

Second Chapter

*On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of
the Understanding*

First Section

<§ 13>^a

On the

principles^b of a transcendental deduction in general.¹⁴

Jurists, when they speak of entitlements and claims, distinguish in a legal matter between the questions about what is lawful^d (*quid juris*) and

^a Paragraph number added in the second edition. In the first edition, the second chapter of the "Transcendental Analytic," the "Transcendental Deduction," is divided into three main sections, the first of which is in turn subdivided into two subsections. Apart from a few minor changes in wording, which will be noted, and the addition of the section numbers themselves, the two subsections of the first section are retained in the second edition and are identical until the last paragraph of their second subsection, which is replaced by three new paragraphs in the second edition. The second and third sections of the chapter in the first edition are then replaced by an entirely new second section in the second edition, which is broken up into numbered paragraphs § 15 through § 27. We will present all of this material in the following sequence: the first section as it appeared in both editions, with the last paragraph of the first-edition version followed by the last three paragraphs that replaced it in the second edition; the second and third sections as they appeared in the first edition; then the second section, consisting of numbered parts § 15 through § 27, as it appeared in the second edition.

^b *Prinzipien*

^c The following notes are inserted here in Kant's copy of the first edition:

"Consciousness and inner sense are different. 'I think' is spontaneity and does not depend on any object. The representation, however, with which I think, must be given to me antecedently in intuition (through imagination). With regard to it I am affected." (E XLVI, p. 25; 23:26)

"It must be proved that if there were no sensible intuition *a priori*, and if this were not the form of sensibility in the subject, with which all appearances must be in accord, then:

"1. No categories would have significance.

"2. From mere categories no synthetic *a priori* propositions at all would be possible."

(E XLVII, p. 25; 23:26)

^d was *Rechterns ist*

that which concerns the fact (*quid facti*), and since they demand proof of both, they call the first, that which is to establish the entitlement or the legal claim, the **deduction**.¹⁵ We make use of a multitude of empirical concepts without objection from anyone, and take ourselves to be justified in granting them a sense and a supposed signification even without any deduction, because we always have experience ready at hand to prove their objective reality. But there are also concepts that have been usurped, such as **fortune** and **fate**, which circulate with almost universal indulgence, but that are occasionally called upon to establish their claim by the question *quid juris*, and then there is not a little embarrassment about their deduction because one can adduce no clear legal ground for an entitlement to their use either from experience or from reason.

Among the many concepts, however, that constitute the very mixed fabric of human cognition, there are some that are also destined^a for pure use *a priori* (completely independently of all experience), and these always require a deduction of their entitlement, since proofs from experience are not sufficient for the lawfulness of such a use, and yet one must know how these concepts can be related to objects^b that they do not derive from any experience. I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects *a priori* their **transcendental deduction**, and distinguish this from the **empirical** deduction, which shows how a concept is acquired through experience and reflection on it, and therefore concerns not the lawfulness but the fact from which the possession has arisen.

Now we already have two sorts of concepts of an entirely different kind,^c which yet agree with each other in that they both relate to objects completely *a priori*, namely the concepts of space and time, as forms of sensibility, and the categories, as concepts of the understanding. To seek an empirical deduction of them would be entirely futile work, for what is distinctive in their nature is precisely that they are related to their objects without having borrowed anything from experience for their representation. Thus if a deduction of them is necessary, it must always be transcendental.

Nevertheless, in the case of these concepts, as in the case of all cognition, we can search in experience, if not for the principle^d of their possibility, then for the occasional causes of their generation, where the impressions of the senses provide the first occasion for opening the en-

^a bestimmt

^b Objecte

^c Kant's copy of the first edition inserts: "They are not borrowed from experience" (E XLVIII, p. 25; 23:46).

^d Principium

tire power of cognition to them and for bringing about experience, which contains two very heterogeneous elements, namely a **matter** for cognition from the senses and a certain **form** for ordering it from the inner source of pure intuiting and thinking, which, on the occasion of the former, are first brought into use and bring forth concepts. Such a tracing of the first endeavors of our power of cognition to ascend from individual perceptions to general concepts is without doubt of great utility, and the famous Locke is to be thanked for having first opened the way for this. Yet a **deduction** of the pure *a priori* concepts can never be achieved in this way; it does not lie down this path at all, for in regard to their future use, which should be entirely independent of experience, an entirely different birth certificate than that of an ancestry from experiences must be produced. I will therefore call this attempted physiological derivation,¹⁶ which cannot properly be called a deduction at all because it concerns a *quaestio facti*,^a the explanation of the **possession** of a pure cognition. It is therefore clear that only a transcendental and never an empirical deduction of them can be given, and that in regard to pure *a priori* concepts empirical deductions are nothing but idle attempts, which can occupy only those who have not grasped the entirely distinctive nature of these cognitions.

But now even if the sole manner of a possible deduction of pure *a priori* cognition is conceded, namely that which takes the transcendental path, it is still not obvious that it is unavoidably necessary. We have above traced the concepts of space and time to their sources by means of a transcendental deduction, and explained and determined their *a priori* objective validity. Geometry nevertheless follows its secure course through strictly *a priori* cognitions without having to beg philosophy for any certification of the pure and lawful pedigree of its fundamental concept of space. Yet the use of the^b concept in this science concerns only the external world of the senses, of which space is the pure form of its intuition, and in which therefore all geometrical cognition is immediately evident because it is grounded on intuition *a priori*, and the objects are given through the cognition itself *a priori* in intuition (as far as their form is concerned). With the **pure concepts of the understanding**, however, there first arises the unavoidable need to search for the transcendental deduction not only of them but also of space, for since they speak of objects not through predicates of intuition and sensibility but through those of pure *a priori* thinking, they relate to objects generally without any conditions of sensibility; and since they are not grounded in experience and cannot exhibit any object^c in *a priori* intuition on which

B 119

A 87

B 120

A 88

^a As in the first edition; the second, declining *quaestio*, prints *quaestionem*.

^b The first edition here reads "diese" instead of the second's "des."

^c Object

to ground their synthesis prior to any experience, they not only arouse suspicion about the objective validity and limits of their use but also make the **concept of space** ambiguous by inclining us to use it beyond the conditions of sensible intuition, on which account a transcendental deduction of it was also needed above. Thus the reader must be convinced of the unavoidable necessity of such a transcendental deduction before he has taken a single step in the field of pure reason; for he would otherwise proceed blindly, and after much wandering around would still have to return to the ignorance from which he had begun. But he must also clearly understand from the outset its inevitable difficulty, so that he will not complain of obscurity where the subject-matter itself is deeply veiled or become annoyed too soon over the removal of hindrances, since we must either surrender completely all claims to insights of pure reason in its favorite field, namely that beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, or else perfect this critical investigation.

In the case of the concepts of space and time, we were able above to make comprehensible with little effort how these, as *a priori* cognitions, must nevertheless necessarily relate to objects, and made possible a synthetic cognition of them independent of all experience. For since an object can appear to us only by means of such pure forms of sensibility, i.e., be an object^a of empirical intuition, space and time are thus pure intuitions that contain *a priori* the conditions of the possibility of objects as appearances, and the synthesis in them has objective validity.

The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not represent to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all, hence objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their *a priori* conditions.¹⁷ Thus a difficulty is revealed here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how **subjective conditions of thinking** should have **objective validity**, i.e., yield conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects; for appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding. I take, e.g., the concept of cause, which signifies a particular kind of synthesis, in which given something *A* something entirely different *B* is posited according to a rule.^b It is not clear *a priori* why appearances should contain anything of this sort (one cannot adduce experiences for the proof, for the objective validity of this *a priori* concept must be able to be demonstrated), and it is therefore *a priori* doubtful whether such a concept is not perhaps entirely empty and finds no object anywhere among the appearances. For that

^a Object

^b Emended in Kant's copy of the first edition to "posited according to an *a priori* rule, i.e., necessarily" (E XLIX, p. 25; 23:46).

objects of sensible intuition must accord with the formal conditions of sensibility that lie in the mind *a priori* is clear from the fact that otherwise they would not be objects for us; but that they must also accord with the conditions that the understanding requires for the synthetic unity^a of thinking is a conclusion that is not so easily seen.^b For appearances could after all be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing would offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance. Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking.

If one were to think of escaping from the toils of these investigations by saying that experience constantly offers examples of a regularity of appearances that give sufficient occasion for abstracting the concept of cause from them, and thereby at the same time thought to confirm the objective validity of such a concept, then one has not noticed that the concept of cause cannot arise in this way at all, but must either be grounded in the understanding completely *a priori* or else be entirely surrendered as a mere fantasy of the brain. For this concept always requires that something *A* be of such a kind that something else *B* follows from it **necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule**. Appearances may well offer cases from which a rule is possible in accordance with which something usually happens, but never a rule in accordance with which the succession is **necessary**; thus to the synthesis of cause and effect there attaches a dignity that can never be expressed empirically, namely, that the effect does not merely come along with the cause, but is posited **through** it and follows **from** it. The strict universality of the rule is therefore not any property of empirical rules, which cannot acquire anything more through induction than comparative universality, i.e., widespread usefulness. But now the use of the pure concepts of the understanding would be entirely altered if one were to treat them only as empirical products.

B 123

A 91

B 124

A 92

^a Following Erdmann in reading "*Einheit*" for "*Einsicht*"; Kant uses "*Einheit*" in a parallel fashion in the next sentence.

^b Inserted in Kant's copy of the first edition: "If I were simply to say that without the connection of causes and effects I would not grasp the sequence of alterations, it would not at all follow from this that this must be precisely as an understanding needs it to be to grasp it, but I would not be able to explain whence they continuously follow one another. Only I would not raise this question if I did not already have the concept of cause and of the necessity of such persistence. A subjective necessity, habit, would make it worse. An implanted necessity would not prove necessity." (E L, pp. 25-6; 23:26)

"Transition
to the transcendental deduction of the categories.

There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its objects can come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet each other: Either if the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the representation alone makes the object possible.

B 125

If it is the first, then this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible *a priori*. And this is the case with appearance in respect of that in it which belongs to sensation. But if it is the second, then since representation in itself (for we are not here talking about its causality by means of the will) does not produce its object as far as its **existence** is concerned, the representation is still determinant of the object *a priori* if it is possible through it alone to **cognize something as an object**. But there are two conditions under which alone the cognition of an object is possible: first, **intuition**, through which it is given, but only as appearance; second, **concept**, through which an object is thought that corresponds to this intuition. It is clear from what has

A 93

been said above, however, that the first condition, namely that under which alone objects can be intuited, in fact does lie^b in the mind *a priori* as the ground of the form of objects.^c All appearances therefore necessarily agree with this formal condition of sensibility, because only through it can they appear, i.e., be empirically intuited and given. The question now is whether *a priori* concepts do not also precede, as conditions under which alone something can be, if not intuited, nevertheless thought as object in general, for then all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily in accord with such concepts, since without their presupposition nothing is possible as **object^d of experience**. Now, however, all experience contains in addition to the intuition of the senses, through which something is given, a **concept** of an object that is given in intuition, or appears;¹⁸ hence concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as *a priori* conditions; consequently the objective validity of the categories, as *a priori* concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of thinking is concerned). For they then are related necessarily and *a priori* to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all.

B 126

^a No section number appears here in the second edition, but "§ 14" should have been added to avoid an unnumbered section between § 13 and § 15.

^b Following Erdmann in reading "liegt" for "liegen"; Kant seems to have confused the singular antecedent (*Bedingung*) with the plural, perhaps because of the intervening occurrence of the plural "objects."

^c *Objecten*

^d *Object*

Section I. On the principles of a transcendental deduction

A 94

The transcendental deduction of all *a priori* concepts therefore has a principle^a toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experiences (whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking).¹⁹ Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. The unfolding of the experience in which they are encountered, however, is not their deduction (but their illustration), since they would thereby be only contingent. Without this original relation to possible experience, in which all objects of cognition are found, their relation to any object^b could not be comprehended at all.

B 127

[There are, however, three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely **sense**, **imagination**, and **appception**. On these are grounded 1) the **synopsis** of the manifold *a priori* through sense; 2) the **synthesis** of this manifold through the imagination; finally 3) the **unity** of this synthesis through original appception. In addition to their empirical use, all of these faculties have a transcendental one, which is concerned solely with form, and which is possible *a priori*. We have discussed this **with regard to the senses** in the first part above, however, we will now attempt to understand the nature of the two other ones.]

A 95

^d<The famous Locke, from neglect of this consideration, and because he encountered pure concepts of the understanding in experience, also derived them from this experience, and thus proceeded so **inconsistently** that he thereby dared to make attempts at cognitions that go far beyond the boundary of all experience. David Hume recognized that in order to be able to do the latter it is necessary that these concepts would have to have their origin *a priori*. But since he could not explain at all how it is possible for the understanding to think of concepts that in themselves are not combined in the understanding as still necessarily combined in the object, and it never occurred to him that perhaps the understanding itself, by means of these concepts, could be the originator of the experience in which its objects are encountered, he thus, driven by necessity, derived them from experience (namely from a subjective necessity arisen from frequent association in experience, which is subsequently falsely held to be objective, i.e., **custom**);^e however he

B 127

^a *Principium*

^b *Object*

^c This paragraph in the first edition is omitted in the second and replaced by three that here follow it.

^d The next three paragraphs are added in the second edition, replacing the previous one.

^e *Gewohnheit*

B 128

subsequently proceeded quite consistently in declaring it to be impossible to go beyond the boundary of experience with these concepts and the principles that they occasion. The **empirical** derivation, however, to which both of them resorted, cannot be reconciled with the reality of the scientific cognition *a priori* that we possess, that namely of **pure mathematics** and **general natural science**, and is therefore refuted by the fact.^a

The first of these two famous men opened the gates wide to **enthusiasm**, since reason, once it has authority on its side, will not be kept within limits by indeterminate recommendations of moderation; the second gave way entirely to **skepticism**, since he believed himself to have discovered in what is generally held to be reason a deception of our faculty of cognition. — We are now about to make an attempt to see whether we cannot successfully steer human reason between these two cliffs, assign its determinate boundaries, and still keep open the entire field of its purposive activity.

B 129

I will merely precede this with the **explanation of the categories**. They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as **determined** with regard to one of the **logical functions** for judgments.²⁰ Thus, the function of the **categorical** judgment was that of the relationship of the subject to the predicate, e.g., "All bodies are divisible." Yet in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding it would remain undetermined which of these two concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate. For one can also say: "Something divisible is a body." Through the category of substance, however, if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always be considered as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise with all the other categories.>

A 95

The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding Second Section

^bOn the *a priori* grounds for the possibility
of experience.

It is entirely contradictory and impossible that a concept should be generated completely *a priori* and be related to an object although it

^a *das Factum*

^b What follows is the version of the "Transcendental Deduction" as it appeared in the first edition, where it is divided into the second and third sections of the present chapter. In the second edition, these two sections will be replaced by a single second section, divided into subsections numbered from § 15 to § 27. See B 129-69 below.

*Of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of
the Understanding*

B 129

Second Section

*Transcendental deduction of the pure
concepts of the understanding^{a,32}*

<§ 15.

On the possibility of a combination in general.

The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition that is merely sensible, i.e., nothing but receptivity, and the form of this intuition can lie *a priori* in our faculty of representation without being anything other than the way in which the subject is affected. Yet the **combination** (*conjunction*) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; for it is an act^b of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, all combination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of several concepts, and in the first case either of sensible or non-sensible intuition, is an action of the understanding, which we would designate with the general title **synthesis** in order at the same time to draw attention to the fact that we can represent nothing as combined in the object^c without having previously combined it ourselves, and that among all representations **combination** is the only one that is not given through objects^d but can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act^e of its self-activity. One can here easily see that this action must originally be unitary^f and equally valid for all combination,

B 130

^a In the second edition, the following § 15 through § 27 replace the second and third sections of the "Transcendental Deduction" in the first edition (A 95 to A 130).

^b *Actus*

^c *Object*

^d *Objecte*

^e *Actus*

^f *einig*; in modern German this is used only in idioms connoting being in agreement or harmony; perhaps Kant meant to write *einzig*, i.e., unique.

and that the dissolution (**analysis**) that seems to be its opposite, in fact always presupposes it; for where the understanding has not previously combined anything, neither can it dissolve anything, for only **through it** can something have been given to the power of representation as combined.

But in addition to the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, the concept of combination also carries with it the concept of the unity of the manifold. Combination is the representation of the **synthetic** unity of the manifold.* The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise from the combination; rather, by being added to the representation of the manifold, it first makes the concept of combination possible.³³ This unity, which precedes all concepts of combination *a priori*, is not the former category of unity (§ 10); for all categories are grounded on logical functions in judgments, but in these combination, thus the unity of given concepts, is already thought. The category therefore already presupposes combination. We must therefore seek this unity (as qualitative, § 12) someplace higher, namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence of the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use.

§ 16.

On the original-synthetic unity of apperception.

The **I think** must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me. That representation that can be given prior to all thinking is called **intuition**. Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the **I think** in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered. But this representation is an act^a of **spontaneity**, i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it the **pure apperception**, in order to distinguish it from the **empirical** one, or also the **original apperception**, since it is that self-consciousness which, because it produces the representation **I think**, which must be able to accompany all others and

* Whether the representations themselves are identical, and whether therefore one could be thought through the other analytically, does not come into consideration here. The **consciousness** of the one, as far as the manifold is concerned, is still always to be distinguished from the consciousness of the other, and it is only the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that is at issue here.

^a *Actus*

which in all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompanied by any further representation. I also call its unity the **transcendental** unity of self-consciousness in order to designate the possibility of *a priori* cognition from it. For the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be **my** representations if they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness; i.e., as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must yet necessarily be in accord with the condition under which alone they can stand together in a universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not throughout belong to me. From this original combination much may be inferred.

B 133

Namely, this thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of the representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is by itself dispersed and without relation to the identity of the subject. The latter relation therefore does not yet come about by my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but rather by my **adding** one representation to the other and being conscious of their synthesis. Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in **one consciousness** that it is possible for me to represent the **identity of the consciousness in these representations** itself, i.e., the **analytical** unity of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some **synthetic** one.*³⁴ The thought that these representations given in intuition all together belong **to me** means, accordingly, the same as that I unite them in a self-consciousness, or at least can unite them therein, and although it is itself not yet the consciousness of the **synthesis** of the representations, it still presupposes the possibility of the latter, i.e., only because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness do I call them all together **my** representations; for otherwise I would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representa-

B 134

* The analytical unity of consciousness pertains to all common concepts as such, e.g., if I think of **red** in general, I thereby represent to myself a feature that (as a mark) can be encountered in anything, or that can be combined with other representations; therefore only by means of an antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytical unity. A representation that is to be thought of as common to **several** must be regarded as belonging to those that in addition to it also have something **different** in themselves; consequently they must antecedently be conceived in synthetic unity with other (even if only possible representations) before I can think of the analytical unity of consciousness in it that makes it into a *conceptus communis*. And thus the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which one must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic and, after it, transcendental philosophy; indeed this faculty is the understanding itself.

B 133

B 134

tions of which I am conscious. Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given *a priori*, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes *a priori* all **my** determinate thinking. Combination does not lie in the objects, however, and cannot as it were be borrowed from them through perception and by that means first taken up into the understanding, but is rather only an operation of the understanding, which is itself nothing further than the faculty of combining *a priori* and bringing the manifold of given representations under unity of apperception, which principle is the supreme one in the whole of human cognition.³⁵

Now this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is, to be sure, itself identical, thus an analytical proposition, yet it declares as necessary a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, without which that thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness could not be thought. For through the I, as a simple representation, nothing manifold is given; it can only be given in the intuition, which is distinct from it, and thought through **combination** in a consciousness. An understanding, in which through self-consciousness all of the manifold would at the same time be given, would **intuit**; ours can only **think** and must seek the intuition in the senses. I am therefore conscious of the identical self in regard to the manifold of the representations that are given to me in an intuition because I call them all together **my** representations, which constitute **one**. But that is as much as to say that I am conscious *a priori* of their necessary synthesis, which is called the original synthetic unity of apperception, under which all representations given to me stand, but under which they must also be brought by means of a synthesis.

§ 17.

The principle of the synthetic unity of apperception
is the supreme principle of all use of the understanding.

The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of sensibility stand under the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold of intuition stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.*³⁶ All the manifold repre-

* Space and time and all their parts are **intuitions**, thus individual representations along with the manifold that they contain in themselves (see the Transcendental Aesthetic), thus they are not mere concepts by means of which the same consciousness is contained in many representations, but rather are many representations that are contained in one and in the consciousness of it; they are thus found to be composite, and consequently the unity of con-

sentations of intuition stand under the first principle insofar as they are given to us, and under the second insofar as they must be capable of being combined in one consciousness; for without that nothing could be thought or cognized through them, since the given representations would not have in common the act^a of apperception, I think, and thereby would not be grasped together in a self-consciousness.

B 137

Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of **cognitions**. These consist in the determinate relation of given representations to an object.^b An **object**,^c however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united.^d Now, however, all unification of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently the unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, thus their objective validity, and consequently is that which makes them into cognitions and on which even the possibility of the understanding rests.

The first pure cognition of the understanding, therefore, on which the whole of the rest of its use is grounded, and that is at the same time also entirely independent from all conditions of sensible intuition, is the principle of the original **synthetic** unity of apperception. Thus the mere form of outer sensible intuition, space, is not yet cognition at all; it only gives the manifold of intuition *a priori* for a possible cognition. But in order to cognize something in space, e.g., a line, I must draw it, and thus synthetically bring about a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this action is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the concept of a line), and thereby is an object^d (a determinate space) first cognized. The synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore an objective condition of all cognition, not merely something I myself need in order to cognize an object^e but rather something under which every intuition must stand in **order to become an object^f for me**, since in any other way, and without this synthesis, the manifold would **not** be united in one consciousness.

B 138

This last proposition is, as we said, itself analytic, although, to be sure, it makes synthetic unity into the condition of all thinking; for it says nothing more than that all **my** representations in any given intuition must stand under the condition under which alone I can ascribe

consciousness, as **synthetic** and yet as original, is to be found in them. This **singularity** of theirs is important in its application (see § 25).

^a *Actus*^b *Object*^c *Object*^d *Object*^e *Object*^f *Object*

them to the identical self as my representations, and thus can grasp them together, as synthetically combined in an apperception, through the general expression **I think**.

This principle, however, is not a principle^a for every possible understanding, but only for one through whose pure apperception in the representation **I am** nothing manifold is given at all. That understanding through whose self-consciousness the manifold of intuition would at the same time be given, an understanding through whose representation the objects^b of this representation would at the same time exist, would not require a special act^c of the synthesis of the manifold for the unity of consciousness, which the human understanding, which merely thinks, but does not intuit, does require. But for the human understanding it is unavoidably the first principle, so that the human understanding cannot even form for itself the least concept of another possible understanding, either one that would intuit itself or one that, while possessing a sensible intuition, would possess one of a different kind than one grounded in space and time.

§ 18.

What objective unity of self-consciousness is.

The **transcendental unity** of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object.^d It is called **objective** on that account, and must be distinguished from the **subjective unity** of consciousness, which is a **determination of inner sense**, through which that manifold of intuition is empirically given for such a combination. Whether I can become **empirically** conscious of the manifold as simultaneous or successive depends on the circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence the empirical unity of consciousness, through association of the representations, itself concerns an appearance, and is entirely contingent. The pure form of intuition in time, on the contrary, merely as intuition in general, which contains a given manifold, stands under the original unity of consciousness, solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold of intuition to the one **I think**, thus through the pure synthesis of the understanding, which grounds *a priori* the empirical synthesis. That unity alone is objectivity valid; the empirical unity of apperception, which we are not assessing here, and which is also derived only from the former, under given conditions *in concreto*, has

^a Princip

^b Objecte

^c Actus

^d Object

merely subjective validity. One person combines the representation of a certain word with one thing, another with something else; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical is not, with regard to that which is given, necessarily and universally valid.

§ 19.

The logical form of all judgments consists in the
objective unity of the apperception
of the concepts contained therein.³⁸

I have never been able to satisfy myself with the explanation that the logicians give of a judgment in general: it is, they say, the representation of a relation^a between two concepts. Without quarreling here about what is mistaken in this explanation, that in any case it fits only **categorical** but not hypothetical and disjunctive judgments (which latter two do not contain a relation^b of concepts but of judgments themselves) (though from this error in logic many troublesome consequences have arisen),*,³⁹ I remark only that it is not here determined wherein this **relation^c** consists.

If, however, I investigate more closely the relation^d of given cognitions in every judgment, and distinguish that relation, as something belonging to the understanding, from the relation^e in accordance with laws of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity), then I find that a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the **objective** unity of apperception.⁴⁰ That is the aim of the copula^f **is** in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. For this word designates the relation of the representations to the original apperception and its **necessary unity**, even if the judgment itself is empirical, hence contingent,

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* The widespread doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns only the categorical inferences, and, although it is nothing more than an art for surreptitiously producing the illusion of more kinds of inference than that in the first figure by hiding immediate inferences (*consequentiae immediatae*) among the premises of a pure syllogism, still it would not have achieved any special success by this alone if it had not succeeded in focusing attention exclusively on categorical judgments as those to which all others have to be related, which according to § 9, however, is false.

^a *Verhältnisses*^b *Verhältnis*^c *Verhältnis*^d Here Kant uses *Beziehung* when he might have used *Verhältnis*.^e *Verhältnisse*^f *Verhältniswörterchen*

e.g., "Bodies are heavy." By that, to be sure, I do not mean to say that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but rather that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of the apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, i.e., in accordance with principles^a of the objective determination of all representations insofar as cognition can come from them, which principles^b are all derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Only in this way does there arise from this relation^c a judgment, i.e., a relation that is objectively valid, and that is sufficiently distinguished from the relation of these same representations in which there would be only subjective validity, e.g., in accordance with laws of association. In accordance with the latter I could only say "If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight," but not "It, the body, is heavy," which would be to say that these two representations are combined in the object,^d i.e., regardless of any difference in the condition of the subject, and are not merely found together in perception (however often as that might be repeated).

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§ 20.

All sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness.

The manifold that is given in a sensible intuition necessarily belongs under the original synthetic unity of apperception, since through this alone is the unity of the intuition possible (§ 17). That action of the understanding, however, through which the manifold of given representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments (§ 19). Therefore all manifold, insofar as it is given in one^e empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the logical functions for judgment, by means of which, namely, it is brought to a consciousness in general. But now the categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them (§ 13).⁴¹ Thus the manifold in a given intuition also necessarily stands under categories.

^a *Principien*^b *Principien*^c *Verhältnisse*; the further occurrences of "relation" in this sentence translate further occurrences of *Verhältnis*.^d *Object*^e *Einer*: Not ordinarily capitalized, suggesting the translation "one" instead of merely "an."

§ 21.
Remark.

B 144

A manifold that is contained in an intuition that I call mine is represented as belonging to the **necessary** unity of self-consciousness through the synthesis of the understanding, and this takes place by means of the category.* This indicates, therefore, that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold of one^a intuition stands under a pure *a priori* self-consciousness, just as empirical intuitions stand under a pure sensible one, which likewise holds *a priori*. – In the above proposition, therefore, the beginning of a **deduction** of the pure concepts of the understanding has been made, in which, since the categories arise **independently from sensibility** merely in the understanding, I must abstract from the way in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, in order to attend only to the unity that is added to the intuition through the understanding by means of the category. In the sequel (§ 26) it will be shown from the way in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility that its unity can be none other than the one the category prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in general according to the preceding § 20; thus by the explanation of its^b *a priori* validity in regard to all objects of our senses the aim of the deduction will first be fully attained.

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In the above proof, however, I still could not abstract from one point, namely, from the fact that the manifold for intuition must already be **given** prior to the synthesis of understanding and independently from it; how, however, is here left undetermined. For if I wanted to think of an understanding that itself intuited (as, say, a divine understanding, which would not represent given objects, but through whose representation the objects would themselves at the same time be given, or produced), then the categories would have no significance at all with regard to such a cognition. They are only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity^c consists in thinking, i.e., in the action of bringing the synthesis of the manifold that is given to it in intuition from elsewhere to the unity of apperception, which therefore **cognizes** nothing at all by

* The ground of proof rests on the represented **unity of intuition** through which an object is given, which always includes a synthesis of the manifold that is given for an intuition, and already contains the relation of the latter to unity of apperception.

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^a *Einer*, again capitalized.

^b The antecedent is probably “the category” in the preceding clause, but it could also be “the unity,” and thus the translation has been left ambiguous.

^c *Vermögen*

B 146

itself,^a but only combines and orders the material for cognition, the intuition, which must be given to it through the object.^b But for the peculiarity of our understanding, that it is able to bring about the unity of apperception *a priori* only by means of the categories and only through precisely this kind and number of them, a further ground may be offered just as little as one can be offered for why we have precisely these and no other functions for judgment or for why space and time are the sole forms of our possible intuition.

§ 22.

The category has no other use for
the cognition of things than its application
to objects of experience.

B 147

To **think** of an object and to **cognize** an object are thus not the same. For two components belong to cognition: first, the concept, through which an object is thought at all (the category), and second, the intuition, through which it is given; for if an intuition corresponding to the concept could not be given at all, then it would be a thought as far as its form is concerned, but without any object, and by its means no cognition of anything at all would be possible, since, as far as I would know, nothing would be given nor could be given to which my thought could be applied. Now all intuition that is possible for us is sensible (Aesthetic), thus for us thinking of an object in general through a pure concept of the understanding can become cognition only insofar as this concept is related to objects of the senses. Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that which, through sensation, is immediately represented as real in space and time. Through determination of the former we can acquire *a priori* cognitions of objects (in mathematics), but only as far as their form is concerned, as appearances; whether there can be things that must be intuited in this form is still left unsettled. Consequently all mathematical concepts are not by themselves cognitions, except insofar as one presupposes that there are things that can be presented to us only in accordance with the form of that pure sensible intuition. **Things in space and time**, however, are only given insofar as they are perceptions (representations accompanied with sensation), hence through empirical representation. The pure concepts of the understanding, consequently, even if they are applied to *a priori* intuitions (as in mathematics), provide cognition only insofar as these *a priori* intuitions, and by means of them also the concepts of the understanding, can be applied to empirical intuitions. Con-

^a für sich^b Object

sequently the categories do not afford us cognition of things by means of intuition except through their possible application to **empirical intuition**, i.e., they serve only for the possibility of **empirical cognition**. This, however, is called **experience**. The categories consequently have no other use for the cognition of things except insofar as these are taken as objects of possible experience.

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§ 23.

The above proposition is of the greatest importance, for it determines the boundaries of the use of the pure concepts of the understanding in regard to objects, just as the Transcendental Aesthetic determined the boundaries of the use of the pure form of our sensible intuition. Space and time are valid, as conditions of the possibility of how objects can be given to us, no further than for objects of the senses, hence only for experience. Beyond these boundaries they do not represent anything at all, for they are only in the senses and outside of them have no reality. The pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation and extend to objects of intuition in general, whether the latter be similar to our own or not, as long as it is sensible and not intellectual. But this further extension of concepts beyond **our** sensible intuition does not get us anywhere. For they are then merely empty concepts of objects,^a through which we cannot even judge whether the latter are possible or not – mere forms of thought without objective reality – since we have available no intuition to which the synthetic unity of apperception, which they alone contain, could be applied, and that could thus determine an object. **Our** sensible and empirical intuition alone can provide them with sense and significance.

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Thus if one assumes an object^b of a **non-sensible** intuition as given, one can certainly represent it through all of the predicates that already lie in the presupposition that **nothing belonging to sensible intuition pertains to it**: thus it is not extended, or in space, that its duration is not a time, that no alteration (sequence of determinations in time) is to be encountered in it, etc. But it is not yet a genuine cognition if I merely indicate what the intuition of the object^c **is not**, without being able to say what is then contained in it; for then I have not represented the possibility of an object^d for my pure concept of the understanding at all, since I cannot give any intuition that would correspond to it, but could only say that ours is not valid for it. But what is most important here is that not even a single category could be applied to such a thing, e.g., the

^a Objecten^b Object^c Object^d Objects

concept of a substance, i.e., that of something that could exist as a subject but never as a mere predicate; for I would not even know whether there could be anything that corresponded to this determination of thought if empirical intuition did not give me the case for its application. But more of this in the sequel.

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§ 24.

On the application of the categories to objects
of the senses in general.

The pure concepts of the understanding are related through the mere understanding to objects of intuition in general, without it being determined whether this intuition is our own or some other but still sensible one, but they are on this account mere **forms of thought**, through which no determinate object is yet cognized. The synthesis or combination of the manifold in them was related merely to the unity of apperception, and was thereby the ground of the possibility of cognition *a priori* insofar as it rests on the understanding, and was therefore not only transcendental but also merely purely intellectual. But since in us a certain form of sensible intuition *a priori* is fundamental, which rests on the receptivity of the capacity for representation (sensibility), the understanding, as spontaneity, can determine the manifold of given representations in accord with the synthetic unity of apperception, and thus think *a priori* synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of **sensible intuition**, as the condition under which all objects of our (human) intuition must necessarily stand, through which then the categories, as mere forms of thought, acquire objective reality, i.e., application to objects that can be given to us in intuition, but only as appearances; for of these alone are we capable of intuition *a priori*.

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This **synthesis** of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary *a priori*, can be called **figurative** (*synthesis speciosa*), as distinct from that which would be thought in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is called combination of the understanding (*synthesis intellectualis*); both are **transcendental**, not merely because they themselves proceed *a priori* but also because they ground the possibility of other cognition *a priori*.

Yet the figurative synthesis, if it pertains merely to the original synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., this transcendental unity, which is thought in the categories, must be called, as distinct from the merely intellectual combination, the **transcendental synthesis of the imagination**. **Imagination^a** is the faculty for representing an object even **without its presence** in intuition. Now since all of our intuition is sensible,

^a Here Kant uses both large type and spacing for extra emphasis.

the imagination, on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs to **sensibility**; but insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining and not, like sense, merely determinable, and can thus determine the form of sense *a priori* in accordance with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility *a priori*, and its synthesis of intuitions, **in accordance with the categories**, must be the transcendental synthesis of the **imagination**, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects of the intuition that is possible for us. As figurative, it is distinct from the intellectual synthesis without any imagination merely through the understanding. Now insofar as the imagination is spontaneity, I also occasionally call it the **productive** imagination, and thereby distinguish it from the **reproductive** imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and that therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition *a priori*, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology.

* * *

Here is now the place to make intelligible the paradox that must have struck everyone in the exposition of the form of inner sense (§ 6): namely how this presents even ourselves to consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we intuit ourselves only as we are internally **affected**, which seems to be contradictory, since we would have to relate to ourselves passively; for this reason it is customary in the systems of psychology to treat **inner sense** as the same as the faculty of **apperception** (which we carefully distinguish).⁴²

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That which determines the inner sense is the understanding and its original faculty of combining the manifold of intuition, i.e., of bringing it under an apperception (as that on which its very possibility rests). Now since in us humans the understanding is not itself a faculty of intuitions, and even if these were given in sensibility cannot take them up **into itself**, in order as it were to combine the manifold of **its own** intuition, thus its synthesis, considered in itself^a alone, is nothing other than the unity of the action of which it is conscious as such even without sensibility, but through which it is capable of itself determining sensibility internally with regard to the manifold that may be given to it in accordance with the form of its intuition. Under the designation of a **transcendental synthesis of the imagination**, it therefore exer-

^a *für sich*

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cises that action on the **passive** subject, whose **faculty** it is, about which we rightly say that the inner sense is thereby affected. Apperception and its synthetic unity is so far from being the same as the inner sense that the former, rather, as the source of all combination, applies to all sensible intuition of objects^a in general, to the manifold of **intuitions in general**, under the name of the categories; inner sense, on the contrary, contains the mere **form** of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in it, and thus it does not yet contain any **determinate** intuition at all, which is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner sense), which I have named the figurative synthesis.

We also always perceive this in ourselves. We cannot think of a line without **drawing** it in thought, we cannot think of a circle without **describing** it, we cannot represent the three dimensions of space at all without **placing** three lines perpendicular to each other at the same point, and we cannot even represent time without, in **drawing** a straight line (which is to be the external figurative representation of time), attending merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold through which we successively determine the inner sense, and thereby attending to the succession of this determination in inner sense.

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Motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of an object),^{*b} consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we abstract from this manifold in space and attend solely to the action in accordance with which we determine the form of **inner sense**, first produces the concept of succession at all. The understanding therefore does not **find** some sort of combination of the manifold already in inner sense, but **produces** it, by **affecting** inner sense. But how the I that I think is to differ from the I that intuits itself (for I can represent other kinds of intuition as at least possible) and yet be identical with the latter as the same subject, how therefore I can say that I as intelligence and **think-**

* Motion of an **object**^c in space does not belong in a pure science, thus also not in geometry; for that something is movable cannot be cognized *a priori* but only through experience. But motion, as **description** of a space, is a pure act^d of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general through productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry but even to transcendental philosophy.

^a *Objecte*

^b *Objects*

^c *Object*

^d *Actus*

ing subject cognize my self as an object^a that is **thought**, insofar as I am also given to myself in intuition, only, like other phenomena, not as I am for the understanding but rather as I appear to myself, this is no more and no less difficult than how I can be an object^b for myself in general and indeed one of intuition and inner perceptions. But that it really must be so can be clearly shown, if one lets space count as a mere pure form of the appearances of outer sense, from the fact that time, although is not itself an object of outer intuition at all, cannot be made representable to us except under the image of a line, insofar as we draw it, without which sort of presentation we could not know the unity of its measure at all, or likewise from the fact that we must always derive the determination of the length of time or also of the positions in time for all inner perceptions from that which presents external things to us as alterable; hence we must order the determinations of inner sense as appearances in time in just the same way as we order those of outer sense in space; hence if we admit about the latter that we cognize objects^c by their means only insofar as we are externally affected, then we must also concede that through inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected by **our selves**, i.e., as far as inner intuition is concerned we cognize our own subject only as appearance but not in accordance with what it is in itself.*⁴³

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§ 25.

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In the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, on the contrary, hence in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only **that I am**. This **representation** is a **thinking**, not an **intuiting**. Now since for the **cognition** of ourselves, in addition to the action of thinking that brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate sort of intuition, through which this manifold is given, is also required, my own existence

* I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is affected by ourselves. Every act^d of **attention** can give us an example of this. In such acts the understanding always determines the inner sense, in accordance with the combination that it thinks, to the inner intuition that corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is commonly affected by this means, everyone will be able to perceive in himself.

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^a Object^b Object^c Objecte^d Actus

B 158

is not indeed appearance (let alone mere illusion), but the determination of my existence^{a,44} can only occur in correspondence with the form of inner sense, according to the particular way in which the manifold that I combine is given in inner intuition, and I therefore have **no cognition** of myself as **I am**, but only as **I appear** to myself. The consciousness of oneself is therefore far from being a cognition of oneself, regardless of all the categories that constitute the thinking of an **object^b** in general through combination of the manifold in an apperception. Just as for the cognition of an object^b distinct from me I also need an intuition in addition to the thinking of an object^c in general (in the category), through which I determine that general concept, so for the cognition of myself I also need in addition to the consciousness, or in addition to that which I think myself, an intuition of the manifold in me, through which I determine this thought; and I exist as an intelligence that is merely conscious of its faculty for combination but which, in regard to the manifold that it is to combine, is subject to a limiting condition that it calls inner sense, which can make that combination intuitable only in accordance with temporal relations^d that lie entirely outside of the concepts of the understanding proper, and that can therefore still cognize itself merely as it appears to itself with regard to an intuition (which is not intellectual and capable of being given through the understanding itself), not as it would cognize itself if its **intuition** were intellectual.

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B 157 * The **I think** expresses the act^e of determining my existence. The existence is thereby already given, but the way in which I am to determine it, i.e., the manifold that I am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not yet thereby given. For that self-intuition is required, which is grounded in an *a priori* given form, i.e., time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable.

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Now I do not have yet another self-intuition, which would give the **determining** in me, of the spontaneity of which alone I am conscious, even before the act^f of **determination**, in the same way as time gives that which is to be determined, thus I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being, rather I merely represent the spontaneity of my thought, i.e., of the determining, and my existence always remains only sensibly determinable, i.e., determinable as the existence of an appearance. Yet this spontaneity is the reason I call myself an **intelligence**.

^a Object^b Objects^c Object^d Zeitverhältnissen^e Actus^f Actus

§ 26.

Transcendental deduction of the universally possible
use of the pure
concepts of the understanding in experience.

In the **metaphysical deduction**⁴⁵ the origin of the *a priori* categories in general was established through their complete coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking, in the **transcendental deduction**, however, their possibility as *a priori* cognitions of objects of an intuition in general was exhibited (§§ 20, 21). Now the possibility of cognizing *a priori* through categories whatever objects may come before our senses, not as far as the form of their intuition but rather as far as the laws of their combination are concerned, thus the possibility of as it were prescribing the law to nature and even making the latter possible, is to be explained. For if the categories did not serve in this way, it would not become clear why everything that may ever come before our senses must stand under the laws that arise *a priori* from the understanding alone.

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First of all I remark that by the **synthesis of apprehension** I understand the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible.

We have **forms** of outer as well as inner sensible intuition *a priori* in the representations of space and time, and the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always be in agreement with the latter, since it can only occur in accordance with this form. But space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as **forms** of sensible intuition, but also as **intuitions** themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of the **unity** of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic).^{*46} Thus even **unity of the synthesis**

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* Space, represented as **object** (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the **comprehension**^a of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an **intuitive representation**, so that the **form of intuition** merely gives the manifold, but the **formal intuition** gives unity of the representation. In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since through it (as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first **given** as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding (§ 24).

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^a *Zusammenfassung*

sis of the manifold, outside or within us, hence also a **combination** with which everything that is to be represented as determined in space or time must agree, is already given *a priori*, along with (not in) these intuitions, as condition of the synthesis of all **apprehension**. But this synthetic unity can be none other than that of the combination of the manifold of a given **intuition in general** in an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories, only applied to our **sensible intuition**. Consequently all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories, and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid *a priori* of all objects of experience.

* * *

B 162 Thus if, e.g., I make the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of its manifold, my ground is the **necessary unity** of space and of outer sensible intuition in general, and I as it were draw its shape in agreement with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. This very same synthetic unity, however, if I abstract from the form of space, has its seat in the understanding, and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition in general, i.e., the category of **quantity**,^a with which that synthesis of apprehension, i.e., the perception, must therefore be in thoroughgoing agreement.*

B 163 If (in another example) I perceive the freezing of water, I apprehend two states (of fluidity and solidity) as ones standing in a relation^b of time to each other. But in time, on which I ground the appearance as **inner intuition**, I represent necessary synthetic **unity** of the manifold, without which that relation^c could not be **determinately** given in an intuition (with regard to the temporal sequence). But now this synthetic unity, as the *a priori* condition under which I combine the manifold of an **intuition in general**, if I abstract from the constant form of my inner intuition, time, is the category of **cause**, through which, if I apply it to my sensibility, I **determine everything that happens in time** in

B 162 * In such a way it is proved that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must necessarily be in agreement with the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual and contained in the category entirely *a priori*. It is one and the same spontaneity that, there under the name of imagination and here under the name of understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition.

^a GröÙe

^b Relation

^c Relation

general as far as its relation^a is concerned. Thus the apprehension in such an occurrence, hence the occurrence itself, as far as possible perception is concerned, stands under the concept of the **relation^b** of effects and causes, and so in all other cases.

* * *

Categories are concepts that prescribe laws *a priori* to appearances, thus to nature as the sum total of all appearances (*natura materialiter spectata*),^c and, since they are not derived from nature and do not follow it as their pattern (for they would otherwise be merely empirical), the question now arises how it is to be conceived that nature must follow them, i.e., how they can determine *a priori* the combination of the manifold of nature without deriving from the latter. Here is the solution to this riddle.

It is by no means stranger that the laws of appearances in nature must agree with the understanding and its *a priori* form, i.e., its faculty of **combining** the manifold in general, than that the appearances themselves must agree with the form of sensible intuition *a priori*. For laws exist just a little in the appearances, but rather exist only relative to the subject in which the appearances inhere, insofar as it has understanding, as appearances do not exist in themselves, but only relative to the same being, insofar as it has senses. The lawfulness of things in themselves would necessarily pertain to them even without an understanding that cognizes them. But appearances are only representations of things that exist without cognition of what they might be in themselves. As mere representations, however, they stand under no law of connection at all except that which the connecting faculty prescribes. Now that which connects the manifold of sensible intuition is imagination, which depends on understanding for the unity of its intellectual synthesis and on sensibility for the manifoldness of apprehension. Now since all possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, but the latter itself, this empirical synthesis, depends on the transcendental one, thus on the categories, all possible perceptions, hence everything that can ever reach empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of nature, as far as their combination is concerned,⁴⁷ stand under the categories, on which nature (considered merely as nature in general) depends, as the original ground of its necessary lawfulness (as *natura formaliter spectata*).^d The pure faculty of understanding does not suffice, however, to

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^a Relation

^b Verhältnisse

^c "Nature regarded materially," i.e., nature in the sense of its material.

^d "Nature formally regarded," i.e., nature considered with regard to its form rather than its matter.

prescribe to the appearances through mere categories *a priori* laws beyond those on which rests a **nature in general**, as lawfulness of appearances in space and time. Particular laws, because they concern empirically determined appearances, **cannot** be completely derived from the categories, although they all stand under them. Experience must be added in order to come to know particular laws **at all**; but about experience in general, and about what can be cognized as an object of experience, only those *a priori* laws offer instruction.

§ 27.

Result of this deduction of the concepts of the understanding.

We cannot **think** any object except through categories; we cannot **cognize** any object that is thought except through intuitions that correspond to those concepts. Now all our intuitions are sensible, and this cognition, so far as its object is given, is empirical. Empirical cognition, however, is experience. Consequently **no a priori** cognition is possible for us except solely of objects of possible experience.*

But this cognition, which is limited merely to objects of experience, is not on that account all borrowed from experience; rather, with regard to the pure intuitions as well as the pure concepts of the understanding, there are elements of cognition that are to be encountered in us *a priori*. Now there are only two ways in which a **necessary** agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects can be thought: either the experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make the experience possible. The first is not the case with the categories (nor with pure sensible intuition); for they are *a priori* concepts, hence independent of experience (the assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of *generatio aequivoca*).^a Consequently only the second way remains

* So that one may not prematurely take issue with the worrisome and disadvantageous consequences of this proposition, I will only mention that the categories are not restricted in **thinking** by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unbounded field, and only the **cognition** of objects that we think, the determination of the object,^b requires intuition; in the absence of the latter, the thought of the object^c can still have its true and useful consequences for the **use** of the subject's **reason**, which, however, cannot be expounded here, for it is not always directed to the determination of the object, thus to cognition, but rather also to that of the subject and its willing.

^a The generation of one sort of thing out of something essentially different, e.g., the supposed generation of flies from rotting meat.

^b Object

^c Object

(as it were a system of the **epigenesis**⁴⁸ of pure reason): namely that the categories contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general from the side of the understanding. But more about how they make experience possible, and which principles of its possibility they yield in their application to appearances, will be taught in the following chapter on the transcendental use of the power of judgment.

If someone still wanted to propose a middle way between the only two, already named ways, namely, that the categories were neither **self-thought** *a priori* first principles^a of our cognition nor drawn from experience, but were rather subjective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with our existence by our author in such a way that their use would agree exactly with the laws of nature along which experience runs (a kind of **preformation-system**⁴⁹ of pure reason), then (besides the fact that on such a hypothesis no end can be seen to how far one might drive the presupposition of predetermined predispositions for future judgments) this would be decisive against the supposed middle way: that in such a case the categories would lack the **necessity** that is essential to their concept. For, e.g., the concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a consequent under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on a subjective necessity, arbitrarily implanted in us, of combining certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation.^b I would not be able to say that the effect is combined with the cause in the object^c (i.e., necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think of this representation otherwise than as so connected; which is precisely what the skeptic wishes most, for then all of our insight through the supposed objective validity of our judgments is nothing but sheer illusion, and there would be no shortage of people who would not concede this subjective necessity (which must be felt) on their own; at least one would not be able to quarrel with anyone about that which merely depends on the way in which his subject is organized.

B 168

Brief concept of this deduction.

It is the exhibition of the pure concepts of the understanding (and with them of all theoretical cognition *a priori*) as principles^d of the possibility of experience, but of the latter as the **determination** of appearances in space and time **in general** – and the latter, finally, from the

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^a *Principien*^b *Verhältnisse*^c *Objekte*^d *Principien*

principle^a of the **original** synthetic unity of apperception, as the form of the understanding in relation to space and time, as original forms of sensibility.

* * *

I hold the division into paragraphs to be necessary only this far, because we have been dealing with the elementary concepts. Now that we will represent their use, the exposition may proceed in a continuous fashion, without this division.>

^a Princip

- section 28, line 5: “Once when he [Demonax, a supposed Cynic sage] came upon two uncouth philosophers inquiring and wrangling with one another – one of them putting absurd questions, the other answering perfectly irrelevantly – he said ‘Don’t you think, my friends, that one of these guys is milking a he-goat and the other putting a sieve underneath it?’” (reference and translation by John M. Cooper). Kant cites “*Lucians Schriften. Erster Theil. Zürich bey Geßner. 1769.*” at R 5553 (1778–79? 1780–81? 18:221–9, at p. 225).
- 4 See R 2129 (1769–70, 16:245–6); R 2131–3 (1772–78, 16:247); R 2147 (1776–78, 16:252); R 2155 (1776–78, 16:254); R 2162 (1776–78, 16:256); and R 2177 (1780s, 16:259). See also the Jäsche *Logic*, introduction VII (9:50–7; *Lectures on Logic*, pp. 557–64).
- 5 For earlier statements of this doctrine, see R 3920–1 (1769, 17:344–6).
- 6 For an earlier sketch, see R 3063 (1776–78, 16:636–8).
- 7 On this paragraph, see R 3063 (1776–78, 16:636–8, especially p. 638); R 3065–6 (1776–1780s, 16:639); R 3069 (1780s, 16:640).
- 8 See R 3104–6 (1776–78, 16:660–1).
- 9 Compare R 4288 (1770–71? 1776–78? 17:497) and R 5228 (1776–78, 18:125–6).
- 10 See R 4679 (1776–78, 17:662–4, especially p. 664: “All appearances belong under titles of understanding”).
- 11 For related claims, see R 4285 (1770–71? 1776–78? 17:496) and R 4520 (1772–76, 17:580).
- 12 The history of the evolution of Kant’s list of categories is long and complicated, and only a selection of the relevant documents can be listed here. The main feature of this development was the only gradual connection of the three categories of relation, on which Kant focused early and often, especially in the documents of 1774–75, with the quadripartite scheme reflected in the previous table of the logical functions of judgment. A prime example of the latter tendency is R 3941 (1769, 17:356–7); an early example of the former tendency is R 4493 (1772–76, 17:571–2). One of the first clear statements of the conjunction of the two analyses is R 4656 (1772–76, 17:623–4); see also R 5055 (1776–78, 18:74). Among other early statements, see also R 4276 (1770–71, 17:492–3) and R 4215 (1775–78, 17:684–5). For an interesting late restatement of the whole doctrine, see R 6338a (1794–95, 18:659–65). Among the large number of notes focusing primarily on the categories of relation, see R 4385 (1771, 17:528); R 4496 (1772–76, 17:573); R 5284 and 5286 (1776–78, 18:143); R 5289–90 (1776–78, 18:144); and R 5854 (1783–84, 18:369–70).
- 13 See, however, R 4276 (1770–71, 17:492–3), where the categories are defined as “the general actions of reason.”
- 14 For Kant’s first formulations of the problem of a transcendental deduction of the categories, see his famous letter to Marcus Herz of 21 February 1772 (letter 70, 10:129–35; translation in Zweig, *Philosophical Correspondence*, pp. 70–6). For contemporaneous reflections, see R 4473 (1772, 17:564–5) and R 4633–4 (1773–76, 17:615–19).
- 15 For other passages using the same distinction, see R 5636 (1780–81, 18:267–8) and *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, 29:764.

- 16 Kant calls Locke a “physiologist of reason” at a number of places, including R 4866 (1776–78, 18:14–15) and R 4893 (1776–78, 18:21).
- 17 For a similar passage, in which Kant formulates a possibility he ultimately means to reject without using the subjunctive mood, but then more explicitly rejects it, see R 5221 (1776–78, 18:122–3).
- 18 See R 4634 (1776–78, 17:616–19).
- 19 In addition to R 4634, just cited, see also R 4383 (1776–78, 17:527–8) and R 5184 (1776–1770s, 18:111–12).
- 20 There are a number of notes in which Kant uses this formulation; see R 4672 (1773, 17:635–6), R 5643 (1780–84, 18:282–4), R 5854 (1783–84, 18:369–70), and R 5931–2 (1783–84, 18:390–2).
- 21 An anticipation of this doctrine of threefold synthesis, which clearly shows that its importance is to explain how appearances are subject to the laws of both intuition and understanding, can be found at R 5216 (1776–78, 18:121). Although Kant will not explicitly refer to this doctrine in the second-edition deduction, R 6358, a major sketch of “the whole of the critical philosophy” from as late as the end of 1797 (18:682–5), shows that he continued to hold the view then (see especially p. 684) and presumably had never given it up.
- 22 For other statements of the claim of this paragraph, see R 4676 (1773–75, 17:653–7, at p. 656); R 4678 (1773–75, 17:660–2, at p. 660); R 5221 (1776–78, 18:122–3), R 5390 (1776–78? 1778–79? 18:169–70); and R 5636–7 (1780–81, 18:266–76, especially pp. 267–8 and 271).
- 23 For similar treatments of the significance of the thought of an object, see R 4642 (1772–76, 17:622), R 4679 (1773–75, 17:662–4, at p. 663), R 4681 (1773–75, 17:665–8, at pp. 666–7), R 5213 (1776–78, 18:120), and R 5643 (1780–88, 18:282–4, at p. 283). For an early statement that gives this analysis of relation of cognition to an object and then takes the next step by adducing the “unity of the mind” as its ground, see R 5203 (1776–78, 18:116–17). See also R 4679, at 17:664.
- 24 In addition to R 5203, cited in the previous note, see also R 4674 (1773–75, 17:643–7) and R 4677 (1773–75, 17:657–60).
- 25 Compare R 4678 (1773–75, 17:660–2, at p. 660), R 5203 (1776–78, 18:116–17), R 5213 (1776–78, 18:120), and R 5216 (1776–78, 18:121).
- 26 On the concept of the transcendental object, see the important R 5554 (1778–81, 18:229–31), where Kant states that the transcendental object “is no real object or given thing, but a concept, in relation to which appearances have unity” (p. 230).
- 27 See the parallel passage at R 5636 (1780–81, 18:267–8, at p. 257).
- 28 Compare R 4676 (1773–75, 17:653–7, at p. 656). See also the loose sheet B 12 (undated) (23:17–20, at p. 19).
- 29 For further comments on the contrast between productive and reproductive imagination and on the relation between apperception and productive imagination, see the undated loose sheet B 12 (23:17–20, at p. 18).
- 30 Compare the accounts given at R 4674 (1773–75, 17:643–7, at p. 647), R 4676 (17:653–7, at p. 656), and R 4677 (1773–75, 17:657–60, especially p. 658).
- 31 On the concept of nature, see R 5607–8 (1778–81, 18:248–51) and R 5904 (1780s? 1776–78? 18:380).

- 32 Kant's thought about the best way to accomplish the task of the "Transcendental Deduction" was in constant ferment between 1781 and 1787; and although he claims in the preface to the second edition that he changed nothing fundamental in his proofs, only in the style of his exposition, it is clear that he considered a number of alternative strategies for the deduction in the period between the two editions and that the version finally published in 1787 differs from that of 1781 in many ways. Two published documents from the intervening period are *Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics* (1783), §§ 16–22, in which the argument turns on a distinction between mere judgments of perception and judgments of experience, with the latter but not the former being held to have *a priori* concepts of the understanding as necessary conditions; and the long footnote in the preface to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786) (4:474–6n.), in which Kant suggests by contrast that the deduction could be grounded entirely on the "precisely determined definition of a judgment in general" (4:475n.). It is notable that there is no reference to the unity of apperception or self-consciousness in either of these attempted deductions. Other important documents on the development of the deduction, many of which date from the period 1783–84, would thus seem to postdate the composition of the *Prolegomena*, which Kant seems to have finished in the summer of 1782, and would thus be either afterthoughts on the *Prolegomena* or notes toward the next edition of the *Critique*. Several notes including extensive sketches of a deduction which may or may not postdate the first edition of the *Critique* include: R 5637, which may be from 1780–81 or later (18:271–6); R 5642, which is univocally assigned to 1780–81 (18:279–82); and R 5643, which may be from anywhere between 1780 and 1788 (18:282–4). Those univocally assigned to the period 1783–84 include: R 5923 (18:385–7), R 5926 (18:388), R 5927 (18:388–9), and R 5930–4 (18:390–3).
- 33 Although he presumably presents here only an outline of the strategy for the ensuing deduction, in a later manuscript Kant suggested that the inference that any combination requires an *a priori* concept is virtually the whole of the deduction. See the manuscripts, written in 1793 or later, entitled *What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?* (20:271, 275–6; in the translation by Ted Humphrey [New York: Abaris Books, 1983], pp. 75, 83–5).
- 34 To this note compare especially R 5930 (1783–84, 18:390).
- 35 To this paragraph compare also the loose sheet B 12 (23:18–20, especially p. 19).
- 36 The singularity or unity of space and time play no role in the argument of § 25, but do play a crucial role in that of § 26. Kant's reference to § 25 here should therefore presumably be replaced by a reference to § 26.
- 37 This is the key premise in a number of Kant's sketches of the deduction from 1783–84, including R 5927 (18:388–9) and R 5932 (18:391–2), as well as R 5643, assigned to the broader period 1780–88 (18:282–4). From the same period, see also *Metaphysik Volckmann*, 28:405–6. For Kant's later thought on the concept of an object, see R 6350 (1797, 18:675–7).
- 38 To the argument of this and the following section, compare especially R 5923 (18:385–7).

- 39 Kant is here summing up the argument of his 1762 essay *Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren*; translated as “The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures” in David Walford, ed., *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 85–105.
- 40 Compare especially R 5933 (18:392–3).
- 41 Erdmann, following Vaihinger, substitutes “§ 10” for the original “§ 13.” This reflects the fact that Kant derives the table of categories from the table of the logical functions of judgment in § 10 (as numbered in the second edition). However, it is in § 13 that Kant raises the question of whether the categories necessarily apply to all of our possible experience in the way that space and time as the forms of intuition do; his reference to § 13 here is presumably intended to show that here is where he has finally answered the question raised in that earlier section. Thus we leave Kant’s reference as it stands.
- 42 For an important note on the problem of inner sense, see R 5655 (1788–89, 18:313–16).
- 43 Kant continued to worry about the problem of inner sense until the end of his career; for late reflections, see R 6349 (1797, 18:672–5), R 6350 (1797, 18:675–7, especially p. 675), and R 6354 (1797, 18:680). The claim that the unidimensionality of time must be represented by the spatial figure of a line, although it does not figure in the “Refutation of Idealism” added at B 274–9 below, does figure in the version of the “Refutation” found at R 5653 (1788, 18:306–12, at pp. 308–9). The distinct claim that *changes* in time and the determinate duration of intervals between changes in time can only be empirically known on the basis of periodic changes in objects in space is emphasized throughout the drafts of the “Refutation” found in R 6311–17 (1790, 18:607–29). See also B 288–92 below.
- 44 To this note, compare the draft of an essay entitled “Answer to the question, Is it an experience that I think?” at R 5661 (1788–90, 18:318–20). See also A 402 and Kant’s long footnote at B 422–3n., below.
- 45 By this term, here first introduced, Kant refers back to the derivation of the categories from the logical functions of judgment (§§ 9–12). This new designation for that argument is widely used in the literature on Kant.
- 46 To this note, compare R 5926 (1783–84, 18:388).
- 47 On this conception of nature, see R 5406–11 (1776–1780s, 18:174–5).
- 48 This term alludes to the biological theory that the germ cells of the two parents give rise to the embryo as a new product, rather than as the evolution of something preformed; the theory of epigenesis is the antithesis of the theory of preformation, and not just a contrast to the concept of *generatio aequivoca*. For another instance of Kant’s use of this and the related biological terms to classify philosophical theories, see his classification of theories of reproduction at *Critique of Judgment*, § 81 (5:421–4).
- 49 This alludes to the biological theory, the antithesis of epigenesis, that the embryo exists completely formed in the germ cell of one parent and that the other parent’s germ cell only stimulates it to growth.