus we can combine with existence the concept of magnitude, and this only by means of time. Hence this is the measure of duration. – *Duration without beginning and end is – eternity.* – But what is beginning? – What is end? – Beginning is an existence. Good. But what does this mean if not that *before* the beginning of a thing there was a time when it was not, or that *after* its end there will be a time when it is no more? Here, therefore, I still have a concept of time, and we cannot find a concept of eternity which would not still be affected with the concept of time; for beginning and end are possible only in time. The divine existence, however, can never be thought of as determinable through time; for then we would have to represent God as a *phaenomenon*. But this would be an anthropomorphic predicate, unthinkable in an *ens realissimum* because it contains limitations in it. For the existence of a thing in time is always a succession of parts in time, one after the other. Duration in time is, so to speak, a continuous disappearing and a continuous beginning. We can never live through^{*} a certain year without already having lived through a previous one. But none of this can be said of God, since he is unalterable. Hence since it is a continuous limitation, time must be opposed in quality to an *ens realissimum*. But if I represent eternity as a duration without beginning or end, which is just about the most minimal definition of eternity I can give, then the concept of time is still mixed with it. For duration, beginning and end are all predicates which can be thought only of things in time. Of course it is true that I am negating beginning and end in relation to God; but I do not gain much by this, since my concept of eternity is not the least enlightened or purified through such negations. Fundamentally I am still representing

28:1044

^{*} *erleben*

28:1045 God as a being within time, even if I do remove beginning and end from him. But it is most necessary to leave all the conditions of time out of the concept of God, because otherwise we could be misled and accept a number of anthropomorphic consequences. For example, if I think of God as existing within time but having no beginning or end, it is impossible for me to think how God could have created the world without suffering any alteration, or what he had been doing before the world was. But if I reject all the conditions of time, then this *before* and *after* are concepts which cannot be thought in God at all, hence even if I must be content to have very little comprehension of God's eternity, my concept will still be pure and free from errors, even though it is deficient. – Some have tried to prevent the difficulties which arise from representing God's existence as within time by insisting that all the consecutiveness of time be thought as simultaneous in God; yet this is a pretension which requires us to think a contradiction: *Consecutive* states of a thing, which are nevertheless *simultaneous*. What is this, if not a *contradictio in adjecto*? For what does *simultaneously* mean, if not at *one* time? And to think of parts of time which follow one upon the other as at one time – this is contradictory. From all this we can see that if eternity is to be represented as a particular attribute of God, it is still impossible to think of it apart from time, because time itself is a condition of all our representation, a form of sensibility. If we nevertheless want to exclude time from the concept of God, then nothing remains of eternity except a representation of the necessity of his existence. But we must make do with this because, on account of the weakness of our reason, it would be impertinent for us to want to lift the curtain which veils in holy darkness him who is invariably and forever. – And so *to be eternal* means (if we want to eliminate every sensible representation of time from the concept of God, as we must because such representations can easily corrupt a concept which is supposed to be free from all limitation), *to be eternal* means only as much as to be *absolutely necessary*. Now although we have seen that we are unable even to think this absolute necessity conceptually, it is nevertheless a concept which reason necessitates us to assume before it can find rest. Eternity has a great similarity to *omnipresence*. For just as eternity fills all of time, according to our sensible representations, so too is God's presence, according to our sensible representation, a filling up of *space*. Spatial presence or the presence of God in space, is subject to just the same difficulties as his eternity when it is conjoined with time; for it is a contradiction that a thing should be in more than one place in space at the same time.

Under the *omnipotence* of God one usually understands the capacity *to make all possible things actual*.³⁴ But it would be most presumptuous to test the power of God on things which are in themselves contradictory. e.g. a circle with four corners, and conclude that God obviously cannot do them; but it is foolish frivolity to think a being with supreme dignity and

majesty in relation^y to *non entia*.^z In general it is very improper when human reason presumes to dispute stubbornly about God, the most sublime thing, which it can think only feebly, and wants to represent everything of him, even the impossible; for whenever reason wants to venture into thoughts of this magnitude, it ought first to make a modest retreat and, fully conscious of its own incapacity, to take counsel with itself how it might worthily think of Him – of God. Hence all such expressions are presumptuous, even if they are posited only as hypotheses; if one, for instance, undertakes to portray God as a tyrant who makes the punishments of hell eternal, or according to the doctrine of predestination, who unconditionally determines some human beings to blessedness and others to damnation!

28:1046

Anthropomorphism is usually divided into the *vulgar* kind, when God is thought of in human shape, and the *subtle* kind, where human perfections are ascribed to God but without separating the limitations from them.³⁵ The latter kind of anthropomorphism is a particularly dangerous enemy of our pure cognition of God; for the former is too obvious an error for human beings to be fooled by it very often. But we have all the more to turn our power against *anthropomorphismus subtilis*, since it is all the easier for it to creep into our concept of God and corrupt it. For it is better not to be able to represent something at all than only to be able to think of it confused with errors. – This is the reason that the transcendental theology we have been treating is of such great utility: it puts us in a position to remove from our cognition of God everything sensible inhering in our concepts, or at least by its means we become conscious that if we predicate something of God which cannot be thought apart from the conditions of sensibility, then we must give a proper definition of these predicates, even if we are not always in a position to represent them in a manner wholly free from faults. It would be easiest to deal successfully with all the consequences of anthropomorphism if only our reason voluntarily relinquished its claim to have cognition of the nature of God and his attributes, as to how they themselves are constituted internally, and if, mindful of its weakness, it never tried to exceed its bounds but were content to cognize only so much about him, who must always remain the object of an eternal quest, as it has need of. This interest of humanity is best furthered and attained *per viam analogiam*, as we will see below. – With this we conclude ontotheology,^a in which we have considered *God as the original being*. At times we have inferred this originality from the concept of the *ens realissimum*, and sometimes we have inferred conversely from the concept

^y *im Verhältnisse*

^z nonbeings, i.e. contradictory beings.

^a The text reads *Ontologie*, but this seems to be a mistake, since the title of the section being concluded is *Ontotheologie*.

28:1047

of the *ens originarium* to its highest reality, etc. Our effort and caution in the cognition of this speculative part of theology have been rewarded in that we may henceforth accept God as an *ens realissimum* and all the predicates flowing from this concept at least *as an undoubted hypothesis* for our speculative reason, and we can be sure that no rational human being will ever prove the opposite, or be able to tear down this support of ours for all human reason. Is this not better than boasting that we can cognize God and his attributes with apodictic certainty through pure reason, and yet having to fear each attack of our opponents? For what reason has taught us about God is faultless and free from error. We may without hesitation found our further investigation on this modest but correct cognition, and we may build on it with trust. It is true that all we have cognized of God in transcendental theology is the mere concept of a highest original ground; but as useless as this concept might be for itself and without any additional cognition, it is nonetheless just this splendid when it is applied as the substratum of all theology.

Second section: Cosmotheology

28:1048

In our treatment of the ontological proof for the existence of God we have already taken the opportunity to deal with the cosmological proof; but we did this only in order to compare both proofs of transcendental theology, and to show the close kinship between them. Now we will set forth a more detailed account of the whole concept of God insofar as it can be derived from a foundation in experience, yet without determining more closely the world to which this experience belongs. Cosmotheology teaches us a theistic concept of God, since in this concept we come to cognize God as supreme intelligence, as highest being who is author of all things through understanding and freedom. The deist understands by the concept of God only a blindly working eternal nature as the root of things, an original being or a highest cause of the world; but he does not venture to assert that God is the ground of all things through freedom. Since we are interested only in the concept of an author of the world, that is, the concept of a living God, let us see whether reason can provide us with this theistic concept of God as a *summa intelligentia*.^b This cognition will not be entirely pure and independent of experience; but the experience which has to be its foundation is the simplest experience there could be, namely the knowledge^c of our self. Hence we now proceed to the psychological

^b highest intelligence

^c *Erkenntnis*

predicates borrowed from the nature of our own soul, and we ascribe them to God after separating all the limitations from them. Yet if in the case of ontological predicates derived *a priori* much caution was necessary to avoid mixing in external sensible representations, think how much more care will be necessary now, when we are founding everything only on empirical principles,^d or at least when it is from objects of sense, such as we ourselves are, that we must abstract the determinations from which we are to form the concept of a highest intelligence. Now we will have to apply all our attention if the reality is not to escape from us along with the limitations, and if, instead of making our concept of God more perfect, we are not to make it impure by bringing negations into it. If we meet with any reality in ourselves which we are able to ascribe to a being which has all reality, then we must be very careful to avoid predicating of God the negative element inhering in that reality in us. This separation of everything limited from the real is often very difficult for us, and nothing of the whole reality may be left over. In this case, where nothing remains after the careful testing of the reality and the removal of every limit, it is self-evident that we cannot think of such a thing in God. But if the reality which is brought out *via negationis* from some perfection in us is even ever so small, we yet should not omit it from God as long as it contains a true reality; instead, we must predicate it of God *per viam eminentiae*. Here the way of analogy is especially appropriate; for it teaches us the perfect similarity between the relation^e of things in the world, where one is regarded as ground and the other as consequence, and between God and the world which has its being from him. First we find in our soul the faculty of cognition. That this is a reality no one can doubt. Every human being holds it to be a great perfection in which he shares in some part. Hence we must also introduce it into our concept of an *ens realissimum*, after all the limitations inhering in it have been carefully separated out. From this it follows that no contradiction will arise from the addition of this reality to our concept of a most perfect being, since one reality does not remove the other in the concept. But if we unite a faculty of cognition with other perfections in our concept of God, it still does not follow that this reality belongs to the thing itself in the synthesis of all other predicates; for as was shown above for this we would have to be able to cognize all the predicates of the thing and all their effects, as they relate^f to one another in the actual composition, which is not possible for the human understanding regarding an all-perfect being. Thus we cannot prove with apodictic certainty that the reality of a faculty of cognition does not remove any of the other realities

28:1049

^d Principien^e Verhältnisses^f sich verhalten

when put together with them; but neither can any human being ever prove the contrary, that in fact some reality in the thing itself, if it were put in composition with a faculty of cognition, would be *removed* or limited in its effects. For both surpass the faculty of human reason. In such cases, where it is equally impossible to prove either side apodictically, we are free to choose the alternative which has the most probability for us; and no one can deny that the concept of an *ens realissimum* itself gives us a much greater right to ascribe a faculty of cognition to it than to exclude such a faculty from the total reality. For here we already have one undoubted reason on our side in the fact that nothing contradictory shows itself in our concept, and while it does not follow that the object⁸ itself is possible in reality, still we cannot see any reason why this reality should not belong to the synthesis of attributes of a most perfect being, even if we cannot prove it with apodictic certainty from our concept of an *ens realissimum*. The deist has nothing on his side when he denies it, because such a denial would require an insight into the nature of an *ens realissimum* which would surpass all human reason.

28:1050 We have, however, a much stricter ground of proof that God has a faculty of cognition, namely a ground derived from the *constitution* of an *ens realissimum*; and the grounds of proof derived from that always have more strength than proofs taken merely from the concept of an *ens realissimum*. We infer, namely, that an *ens originarium* that contains within itself the ground of the possibility of all things must have a faculty of cognition because it is the original source of beings which do have this faculty, e.g. human beings. For how could something be derived from a being unless this original being had it? Thus the original being of all beings must have a faculty of cognition. Of course the deist may reply that there could be another kind of reality in the original source of things which might give rise to a faculty of cognition inhering in human beings. This faculty of cognition would not itself, therefore, be the original reality, but only a consequence of some reality, unknown to us, in the original being. Thus the Tibetans, for example, represent God as the highest source from which all other beings emanate, and to which they will again return, without this original being having the same perfections that pertain to the things derived from it. But where will the deist find a reason for asserting such a thing? It is true that we can never refute him with apodictic certainty, but neither will he ever be in a position to prove his position. Rather, we will always have a greater right to assume a faculty of cognition as one of the realities in the original being. – Yet not, to be sure, a faculty like the one encountered in human beings; but rather a faculty of an entirely different kind. We cannot in the least think how a reality could be in an effect without already being in its cause – how beings with under-

⁸ *Objekt*

standing could be derived from an original source which is dead and without a faculty of cognition. We do not have the least concept of the way in which one reality could produce other realities without having any similarity to them. From what could the human faculty of cognition be derived if not from such a faculty in the original being? – Thus we see that speculative reason not only presents no obstacle to our assuming a faculty of cognition in a highest being, but it even urges us to assume it, since otherwise we would have to search for another reality in this being as the cause of our power of cognition. Yet that would be a reality of which we could make no concept at all, indeed which must not only remain completely unknown to us, but also be thought up without any ground at all.

28:1051

Why, then, would we take refuge in such an unknown, incomprehensible reality in God when we can much more easily explain our faculty of cognition by deriving it from the supreme intelligence of the highest original being? Hence God has a faculty of cognition; but all the limitations found in our faculty of cognition must be carefully separated out if we are to think of such a faculty in the highest being. Hence the faculty of cognition in God will be:

First: not sensible, but pure understanding. We therefore have to exclude sensibility from an *ens originarium*, because as an *ens independens* it cannot be affected by any object.^h But sensible cognition is obtained from objects which have some influence on us. But in the case of God, there can be no influence of any objectⁱ on him and therefore no sensible cognition; in an original being all cognition must necessarily flow from a pure understanding not affected by any representations of sense. Hence it is not because sensible representations are obscure, as is commonly said, that they cannot be ascribed to God; for we often find that a representation of sense is much more distinct than certain cognitions gained through the understanding; but rather, everything sensible must be removed from God because, as we have shown above, it is impossible for objects to influence an independent being.

Second: The understanding of God is intuitive. It is a limitation of our understanding that we can infer the particular only from the universal, and this limitation cannot in any way be ascribed to a most real being. This being must rather intuit all things immediately through its understanding, and cognize everything at once. To be sure, we are unable to form any concept of such an intuitive understanding, because *we* can intuit only through the senses. But it follows from God's supreme reality and originality that such an understanding must be present in him.

^h Objektⁱ Objekt

28:1052 *Third: God cognizes everything a priori.* We can cognize only a few things without previous sensible intuitions; indeed it is impossible in the case of any thing of which we are not ourselves the author. For example, we can represent a garden we have planned a priori in our thought before it actually exists; but this is not possible for things which lie outside our sphere of operation. – The original being is the ground of everything possible. Everything existing is dependent on it and derives from it. Hence it must cognize every possibility *a priori* even before it exists. – God cognizes all things by cognizing himself as the ground of all possibility; this is what has been called *theologia archetypa* or *exemplaris*, as we have mentioned previously.³⁶ Thus God has no empirical cognition because this would contradict independent, original being. – We human beings cognize very little *a priori* and have our senses to thank for nearly all our cognition. Through experience we cognize only appearances, the *mundum phaenomenon* or *sensibilem*,^j but not the *mundum noumenon* or *intelligibilem*,^k not things as they are *in themselves*. This is shown in detail in the theory of being (ontology). God cognizes all things as they are *in themselves* immediately and *a priori* through an intuition of the understanding; for he is the being of all beings and every possibility has its ground in him. If we were to flatter ourselves that we cognize the *mundum noumenon*, then we would have to be in community with God so as to participate immediately in the divine ideas which are the authors of all things in themselves. *To expect this in the present life is the business of mystics and theosophists.* Thus arises the mystical self-annihilation of China, Tibet and India, in which one deludes oneself that one is finally dissolved into the Godhead.³⁷ Fundamentally one might just as well call Spinozism a great enthusiasm as a form of atheism. For Spinoza affirms two predicates of God: *extension* and *thinking*. Every soul, he says, is only a modification of God's thinking, and every body is a modification of his extension. Thus Spinoza assumed that everything that exists is to be found in God. But he thereby fell into crude contradictions. For if only a single substance exists, then either I must be this substance, and consequently I must be God – but this contradicts my dependency – or else I am an accident – but this contradicts my concept of my I, in which I think myself as the ultimate subject which is not the predicate of any other thing. Attention, abstraction, reflection and comparison are only aids to a discursive understanding; hence they cannot be thought in God; God has no *conceptus* but pure *intuitus*, through which his understanding immediately cognizes every object as it is in itself, whereas every concept is something mediate, in that it originates from universal marks. But an understanding which cognizes everything immediately, an intuitive understanding, has no need of reason; for reason is only a mark of the limits of

Spinozism & the 'I'

28:1053

^j phenomenal or sensible world^k noumenal or intelligible world

an understanding and provides it with concepts. But an understanding which receives concepts through itself has no need of reason. Thus the expression "reason" is beneath the dignity of the divine nature. One should leave this concept entirely out of the most real being, and it would be better to ascribe to it only an intuitive understanding as the highest perfection of cognition. Of such an immediate intuition of the understanding *we* have *now* no concept at all; but whether the *separated* soul, as an intelligence, could perhaps contain a similar intuition instead of sensibility, through which it might cognize things in themselves in their divine ideas – this can neither be denied nor proven.

The author⁸ divides God's cognition into: (1) *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*,¹ (2) *scientia libera*,^m and (3) *scientia media*.ⁿ As for the expression "science"^o (*scientia*), it is improper as applied to God. For in God we should make no distinction between *knowledge*, *belief* and *opinion*,^p because all his cognition is intuitive and thus excludes opinion. Thus it is not necessary to apply the anthropomorphic term "scientific knowledge" to God's cognition. It is better to call it simply "cognition." And [Baumgarten's] division itself will hardly hold water if we try to think of it in relation to God. For the term *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* is understood by the author to mean the cognition of everything possible, while *scientia libera* means the knowledge of everything actual. Yet in regard to God there is no distinction between the possible and the actual; for a complete cognition of the possible is simultaneously a cognition of the actual. The actual is already included within the possible, since what is actual must also be possible, for otherwise it could not be actual. – Thus if God is thinking of everything possible, he is already thinking of everything actual. The distinction between *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* and *scientia libera* is to be found only *in our* human representation of God's cognition, and not in this cognition itself. We represent to ourselves, namely, that in cognizing his own essence (*simplex intelligentia*) God must also cognize everything possible, since he is the ground of all possibilities. Thus we derive the cognition of all possibilities from his nature and call it *cognitio simplicis intelligentiae*. – We think of *scientia libera* as God's cognition of the actual, insofar as he is simultaneously conscious of his free choice of things; for either all things are actual *by the necessity of God's nature* – which would be the principle^q of *emanation*; or else they exist *through his will* – which would be the system of *creation*. We think of a *scientia libera* in God to the

28:1054

¹ knowledge of simple intellect

^m free knowledge

ⁿ middle knowledge

^o *Wissenschaft*

^p *Wissen, Glauben und Meinen*; cf. *Critique of Pure Reason* A820/B848.

^q *Princip*

28:1055

extent that in his cognition of everything possible, God is at the same time conscious in his free will of those possible things which he has made actual; hence this representation is grounded on the system of creation, according to which God is the author of all things through his will. But so too according to the principle^r of emanation. For since everything that exists is actual through the necessity of the divine nature, God must be conscious of all things – not, however, as he is conscious of his choice of things, but rather as he is conscious of them insofar as he is conscious of his own nature as a cause of all things. All God's cognition is grounded on his being an *ens entium*, an independent original being. For if God were not the cause of things, then either he would not cognize them at all, because there would be nothing in his nature which could supply him with knowledge of things external to him, or else things would have to have some influence on him in order to give him a mark of their existence. But then God would have to have sensible cognition of things, consequently he would have to be *passibilis*,^s which contradicts his independence as an *ens originarium*. If, therefore, God is able to cognize things apart from sensibility, he cannot cognize them except by being conscious of himself as the cause of everything. And consequently the divine cognition of all things is nothing but the cognition God has of himself as an effective power. – The author further divides *scientia libera* into *recordatio*,^t *scientia visionis*^u and *praescientia*.^v Yet this division is again expressed according to human representations and cannot be thought in the divine cognition itself. For him, the unalterable, nothing is past or future, since he is not in time at all. He cognizes everything simultaneously, whether it is present to our representation or not. If God cognizes everything, he also cognizes our free actions, even those we will perform only at a future time. But the freedom of our actions is not removed or limited by the fact that God foresees them; for he foresees simultaneously the whole nexus in which our actions are comprehended, the motives for which we do them and the aims we strive to attain by means of them. Now in foreseeing all this, God does not at all determine that it has to happen as it does. Through his prevision, he does not at all make our future actions necessary, as some have falsely believed; but he only sees that these or those actions will happen. Besides, the concept of prevision is anthropomorphic, and cannot be thought in God himself. Rather there is not the least further difficulty in representing how God cognizes the future free actions of a human being. Insight into the one is just necessary for our reason as insight into the other.

^r *Princip*^s capable of being passive^t memory^u science of vision^v foreknowledge

The so-called *scientia media*, or the cognition of that which could happen in other possible worlds outside the present actual one, is an entirely useless distinction. For if God cognizes everything possible, then he cognizes it as much in itself as *in nexu*,^w and consequently in just this way he cognizes every possible world as a whole. – A cognition is *free* if the object^x itself depends on this cognition. Hence our cognition is not free, because the objects^y themselves are *given* and our cognition of the objects depends on this. The freedom of God's cognition presupposes that God is the cause of the world *through freedom*, or the author of the world.

All errors presuppose illusion and deception.^z They are not a mere lack of cognition, for that would be ignorance; but they are a consequence of some positive obstacles to truth. Now God cognizes nothing *a posteriori*; no object^a can have any influence on him, because he is independent, the original being, and consequently *impassibilis*. But just because no object can influence God, no object^b can mislead^c him. God is therefore *infallibilis*. Proofs such as this one, which are derived from certain predicates belonging to God, are always better than proofs derived merely from the concept of an *ens realissimum*.³⁹ For in the latter case it is often difficult to decide whether something is in fact a pure reality.

28:1056

The author calls the *scientia visionis* or *scientia libera* an *analogon modi*,⁴⁰ as if the cognition of an actual thing contained more than the cognition of something possible. But the difference between something's being first possible and then becoming actual is only a distinction with respect to temporal relationships and does not pertain to God at all. – Now the author goes on to another property of God, the divine *wisdom*. But this is premature, because wisdom presupposes a faculty of desire, and this faculty has not yet been proven in God.⁴¹ For as a *summa intelligentia*^d God has *three* predicates which we have ascribed to him from psychology, namely *cognition*, *pleasure* and *displeasure*, and a *faculty of desire*. For the sake of economy we should therefore spare ourselves this treatment of God's wisdom; but since we don't want to leave the author's order behind altogether, we will now deal with it provisionally. – A being which has cognition must have the following two properties of its cognition:

1. *Theoretical perfection of its cognition*. This would belong to it insofar as the cognition is common cognition or science. But neither of these

^w in connection [with other things]

^x Objekt

^y Objekte

^z Schien und Verleitung

^a Objekt

^b Objekt

^c hintergehen

^d highest intelligence

is suitable for God, but apply only to human beings. For common cognition is an aggregate, while science on the contrary is a system of cognitions. Both comprise a collection^e of cognitions in themselves, only with the difference that in the former cognition is just accumulated without being ordered by any principle,^f whereas in the latter it is bound up in common as a unity. – The theoretical perfection of the cognition of God is called *omniscience*.

2. *Practical perfection* of cognition. To this belongs:

- a) *Skill*, i.e. perfection in the cognition of choosing the means to arbitrary ends, which are still problematic.
- b) *Prudence*. This is the cognition of the means to given ends, insofar as the means to them are not completely in my power. These means are rational beings. Hence prudence is nothing but a skill in making use of freely acting beings for given ends.
- c) *Wisdom*, i.e. perfection of cognition in the derivation of every end from the system of all ends. On the unity of ends rests contentment. It is easy to see that the first two kinds of perfection (skill and prudence) cannot be predicated of God, because they involve too much which is similar to the human and moreover whatever is real in them is already contained in omniscience. How, for example, is prudence to be ascribed to God? For he has the full perfection of power, and consequently no end can ever be given whose means are not fully in his power. It is beneath the dignity of the divine nature to think of God as skillful or prudent; wisdom, on the contrary, when properly understood, can apply only to a being of the highest perfection. For who else cognizes the system of all ends, and who else is in a position to derive every end from it? If we predicate wisdom of human beings, then this can mean no more than the positing of all one's ends in harmony with morality. For morals has as its object precisely to consider how each end can stand together with the idea of a whole of all ends, and it estimates all action as common rules. – Insofar as our cognition of human actions is derived from the principle^g of a possible system of all ends, it can be called human wisdom. Hence we are even able to give an example *in concreto* of a highest understanding which infers from the whole to the particular, namely our conduct in morals, because here we determine the worth of each end by means of an idea of a whole of all ends. In the idea of happiness, on the contrary, we have no concept of the whole, but rather we *only compose it out of parts*. And just for this reason we cannot direct our actions according

^e Menge

^f Princip

^g Princip

to an idea of happiness, because such a whole cannot be thought by us. – 28:1058
 But the human being does have an idea of a whole composed of *all* ends, even though he never fully attains to this idea and thus is not himself wise. Accordingly, the divine wisdom is distinguished from human wisdom not only in quantity but also in quality, just as God's absolute necessity is distinguished from the existence of all other things. – God's wisdom consists also in the agreement of divine choice with itself. A plan involving *selection*,^h which in its execution would produce collisions and thus require exceptions, cannot be the most perfect plan. Hence God's plan for the arrangement of nature has to be conjoined with the divine will as a whole. And this complete unity in the choice of means to his ends is a property of God's wisdom. But we must postpone further discussion of this until after our treatment of the divine will, where it really belongs.

The author also speaks of the divine *omniscience*, and treats it as a property distinct from divine cognition.⁴² But we cannot take special note of God's knowledge, so as to distinguish it from belief, opinion and conjecture. For the latter do not apply to God at all, since he cognizes everything; his cognition is knowledge just because of this; for this knowledge flows from an all-sufficiency of cognition. Since we do not always cognize things completely, our cognition is often not a knowing but a believing; God's complete cognition of everything, on the contrary, is precisely his omniscience.

To conclude [Baumgarten's] treatment of divine cognition, we add one more remark concerning the Platonic idea. The term *idea* properly signifies *simulacrum*, and therefore in human philosophy it signifies a concept of reason insofar as no possible experience can ever be adequate to it. Plato thought of the divine ideas as the archetypes of things, according to which these things are established, although, to be sure, they are never posited as adequate to the divine idea. For example, God's idea of the human being, as archetype, would be the most perfect idea of the most perfect human being. Particular individuals, as particular human beings, would be formed in accord with this idea, but never in such a way that they completely corresponded to it. – In consequence, Plato was blamed for treating these ideas in God as pure substances. And in the second century there finally emerged a so-called "eclectic" school which dreamed of *the possibility of participating in the divine ideas*.⁴³ *The whole of mystic theosophy based itself on this*, so it was fundamentally nothing but a corrupt Platonic philosophy. 28:1059

We have now dealt with the first of God's predicates drawn from psychology, the faculty of cognition or understanding; the author now proceeds to discuss the *will* of God,⁴⁴ which is a practical perfection, just

^h *Auswahl*

as the understanding is a theoretical perfection. Here many difficulties show themselves right away at the beginning, as soon as we ask: Does God have a faculty of desire? And how is it constituted? All desires are either immanent or transient, i.e. either they relate to the very thing which has them and remain in this thing or else they relate to something which is external to the thing. But neither can be thought in a being of all beings. First, an all-sufficient being cannot have immanent desires, simply because it is all-sufficient. For every desire is directed only to something possible and future. But since God has all perfections actually, there is nothing left over for him to desire as a future possibility. But neither can God be represented as desiring something external to him; for then he would need the existence of other things in order to fulfill the consciousness of his own existence. But that is contrary to the concept of an *ens realissimum*. Thus the big question is: How can we think of a most perfect being as having desires? To answer this question, let us undertake the following investigations. The powers of our mind are (1) *cognition*; (2) the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, or better, since the word *feeling* appears to connote something sensible, the faculty of *being well-pleased and displeased*;ⁱ and (3) the *faculty of desire*.

28:1060

There are only a few beings which have a faculty of representation. If a being's representations can become the cause of the objects of representation (or of their actuality), then the being is called a *living* being. Hence a faculty of desire is the causality of the faculty of representation with respect to the actuality of its objects. The will is the faculty of ends. — Well-pleasedness cannot consist in the consciousness of perfection, as our author defines it,⁴⁵ because perfection is the harmony of a manifold in a unity. But here I do not want to know *in what* I take pleasure, but rather *what* pleasure itself is. Now pleasure itself does not consist in the relation of my representations to their object;^j it consists rather in the relation of my representations to the subject, insofar as these representations determine the subject to actualize the object. Insofar as it first determines the subject to the desire, it is called *faculty of desire*; but insofar as it first determines the subject to desire, it is called *pleasure*. Thus one obviously sees that pleasure precedes desire. Well-pleasedness with one's own existence, when this existence is dependent, is called *happiness*. Thus *happiness is contentment with my own dependent existence*. But a complete well-pleasedness with one's independent existence is called *acquiescentia in*

ⁱ Pleasure and displeasure = *Lust und Unlust*; well-pleased and displeased = *Wohlgefallen und Missfallen*. The former pair translate Baumgarten's *voluptas et taedium*, and imply sensible feelings; the latter pair translate Baumgarten's *complacientia et displacientia* and do not imply sensation. *Wohlgefallen* also has Biblical connotations: e.g. "Thou art my beloved son, in whom I am well-pleased" (Luke 3:22).

^j *Objekte*

*semetipso*⁴⁶ or self-sufficiency (*beatitudo*). This blessedness of a being consists therefore in a *well-pleasedness* with one's own existence *apart from any need*, and thus it belongs solely to God alone; for he alone is independent. Hence if the will of God has to be represented as the will of a self-sufficient being, then it follows that before treating of the divine will, it will be necessary first to discuss the faculty of the object of well-pleasedness and displeasedness, and then also the self-sufficiency of God. This attempt is new; but it is founded on the natural sequence of ideas, according to which something must be discussed first if the matter at hand cannot be cognized clearly without it. Thus in order to answer the main question as to the manner in which a faculty of desire could be found in a most real being and how this faculty of desire would have to be constituted, we must first deal with God's faculty of pleasure and displeasure, and with his blessedness. – If there is to be a conjunction of the divine understanding with volition, then it must be shown how a self-sufficient being could be the cause of something external to itself. For God's will is derived from the fact that he is supposed to be the creator of the world. – We see very well that things in the world can be the cause of something else; this quality, however, does not relate to the things themselves, but only to their determinations; not to their substance but only to their form. It follows that the causality by which God is supposed to be the author of the world must be of a wholly different kind. For it is impossible to think God's causality, his faculty of actualizing things external to himself, otherwise than as in his understanding; or in other words, a being which is self-sufficient can become the cause of things external to itself only by means of its understanding; and it is just this causality of God's understanding, his actualization of the objects of his representation, which we call "will." The causality of the highest being as regards the world, or the will through which he makes it, rests on his highest understanding, and cannot rest on anything else. We can think of the opposite of an understanding, of a blindly working eternal root of all things, a *natura bruta*. But how can the divine will lie in this causality? Without understanding it would have no faculty at all for relating itself, its own subject, to something else, or for representing something external to itself; and yet it is only under this condition that anything can be the cause of other things external to itself. From this it follows that an all-sufficient being can produce things external to itself only through will and not through the necessity of its nature. The self-sufficiency of God, connected to his understanding, is *all-sufficiency*. For in cognizing himself, he cognizes everything possible which is contained in him as its ground. The well-pleasedness of a being with itself as a possible ground for the production of things is what determines its causality. – The same thing can be expressed in other words by saying that the cause of God's will consists in the fact that despite his highest self-contentment, things external to him shall exist insofar as he is con-

28:1061

28:1062

scious of himself as an all-sufficient being. God cognizes himself by means of his highest understanding as the all-sufficient ground of everything possible. He is most well-pleased with his unlimited faculty as regards all possible things, and it is just this well-pleasedness with himself which causes him to make these possibilities actual. Hence it is just this which is God's desire to produce things external to himself. The product of such a will must be the greatest whole of everything possible, that is the *summum bonum finitum*,^k the most perfect world. If we make such a representation of the divine will, one which is suitable to the highest being, then the usual objections to the possibility of volition in a highest being will collapse. For objections are directed only to an anthropomorphic conception of God's will. It is said, for example, that a being which desires something external to itself can be contented only if what it desires actually exists. Hence volition or the desire for something presupposes that the well-pleasedness or contentment of a being with such desires can be complete only through the existence of other things. And indeed it is true of every created being that the desire for something always presupposes a need, and it is because of this need that I desire it. But why is this? *Simply because no creature is self-sufficient*, and so each one always has need of many things. Just for this reason it always reaches a higher degree of self-contentment when what it desires is produced. But in a being which is independent and thus self-sufficient as well, the ground of its volition and desire that things external to itself should exist is just that it knows its own faculty of actualizing things external to itself. – Hence according to pure reason, we see that a faculty of desire and volition may be found in a self-sufficient being. In fact, it is impossible to think of a being which combines the highest self-contentment with a supreme understanding unless we also think in it a causality as regards the objects of its representations. Of course here we must stay away from an anthropomorphic concept of volition; for otherwise vain contradictions will result instead of agreement. – Now before we proceed to our proper treatment of the divine will, we must first consider an introduction to it borrowed from *physicotheology*.

Third section: Physicotheology

28:1063

The question, namely, is: From the purposive order of nature can one infer an intelligent author of this order? In his *Dialogues*, Hume raises an objection to this inference which is by no means weak. He says that even assuming there is a supreme cause which has brought about all the order in nature through understanding and freedom, we still cannot compre-

^k "the highest *finite* good." The phrase as a whole is italicized because it is in Latin, but Kant also stresses the word "finite."

hend how this supreme intelligence could have all the perfections necessary to produce such a harmony, or where all these excellences in such a being might come from. We can no more comprehend this, he says, than we can comprehend the origin of the perfections of the world apart from the presupposition of an intelligent author.⁴⁷ We can feel the full force of Hume's objection only after we have come to see that it is quite impossible for us either to assert that a supreme original being is absolutely necessary or to cognize whence God himself is. For *this* question is equally unanswerable: "Where do all the perfections of God come from?" – On the other hand, however, we have already shown that we can have no insight through our reason into the existence of a being whose nonexistence is impossible, in a word, we have no insight into an existence which is absolutely necessary, and yet our reason urges us on *to assume* to such a being as a *hypothesis which is subjectively necessary for us*, because otherwise we could provide no ground why anything in general is possible. But if it is a true need of our speculative reason to assume a God, nevertheless from the fact that human beings cannot prove this apodictically, nothing follows except that *such a proof exceeds our faculty of reason*. But now as regards Hume's objection, it is mistaken despite its apparent strength; for let us now compare two hypotheses with each other. The first is this: A supremely perfect being is the author of the world through understanding. The second is: A blindly working eternal nature is the cause of all the purposiveness and order in the world. Now let us see whether we are able to accept¹ this latter hypothesis. Can we think without contradiction that the purposiveness, beauty and harmony of the world have arisen from a *natura bruta*, even though these things obviously have to be predicates of an understanding? How could nature, simply of itself, arrange the various things in harmony with its determinate final aims, using so many united means? Everywhere in the world we find a chain of effects and causes, of ends and means, of regularity in arising and perishing; how could this whole, just of itself, come to be in its present state? Or how could merely a blind, all-powerful nature be the cause of it? – Purposiveness in the effects always presupposes understanding in the cause. Or what cooperation of blind accidents could produce a moth, with its purposive structure? Hume says: A mere fecundity is certainly in a position to produce harmony in its effects.⁴⁸ We can see this right now in the way things come to be in the world; we ourselves, as intelligent beings are generated by our parents through the senses and not through understanding. Very well; but what about the whole of things, the totality of the world? Is it therefore generated by some fertile cause? What a sophistry! – Could a being have understanding when, like the world, it is a composite of true substances? – Is it possible for us to think an understanding distributed [among things]?

28:1064

¹ *annehmen*

It is certainly more comprehensible to us if we assume that a highest understanding of the world, rather than to assume that a fertile cause without understanding generated all this from the necessity of its nature. The latter supposition cannot even be thought without contradiction; for assuming that we think of nature as such a blindly working original being, it would never have had the capacity to relate itself to subjects, to things outside it. How, then, could it have the causality or the capacity to actualize things outside it, and indeed things which are to agree with a plan? But if the things of the world are generated simply through fertility, then what is generated are only the *forms* of things. As regards their first origin, the things themselves which are already contained in the sense could have been produced only by some being with freedom and understanding. But if on the contrary we do assume a highest intelligence which has caused the whole of creation through its will, then it is not at all incomprehensible to me how a purposive order could be found in nature, since I derive it from a supreme understanding. And if we ask *how* this supreme being has sufficient perfections and *whence* it gets them, the answer can be only that they follow from its absolute necessity – into which, to be sure, on account of the limitations of my reason I really have no insight, but which for the same reason I also cannot deny. – After this preliminary introduction, we will now turn to our real treatment of the divine will, and in it we will follow the author in regard to the order of his §§.⁴⁹

28:1065

The author first talks about the fact that God's faculty of desire cannot be sensible.⁵⁰ This follows because God, as an *ens originarium independens*, cannot be affected by objects. But we have already given a detailed treatment of this point, and also of the author's discussion of the *acquiescentia Dei in semetipso*.⁵¹ But if we ask what the divine will is, we can answer: It is the divine understanding determining God's activity to the production of the objects he represents. In human beings, well-pleasedness is pleasure in an object. Thus, for example, I can be well-pleased with a house, even if I can see only the plans. But well-pleasedness in the *existence* of an object is called *interest*. I cannot predicate either one of God. He has no pleasure and no interest; for his is self-sufficient and has a complete self-contentment in his independent existence; he needs no thing external to him, and nothing outside him could increase his blessedness. Hence we can ascribe to God only an analogue of interest, that is, a similarity of relation. The relation of everything good in the world to the will of God is the same as the relation of a benevolent deed to the will of the being who does the deed for me, when this being from whom I receive the benevolence is happy and has no need of me; all good in the world is related in this way to the will of God, which beyond this is unknown to me. I know only this much: that his will is *pure goodness*,^m and that is enough for me. –

^m Gute

Thus the Stoics thought the ideal of the sage, as one who would feel no compassion for distress, but would feel no greater delight in anything than in remedying all distress. This ideal is not possible for human beings; for an incentive must be added to my cognition of the good before I can actually will to produce the good. This is because my activity is limited, and thus if I am to apply my powers to the production of some good I must first judge whether in this way I am not using up resources" which might have produced some other good. Therefore I need certain incentives to determine my powers to this or that good, since I do not have resources sufficient for the actual production of everything I cognize to be good. — Now these incentives consist in certain subjective relations which must determine my being well-pleased in choosing, subsequent to the determination of my *well-pleasedness* in judging or my cognition of the good. If this subjective relation were taken away, then my choice of the good would be removed. But with God it is entirely different. He has the greatest power combined with the highest understanding. Since his understanding cognizes his capacity to actualize the objects of his representation, he is *eo ipso* determined to activity and to the production of the good, and indeed to the production of the greatest possible sum of all good. For God the mere representation of a good is all that is required to actualize it. He does not need to be motivated, and in his case there are no particular incentives; indeed, no subjective relations are possible for him at all, because he is already all-sufficient in himself and has the highest blessedness. If, therefore, we talk about God's motives, nothing but the goodness of the object^o can be understood by it, but no subjective relations, as if God were out for praise or glory. For this would not be suitable to the dignity of the most blessed being, but rather God knows through his understanding simultaneously both the possible good and his capacity to produce it. In this cognition lay simultaneously the ground why he actually produced it.

28:1066

The divine will is *free*. Freedom of the will is the capacity to determine oneself to actions independently of *causae subjectae*^p or sensuous impulses, or the capacity to will *a priori*. But since with us inclinations are the subjective conditions of self-contentment, the concept of human freedom is subject to many psychological difficulties. For the human being is a part^q of nature, and belongs to the sensible world, thus he is therefore also subject to the laws of appearances. All appearances are determined among themselves by certain laws, and it is just this determination of everything

ⁿ *Vermögen*^o *Objekte*^p "Subjective causes," i.e. causes in the subject. Kant's Latin phrase, *causis subjectis*, is in the ablative.^q *Glied*

28:1067

given in nature by universal laws which constitutes the *mechanism* of nature. The human being, therefore, as a part^r of nature is subject to this natural mechanism, or at least to a psychological mechanism. But how, then, can his actions be thought of as independent of the natural occurrences? To be sure, the human being is conscious of himself as an intellectual object,^s but this consciousness too has its difficulties, with which psychology must deal. — But *here* these difficulties do not concern us; for they do not apply to God at all. God is wholly distinct from the world *and has no connection at all with space and time*, is therefore not subject to the laws of appearances and is not determined by anything whatever. Consequently it is self-evident that his will is not determined by other things as incentives. Just as little is it possible for God to have inclinations to change his state; for he is the self-sufficient one. Hence if we want to think of the concept of divine freedom purified of every limitation, then it consists in nothing but the complete independence of God's will both from external things and from inner conditions. But as little as we need to fear that this concept of freedom will be exposed to any psychological difficulties (since these apply only to human freedom), we yet cannot any the less avoid the contrary defect that this concept cannot be represented *in concreto*. For from where will we draw an example from which to put the concept distinctly before our eyes? Indeed, a freedom such as God has applies to no one; but it is the case in general that if we purify divine predicates of all negations, then we have no means of thinking them *in concreto*, since all sensible conditions have been taken away. Now just because this concept cannot be illustrated by an example, the suspicion might arise that the concept itself is obscure or even false; yet once a concept has been introduced *a priori* with apodictic certainty, then we need fear no error even if our incapacity or even all our reason forbids us to set up a case of it *in concreto*. For it can be proven that the divine will has to be entirely free, for otherwise God could not be an *ens originarium*, or in other words, could not be God. For as *prima causa mundi*^t his will must be independent of all things, because there is nothing which could serve as an incentive to determine him to anything. Just as little could any inclination toward something arise in him, since he possesses supreme self-contentment. To God pertains transcendental freedom, which consists in an absolute spontaneity, as well as practical freedom, or the independence of his will from any sensuous impulses. The latter cannot be proven at all in regard to the human being, indeed its possibility cannot be cognized, because we human beings belong to the world and are affected by things; but in God it can be thought without the least difficulty. It is just the same with practical

28:1068

^r *Glied*^s *Objekt*^t first cause of the world

freedom which must be presupposed in human beings if the whole of morality is not to be abolished. The human being acts according to the idea of freedom, he acts *as if he were free, and eo ipso he is free*. This capacity to act according to reason must certainly be in God, since sensuous impulses are impossible in him. **One might raise the objection that God cannot decide otherwise than he does, and so he does not act freely but from the necessity of his nature.** The human being, however, can always decide something else, e.g. a human being, instead of being benevolent in this case, could also not be that. But it is precisely this which is a lack of freedom in the human being, since he does *not always* act according to his reason; but in God it is not due to the necessity of his nature that he can decide only as he does, but rather it is true freedom in God that he decides only what is in conformity with his highest understanding. – Fatalism predicates blind necessity of God, thus contradicts the concept of a highest intelligence.⁵² This wrongheaded opinion does of course deserve to be called “fatalism,” just as we give the name “chance” to a blind accident. Fatalism arises *when the blind necessity of nature is not distinguished from physical and practical necessity*. Of course the fatalist appeals to examples where God is supposed to have acted only according to a necessity of nature, e.g. that God created the world only so and so many years ago, but did nothing in a whole long eternity before that.⁵³ This, says the fatalist, can be explained only by saying that God *had to* create the world just at that time. But how anthropomorphic this representation is! No years can be thought in God, and no time. He is not in time at all; and to limit his efficacy to the conditions of time is to think contrary to the concept of God.

God is not
necessitated by
his nature

The author appeals to a distinction in the divine volition between *voluntas antecedens* and *voluntas consequens*.⁵⁴ The *voluntas antecedens*^u refers to the object of my will according to universal concepts. For example, the king wills to make his subjects happy, because they are his subjects. The *voluntas consequens*^v refers to the object of my will in its thoroughgoing determination. For example, the king wills to reward his subjects only insofar as they are worthy subjects. In both kinds of volition we must remove the human concept of time, according to which the will precedes what follows it, and applied to God in this way it is proper to the majesty of a highest being. This division in volition has a foundation in every rational being; only in God all succession must be left out. In the human being the *voluntas antecedens* is a provisional opinion of the will, but the *voluntas consequens* is the resolution. In God, however, the *voluntas antecedens* is always already in the *decreto*,^w and refers only to what the object has in common with other things not willed by God.

28:1069

^u antecedent will

^v consequent will

^w decree

28:1070 It is clear that everything which happens in the world conforms to a divine decree, because otherwise it would not exist. But now suppose we try to gain insight into the motives of the divine will; suppose we want to know what there was in the world that made God arrange it as he did, and to gain insight into the ends of God's will; then we will of course find that God's will is *inscrutable*.⁵⁵ We may indeed make use of the analogy with a perfect will and apply some of its aims to help us in particular cases; but these judgments can be only problematic and we must not flatter ourselves that they are apodictically certain. It would be presumption, and a violation of God's holy right, to want to determine precisely that this or that is and had to be God's end in the production of a certain thing. In a few cases the wise will of God and his intentions are obvious, e.g. the whole structure of the human eye shows itself to be a wise means to the end of seeing. But it is not possible for our reason to decide whether in a certain thing we are encountering an end in itself or only with a consequence of still higher ends, which constitute the connection of all ends. For the presupposition that everything in the world has its utility and its good intention, if it is supposed to be constitutive, would go much farther than our observations up to now can justify; yet as a regulative principle^x it serves very well for the extension of our insight and can therefore always be useful to reason and yet never harm it. For if we approach the world assuming the wise intention of its author in a thousand ways, then we will make a host^y of discoveries. In any case the only error which can result from this is that where we expected a teleological connection (a *nexus finalis*), we will encounter only a mechanical or physical one (a *nexus effectivus*); through which in such a case we merely miss one more unity, but do not spoil the unity of reason in its empirical use. In a *nexus effectivus* the end is always last and the means, on the contrary, is first; but in a *nexus finalis* the aim always precedes the use of the means. When a sick person, by means of medications, attains his end (health), this is an example of a *nexus effectivus*; a *nexus finalis*, on the contrary, is where the sick person first sets himself the aim of becoming healthy before he applies the means to it. – Of the will of God we always cognize only the conditioned aim, e.g. if human beings are to exist they must see and hence their eyes must be arranged thus and not otherwise; but never the final aim, e.g. why human beings exist at all. Of course we can be sure that human beings are ends, and not just the consequence of still higher ends; for the latter would be to downgrade rational beings; but this is the only case where we can be certain of such a thing. In the case of every other thing in the world, it is impossible to

^x *Princip*^y *Menge*

cognize whether its existence is a final aim of God or only something necessary as a means to still higher ends. —

The recognition that from the primary constitution of nature we can infer a supreme principle^z as a highest intelligence shows in general both the possibility and necessity of a physicotheology. Indeed, the proposition that everything good and purposive comes from God can itself be called a universal physicotheology. But if we find that a great deal of the order and perfection in nature has to be derived from the essence of things themselves according to universal laws, still in no way do we need to withdraw this order from God's supreme governance; but rather these universal laws themselves always presuppose a principle^a connecting every possibility with every other. But to say that God's will is directed to ends is to ascribe a psychological predicate to it; and thus the nature of his will must remain incomprehensible to us, and its aims inscrutable. — The other predicates of his will were *ontological*; those which are still left to us are the *moral* ones.

28:1071

^z *Princip*

^a *Princip*

Second part:

Moral theology

First section: On the moral attributes of God

The concept of God is no natural concept and not necessary from a psychological standpoint. For in psychology and in the cognition of nature I must nowhere appeal directly to God whenever I perceive beauty and harmony. For this is a kind of lazy reason,⁵⁶ which would gladly dispense with all further investigations into the natural causes of natural effects. Rather in such cases I must turn to a method which can further the cultivation of my reason, and I must seek out the proximate causes of such effects in nature itself. In this way I may come to know^b the universal laws according to which everything in the world proceeds. Earlier I saw that it was necessary for me to assume the hypothesis of a being containing in itself the ground of these universal laws; but even without this hypothesis I can still make great progress in physics by endeavoring to find all the intermediate causes. Physicotheology also does not give me a determinate concept of God as an all-sufficient being, but only teaches me to recognize him as a very great and immeasurable being. But in this way I still am not entirely satisfied regarding what I need to cognize of God. For I can always ask further: Is not perhaps another being possible, which might possess even more power and cognition than this recognized supreme principle of nature? But an indeterminate concept of God does not help me at all. Yet on the contrary the concept of God is a *moral* concept, the *practically necessary*; for morality contains the conditions, as regards the conduct of rational beings, under which alone they can be worthy of happiness. These conditions, these duties, are apodictically certain; for they are grounded in the nature of a rational and free being. Only under these conditions can such a being become worthy of happiness. But if in the case of a creature who has conducted himself according to these eternal and immediate laws of nature and who has thus become worthy of happiness, no state can be hoped for where he participates in this happiness; if no state of well-being thus follows his well-doing; then there would be a contradiction between morality and the course of nature. Yet

28:1072

^b kennen

experience and reason show us that in the present course of things the precise observation of all morally necessary duties *is not always connected with well-being*, but rather the noblest honesty and righteousness is often misunderstood, despised, persecuted, and trodden underfoot by vice. But then there must exist a being *who rules the world according to reason and moral laws*, and who has established, in the course of things to come, a state where the creature who has remained true to his nature and who has made himself worthy of happiness through morality will actually participate in this happiness; *for otherwise all subjectively necessary duties which I as a rational being am responsible for performing will lose their objective reality*. Why should I make myself worthy of happiness through morality if there is no being who can give me this happiness? Hence without *God* I would have to be either a visionary or a scoundrel. I would have to deny my own nature and its eternal moral laws; I would have to cease to be a rational human being. – Hence the existence of God is not merely a hypothesis about contingent appearances, as it was in physicotheology, but rather a *necessary postulate for the incontrovertible laws of my own nature*. For morality not only shows that we have need of God, but it also teaches us that he is already present in the nature of things and that the order of things leads us to him. Of course *this* proposition must first be firmly established: that moral duties are necessarily grounded in the nature of everyone's reason and hence that they have a bindingness for me which is apodictically certain. For if moral duties are based only on feelings, or on the prospect of happiness – so that just by fulfilling them I would become *happy already*, not merely *worthy of happiness*, but through them an actual participant in happiness – then well-being would already exist in the present course of things as the effect of good conduct and I would not need to count only on a happy state in the future or assume a being who could help me attain it. But the ungroundedness of Hume's proposition, when he wants to derive all morality from particular moral feelings,⁵⁷ is sufficiently demonstrated by morality; and *this* proposition: that here virtue is already sufficiently rewarded, has experience against it. Hence the duties of morality are apodictically certain, since they are set before me by my own reason; but there would be no incentives to act in accord with these duties as a rational human being if there were no God and no future world.

28:1073

Morality alone, moreover, gives me a *determinate* concept of God. It teaches me to recognize him as a being having every perfection; for that God who has to judge, according to the principles of morality, whether I am worthy of happiness, and who in that case must also make me actually participate in happiness, must be acquainted even with the most secret stirrings of my heart, because this chiefly determines the worth of my conduct; he must also have the whole of nature under his power if he is to be able to order my future happiness in its course according to a plan;

finally, he has to arrange and direct the consequences of the different states of my existence. In short, he must *be omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, and not in time*.

28:1074 A being who is to give objective reality to moral duties must possess without limit the moral perfections of *holiness, benevolence and justice*.⁵⁸ *These attributes constitute the entire moral concept of God. They belong together in God, but of course according to our representations they have to be separated from one another.* Thus through morality we recognize God as a *holy lawgiver, a benevolent sustainer of the world, and a just judge*. We must think of the holiness of the laws *as first*, even though our interest commonly beguiles us into placing God's benevolence above it. But a restrictive condition always precedes God's benevolence, under which human beings are to become worthy of the happiness flowing to them. This condition is that they conduct themselves in accord with the holy law, which must therefore be presupposed if well-being is to follow upon it. A supreme principle of legislation must be altogether *holy*, and it must allow no vice or sin or declare them less punishable than they are. For it should be an eternal norm for us, departing at no point from what is in accord with morality. – *Benevolence*, once again, is a special idea whose object is happiness, just as the object of holiness can be nothing but strictly good conduct or the highest virtue.⁵⁹ Benevolence in and for itself is without limit, but it has to express itself in the apportionment of happiness *according to the proportion of worthiness in the subject*. And just this *limitation of benevolence by holiness* in apportioning happiness is *justice*.⁶⁰ I must not think of a judge as benevolent, as if he could somewhat relax the holiness of the law and spare something of it. For then he would not be a judge at all, since a judge must weigh and apportion happiness strictly according to the measure in which the subject has become worthy of it through his good conduct. The justice of the judgment must be unexceptionable and unrelenting. – We meet with a symbol of this in the well-ordered government of a land; only with this difference, that in such a government the powers of legislation, government and justice are found in different persons, whereas in God they are all combined. – In a state the legislator must be sovereign, one whom nobody can evade. The administrator of the laws (who provides for and proportionately rewards those who have become worthy of his benevolence by following the laws) must be subordinate to the legislator, because he too must conduct himself in accord with the same laws. Finally, the judge must be most just and must look closely to see whether the apportionment of rewards is really in accord with desert. Now if we separate every human representation from this symbol, the pure concept we obtain will be precisely that which constitutes the moral perfections of God. This idea of a threefold divine function is fundamentally very ancient and seems to ground nearly every religion. Thus the Indians thought of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva; the Persians of

Ormuzd, Mithra and Ahriman; the Egyptians of Osiris, Isis and Horus; and the ancient Goths and Germans of Odin, Freya and Thor: as three powerful beings constituting one divinity, of which world-legislation belongs to the first, world-government to the other and world-judgment to the third.

28:1075

Reason leads us to God as a holy legislator, our inclination for happiness wishes him to be a benevolent governor of the world, and our conscience represents him to our eyes as a just judge. Here one sees the needs and also the motives for thinking of God as holy, benevolent and just. Happiness is a system of ends which are contingent because they are only necessary on account of the differences between subjects. For everyone can participate in happiness only in the measure that he has made himself worthy of it. Morality, however, is an absolutely necessary system of *all ends*, and it is just this agreement with the idea of a system which is the *ground of the morality of an action*. Hence an action is *evil* when the universality of the principle from which it is performed is contrary to reason. Moral theology convinces us of God's existence with far more certainty than physicotheology. For the latter teaches us only that we have need of the existence of God as a hypothesis for the explanation of contingent appearances, as has been sufficiently shown in that part of cosmology which deals with contingent ends. But morality leads us to the principle of *necessary ends*, without which it would itself be only a chimaera.

Holiness is the absolute or unlimited moral perfection of the will.⁶¹ A holy being must not be affected with the least inclination contrary to morality. It must be *impossible* for it to will something which is contrary to moral laws. So understood, no being but God is holy. For every creature always has some needs, and if wills to satisfy them, it also has inclinations which do not always agree with morality. Thus the human being can *never* be *holy*, but of course [he can be] *virtuous*. For virtue consists precisely in *self-overcoming*. But one also calls someone "holy" if he has an aversion to something as soon as he recognizes it to be morally evil. Yet this concept of holiness is not sufficiently dignified for the thing itself which it is supposed to designate. It is always better, therefore, not to call any creature perfectly holy, however perfect it may be; or at least not in the sense that God is. For he is the moral law itself, as it were, but thought as personified.

28:1076

Benevolence is an immediate well-pleasedness with the welfare of others. Except for God, pure and complete is nowhere to be found. For every creature has needs which limit its inclination to make others happy, or its *de facto* ability to exercise these inclinations in such a way as to have no regard at all for its own welfare. But God is independent benevolence. He is not limited by any subjective ground, because he himself has no needs; though to be sure the application of his benevolence is limited *in concreto*

through the constitution of the subject in which it is to be shown. This benevolence is something positive, but *justice* is fundamentally only a negative perfection, because it limits his benevolence in the measure that we have not made ourselves worthy of it. God's justice therefore consists in the *combination of benevolence with holiness*. In other words, one could also call it a true benevolence. – Against these moral perfections of God, reason makes objections whose strength have driven many human beings crazy and plunged them into despair. It is just on this account that these perfections have been made the object of extensive philosophical investigations. Among others, Leibniz has attempted in his *Theodicy* to weaken these objections, or rather to do away with them entirely. Let us now look carefully at these objections ourselves and test our powers on them.

The first objection is against God's *holiness*. If God is holy and hates evil, then whence comes this *evil*, which is an object of aversion to all rational beings and is the ground of all intellectual aversion?

The second objection is against God's *benevolence*. If God is benevolent and wills that human beings be happy, then whence comes all the *ill* in the world, which is an object of aversion to everyone who meets with it and constitutes the ground of physical aversion?

1077 The third objection is against God's *justice*. If God is just, then whence comes the unequal apportionment of good and evil in the world, standing in no community with morality? –

Concerning the first objection – namely: Where does the evil in the world come from if the sole original source of everything is holy? – this objection gains its strength primarily through the consideration that nothing can arise without its first predisposition being made by its creator. What, then? Has a holy God himself placed a predisposition to evil in human nature? Because they were unable to make sense of this, it occurred to human beings long ago to assume a *special* evil original being, who had wrested part of all things from the holy original source and impressed its own essence on that part. Yet this manichaeism conflicts with human reason, since reason leads us to one single being of all beings, and it can think of this being only as supremely holy. What, then? Shall we derive evil from a holy God? – The following considerations will settle the matter for us. First, one must note that among the many creatures, the human being is the only one who has to work for his perfections and for the goodness of his character, producing them from within himself. God therefore gave him talents and capacities, but left it up to the human being how he would employ them. He created the human being free, but gave him also animal instincts; he gave the human being senses to be moder-

ated and overcome through the education of his understanding. Thus created, the human being was certainly perfect both in his nature and regarding his predispositions. But regarding their education he was still uncultivated.⁶¹ For this the human being had to have himself to thank, as much for the cultivation of his talents as for the benevolence of his will. Endowed with great capacities, but with the application of these capacities left to himself, such a creature must certainly be of significance. One can expect much of him; but on the other hand no less is to be feared. He can perhaps raise himself above a whole host of will-less angels,⁶² but he may also degrade himself so that he sinks even beneath the irrational animals. To begin his cultivation he must step forth out of his uncultivated state and free himself from his instincts. – But what then will be his lot? Only false steps and foolishness. Yet who but the human being is responsible for them? This way of representing things agrees completely with the mosaic story, which describes the same thing in a sensible way. In paradise the human being here appears as a darling of nature, great in his predispositions but crude in his cultivation. Thus he lives undisturbed, led by his instincts, until finally he feels his humanity, and in order to prove his freedom, he *falls*. Now he no longer *is* an animal, but he has *become* an animal. He proceeds to educate himself, but with each new step he takes some new false steps, and in this way he approaches ever nearer to the idea of perfection in a rational being, which he will nevertheless perhaps not attain to for millions of years.⁶³ – In this earthly world there is only progress. Hence in this world goodness and happiness are not things to be possessed, they are only paths toward perfection and contentment. Thus evil in the world can be regarded as *incompleteness in the development of the germ toward the good*. Evil has *no special* germ; for it is *mere negation* and consists only in the *limitation of the good*. It is nothing beyond this, other than incompleteness in the development of the germ to the good out of uncultivatedness. *The good, however, has a germ; for it is self-sufficient*. This predisposition to good, which God has placed in the human being, must be developed by the human being himself before the good can make its appearance. But since at the same time the human being has many instincts belonging to animality, and since he has to have them if he is to continue being human, the strength of his instincts will beguile him and he will abandon himself to them, and *thus arises evil*, or rather, when the human being begins to use his reason, he falls into foolishness. *A special germ toward evil cannot be thought*, but rather the first development of our reason toward the good is the origin of evil. And that remainder of uncultivatedness in the progress of culture is again evil. – Is evil therefore inevitable, and in such a way does God really will evil? –

Not at all; but rather God wills the *elimination* of evil through the all-

28:1078

animality & evil

28:1079 *powerful development of the germ toward perfection.* He wills that evil be removed through the *progress toward good*. Evil is also *not a means to good*, but rather arises as a *by-product*, since the human being has to struggle with his own limits, with his animal instincts. The means to goodness is placed in *reason*; this means is the striving to tear himself out of uncultivatedness. When the human being makes this beginning, he first uses his reason in the service of instinct; finally he develops it *for its own sake*. Hence he finds evil *first* when his reason has developed itself far enough that he recognizes his obligations. St. Paul says that sin follows upon the law.⁶⁴ When the human being has finally developed himself completely, *evil will cease of itself*. As soon as the human being recognizes his obligation to the good and yet does evil, then he is *worthy of punishment*, because he could have overcome his instincts. And even the instincts are placed in him *for the good*; but that he exaggerates them is his own fault, not God's.

This *justifies* God's holiness, because by following this path the whole species of the human race will finally attain to perfection.⁶⁵ But if we ask where the evil in individual human beings comes from, the answer is that it exists on account of the limits necessary to every creature. It is just as if we were to ask: Where do the parts of the whole come from? – But the human race is a class of creatures which through their own nature are someday to be released and set free from their instincts; during their development many false steps and vices will arise. But the whole is *someday to win through to a glorious outcome*, though perhaps only after enduring many punishments for their deviation. If one went so far as to ask why God created me, or humanity in general, this would certainly be *presumptuousness*, for it would be as much as to ask why God completed and joined together the great chain of natural things through the existence of a creature like the human being. Why did he not instead leave a *gap*? Why didn't God make the human being into an angel instead? But then would he have still been human? – The objection that if God has the actions of human beings in general under his power and guides them according to general laws, then he must be the author of evil actions, is transcendental and hence does not belong here, but to rational psychology, which deals with human freedom. Later on in our theory of providence we will show how we are to understand the claim that God concurs in the free actions of human beings.⁶⁶

28:1080 The other objection, taken from the *ill* that is in the world, goes up against God's *benevolence*. Hence now we want to investigate where the ill in the world comes from. – We do, to be sure, have an idea of the complete entirety of well-being and of the highest contentment; but we cannot cite a case *in concreto* where this idea of happiness is *entirely* realized. There is a twofold happiness:

1) A happiness consisting in the *satisfaction of desires*. But desires al-

ways presuppose needs, which is why we desire something, hence also pains and ill. — But there also may be thought as a possibility:

2) A happiness *without any desires*, consisting merely in *enjoyment*. Any human being who wanted to be happy in this way would be the most useless human being in the world. For he would be completely lacking in any incentives to action, since incentives consist in desires. Fundamentally we cannot even frame a correct concept of happiness for ourselves except by thinking of it as a *progress toward contentment*. This is why we are uneasy about the lifestyle of those human beings who do almost nothing except eat, drink and sleep. It would not occur to any human being who is aware of the powers and impulses in himself toward activity to exchange his state for this supposed happiness, even if he had to struggle with all sorts of discomforts. Hence a novelist always permits his hero to withdraw from the stage once he has overcome his many difficulties and has finally achieved tranquillity. For the novelist is quite conscious of the fact that he cannot describe happiness as mere enjoyment. Rather it is labor, difficulty, effort, the prospect of tranquillity and the striving toward the achievement of this idea which is happiness for us and a proof already of God's benevolence. The *measure* of happiness for a creature cannot be determined *for one point* of its existence. Rather God's aim is the happiness of creatures *throughout their entire duration*. Ill is only a special arrangement *for leading the human being toward happiness*. We are acquainted with too little of the outcome of suffering, of God's purposes in it, of the constitution of our nature and of happiness itself, to be able to determine the measure of happiness of which the human being is capable in this world. It is enough that it is within our power to render most ill harmless to ourselves, indeed to make our world into a paradise, and to make ourselves *worthy* of an uninterrupted happiness. But ill is necessary if the human being is to have a wish and an aspiration toward a better state, and at the same time to learn how to strive to become worthy of it. If the human being must someday die, then he must not have only sweetness here. Rather, the sum, the whole *facit* of his sufferings and his joys must finally be brought into relation.^d Is it possible to think of a better plan for human destiny?

28:1081

The third objection is against God's *justice*, and has this question as its object: Why in this world is there no proportion between good conduct and well-being? If we investigate this closely we find that the disproportion between the two is not really so large, and in the end *honesty is the best policy*.^e We must not be blinded by the outward glitter that frequently surrounds the vicious person. If we look within, we read constantly, as Shaftesbury says, his reason's admission: *You are nevertheless a villain*.⁶⁷

^d *Verhältnis*

^e *Positio*

28:1082 The restlessness of his conscience torments him constantly, agonizing reproaches torture him continually, and all his apparent good fortune is really only self-deceit and deception. Nevertheless we cannot deny that at times even the most righteous human being would seem to be a ball in the hands of fate, as regards the external circumstances of fortune. But all morality, that is, all good conduct which is done merely because our reason commands it, would come to nothing if our true worth were determined by the course of things and the fate we meet with in it. Moral conduct would be transformed into a *rule of prudence*; self-interest would be the incentive for our virtues. But to sacrifice one's peace, one's powers and one's advantage when the eternal laws of morality demand it, *that is true virtue, and worthy of a future recompense!* If there were no disproportion at all between morality and well-being here in this world, there would be no opportunity for us to be truly virtuous.

Second section

Of the nature and certainty of moral faith

Probability has a place only regarding cognition of things in the world. For a thing of which I am to have probable cognition must be homogeneous with (or a thing of the same kind as) some other thing of which my cognition is certain. For example, I cognize with probability that the moon is inhabited because I discover many similarities between it and the earth (mountains, valleys, seas, and perhaps also an atmosphere). But this cognition of the moon's habitability is *probable* only because I see with certainty that the earth is homogeneous with it in many ways, and from this I infer that it would also be similar to it in this way. But when it is a question of a thing that does not belong to this world at all, then no homogeneity and hence no probability can apply to it. So I cannot say that it is probable that God exists. Such an expression would also be unsuited to the dignity of this cognition; and it is improper too because no analogy between God and the world is thinkable. Hence in this case I must either be entirely modest about cognizing something or else have complete conviction of its existence.

All conviction is of two kinds: either dogmatic or practical. The former must be sought in mere concepts *a priori* and has to be apodictic. But we have already seen that by the path of mere speculation we cannot convince ourselves with certainty of God's existence. At most the speculative interest of our reason compels us to assume such a being as a subjectively necessary hypothesis; but nowhere has reason sufficient capacity *to demonstrate it*. Our need makes us wish for this being, but our reason cannot grasp it. It is true that I can infer from the existence of the world and from

its contingent appearances to the existence of some supreme original being; but I cannot sufficiently cognize its nature and attributes. Yet there still remains to us another kind of conviction, the *practical*. This is a special field which gives us far more satisfying prospects than dry speculation can ever yield. For if something presupposed on subjective grounds is only a hypothesis, *then*, on the contrary, *a presupposition from objective grounds is a necessary postulate*. These objective grounds are either theoretical, as in mathematics, or *practical*, as in morals. For moral imperatives, since they are grounded in the nature of our being as free and rational creatures, have as much evidence and certainty as ever could be had by mathematical propositions originating in the nature of things. Thus a necessary practical postulate is the same thing in regard to our practical interest as an axiom is in regard to our speculative interest. For the practical interest which we have in the existence of God as a wise ruler of the world is, on the contrary, *the highest* there can ever be, since if we remove this fundamental principle, we renounce at the same time all prudence and honesty, and we have to act against our own reason and our conscience.

28:1083

Such a moral theology not only provides us with a convincing certainty of God's existence, but it also has the great advantage that it leads *to religion*, since it joins the thought of God firmly to our morality, and in this way it even makes *better* human beings of us. This moral faith is a practical postulate, in that anyone who denies it is brought *ad absurdum practicum*.^f An *absurdum logicum*^g is an absurdity in judgments; but there is an *absurdum practicum* when it is shown that anyone who denies this or that would have to be a scoundrel. And that is the case with moral faith. This moral belief is not equivalent to saying that my opinions occur only as hypotheses, i.e. as presuppositions such that they are grounded on contingent appearances. If one infers from the contingency of the world to a supreme author, this is only a hypothesis, even if it is one which is necessary for us as an explanation, and hence something like a highly probable opinion. But such presuppositions, which flow from some absolutely necessary datum, as in morals and mathematics, are not mere opinions but demand of us a firm belief. Hence our faith is not knowledge, and thank heaven^h it is not! For divine wisdom is apparent in the very fact that *we do not know but rather ought to believe that a God exists*. For suppose we could attain to knowledge of God's existence through our experience or in some other way (although the possibility of this knowledge cannot immediately be thought); suppose further that we could really reach as much certainty through this knowledge as we do in intuition; then all morality would

28:1084

^f to a practical absurdity

^g logical absurdity

^h Heil uns!

break down. In his every action the human being would represent God to himself as a rewarder or avenger; this image would force itself involuntarily on his soul, and his hope for reward and fear of punishment would take the place of moral motives; the human being *would be virtuous from sensible impulses*.

If the author talks about God's *sincerity*,⁶⁸ this expression is far beneath the dignity of the highest being. For negative perfections like sincerity, which consist only in God's not being hypocritical, could be predicated of God only insofar as *it might occur to someone to deny them*. But sincerity and truth are already contained in the concept of God in such a way that anyone who rejected these attributes would have to deny God himself as well. Such perfections, moreover, are already contained in God's holiness, since a holy being would certainly never lie; and why set up a particular rubric and classification for each of the *corollaria*? If we really want to cite sincerity and truth as particular attributes of God, it would be better to define them in terms of the sincerity and truth God demands *from us*. So there are still only three moral attributes of God, the three we have treated above: holiness, benevolence and justice.

28:1085 We can think of divine *justice* in two ways: either as justice within the order of nature or justice by special decree. But as long as we have no instruction concerning the latter, or as long as we can make everything given in nature harmonize with God's holiness and benevolence, it is our duty *to stop with a justice which gives us what our deeds are worth in the present course of things*. This justice within the order of nature consists in the fact that God has already laid down in the course of things and in his plan for the world, the way in which a human being's state will be proportioned to the degree of morality he has attained. Well-being is inseparably combined with good conduct, just as punishment is combined with moral corruption. Moral perfection in this life will be followed by moral growth in the next, just as moral deterioration in this life will bring a still greater decline of morality in that life. After death the human being will continue with his development and predisposition of his capacities, and thus if in this world he strives to act in a morally good way and gradually attains to moral accomplishment, he may hope to continue his moral education there too; on the other side, if he has acted contrary to the eternal and necessary laws of morality and has gradually made himself worse by frequent transgressions, then he must fear that there too his moral corruption will continue and increase. Or at least he has no reason to believe that a sudden reversal will occur in the next life. Rather, the experience of his state in the world and in the order of nature in general gives him clear proofs that his moral deterioration, and the punishments essentially necessary with it, will last indefinitely or eternally, just as will moral perfection and the well-being inseparable from it.

God's justice is usually divided into *justitiam remunerativam et punitivam*,ⁱ according as God punishes evil and rewards good.⁶⁹ But the rewards God bestows on us proceed not from his justice but from his benevolence. For if they came to us from justice, then there would be no *praemia gratuita*,^j but rather we would have to possess some right to demand them, and God would have to be bound to give them to us. Justice gives nothing gratuitously; it gives to each only the *merited* reward. But even if we unceasingly observe all moral laws, we can never do more than is our duty; hence we can never expect rewards from God's justice. Human beings may certainly merit things of *one another* and demand rewards based on their mutual justice; but we can give nothing to God, and so we can never have any right to rewards from him. If, according to a sublime and moving text, it says: "He that hath pity on the poor lendeth to the Lord,"⁷⁰ then here the reward which is due us for the sake of the unfortunate is ascribed to God's benevolence, and God himself is regarded as our debtor. It is represented that when God bestows a promise on us we are justified in demanding what he has promised us and expecting from his justice that it will be fulfilled. But promises of this kind, where someone pledges a wholly undeserved benefit to another, do not appear actually to bind the promisor to grant this benefit to the other; at least they give him no right to demand it. For they always remain beneficent deeds, bestowed on us undeservedly, and they carry the mark not of justice but of benevolence. Hence in God there is no *justitiam remunerativam* toward us, but all the rewards he shows us must be ascribed to his benevolence. His justice is concerned only with punishments. These are either *poenae correctivae*,^k *poenae exemplares*,^l or *poenae vindicativae*.^m The first two are given *ne peccetur*,ⁿ the third *quia peccatum est*.^o But all *poenae correctivae* and *poenae exemplares* are always grounded on *poenae vindicativae*. For an innocent human being may never be punished as an example for others unless he deserves the punishment himself. Hence all corrective punishments which have as their aim the improvement of the punished, as well as those which have been ordained for the guilty as a warning to others, must always accord with the rules of justice. They must at the same time be *avenging* punishments. But the expression *poenae vindicativae*, like the expression *justitia ultrix*,^p is really too hard.⁷¹ For

28:1086

ⁱ rewarding justice and punitive justice^j gifts of grace^k corrective punishments^l exemplary punishments^m vindictive punishmentsⁿ so that there will not be sin^o because there has been sin^p avenging justice

28:1087

vengeance cannot be thought in God, because vengeance always presupposes a feeling of pain impelling one to do something similar to the offender. So it is better to regard the punishments inflicted by divine justice on sins in general as an *actus of justitiae distributivae*,⁴ that is, as a justice limiting the apportionment of benevolence *by the laws of holiness*. Hence we see that there must be *poenae vindicativae*, because they alone constitute what is proper to justice; if they were rejected, this attribute could not be assumed in God at all. For *poenae correctivae* and *exemplares* are really acts of benevolence, because they promote what is best either for the individual human beings improved by them or for the entire people for whom the punishment serves as a warning. How, then, is the essence of divine justice to be posited in them? God's justice must limit benevolence so that it distributes good only *according to the subject's worthiness*, hence justice will not ordain punishments for the criminal merely in order to teach what is best for him or for someone else, but rather it does so in order to punish the offense by which he has violated the law and made himself unworthy of happiness. These retributive punishments will become obvious only when our whole existence is considered, and hence can be correctly determined and appraised only in it. *It is from this we get the majestic idea of a universal judgment of the world*. There it is to be made well known before all the world how far the human race has made itself *worthy* of a determinate happiness or unworthy of it through transgression of holy moral laws. At the same time, the conscience, that judge in us which is not to be bribed, will place before the eyes of each one the whole world of his earthly life and convince him himself of the justice of the verdict. And then, in accord with the constitution of our striving here in the world, there too there will follow either eternal progress from good to better or an interminable decline from the bad into the still worse. —

The *patience* of God consists in the fact that he executes his punishment of evil in the criminal only after he has given him the opportunity to improve himself.⁷² But after that, God's justice is unrelenting. For a judge who *pardons* is not to be thought of! He must rather weigh all conduct strictly according to the laws of holiness and allow each only that measure of happiness which is proportionate to his worthiness. It is enough to expect from God's benevolence that in this life it gives us the capacity to observe the laws of morality and to become worthy of happiness. God himself, the all-benevolent, can make us worthy of his good deeds; but that he shall yet make us partakers of happiness without our becoming worthy of his good deeds in virtue of morality — *that* he, the Just One, cannot do.

Impartiality belongs to those attributes which should not be specifically predicated of God,⁷³ since no one could doubt that it pertains to him,

⁴ act of distributive justice

because it lies already in the concept of a holy God. God's impartiality consists in the fact that God has no favorites; for this would be to presuppose some predilection in him and that is only a human imperfection, e.g. when parents have a special love for a child which has not especially distinguished itself. But it cannot be thought of God that he would choose some individual subject over others as his favorite with no regard to the subject's worthiness; for this would be an anthropomorphic representation. But if it should happen that one nation becomes enlightened sooner than another and is brought nearer to the destination' of the human species, then this (far from being a proof that God had a special interest in, and cares with special favor for this people) would belong rather to the wisest plan of universal providence, which we are in no position to survey. For in the realm of ends as in the realm of nature, God governs according to *universal* laws which do not appear to be in connection with our short-sighted understanding. The human being is certainly in the habit of taking any special bit of undeserved good fortune which may befall him for a special testimony of the favor of divine providence. But this is the work of our love of self, which would gladly persuade us that we are really worthy of the happiness we enjoy.

28:1088

Equity is also an attribute which is beneath the majesty of the supreme being;⁷⁴ for we can think of genuine equity only among human beings. Equity is an obligation arising from the right of another insofar as it is not combined with a warrant to compel someone else. Hence it is distinguished from strict right, where I can compel someone else to fulfill his obligation. For example, if I have promised to give a servant a certain allowance, then I must pay it to him whatever happens. But now suppose there comes a time of scarcity, so that the servant cannot live on the agreed wages; here according to strict right I have no obligation to accord him more for his maintenance than I have promised him; he cannot compel me to do so, since he has no further obligation as a ground for his right. But it is only equitable that I not let him go hungry, and that I add to his wages a proportion large enough that he can live from it. Before the bar of conscience it counts as a strict right that I owe to others what is due them merely from equity; and even if everyone were to think me just because I fulfill everything to which I can be compelled and to which I have an external obligation, my conscience will still reproach me if I have violated the rules of equity. God judges according to our conscience, which is his representative here on earth.

28:1089

Absolute *immortality*, the impossibility of perishing, is ascribed to God.⁷⁵ This attribute belongs by right only and solely to him, as a consequence of the absolute necessity of his existence. But the expression "immortality" is unsuitable, because it is only a mere negation of an

⁷ *Bestimmung*

anthropomorphic representation. It is to be remarked in general that in theory the concept of God must be carefully purified and freed of all such human ideas; from a practical point of view, though, we may momentarily represent God using such predicates whenever by this means the thought of God affords more power and strength to our mortality. But in the present case it is much better to use the expression *eternal* instead of "immortal," since it is nobler and more appropriate to the dignity of God.

When the author praises God as *the most happy*,⁷⁶ it will be necessary for us to investigate the true concept of happiness⁷ to see whether it fits God. Pleasure in one's state is called *welfare*; insofar as this pleasure applies to the entirety of our existence it is called "happiness." This is consequently *pleasure in our state as a whole*. Pleasure in *one's own person* is called *self-contentment*. But what is distinctive about us is constituted by freedom. Consequently, self-contentment is a pleasure in one's own freedom, or in the quality of one's will. If this self-contentment were to extend to our *entire existence*, it would be called *blessedness*.⁸ The difference between self-contentment and happiness is just as necessary as it is important. For one can be fortunate without being blessed, even though the *consciousness of one's own dignity*, or self-contentment, belongs to a perfect happiness. But self-contentment can certainly be found without good fortune, because at least in this life good conduct is not always combined with well-being. Self-contentment arises from morality, while happiness depends on *physical* conditions. No creature has the powers of nature in its control, so as to be able to make them agree with its self-contentment. Hence the highest degree of self-contentment, or in other words blessedness, cannot be ascribed to any creature. But we are more fortunate if our whole state is such that we are able to be well-pleased with it. Yet in the present life happiness itself *will hardly be our lot*, and the Stoics probably exaggerated things very much when they believed that in this world virtue is always coupled with being well-pleased. The most infallible witness against this is experience.

Human good fortune is *not a possession, but a progression toward happiness*. Yet full self-contentment, the consoling consciousness of rectitude, is a good which can never be stolen from us, whatever the quality of our external state may be. And in fact all earthly happiness is far outweighed by the thought that as morally good human beings we have made ourselves worthy of an uninterrupted future happiness. Of course this inner pleasure in our own person can never compensate for the loss of an externally happy state, but it can still uplift us even in the most troubled

28:1090

⁷ *Glückseligkeit*; "the most happy" translates *den Glücklichen*. The noun *Glück* means both "happiness" and "good fortune," and the same is true of the adjective *glücklich*. In the following passage, these words will be translated in either or both ways as seems most suitable.

⁸ *Seligkeit*

life when it is combined with the prospect for the future. If now the question is whether happiness may be ascribed to God, since happiness relates only to one's external state, the question must first be raised whether one can think of God as *in a state*. Here we must first see what a *state* is. The ontological definition of a "state" is this: the coexistence of the alterable determinations of a thing along with the persisting ones; in the human being, for example, the persisting determination is that he is human, whereas what alters is whether he is learned or ignorant, rich or poor. This coexistence of his alterable determinations, such as wealth or poverty, with the persisting one, humanity, constitutes his state. But in God *everything* is permanent; for how could changeable determinations be thought in him, existing along with what is persisting in his essence? Or how, then, can the Eternal be thought of as in a state? But if no state can be predicated of God, then a state of happiness cannot be ascribed to him either. But supreme blessedness, the greatest possible self-contentment with himself belongs to him, and indeed in a sense that no creature can ever boast of anything even similar to it. For with creatures many external, sensible objects have an influence on their inner pleasure; but God is completely independent of all physical conditions. He is conscious of himself as the *source* of all blessedness. He is, as it were, the moral law itself personified; hence he is also the only blessed one. —

28:1091

At the conclusion of moral theology it should be remarked that the three articles of moral faith, *God, freedom of the human will, and a moral world*,⁷⁷ are the only articles in which it is permissible for us to transport ourselves in thought beyond all possible experience and out of the sensible world; only here may we assume and believe something from a practical point of view for which we otherwise have no adequate speculative grounds. But however necessary or dependable this procedure may be on behalf of our morality, we are in no way justified in admitting ourselves further into this idea and venturing to go with our speculation to a region with which only our practical interest is concerned. If we do so, *then we are enthusiasts*. For here the limits of our reason are distinctly indicated, and whoever dares to transcend them will be punished by reason itself for his boldness with both pain and error. But if we remain within these boundaries, then our reward will be to become wise and good human beings.

Third section Of God, regarding his causality

God's causality, or his *relation*^a to the world, can be considered in *three* respects:

^a *Verhältnis*

- 28:1092
1. *in nexu effectivo*,^v insofar as God is in general the cause of the world, and the latter is an *effectus* of him;
 2. *in nexu finali*,^w insofar as God has willed the attainment of certain aims by his production of the world. Here God is considered as an author of the world, i.e. as a cause of the world according to aims;
 3. *in nexu morali*.^x Here we become acquainted with God as the ruler of the world.

I) OF GOD AS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD

All the concepts in which human beings have ever thought of God as the world's cause can be brought under the following classification:

1. One has represented things as if the world itself were God.
2. Or God has been thought as an *ens extramundanum*,^y but as to his causality, either:
 - (a) One has sought to explain it according to the necessity of his nature. This is the *systema emanationis*,^z which is either *crassior*,^a as when one represents the substances of the world as arising through division. But this is absurd, or *subtilior*,^b where one considers the origin of all substances to be an emanation of God,⁷⁸
 - (b) Or: according to freedom. This is the *systema liberi arbitrii*,^c in which God is represented as the creator of the world.

The system of emanation of the subtler kind, according to which God is regarded as the cause of substances by the necessity of his nature, has one ground of reason opposed to it, which at once overthrows it. This ground is taken from the nature of an absolutely necessary being and consists in the fact that the actions which an absolutely necessary being undertakes from the necessity of its nature can never be any but those internal actions which belong to the absolute necessity of its essence. For it is unthinkable that such a being should produce anything outside itself which is not also absolutely necessary. But how can something produced by something else be thought of as absolutely necessary? Yet if it is contingent, then how could it have emanated from a nature which is absolutely necessary? Every action performed by such a being from the necessity of

^v "in effective connection," i.e., regarding efficient causality

^w "in final connection," i.e., regarding final causality

^x in moral connection

^y a being outside the world

^z system of emanation

^a more vulgar

^b more subtle

^c system of free will

its nature is immanent and can concern only its essence. Other things external to it can be produced by it only *per libertatem*,^d otherwise they are not things external to it but belong to the absolute necessity of its own essence and are therefore *internal* to it. – This ground sets up a resistance on the part of reason toward the system of emanation, which regards God as cause of the world by the necessity of his nature, and discovers the cause of the unwillingness to accept this system, which everyone feels even if he is not able to develop it distinctly. It is an altogether different matter when we see one thing arise from another by the necessity of its nature within the world itself. For here cause and effect are homogeneous, as for instance in the generation of animals and plants. But it would be absurd to think of God as homogeneous with the totality of the world, because this would contradict entirely the concept of an *ens originarium*, which, as we have shown above, has to be isolated from the world. Hence there remains to our reason only the opposite system of causality, the *systema per libertatem*.^e

28:1093

2) OF GOD AS THE AUTHOR OF THE WORLD⁷⁹

As *autor mundi*^f God can be thought of either:

1. merely as the author of the forms of things; in this way we regard God as only the *architect* of the world; or
2. as the author of the very matter of substance in the world as well; and then God is the *creator of the world*.

In the world itself, only the forms of things arise and perish; substances themselves are permanent. For example, an apple arises because the tree forces fluids up through its stems and composes them. But the fluids themselves, where did the tree get them? From the air, the earth, the water, and so on. This matter is found in the apple too; but it exists in a different composition, a different form. Another example is an example of perishing. For example, when we remove the phlogiston from iron, its whole form is changed; it decomposes into dust and is no longer iron at all to ordinary eyes.⁸⁰ But the substance of the iron remains undisturbed. For when now phlogiston is blown into it, the old form is restored and the iron dust becomes firm and solid. This form is contingent; its alternations testify to this. Hence it must have an *author*, who gave it its initial arrangement. But the substances in the world, even if we do not perceive any alterations in them, are just as contingent as the forms. This is clear from

28:1094

^d through freedom

^e system [of causality] through freedom

^f author of the world

their reciprocal *commercium*^g the relationship in which they stand to each other as parts of a whole world. Indeed, in ancient times it was assumed that the matter of things, the fundamental material out of which all their forms arise, is eternal and necessary. Hence God was considered only as the world's *architect*, and matter was considered to be the material out of which he formed all things. Fundamentally, therefore, one assumed two principles:^h *God* and *nature*. This served excellently for blaming the greater part of the world's ills on the original properties of matter, without detracting from the wisdom and benevolence of the architect. Matter was held responsible because the eternal attributes of its nature were supposed to have placed many obstacles in the way of God's will when he tried to form it to his ends. Yet this opinion was rejected, and rightly, as soon as philosophical ideas were further determined and refined. For it was seen that if matter occasions the ill in the world owing to its being unsuitable for certain aims, then it might also occasion much that is good through its fitness and agreeableness with other ends of the author, and that it might accordingly be difficult to determine the extent to which God as the world's architect is responsible for what is good and bad in the world and the extent to which matter, as its fundamental material, is responsible. Such indeterminate ideas are useless in theology. Also, one finally noted the contradiction between saying that substances are eternal and necessary and yet that they nevertheless have an *influxum mutuum*ⁱ on each other. The confusion and absurdity in the view that the whole world consists of many necessary beings finally put human reason on the track of *creation* from nothing, a doctrine of which the ancients hardly had the least concept. Matter was now viewed as a product of God's free will, and God was thought of not only as the world's architect but also as its creator. But for a long time the idea of an independent matter persisted in the heads of philosophers, even of the orthodox. Hence there were zealous outcries against anyone who ventured to explain part of the world's order and beauty from universal laws of nature. For some were concerned that in this way such arrangements would be snatched away from God's supreme rule. But this could be believed only by someone who thinks of matter as independent of God, like a coordinated principle.^j If, on the contrary, it is assumed that every substance receives its origin from God, then all matter is subordinated to God and all its laws in the last analysis have their origin in him. This creating out of nothing appears to contradict the metaphysical proposition: *ex nihilo nihil fit*.^k Yet this proposition can be true only of

28:1095

^g community, in the sense of mutual causal influence^h *Prinzipien*ⁱ mutual influence^j *Prinzip*^k Nothing is made out of nothing.

what is highest in the world itself. In this world it can be rightly said that no substance can arise which has not already previously existed. And only *that* is what the above proposition means to say. But if we are talking about the origin of the world-whole, and this creation itself is not thought of as an occurrence in time, since time itself, indeed, began only *with* it, then there is no difficulty in thinking that the whole universe might have arisen through the will of an extramundane being, even if nothing previously existed. But at this point we must guard against mixing in the concepts of time, arising, and beginning; for this would only introduce confusion. We must even admit that such a production of substances, hence the possibility of creation, is something which cannot be comprehended by human reason, since we are not in a position to cite any similar case *in concreto* where the arising of a substance could be put before our eyes. In general the question how one substance can be produced by another, whether through emanation or through freedom, makes for many difficulties, which may well remain in part insoluble. But this is certainly not a sufficient ground for doubting the system of creation itself, since the subject matter here is of such a kind that, chained as we are to sensible representations, we can probably never attain to a clear insight into it. It is enough we feel in some way the urge to assume it as something given and to have a firm belief in it. For speculative reason must always admit that this idea is the most rational of any, and the one most suited to reason's own use.

Creation, or the making actual out of nothing, relates merely to substances; their forms, however different they may be, arise from the particular modifications of their composition. Hence one calls every substance produced out of nothing a *creature*. Now if, therefore, even the substance itself as well as its form comes from God, the question still remains: Can one substance be thought as the *creatrix* of another? And to this the answer is: Absolutely not! For all substances, as part of the world-whole, are in reciprocal *commercium* and have a mutual influence on one another. If this were not so, then all the substances together could not constitute a whole with each substance as a part of the whole. But if this is so, then it is unthinkable that one substance could be the author of another, since the second substance must act on the first as well as being passive to it. But that is a *contradictio in adjecto*.¹ For example, if someone built a house and then was killed when it collapsed, then one could think of him as having been here the cause of his own passivity. But in fact he made only a mere form through the composition of the building materials, and did not himself generate the substance, the matter. But it was just this matter, of which he was not the author or cause, which worked its influence on him and caused his death. Hence even God cannot be thought as having a reciprocal influence on the world. He effects everything, but cannot be

28:1096

¹ contradiction in the adjective

passive to anything. Creation cannot have been other than completed at once in an instant. For in God only one infinite act can be thought, a single, enduring force which created an entire world in an instant and preserves it in eternity. Through this act, many natural forces were poured out, as it were, in this world-whole, which they gradually formed in accordance with general laws.

Creation of the world, as we have remarked already, applies merely to substances. Hence if it is said that the creation of the world happened all at once, it is only the creation of substances that is to be understood. Now these substances also remain always persisting and their number neither increases nor decreases. God creates *only once*. Hence one cannot assert that *even now* God is creating a world, at least in the sense we mean here, that new substances can arise, even though many *new forms* can arise in the *world*, when the matter already present is put together^m in some different way. Fundamentally only one action can be thought in God; for in him there is no succession; but nevertheless this one act may have an infinite number of relations and expressions according to the constitution of the subjects to which it relates, and it actually does have them too. Hence God's power is not at all visible to us at one time while at another it is sensed by us.

God acts in no way but *freely*. Nothing has any influence on him, so as to be able to move him to act in any particular way and not otherwise. For in an absolutely necessary being all determinations that might impel him to actions other than those he wills out of his highest freedom are done away with. – That the world created by God is the *best* of all possible worlds is clear from the following reason.⁸¹ If a better world than the one willed by God were possible, then a *better will* than the divine will would also have to be possible. For indisputably that will is better which chooses what is better. But if a better will is possible, then so is a being who could express this better will. And this being would therefore be more perfect and better than God. But that is a contradiction; for in God is *omnitudo realitatis*. – There is more on this subject in Kant's "Attempt at Some Considerations on Optimism."⁸²

According to Leibniz, all the objections to the theory based on the existence of so much ill in the world can be briefly dismissed in that since our earth is only a part of the world, and since each part must be incomplete in itself, because only the *whole* totality of the world is supposed to be the best, it is impossible to determine whether ill would have to belong even to the best world as regards the plan for the whole. For whoever demands that our earth be free of all ill, and hence wholly good, is acting as if he wanted one part to be the whole.⁸³ Thanks be to the astronomers,

^m *zusammengesetzt*

ⁿ the all of reality

who by their observations and inferences have elevated our concept of the world as a whole far above the small circle of our world, for they have not only provided us with a broader acquaintance with the whole, but they have also taught us modesty and caution in our estimation of it. For surely if our terrestrial globe were the whole world, it would be difficult to know it to be the best and to hold by this with conviction; for, to speak with sincerity, on this earth the sum of pain and the sum of good might just about *balance each other*. Yet even in pain there are incentives to activity, and so one might even call it beneficial in itself. Thus the stinging flies in a swampy place are nature's call to human beings to drain the mires and make them arable in order to get rid of these disagreeable guests. Or if we did not feel the pain of a wound and were not thus driven to concern ourselves with healing it, we might bleed to death from it. But it is possible to recognize the doctrine of the best world from maxims of reason alone, independently of all theology and without its being necessary to resort to the wisdom of a creator in proof of it. And specifically in the following way: In the whole of organized nature it must be assumed as a necessary maxim of our reason that in every animal and plant there is not the least thing which is useless and without purpose; on the contrary, it must be assumed that everything contains a means best suited to certain ends. This is an established principle in the study of nature, and it has been confirmed by every experiment made in this case. Set these experiments aside and the field of discoveries is foreclosed to the anatomist. Hence the cultivation of our own reason urges us to assume and use this maxim. But if the whole of organized though irrational nature is arranged in anything like the best way, then we should expect things to be similar in the nobler part of the world, in rational nature. But the same law is valid also for organized creatures and for the mineral realm, for the sake of the necessary harmony in which everything is combined under the supremely necessary principle of unity. Thus we can and must assume for reason's sake that everything in the world is arranged for the best, and that the whole of everything existing is the best possible one. This doctrine has the same influence on morality as it has on natural science; for if I cannot be sure that the laws governing the course of nature are the best ones, then I must also doubt whether in such a world true well-being will eventually be combined with my worthiness to be happy. But if this world is the best, then my morality will stand firm and its incentives will retain their strength. For now I can be certain that in a best world it is impossible for good conduct to exist apart from well-being; and that even if for a certain part of my existence the course of things does not look this way, it would certainly have to hold for my existence as a whole if this world is to be the best. Hence even *our practical reason* takes great interest in this doctrine and recognizes it as a necessary presupposition for its own sake and

28:1098

28:1099

without founding it only theology. For how the best^o in a best world can obtain as a by-product of the progress toward the morally good, is already clear from our above theory of the origin of evil.⁸⁴

On the end of creation. It is possible to think of a double end for it, first an objective end, consisting in the perfection which made the world an object of God's will, and then a subjective end. Yet what kind of incentive, if one may so express it, could move God to create a world? But the next section⁸⁵ will deal with this latter end; the first end is the object of our present investigation.

Now what is the perfection for which the world was created by God? We may not seek such an end in irrational creatures. For everything in these creatures is only a means to higher ends which can be reached only by correct use of these means. The true perfection of the world-whole has to lie in the use *rational creatures* make of their reason and freedom. Only here can absolute ends be proposed, since reason is always required for something intentional. But what is the right use which rational creatures are to make of the will? It is a use such as can stand under the principle of the system of all ends. A universal system of ends is possible only in accord with the idea of morality. Hence the only rightful use of reason is that according to which the moral law is fulfilled. The perfection of the world will therefore consist in the fact that it is congruent with morality, which alone is what makes possible a system of all ends. —

A *twofold* system of all ends may be thought: either *through freedom or according to the nature of things*. A system of ends through freedom can be attained by means of the principles of morality, and this is the moral perfection of the world; only insofar as they can be regarded as members of this universal system do rational creatures have personal worth. For a good will is something good in and for itself, therefore something *absolutely* good. Everything else is only a conditioned good. For example, acuteness of mind, or health, is good only under the right condition, namely that of its right use. But morality, through which a system of all ends is possible, gives to the rational creature a worth in and for itself by making it a member of this great realm of all ends. The possibility of such a universal system of all ends is *dependent solely on morality alone*. For it is only insofar as *all* rational creatures act according to these eternal laws of reason that they can stand under a principle of community and together constitute a system of all ends. For example, if all human beings speak the truth, then among them a system of ends is possible; but if only one should lie, then his end is no longer in connection with the others. Hence the universal rule for judging the morality of an action is always this: If all

28:1100

^o *Beste*; it is possible that the text is corrupt at this point and the word intended is *Böse* (evil).

human beings did this, could there still be a connection of all ends? The system of all ends in accordance with the nature of things is attained along with the rational creature's worthiness to be happy, and it is the physical perfection of the world. It is only in this way that the state of a creature may obtain a preeminent value. Without this the rational creature might certainly have an excellent worth in itself, but its state could still be bad, and vice versa. But if both moral and physical perfection are *combined*, then this is the best world. The objective end of God in creation was the perfection of the world and not merely the happiness of creatures; for this constitutes only the [world's] physical perfection. A world with it alone would still be lacking in moral perfection, or the worthiness to be happy. Or is the perfect world supposed to be one whose members overflow with pleasure and good fortune while nevertheless being conscious that their own existence is *without worth*?

But apart from objective grounds for being well-pleased with some thing itself and its constitution, there are also *subjective* grounds for pleasure in the existence of a thing. The two must be distinguished from each other, for I can find a thing to be very fine indeed on objective grounds, but still be indifferent to its existence as far as I myself am concerned. Here a subjective ground for my pleasure, or in a word, my interest, would be lacking. Just this often holds even of moral motives which, if they are objective, obligate me to do something, but still do not bestow on me the powers and incentives to do it. For in order to perform the actions recognized to be good and right, certain subjective motives in me are also required to put them into practice. For this it is necessary not only that I find the deed to be noble and fine, but that my choice be determined accordingly. Now it is asked: Did God in creating the world have, in addition to the objective ground of its perfection, also a subjective determining incentive determining his choice, and if so what was it? In God, however, no incentives except the objective motives may be thought! His pleasure which he has in the idea of a perfect object, combined with the consciousness of himself as a sufficient ground of every perfection, already determines his causality. – For if before God actualized anything some further subjective pleasure in the existence of this thing had to be added as an incentive to his causality, then a part of his blessedness would have to depend on the existence of the thing in which he takes this interest. For his pleasure in the perfection of the thing in its idea alone would not be strong enough to move him to produce it, and God would have need of a special interest that the thing should actually exist. This interest would not have been there if the thing, however perfect it may be in the idea, had not also actually existed; consequently God would have needed the existence of a world in order to have his perfect blessedness. But this contradicts his highest perfection. – Hence one must make a

28:1101

28:1102

distinction between a *voluntas originaria*^p and a *voluntas derivativa*.^q It is only the latter which has need of special incentives to determine it to the choice of something good. Thus, for example, a human being can find a deed thoroughly noble on objective grounds, but he may nevertheless hesitate to perform it because he believes he has no particular subjective motives for doing so. A completely perfect will, on the contrary, would do the deed merely *because it is good*. The perfection of the thing it wills to produce is by itself a sufficient motive for it actually to put the deed into practice. Hence God created a world because he was most well-pleased with its highest perfection, where every rational creature would participate in happiness to the measure in which he had made himself worthy of it; in short, he created the world for the sake of its physical as well as its moral perfection. Thus one must not say that God's motive in creating the world *was merely the happiness of his creatures*, as if God could take pleasure in seeing other beings happy without their being worthy of it; God's infinite understanding, on the contrary, recognized the *possibility of a highest good* external to himself in which morality would be the supreme principle.^r He was conscious at the same time of having all the power needed to set up this most perfect of all possible worlds. His well-pleasedness in this consciousness of himself as an all-sufficient ground was therefore the only thing determining his will to actualize the greatest finite good. Hence it would be better if one said that God created the world for the sake of his honor because it is only through obedience to his holy laws that God can be honored.⁸⁶ For what does it mean to honor God? What, if not to serve him? – But how can he be served? Certainly not by trying to entice his favor by rendering him all sorts of praise; for that is at best only a means of preparing ourselves and elevating our own hearts to a good disposition; instead the service of God consists simply and solely in *following his will* and observing his holy laws and commandments. *Thus morality and religion stand in the closest combination*, and are distinguished from each other only by the fact that the former moral duties are carried out from the principles of every rational being, which is to act as a member of a universal system of ends; whereas *here* [in religion] these duties are regarded as commandments of a supremely holy will, because fundamentally the laws of morality are the only ones that agree with the idea of highest perfection. –

The whole world can be regarded as a universal system of all ends, whether through nature or through freedom. This doctrine of ends is called “teleology.” But just as there is a physical system of ends in which every thing in nature has a relation as a means to some end found in rational creatures, so there is also a practical system of ends, that is, a

^p original will^q derivativa will^r Prinzip

28:1103

system in accordance with the laws of free volition. In this system every rational creature stands in connection with every other as reciprocal end and means. The former system of ends is the object of *theologia physica*;³ the latter is treated by *theologia practica seu pneumatica*.⁴ There all rational beings are themselves regarded as possible means to the attainment of ends of rational creatures, and in this way the world may be exhibited not merely *in nexu effectivo*⁵ as a combination of causes and effects like a machine, but also *in nexu finali*⁶ as a system of all ends. In *theologia practica*⁷ we see that rational creatures constitute the *center* of creation, and everything in the world relates to them. But they also have some relation to one another as mutual means. Yet however disordered and purposeless as history may describe human conduct, yet we should not let this drive us crazy, but should rather believe nevertheless that the human race is grounded on a *universal plan* according to which it will in the end *attain to its highest possible perfection*. For up to now we have surveyed the plan *only in its individual parts and fragments*.

To conclude our consideration of God as creator of the world, we must yet try to solve the cosmological problem as to whether he created the world *in time or from eternity*. – Now would it not be an internal contradiction to say that God created the world *from eternity*? For then the world would have to be eternal, as God is; and yet it is also supposed to be dependent on him. Yet if “eternity” here means the same as infinite time, then I become guilty of a *regressus in infinitum*⁸ and commit an absurdity. But then can we think of the creation of the world only as in time? No, not this either. For when I say that the world had a beginning, I am thereby asserting that there was a time *before* the origin of the world, because every beginning of something is the end of a time just past, and the first moment of a subsequent time. But if there was a time before the world existed, then it must have been an empty time. Again an absurdity! And God himself must have been in this time. – Now how can reason emerge from this conflict between its ideas?²⁸⁷ What is the cause of this dialectical illusion? It lies in the fact that I am regarding time, a *mere form of sensibility*, a mere formal condition and a phenomenon, as a determination of the *mundus noumenon*.⁹ All appearances, to be sure, are given only in time; but when I try to bring under the rule of time even the actuation of the substances themselves which are the substratum of all appearances and consequently also of my sensible representations, then I commit a striking

28:1104

³ natural theology⁴ practical or spiritual theology⁵ in the connection of efficient causes⁶ in the connection of final causes⁷ practical [or moral] theology⁸ regress to infinity⁹ noumenal world

error, a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*.^z For I confuse things which do not belong together at all. At this point my reason recognizes its incapacity to raise itself above experience, and although it is in a position to show that all the objections of its opponents are fruitless and vain, it is still too weak to settle anything itself with apodictic certainty.

Of providence

The actuation of the beginning of the world is *creation*. The actuation of its duration is *conversation*. Both apply only to substances. For of that which adheres to them as something accidental, I can say neither that it was created nor that it is conserved. It is also good if one makes a distinction between the concepts of God as the architect of the world and as the world's creator. This distinction is just as cogent as the one between accident and substance. For in God only one act can really be thought, which never ceases but expresses itself without variation or interruption. For in God no succession of states takes place, and consequently no time. So how could his power operate only for a certain time and then cease or be interrupted? Hence the same divine power which actuated the beginning of the world constantly actuates its duration. The same power required for the creation of substances is also needed for their conservation. Yet if every substance in the world can have duration only through a continuous *actus divinus*,^a then it would appear that this deprives it of its very substance. But here it is fundamentally only the expression *subsistentia*^b (self-sufficiency^c) which causes the difficulty and the apparent contradiction. Of course we cannot substitute a more suitable expression for it because language does not have one; but we can prevent it from being misunderstood by explaining it. A substance, a thing subsisting for itself, is one *quod non indiget subjecto inhaerentiae*,^d that is, it exists without being the predicate of anything else. For example, I am a substance because I refer everything I do to myself, without needing something else to which to ascribe my actions as something inhering in it. – But I myself may nevertheless always have need of some other being for my own existence. This being may be the author of my existence and duration without its having to be at the same time the author of my actions. Hence substance and accident must be carefully distinguished from cause and effect. For the two relationships are entirely different. A thing can be a *causatum*

28:1105

^z a change to another kind

^a divine act

^b subsistence

^c *Selbständigkeit*

^d which does not need a subject of inherence

alterius^e (or have need of the existence of something else for its own existence) and still subsist for itself. But subsisting and existing *originarie*^f have to be distinguished from one another; for subsistence would involve a contradiction if something existing *originarie* also had to exist as a *causatum alterius*. This would be the false definition of substance like the one sketched out by the well-meaning Spinoza; for through too great a dependence on Cartesian principles he understood a substance to be a thing *quod non indiget existentia alterius*.⁸⁸ – The result of all this is that it is incomprehensible how substances should have duration through the power of God; but it is not contradictory.

The causality of more than one *causa* is a *concursus*. Several causes, that is, can be united to produce one effect. If this happens, then several *concausae*^g concur. In such a case none of these cooperating causes is in itself sufficient to produce the effect; for otherwise its unification with another cause would not be necessary to give it a *complementum ad sufficientiam*.^h But where there is a *causa solitaria* or solitary cause, there can be no *concursus*. For firstly, several causes are required for a *concursus*; but these causes also have to be *concausae*, that is, they must be coordinated with one another and not subordinated one to another. For if the causes are subordinated one to another and constitute a chain or series of causes in which each is a particular link, then each link in the chain is the complete cause of the next, even if all together they have a common ground in the first cause. But then each considered in itself is still a *causa solitaria* and there is no *concursus*. If this is to take place, then causes have to be united and coordinated with one another; and one cause must make up for what the other fails to produce. Thus the effect is produced only by the causes being unified and working in community with one another. – Applying this to God, it is clear firstly that he does not concur in the existence of substances; for substances contribute nothing to their own duration, and therefore cannot themselves operate in union with God as *concausae* of their own conservation.⁸⁹ – In this case there is only a subordination of causes, so that every substance has its ground in God as the *prima causa*,ⁱ since the matter of every substance itself is created by him; but just for this reason there can be no *concursus*, for if there were, then the substance would have to be coordinated with God. – In the same way, there takes place no *concursus* of God with natural occurrences. For just because they are supposed to be natural occurrences, it is presupposed already that their first proximate cause is in nature itself, and it must be

28:1106

^e being caused by another

^f “originally,” i.e. without need of an external cause

^g cooperating or joint causes

^h complement to the point of sufficiency

ⁱ first cause

sufficient to effect the occurrence, even if the cause itself (like every natural cause) is grounded in God as the supreme cause. – Yet a *concursum* between God and natural occurrences in the world is still not impossible; for it is always thinkable that a natural cause is not sufficient by itself to produce a certain effect. In such a case God might give it a *complementum ad sufficientiam*; but whenever he did this, he would *eo ipso* perform a miracle. For we call something a miracle *when the cause of an occurrence is supernatural*, as it would be if God himself operated as *concausa* in the production of such a miracle. – Hence if one ascribes to God special turns and twists of affairs in the world, then one is only predicating so many miracles of him. –

But how does it stand with free actions? Can a *concursum divinum* be affirmed of them?⁹⁰ Now in general speculative reason cannot comprehend the freedom of creatures, nor can experience prove it; but our practical interest requires us to presuppose that we can act according to the idea of freedom. Yet even if it is true that our will can decide something independently of every natural cause, it is still not in the least conceivable how God might concur in our actions despite our freedom, or how he could concur as a cooperating cause of our will; for then *eo ipso* we would not be the author of our own actions, or at least not wholly so. Of course this idea of freedom is one which belongs to the intelligible world, and we are acquainted with nothing of it beyond the fact that it exists, so we also do not know the laws by which it is governed. But even if our reason cannot deny the possibility of this *concursum*, it still sees that such an effect would have to be a miracle of the moral world, just as God's acts of cooperation with occurrences in the sensible world are God's miracles in the physical world.

28:1107

God's *omnipresence* is closely bound up with *conservation*;⁹¹ the former, indeed, consists precisely in God's immediate operation in the duration of every thing in the world. It is, in the first place, something *immediate*. God does not act through intermediate causes in his conservation of substances; for if he did, then these causes would once again have to be substances which were his effects, and consequently one substance would have to operate in conserving the others, and thus one substance would be dependent on another. But that one substance in the world cannot cause the existence of another had already been shown where we dealt with the impossibility of substances in the world standing *in commercio* with each other so as to be able to create each other.⁹² Just as impossible is that substances could mutually contribute to the conservation of one another or the duration of each other's existence. For creation and conservation are one and the same act. Further, God's omnipresence is an *inward* presence; i.e. God conserves what is substantial, the very inwardness of substances.⁹³ For it is just this which is necessary for the duration of substances, and unless God unceasingly actuated this inwardness and

essential substantiality, things in the world would all have to cease being. We have an example of such a thing in Newton's theorems about the mutual attraction of all things in the world; for things attract one another immediately, or as he expressed it, in empty space, consequently they operate reciprocally on one another and thus they are all present to one another, but not inwardly; for this is only a case of reciprocal influence, that is, an operation on the state of things or a modification of their alterable determinations by one another. An inward presence, however, is an action of the duration of the very substance in a thing. Hence one cannot, as the author does, call conservation a "constant influence";⁹⁴ for by speaking of an influence, he is saying that God conserves only the state of substances (their alterable determinations) and not the substances themselves; hence we would be asserting that matter is independent of God. God's omnipresence is therefore *immediate* and *inner* but *not local*; for it is impossible for a thing to be in two or more places at the same time, because then the thing would be external to itself (which is a contradiction). Suppose, for example, that *A* is in place *a*; then *A* is wholly in *a*; if one said now that it is in place *b* too, then it cannot be wholly in place *a* or in place *b*, but there must be a part of it in each place. Hence if one wants to assert that God is in all places, then he has to be thought of as a composite being, as a mass extending throughout the whole world, something like the air. But then God would not be wholly in any place in the world; part of him would be in each place, just as the whole atmosphere is not in any place on the earth but in each place there is always only a collection of little particles of air. Yet if God is the most perfect spirit, then he cannot be thought of as in space. For space is only a condition of the sensible appearance of things. – Newton says in one place that space is the *sensorium* of God's omnipresence.⁹⁵ Of course one can think of such a *sensorium* in the human being, where the *seat* of the soul is located and where all the impressions of sense concur; but this would be the soul's organ, the point from which it disperses its powers and operations to the whole body. Such a representation of God's omnipresence, however, is most inappropriate; for it would regard God as the *soul of the world*, and space as his *sensorium*. For if God were the soul of the world, then he would have to stand *in commercio* with the world and all the things in it, i.e. he would not only operate on those things but receive their operations as well. Or at least our only concept of a soul is that of an intelligence united with a body in such a way that both *reciprocally* influence each other. It is not easy to see how such a thing could be brought into agreement with the impassibility of a highest being. It would be better to say that space is a phenomenon of God's omnipresence, although even this expression is not entirely suitable, though it cannot be avoided on account of the poverty of language, which lacks words signifying such thoughts, not to mention expressing them clearly. But space is only an appearance of our senses and

28:1108

28:1109

a relation^j of things to one another; and the relation between things themselves is possible only insofar as God conserves them through his immediate and inner presence; thus he determines the place of each through his omnipresence; so to this extent God himself is the cause of space, and space is a phenomenon of his omnipresence. The omnipresence of God is consequently not local but virtual; i.e. God's power operates constantly and everywhere on all things; thus he conserves substances themselves as well as governing their state. But we must be *careful* to guard ourselves *against all enthusiasm* in this representation, for although God's omnipresence expresses itself in each of us by the actuation of our very existence, this omnipresence cannot be felt by any of us, nor can any of us be certain for himself that God is operating in him in any particular case. For how am I to experience or be sensible of what is the cause of my own existence? – Indeed, if it were only a question of some change in my state, it might very well be possible for me to feel it. Yet no experience of the actuation of my own existence is possible. This is of great importance, and a caution^k *protecting us from all fanatical madness and delusion*.

If we affirm a *concursum divinum* as regards things as well as occurrences in the world, then this is usually called a *concursum physicam*. But from what we have already said about God's "cooperation" with natural occurrences, can it not be recognized how inappropriate it is to use this expression in place of "divine conservation." For how can I regard substances as concurring with God in their own preservation, since they are not coordinated with him but wholly depend on him as their *causa solitaria absolute prima*?^l Would I not then be asserting that their existence is not actuated by God and that they do not have need of him for their duration as their sole cause, since he is only a cooperating cause of it? – It is equally wrong to posit a *concursus Dei* for natural occurrences. For we can always think of a *causa proxima*^m for these occurrences, operating in accord with laws of nature; since otherwise they would *eo ipso* not be natural occurrences. So it is likewise unthinkable that God, who is the *causa prima*ⁿ of the whole of nature, might also cooperate as a *concausa* in each particular occurrence. For then these occurrences would be just so many miracles; for every case where God himself acts immediately is *an exception to the rule of nature*. But if God is to cooperate as a special *concausa* of every particular natural occurrence, then every occurrence would be an excep-

^j Relation^k Cautele^l absolutely first solitary cause^m proximate causeⁿ first cause

tion to the laws of nature, or rather there would be no order at all in nature, because the occurrences would not happen according to general rules but in each case God would have to give a *complementum ad sufficientiam* to anything which was to be set up according to his will. What imperfection in a world, totally irreconcilable with a wise author!

28:IIIO

But as regards a *concursum morale*^o or God's free cooperation in the free actions of human beings, such a thing cannot be comprehended in the nature of freedom, but at the same time it cannot be regarded as impossible. For if it is presupposed that every rational being could from itself act even against the plan of God, hence entirely free and independently of the whole mechanism of nature, then it is indeed possible that God, in order to make rational creatures use their freedom in a manner agreeable to his highest will, could cooperate as a *concausa*.

Providence is in God one single act; but we can think of it as having three separate functions, namely *providence*,^p *government* and *direction*.^q Divine *providence*^q consists in the institution of the laws according to which the course of the world is to proceed. *Government* is the conservation of the course of the world in accord with these laws, and divine *direction* is the determination of individual occurrences according to these decrees. Insofar as God's providence is benevolent, it is called *provision*.^r These expressions are deceptively infected with the concept of time; but one nevertheless has to use them, after separating all sensible limitations, for lack of anything more suitable.

God's providence is usually divided into *providentiam generalem* and *providentiam specialem*.^s By the former is understood God's conservation of all types and kinds (*genera*); by the latter, however, his caring for *species*, a word used here in its juridical sense to indicate care for individuals. At this point the expression *generalis* is distinguished from *universalis*, as if many exceptions may be made in a general providence, as for example it is said of a king that he cares for his subjects in general.^t Yet this concept of divine providence is obviously wholly anthropomorphic. For such general provision is extremely imperfect, and in fact could be found only in beings who have to be acquainted through experience with needs. But experience furnishes only an aggregate, and hence the rules abstracted from it can

28:IIII

^o moral cooperation

^p *Providenz*

^q *Providenz*

^r *Vorsorge*

^s general providence and special providence

^t The German word *allgemein* translates both *generalis* (general) and *universalis* (universal). We will continue to translate it as either "general" or "universal," as the context dictates, but in the following passage it is well for the reader to keep in mind that the term translated in these ways is ambiguous in the original.

never be universal, because a portion of the possible perceptions are always lacking. Consequently, it is impossible for every law whose beneficence rests on principles of experience to suit every individual in the state and to work equally for the well-being of all and the common utility. For how could the lord of a country be acquainted with every single one of his subjects and with all the circumstances under which his laws might be of great advantage to one but detrimental to another? God, however, has no need of experience at all; rather he knows everything *a priori* because he himself created everything he provides for, and everything is possible only through him. Hence God formulated the laws governing the world in light of a thorough acquaintance with every single occurrence in it, and in the establishment of the course of the world he certainly had the greatest possible perfection in view, because God himself is the all-wise and is all in all. For certainly in his omniscience he foresaw every possible individual, as well as every *genus*, even before there was anything at all. And in actualizing them he provided for their existence as well as their welfare, through the establishment of suitable laws. Hence because *God cognizes everything a priori*, his providence is *universalis*, or general enough to comprehend everything: *genera*, *species* and individuals. In one glance God surveys all of existence and he conserves it by his power. This universality of divine providence is not a logical generality, as with general rules we draw up in order to classify the marks in things; rather it is *real* [universality], for God's understanding is intuitive, whereas ours, on the contrary, is discursive. Hence it is foolish to think of a divine providence "on the whole" (*generalis*) as coming from a highest being; for such a being could not fail to cognize the totality in every single part. Rather God's providence is wholly universal (*universalis*), and thus the distinction of a *providentia generali* from a *providentia speciali* collapses of itself.

28:1112

Since every occurrence in the world is directed by God, supreme will, the divine *direction* is partly *ordinary* and partly *extraordinary*. The former consists in God's setting up an order in nature, so that its laws accord with what he decrees for the world; the latter consists in the fact that he sometimes determines in accord with his aims that individual occurrences should not correspond to the order of nature. It is not at all impossible that even in the best world the powers of nature may sometimes require the immediate cooperation of God in order to bring about certain great ends. It is not impossible that the lord of nature might at times communicate to it a *complementum ad sufficientiam* in order to carry out his plan. Or who would be so presumptuous as to want to cognize how everything God intends for the world could be attained in accord with universal laws and without his extraordinary direction? – Hence God can of course use natural causes merely as means for bringing about certain occurrences which

he has put before himself as an end, and for the sake of the greater perfection of the whole are applied to the production of this or that occurrence. Such exceptions to the rules of nature may be necessary because without them God might not be able to put many great aims to work in the usual course of nature. Only we must guard ourselves from trying to determine without further instruction whether God's extraordinary direction^u has taken place in *this or that case*; this is sufficient for us to place an immeasurable trust in God.

Nevertheless, not everything happens through divine direction, even if everything stands *under* it. For as soon as an occurrence is produced immediately through the divine will, then it is a miracle and an effect of his extraordinary direction. Now every miracle either was woven by God into the laws of nature during the creation of the world, or else he works it in the course of the world in order to bring about some necessary aim of his. In either case they are miracles, which we cannot expect, but neither can we deny them. To reassure ourselves in the face of life's contingencies, we may think of every occurrence as fundamentally a consequence of God's government and direction.^v What is it to us whether these events happen in accord with the order of nature or in an extraordinary way? Everything still stands under his provision. — Only we must never regard our *prayer* as a means of getting something, but rather, as regards corporeal advantages, we ought to offer it both with a trust in God's wisdom and with submission to this wisdom. The greatest utility of prayer is indisputably a *moral* one, because through prayer both thankfulness and resignation toward God become effective in us. But if an investigation is required into whether this or that occurrence is an immediate end of God, something he has arranged or effected in an extraordinary way, then here *great reserve and caution* are necessary, so that we do not, at the bidding of a lazy reason, derive anything from God as its immediate cause when more acute reflection might convince us that it was only a natural effect; and even if all our researches on this score should be in vain, it is still the case that our fruitless seeking fulfills our great vocation and furthers the cultivation of our reason. —

28:1113

If, in our discussion of the truth that God created the whole world for the best, it was necessary to reply to the objection how moral evil could be found in such a best world, then it is now also our duty to show why God has *not prevented* evil, since everything is subject to his government. — The possibility of deviating from the moral law must adhere to every creature. For it is unthinkable that any creature could be without needs and limits. God alone is without limitations. But if every creature has

^u *Lenkung*^v *Lenkung*

needs and deficiencies, then it must also be possible that impulses of sense (for these derive from the needs) can seduce it into forsaking morality. It is self-evident that we are speaking here only of free creatures, since the irrational ones have no morality. If the human being is to be a free creature and responsible for the development and cultivation of his abilities and predispositions, then it must also be within his power to follow or shun the laws of morality. His use of his freedom has to depend on him, even if it should wholly conflict with the plan God designed for the moral world. By divine decree God could have given the human being overriding powers and motives sufficient to make him a member of the great realm of ends. Hence if God does not prevent evil in the world, this never sanctions evil; it only permits it.

3) OF GOD AS THE RULER OF THE WORLD

28:1114 God is the only *ruler of the world*. He governs as a monarch, but not as a despot;⁹⁷ for he wills to have his commands observed out of love, not out of servile fear. Like a father, he orders what is good for us and does not command out of mere arbitrariness, like a tyrant. God even demands of us that we reflect on the *reason*^w for his commandments, and he insists on our observing them because he wants first to make us worthy of happiness and then make us participate in it. – God's will is benevolence and his end is the best. If God commands something for which we cannot understand the reason, then this is because of the limitations on *our* cognition, and not because of the nature of the commandment itself. God carries out his rulership over the world *alone*; for he surveys everything with one glance. Of course he may often use wholly incomprehensible means to carry out his benevolent aims.

Since God governs everything, we are warranted in assuming a teleological connection in nature. For governing presupposes aims, and God's government presupposes the wisest and best ones. To be sure, in many cases our efforts must be in vain, because the true ends of the highest understanding are too much concealed from our insight for us to be able to descry them. Great care is required on our part if we are not to take some natural occurrence to be part of a divine end when it is really either only a means or a by-product of a higher end. But even if we sometimes engage in these researches without success, still we have exercised our reason and at least discovered something. And even if we go entirely wrong, no greater harm results than that we take something to be the work of an intention when it is only a mechanism of nature. A need of our own reason requires that we search everywhere for universal laws according to

^w *Grund*

which certain occurrences are ordered. For in this way we bring unity and harmony into our cognition of nature, instead of destroying all order in nature, as we would do if we regarded every single thing in the world as an effect of God's special providence. – In the same way, in world history we can also think of the occurrences which are consequences of human freedom as connected with and carried out by God's government according to a plan. Only here too according to the nature of our reason we have to hold on to the universal and not try to determine how divine providence has proven itself effective in particular cases. – For although for God's understanding, which cognizes everything intuitively, the whole is a whole fundamentally only insofar as it consists of every particular; for this, consequently, divine providence is also completely universal, in the sense that it includes every individual in its plan; but it would be perverse of us and contrary to our discursive reason if we too tried to rise from the particular directly^x to the universal and survey the whole. The nature of our reason lays on us the duty of first reflecting^y on *general* laws and then, as far as possible, of grasping every individual and then every species under them, and in such a way of forming some sketch of the whole, which is to be sure very defective, but nevertheless sufficient for our needs.

28:1115

What the author says about *divine decrees* is obviously only a human representation; for in God the decree and its execution are one.⁹⁸ But it is necessary to our concept, as long as we think of it in a worthy manner. Yet an *absolutum decretum* is absolutely improper regarding God;⁹⁹ for such a thing would make of God not only a despot but a complete tyrant, as if without any regard to the worthiness of his subjects he elected some to happiness and condemned the others straightway to reprobation, providing all sorts of remedies for the first and withdrawing from the others every power and opportunity to make themselves worthy of happiness, so as to do all this with a show of right. It would be almost unthinkable that any men of heart and insight could come to such dishonorable thoughts about God, unless it is assumed for their honor's sake either that they have not thought over the terrible consequences of such corrupt doctrines or have not shunned them merely out of bewilderment. For through this the concept of God would become a scandal and all morality would become a figment of the brain. This would also wholly conflict with the idea of human freedom, since in this way all actions can be considered to accord with the necessity of nature. Hence speculative philosophers may always be forgiven for having fallen into such notions,^z since human freedom and its possibility will always be something insoluble for them. But in any theology which is to be a princi-

^x erst^y nachsinnen^z Vorstellungen

28:1116 ple^a for religion it is both puzzling and senseless to make such concepts of God the ground. *If the human soul as an intelligence is free* (for as appearance it belongs to be sure in the series of natural things), *then it also depends on the soul itself whether it will be worthy or unworthy of happiness.*

Insofar as its object is the reprobation of one whole part of humankind, the doctrine of *predestination* presupposes an *immoral* order of nature. For it is thereby asserted that in the case of some human beings the circumstances of their lives are so ordered and connected that they could not but be unworthy of blessedness. Hence simply according to the order of nature, these unfortunates would be *sacrifices to misery*. But how could such a thing be compatible with the concept of a benevolent, wise and holy creator and governor of the world? It is one of the great advantages provided by the doctrine of God from the point of view of our cognition and reassurance that this doctrine *brings the realm of nature into exact harmony with the realm of ends!* It is precisely through it, indeed, that we infer that the whole order of nature is arranged in accordance with God's ends and agrees with them! – How, then, should we suppose that one of God's ends is the misery of a portion of his creation? – God's government of the world in accordance with *moral principles* is an assumption without which all morality would have to break down. For if morality cannot provide me with the prospect of satisfying my needs, then it cannot command anything of me either. Hence it is also necessary that God's will should not be made the principle^b of rational morality; for in this way we could never be sure what God had in mind for the world. How can I know by reason and speculation *what* God's will is, and what it consists in? Without morality to help me here, I would be on a slippery path, surrounded by mountains which afford me no prospect. How much danger I would be in of having my foot slip, or, because no clear horizon ever meets my eyes, of wandering lost in a labyrinth!

28:1117 The cognition of God must therefore complete morality, but it must not first determine whether something is morally good or a duty for me! This I must judge from the nature of things in accordance with possible system of ends; and I must be just as certain of it as I am that a triangle has three angles. But in order to provide my heart with conviction, weight and emphasis, I have need of a God who will make me participate in happiness in accordance with these eternal and unchangeable laws, if I am worthy of it. – In the same way, the cognition of God and his providence must be the goal of our natural science, crowning all our endeavors in it; but not the principle from which we derive every single occurrence without inquiring into its general laws.

^a *Princip*

^b *Princip*

Fourth section

Of revelation

The author defines¹⁰⁰ *revelationem latius dictam*^c as *significationem mentis divinae creaturis a Deo factam*.^d Yet this definition of a revelation in general is *angustior suo definito*.^e For divine revelation must be able to furnish us with convincing cognition of God's existence and attributes as well as his will. The former have to be the motives and incentives impelling us to fulfill the latter. Revelation is divided into the *outer* and the *inner*. An *outer* revelation can be of *two kinds*: either through works, or through words. *Inner* divine revelation is God's revelation to us through our own reason; this latter must *precede all other* revelation and serve for the estimation of outer revelation. It has to be the touchstone by which I recognize *whether an outer revelation is really from God*, and it must furnish me with proper concepts of him. For as we have seen above, nature by itself can never give me a complete and determinate concept of God unless I bring reason to its aid. Nature teaches me to fear that one being, or several beings, who might have produced the world, but not to honor and love without flattery a God who has all perfection. But now if I make into a principle^f of religion a concept of God such as nature gives me, namely the concept of a very mighty being (for I would hardly come to be acquainted with him as a benevolent being in this way, on account of the apparent conflict of ends in the world) – in short, if I take as this principle not the concept of God as an all-perfect being but only the mere concept of a very perfect being, then from this little or nothing can be deduced toward the confirmation and awakening of a true morality. And of what use, then, is the entire natural concept of God? Certainly for nothing else than that actually made of it by most peoples: as a *terrifying picture of fantasy*, or a superstitious object of ceremonial adoration and hypocritical high praise! But now if before I turn to physicotheology, my reason has already taught me that God is all in all,¹⁰¹ and that in accordance with my cognition of moral laws I have gained insight into the concept of God as a being who governs the world according to the highest morality, then in this case my knowledge of nature serves me admirably to give the pure concepts of my understanding greater intuitiveness^g and to make a stronger impression on the sensible human being. I will no longer be in danger of forming an incomplete concept of God from mere nature; for now I have already received from my reason a thoroughly determinate concept; and in accord with this

28:1118

^c revelation in the wide sense^d a signification by the divine mind to the creature made by God^e narrower than what is defined^f *Principe*^g *Anschaulichkeit*

28:1119

concept I can judge all God's works in this world insofar as he has revealed himself in them. In just the same way, the revelation of God through words presupposes an *inner* revelation through my own reason. For words are only the sensible signs of my thoughts; how by means of them will I therefore attain to an entirely pure concept of God? But if my own reason has already abstracted such a concept from things, if with the help of morality it has already come to an entirely determinate concept of God, then I have a norm in accordance with which I can measure and explain the verbal expressions of a divine revelation. Even if God were to make an immediate appearance, I would still need a previous rational theology. For how will I become certain here whether it is God himself who has appeared to me, or only another powerful being? Thus I have need of a pure idea of the understanding, an idea of a most perfect being, if I am not to be blinded and led astray. Thus we can have no correct insight into the external revelation of God, and we can make no right use of it, until we have made an entirely rational theology our property. But on the other side an external divine revelation can be an occasion for the human being to come for the first time to pure concepts of God which are pure concepts of the understanding; and it can also give him the opportunity to search for these concepts. A verbal revelation will always become more and more a matter of scholarly learning the longer it lasts, even if in the beginning it was something quite simple. For with time it becomes a matter of tradition, whether it is transmitted orally or in writing; and then there can be only a few whose scholarly learning is broad enough that they can go back to its very first origins and carefully test its genuineness. Here the religion of reason always has to remain the *substratum* and foundation of every investigation; it is *according to this religion* that the value of that verbal revelation must be determined. So it must precede every other revelation and serve as a gauge.

In rational theology there are many *credenda*^h which reason itself urges us to assume; and it is an important duty for us to believe them with conviction. The objectⁱ of this cognition – God – is of such a kind that, since it transcends the bounds of every possible experience and belongs to the intelligible world, there can be no knowledge of it. For I can have knowledge only of what I myself experience. But regarding our morality, it is very good that our cognition is not knowledge but faith; *for in this way the fulfillment of my duty will be far purer and more unselfish*. But the matters of faith pertaining to rational religion extend their obligation to the whole human species; for every rational being must assume them unflinchingly from a moral standpoint even if he cannot prove them with apodictic certainty.

^h things believed

ⁱ *Objekt*

Now it can be asked whether there are also *credenda* given in a higher revelation, which have to be accepted⁷ even though reason does not recognize the necessity of believing them. But reason can *neither deny nor prove* the possibility of such things. First, no human being can hold it impossible that in order to bring the human species to the highest stage of perfection in its vocation, God might have given to it, in a higher revelation, certain truths necessary to happiness into which reason, through its own cultivation, can perhaps never come to have insight. For who dares to specify the plan or the means by which God might help human beings to become what their vocation determines them to be? – But on the other side my reason has *just as little insight* as to how something not lying in reason but transcending all reason could be necessary to the welfare of humanity. Thus a pagan philosopher¹⁰² once said: *Quod supra nos, nihil ad nos.*^k The precise cognition of and adherence to the path reason prescribes is all that God himself teaches to make us worthy of any higher insight which might be provided to supplement reason's deficiencies. For how could I reckon in additional gifts and presents even before I have applied and used that with which I am already endowed?

28:1120

Mysteries, properly so called, are those doctrines which are not to be made public;¹⁰³ for they are truths into whose possibility reason cannot have insight, but which are to be accepted⁷ from other causes. There are many natural mysteries; but there are also many mysteries in rational religion, for example, the absolute necessity of God, to believe which reason is urged for its own sake, but concerning which reason comes to a standstill as soon as it is a question of gaining insight into the possibility of such a thing. Further: [it is a mystery that] a just God in his benevolence can distribute happiness only according to the object's worthiness to be happy; yet he can make a human being happy even when this human being finds himself unworthy of happiness, since before the bar of conscience his best striving is never adequate to the whole of the moral law. Here our reason is profoundly silent. For even if it says, "Do as much good as you can," this is still a long way from being sufficient to reassure me. For where is there a human being who can determine how much good he can do? Where is the human being bold enough to say: "I have done everything I could"? I cannot rely upon God's beneficence here, for my reason has to think of God's judgment as supremely just, limiting benevolence by his strict holiness, so that no one unworthy might participate in it. What end of means God has here to replace what is lacking in my worthiness to be happy – this is for my reason an impenetrable mystery. It is enough that I have a duty to strive as much as possible to act in accord with the moral

28:1121

angenommen

What is above us is nothing to us.

angenommen

law, and make myself susceptible and worthy of such a means. Accordingly, that mysteries are possible in God's revelation through words is, according to what we have already said, not to be denied; but whether *there actually are such mysteries, no longer belongs to rational theology.*

- 43 Thomas More, *Utopia* (1516); James Harrington (1611–77), *Oceania* (1656), Denis Vairasse d'Allais (fl. 1665–81), *History of Severambes* (1675). Oliver Cromwell's protectorate lasted from 1653 to 1658.
- 44 Anton F. Büsching (1724–93) was the author of extensive writings on geography, history, education, and religion, and the editor of two journals in the fields of geography and history.
- 45 David Hume (1711–76), "Of Public Credit," in *Essays Moral, Political and Literary* (1741–42).
- 46 C. W. Hufeland was Professor of Medicine at the University of Jena and author of *Macrobiotics: Or the art of prolonging human life* (1796), a copy of which he sent to Kant (see AK 12:137). Hufeland made several comments on Kant's essay (see AK 7:345–7).
- 47 "All are from the dust, and all return to dust" (Ecclesiastes 3:20).
- 48 The Leipzig publisher Johann Gottlieb Breitkopf (1719–94) advocated the development of Fraktur type, whereas the Didot firm in Paris had, since 1713, published its Antiqua in very small type.
- 49 Hufeland here added a note confirming Kant's view that this condition is not an opthalmic disease, and suggesting that it results from a temporary circulatory or gastric irritation (AK 7:346–7).

Lectures on the philosophical doctrine of religion

- 1 The *Cyropaedia* is a historical novel by Xenophon (c. 430–355 B.C.) purporting to describe the education of Cyrus the Great of Persia (died 529 B.C.); its real (moralistic) purpose is to set forth Xenophon's conception of the ideal ruler, statesman, and general. The point of Kant's illustration is clearer in another manuscript of the lectures: "The idea in an *individuum* is an ideal. e.g., the Cyrus of Xenophon is an idea of a perfect prince, which Xenophon here sets forth *in concreto*" (AK 28:1223).
- 2 What Rousseau actually says is that a single tutor should educate one pupil to maturity, and should never attempt to educate more than a single pupil during his life (Rousseau, *Émile*, Book I, *Oeuvres complètes*; Paris: Gallimard, 1969; 4:265).
- 3 See below AK 28:1071. This is the error of *ignava ratio* which Kant criticizes in the *Critique of Pure Reason* A689/B717.
- 4 Kant's discussion here is clearly intended as a criticism of Eberhard's use of the term *Gottesgelehrtheit*, as applied to natural theology: "[In theology] the cognition of God has to be taken in the greatest perfection possible for human beings; that is, it must be the richest, most correct, clearest, most evident, and most living cognition, or, in short, it must be most scientific or learned. Such cognitions, even the more limited ones, contain *religion*. We do well to distinguish two kinds of cognition of God. For every human being has to have religion but not every human being needs to be a divine [*Gottesgelehrte*]" (J. A. Eberhard, *Vorbereitung zur natürlichen Theologie*; Halle, 1781, p. 4).
- 5 Cf. *Phaedo* 97–98, where Socrates describes his enthusiasm over Anaxagoras's view that mind (*nous*) is the cause of everything, producing and ordering everything for the best.
- 6 Descartes, *Meditations of First Philosophy*, Meditation 5.

- 7 Kant's version of the proof is closest to Wolff, *Metaphysik* (Halle, 1751) § 928, 1:574–5, and *Theologia naturalis* (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1730) § 69, 1:55.
- 8 Following Eberhard, Kant first classified the Wolffian proof *a contingentia mundi* as an a posteriori proof. His own opinion, however, is that it is just as much an a priori proof as the ontological proof is (cf. Eberhard, *Vorbereitung*, p. 28).
- 9 Compare the following passage from Hume: "And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce from your hypothesis to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth: why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs" (Hume, *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* Part V; New York: Hafner, 1948, p. 39). Hume's *Dialogues* were published posthumously after Hume's death in 1776. Kant, who did not read English, may very well have been acquainted with them through the German translation published in 1781.
- 10 Cf. Eberhard's remarks: "The proof of God's existence drawn from the agreement of nations has too many difficulties to be used with certainty. For (1) it gets entangled in historical investigations pertaining to the minor premise, and (2) the major premise will also be disputed, because the cognition of God in many nations is mixed with error and superstition" (Eberhard, *Vorbereitung*, p. 60). Eberhard probably takes the argument to go something like this:
Major premise: Whatever all nations agree on is true.
Minor premise: All nations agree that God exists.
Therefore, God exists.
- 11 The target here seems to be the following passage from Eberhard's textbook: "Realities are either pure or mixed. . . . The latter are realities which include negations in themselves. . . . In this case we have to separate the negative element from our concept if we are to retain something real" (Eberhard, *Vorbereitung*, pp. 14–15).
- 12 This is the doctrine of divine simplicity, which is found (for example) in St. Anselm (*Monologion* 16–18, *Proslogion* 12, 17) and St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* Ia Q. 3, aa. 3, 7. Earlier sources of the doctrine include Pseudo-Dionysius (*On the Divine Names* 4.1) and St. Augustine (*On the Trinity* 6:7–8, *The City of God* 11:10).
- 13 Eberhard claims that God is both "mathematically" (or "indeterminately") infinite and "metaphysically" (or "determinately") infinite (*Vorbereitung*, pp. 15–17).
- 14 Both the way of negation and the way of eminence are discussed by Eberhard, *Vorbereitung*, p. 26 and Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* (Halle, 1963) § 826.
- 15 Kant's preference for the ground/consequence over the cause/effect relationship is probably a critical reflection on Eberhard's discussion of the "way of causality" (*via causalitatis*) (Eberhard, *Vorbereitung*, p. 26).
- 16 Duns Scotus seems to have been the first to maintain that the ontological argument, in order to be demonstrative, requires the premise that God is possible; and he claimed the argument was not demonstrative because this

- premise is neither self-evident nor demonstrable (Scotus, *Commentaria Oxoniensis* (Quaracchi, 1912–14) 1.2.2.32). Leibniz, accepting the challenge, offered a proof that necessarily God is possible because the concept of God, consisting solely of realities and of no negations, is necessarily free of contradiction (Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften*, ed. Gerhardt, 7:261–2. Cf. Loemker (ed.), *Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), p. 167). Kant accepts Leibniz's proof but claims it settles only the question of logical possibility, not of real possibility.
- 17 With the above critique of the ontological argument cf. *Critique of Pure Reason* A598–600/B626–8.
 - 18 With the above critique of the cosmological argument cf. *Critique of Pure Reason* A605–6/B633–4.
 - 19 Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason* A592–6/B621–4.
 - 20 Wolff does not use this illustration, but it is strongly reminiscent of Descartes in *Meditation* 5.
 - 21 Victor Albrecht von Haller (1708–77) was a Swiss anatomist, physiologist, novelist and poet. The allusion is to Haller's *Imperfect Poem on Eternity* (1736), which Kant quotes in *The End of All Things*; see above (8:327).
 - 22 AK 2:63–204.
 - 23 Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason* A637/B715.
 - 24 Cf. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 815.
 - 25 "To God belongs the highest unity, which is inseparable from the plurality of the highest realities" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 815).
 - 26 "Every substance is a monad. God is a substance. Hence God is a monad and a simple being. But if the highest simplicity of God is granted, then it is denied that there could be any ground for his being a composite made up of external parts" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 838).
 - 27 "The determinations of every necessary being are absolutely and internally immutable. Therefore, God is absolutely and internally immutable" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 839).
 - 28 "Many gods are impossible. . . . God is unique. POLYTHEISM is the proposition positing more than one god, and is an error" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 846).
 - 29 "MANICHAEISM is the proposition positing an equally powerful god as the author of evil, and is an error" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 844).
 - 30 "God is a being outside the world [*ens extramundum*]. And the world is not something essential to him, nor is it his essence, nor one of God's attributes, nor modes, nor modifications, nor accidents. THEOLOGICAL SPINOZISM is the proposition denying that God is a being outside the world, and is an error" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 855).
 - 31 Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason* A727–8/B755–6.
 - 32 "Substance is that whose existence does not require the existence of anything else." Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics* I, Def. 3: *Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est et per se concipitur: hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debet*. "By substance, I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; it is that whose concept can be formed without requiring the concept of any other thing" (Spinoza, *Opera* (The Hague: 1882) 1:39).

- 33 “In God there are no successive states. Hence God is not in time. . . . If a contingently eternal being be posited, its eternity differs in many ways from God’s eternity. For (1) its duration as a continuous modification of successive states is obnoxious [to the divine nature]. (2) Its eternity has no protensive end; yet such an eternity could not really be called infinite. And (3) its eternity would be time without beginning or end (and could be called infinite for this reason); yet it is not really infinite mathematically. For a being having successive states is never actually all that it can be in its internal determinations” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* §§ 849–50).
- 34 “Omnipotence is the power sufficient to actualize everything” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 832).
- 35 “God has no shape (*figuram*). VULGAR ANTHROPOMORPHISM (*Anthropomorphismus crassior*) is the error of attributing some shape to God (e.g. the human). SUBTLE ANTHROPOMORPHISM (*Anthropomorphismus subtilior*) is the error of attributing to God the imperfections of finite things (e.g. of human beings)” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 848).
- 36 “The cognition of God is THEOLOGY IN THE WIDER SENSE. That theology by which God cognizes himself is EXEMPLARY THEOLOGY (*Theologia exemplaris*) (*archetypos*)” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 866).
- 37 Cf. *The End of All Things* AK, 8:335.
- 38 “God knows (*scit*) every determination of every thing, insofar as mere possibility pertains to it. This is KNOWLEDGE OF SIMPLE INTELLECT. . . . God knows every determination of what is actual in (1) this world, and this is his FREE KNOWLEDGE (or vision) of (a) the past (the *divine memory*) (b) the present (knowledge of vision) and (c) the future (*foreknowledge*) . . . God knows every determination of what is actual in (2) other [possible] worlds, which is MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* §§ 874–6). The distinctions drawn here were first devised by the sixteenth-century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina. According to Molina, God knows everything possible through his “knowledge of simple intellect” and everything absolutely existing through his “knowledge of vision.” But God also knows, prior to any absolute decree on his part, what he will decree concerning future contingents. This knowledge, falling midway between knowledge of mere possibles and knowledge of absolute existents, is what Molina calls “middle knowledge.” Molina’s purpose is to show how God’s infallible foreknowledge can be reconciled with real contingency, especially with human free choice.
- 39 Baumgarten appears to infer God’s infallibility simply from the fact that the possibility of error in God would be a defect (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 879), hence to prove it in a way Kant regards as less than satisfactory.
- 40 “God’s free knowledge is one of his perfections. And since he is an absolutely necessary being, this knowledge in him must be most true. Yet God causes this world to exist in such a way that it is in and for itself contingent. For this reason it is absolutely necessary that [God’s free knowledge] be necessary only hypothetically. Therefore, God’s free knowledge is a modal analogue (*analogon modi*)” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 881).
- 41 Baumgarten, like Kant, includes in wisdom (*sapientia*) the ability to perceive final ends (*sapientia generatim*), particular ends (*sapientia speciatim*), and the means to them (*prudentia*) (*Metaphysica* § 882).

- 42 “Omniscience is the knowledge of everything (*scientia omnium*)” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 889). Baumgarten first attributed knowledge (*scientia*) to God at *Metaphysica* § 873.
- 43 This is a reference to the movement now usually called “neo-Platonism,” centered in Alexandria, Egypt, in the third century A.D. Its founder was Ammonius Saccas (d. 243), and its most prominent representatives were Plotinus (c. 205–70), Porphyry (d. 304), and Iamblichus (d. 333). The term “eclecticism” was first applied to it by Jakob Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae* (Leipzig, 1742–4) 2:193; this work was Kant’s principal source for the history of philosophy.
- 44 Part 4, Section 3 (§§ 890–925) of Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica* is a treatise on the *Voluntas Dei*.
- 45 Baumgarten defines well-pleasedness as “a state of the soul occasioned by the intuition of perfection” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 655). Kant’s real reason for objecting to this is that Baumgarten followed Wolff in holding that perfection of character was an end desirable *a priori* which serves as the determining ground or motive of moral volition. Kant holds, on the contrary, that the relation between any pleasure and its object, when the pleasure is caused by the object, is *a posteriori*, contingent and hence sensible. This is his reason for denying that any “material” practical principle (any principle presupposing an object of desire as the motive of the will) must be contingent and cannot be a categorical imperative (*Critique of Practical Reason* 5:21). In the present context, however, this point seems moot, since Kant would presumably agree that in the case of God, whose well-pleasedness and displeasedness are not empirical, there could be an *a priori* connection between well-pleasedness and a necessary or *a priori* motive.
- 46 “Because God intuits himself most distinctly as the good and the supreme holiness, . . . the acquiescence of God in himself is the exemplary theology, and the greatest delight” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 892).
- 47 “How therefore shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being, whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to your system of anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material? Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no farther, then why go so far? Why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on *in infinitum*? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression?” (David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, Part 4, New York: Hafner, 1969, p. 34).
- 48 In Hume’s *Dialogues*, Cleanthes proposes to explain the purposiveness of living things in nature through the hypothesis that their cause is an intelligent designer; in Parts 6 and 7 of the *Dialogues*, Philo cleverly proposes the rival hypothesis that it results from a generative process like that through which individual living specimens are reproduced.
- 49 See note 44.
- 50 “God’s well-pleasedness and displeasedness are not pleasure or displeasure, nor does he have sensitive appetites and aversions” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 891).
- 51 See note 46.

- 52 “FATALISM, the proposition denying God’s freedom, is an error” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 898).
- 53 Cf. Leibniz, *Correspondence with Samuel Clarke*, Third letter, § 6, *Philosophical Essays*, trans. Ariew and Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p. 325.
- 54 “THE WILL OF GOD, insofar as it is the object of his free knowledge, or he desires the actual things of the universe, is called his CONSEQUENT WILL; insofar as it is turned toward universals and actual things in other universes, it is called his ANTECEDENT WILL” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 899).
- 55 “An INSCRUTABLE WILL is one whose impelling causes are incomprehensible. But the impelling causes of the divine will are most distinctly at God’s own discretion (*ipsius lubitus*). For this reason [God’s will] is to God internally perfect but to us incomprehensible” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 900).
- 56 See above, note 3.
- 57 Cf. Hume, *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. J. Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), especially Appendix 1: Concerning Moral Sentiment, pp. 82–8.
- 58 Cf. *Religion* 6:139.
- 59 “BENEVOLENCE (kindness) is the determination of the will to doing good to another. . . . God wills to confer benefit on others. Therefore, he is kind” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 903–904).
- 60 “JUSTICE is benevolence proportionate to a person or spirit” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 906). But Baumgarten does not systematize God’s moral attributes in triadic form as holiness, benevolence and justice. He dealt with God’s holiness earlier (see next note). Kant seems to be following his practice in the table of categories, which are arranged in triads, with the third member consisting in some sort of combination of the first two (see *Critique of Pure Reason* B110–11).
- 61 “HOLINESS is the reality of a being by which all imperfections are denied in it” (*Metaphysica* § 828).
- 62 The allusion is to a line from Albrecht von Haller’s *Über den Ursprung des Übels* (*On the Origin of Evil*) (1734), 2:33–4:
*Denn Gott liebt keinen Zwang, die Welt mit ihren Mängeln
 Ist besser als ein Reich von Willen-losen Engeln.*
 For God loves no compulsion, the world with all its faults
 Is better than a realm of will-less angels.
- Kant also quotes these lines at *Religion* 6:65n.
- 63 Cf. *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786), AK 8:115–16.
- 64 “I would not have known sin except through the law” (Romans 7:7).
- 65 Cf. *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* AK 8:18.
- 66 See below 28:1106–7.
- 67 This does not appear to be an exact quotation. Perhaps Kant has in mind the following passage:
 There scarcely is, or can be any Creature, whom Consciousness of Villainy, as such merely, does not at all offend; nor anything opprobrious or heinously imputable, move, or affect. If there be such a one; ’tis evident he must be absolutely indifferent towards moral Good or Ill. If this indeed be his Case, ’twill be allow’d he can be in no way

- capable of natural Affection: If not of that, then neither of any social Pleasure, or mental Enjoyment, as shewn above; but on the contrary, he must be subject to all manner of horrid unnatural and ill Affection. So that to want CONSCIENCE, or *natural Sense of the Odiousness of Crime and Injustice*, is to be most miserable of all in Life; but where Conscience, or Sense of this sort, remains; there, consequently, whatever is committed against it must of necessity, by means of Reflection, as we have shewn, be continually shameful, grievous and offensive" (Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Times*, Volume 2, Treatise 4: An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit (London, 1699) 2:2:1, pp. 121–2).
- 68 "SINCERITY is benevolence concerning what is signified in one's mind, and this is in God" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 919).
- 69 "A REWARD (remuneration) is some good contingent on the moral goodness of a person. Justice in conferring rewards is REMUNERATIVE JUSTICE (*Iustitia Remuneratoria*), which we venerate in God in the highest degree" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 907). "Justice in imposing punishment is PUNITIVE JUSTICE (*Iustitia Punitiva*) (vindictive, avenging, vindicating, nemesis); punitive justice belongs to God" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 910).
- 70 Proverbs 19:17.
- 71 These are expressions used by Baumgarten, see note 69 above.
- 72 "FORBEARANCE (the patience of a judge) is justice which does not look for occasions to punish. God infallibly knows all the opportunities for punishment and all the proximate matters for punishment where they are real; but he wills [punishments] proportionately. Hence he is the most forbearant" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 916).
- 73 God's *impartialitas* is spoken of by Baumgarten in *Metaphysica* § 917.
- 74 "Impartial justice is EQUITY. God is most just and most impartial, so he is most equitable" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 918).
- 75 "Since God's highest life is absolutely necessary (for it is his essence itself and his existence), God is not only immortal, but *only he has absolute immortality*" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 922).
- 76 Cf. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 924.
- 77 Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason* B xxx, where the three postulates of practical reason are identified as God, freedom and immortality; immortality is also presented in the *Critique of Practical Reason* as the first postulate of practical reason (KpV 5:121–4). But in Reflexion 8101 (AK 19:644) he describes faith in immortality as "faith of the second rank," suggesting that it may not be as necessary for the moral life as faith in God.
- 78 "CREATION BY EMANATION is the actualization of the universe from the essence of God" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 927).
- 79 "An AUTHOR (*Auctor*) is a cause of free actions, and such actions as are caused by it are the effects of an author are DEEDS (*Facta*). Now God is the author of creation and of this world" (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 940).
- 80 Here as in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B xii–xiii) Kant follows Stahl's phlogiston theory of combustion and other chemical processes (such as the rusting of iron) which are now regarded as processes of oxidation. Kant followed with interest the revolution in chemistry brought about by Antoine Lavoisier in the 1790s, and exhibits awareness of it in his *Opus postumum*. See AK 22:508–9 and *Opus Postumum*, ed. Eckart Förster,

Cambridge Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 150, 275.

- 81 “In creating this world, God decreed according to his most proportional will. Hence he decreed the existence of this world for the sake of the good he recognized in it. . . . Therefore, this world is of all possible ones the most perfect” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* §§ 934–5). Kant defended this Leibnizian doctrine in “An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism” (1759), AK 2:27–35. But compare *On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy* 8:258, 263–4.
- 82 Kant is referring to his 1759 essay; see previous note.
- 83 Cf. Leibniz, *On the Ultimate Origin of Things* (1697), *Philosophischen Schriften* 7:303–4; cf. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, tr. R. Ariew and D. Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), pp. 153–4. The argument is stated most precisely in *Theodicy* §§ 213–15: “That part of the best whole is not necessarily the best which could have been made of that part. For the part of a beautiful thing is not always beautiful, since it can be extracted from the whole or taken in the whole in an irregular manner. If goodness and beauty always consisted in something absolute and uniform. . . . it would be necessary to say that the part of what is good and beautiful would also be good and beautiful. But this is not so with things involving relations (*choses relatives*). . . . In some parts of the universe, we find defects which the author of things allowed because otherwise, if he had reformed the faulty part and made a satisfactory composite out of it, the whole would not be as beautiful as it is. . . . [Hence] I answer that since God chooses the best possible, one cannot object to any limitation in its perfections. And not only does good surpass evil in the universe, but in fact the evil serves to augment the good” (*Philosophischen Schriften* 6:245–7).
- 84 See above, 28:1077–9.
- 85 See 28:1100–2.
- 86 “HONOR is the recognition of a higher perfection in something. Greater honor is GLORY. God’s glory therefore is the greater cognition of his own highest perfection” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 942). Clearly Kant is strongly inclined to reject the traditional idea that God created the world for the sake of his own glory, in the sense of the praise and honor bestowed on him by his creatures: cf. 28:1002, 1102, 1118. But he also tries to save this doctrine by reinterpreting it, as he does here and also at KU 5:449n.
- 87 The problem raised here is the temporal half of the First Antinomy of Pure Reason. Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason* A426–35/B454–63.
- 88 See above, note 32. In the *Principles* Descartes defines substance as “that which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist,” and adds that so understood, the term applies strictly only to God, so that it must have a different sense when applied to creatures (Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* 1:51).
- 89 “God concurs mediately as efficient cause in all the actions of finite substances, and . . . concurs immediately as efficient cause . . . actuating and conserving them” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 954). Kant rejects this doctrine of a “GENERAL PHYSICAL COOPERATION OF GOD (*Concursus Dei Physicus Generalis*)” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 958).

- 90 This is, in contrast to the *physical* cooperation of God (see previous note) the “MORAL OR SPECIAL COOPERATION OF GOD (*Concursus Moralis seu Specialis*)” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 960).
- 91 “God is close to every monad in this world and is inwardly present to every body. And it is by this moment that every creature is actual. Therefore, God is most omnipresent” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 956).
- 92 See above, 28:1095–6.
- 93 “What is proximately present as a whole and singly to the substantial parts of a thing, the same is called an INWARD PRESENCE to it. Now God is proximately present to all substantial parts of all bodies in this universe. Therefore, God is inwardly present to all bodies in this universe” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 955).
- 94 “Conservation is God’s constant influence” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 951).
- 95 “The first Contrivance of those very artificial Parts of Animals . . . and the Instinct of Brutes and Insects, can be the effect of nothing else than the Wisdom and Skill of a powerful ever-living Agent, who being in all Places, is more able by his Will to move the Bodies within his boundless uniform Sensorium, and thereby to form and reform the Parts of the Universe, than we are by our Will to move the Parts of our own Bodies” (Newton, *Opticks* (London: 1931), p. 403). Newton’s conception of space as a manifestation of God reflects the influence of Henry More on his theology. Kant’s criticism of Newton here follows Leibniz’s in his first, second, third, and fourth letters to Samuel Clarke.
- 96 Providence = *Vorsehung*, providing = *Providenz* (cf. *providentia*, Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 974). Governing = *Gubernation* (cf. *gubernatio*, Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 963). Directing = *Direction* (cf. *dirigere strictius*, Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 963).
- 97 Baumgarten describes God as *despotes*, and his rule of the world as a *monarchia despotica*, since he has not only “supreme power” but also “plenary power” over creatures (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 974).
- 98 Baumgarten distinguishes between (1) the *propositum* in which God represents the best complex of compossible beings, (2) the *praevision* in which he knows it as the best possible world and (3) the *decretum* through which this best world receives existence. But Baumgarten himself admits that this account is only “a way in which [God’s decree] may be conceived according to a human fashion” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 976).
- 99 Baumgarten too insists that God’s decrees are not “absolute,” rejecting the doctrines of eternal predestination and reprobation which seem to follow from this *absolutismus theologicus* (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 980).
- 100 “Revelation in the wide sense is the signification by the divine mind to the creature made by God” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 982).
- 101 “Now when all things are made subject to Him, then the Son Himself will also be subject to Him who put all things under Him, that God may be all in all” (1 Corinthians 15:28). Cf. *Religion* 6:135.
- 102 This classical proverb is probably most often attributed to Socrates.
- 103 “Holy mysteries are things set above the reason of creatures, and included in the objects of holy faith” (Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* § 906).

- 104 Christoph Meiners (1747–1810) was a prolific German writer on a wide variety of historical topics. The *Historia doctrinae de uno vero Deo* (History of the doctrines of the one true God) (1780) was the first of his many writings on the history of religions, culminating in his two-volume *Allgemeine kritische Geschichte der Religionen* (Universal critical history of religions) (1806).
- 105 See above, note 101.
- 106 Herodotus, *The Persian Wars* 2:35–182, which has much to say about the influence of Egyptian religious practices on the Greeks.
- 107 David Hume, *The Natural History of Religion* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), Sec. 9, pp. 48–51.
- 108 See above, note 5.