
On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy,
Exposition of its Different Modifications and
Comparison of the Latest Form with
the Ancient One

Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, I, no. 2 (1802) 1-74

Translation and Notes by H. S. Harris

The long excerpt that is translated above (see pp 105-33) from G.E. Schulze's first book *Aenesidemus* (1792) provides a clear picture of what his philosophical position was, and of how he sought to defend it. Hegel is here concerned with the major work that Schulze published nine years later (not eight as Hegel mistakenly says at the beginning). Schulze's own position has not changed, so the reader will be able to decide for himself how far Hegel's extremely trenchant criticism of Schulze himself is just.

But the review shows us that the historical topic of Schulze's book was far more important to Hegel than Schulze's own position (see the introductory essay, pp. 256-65 above). Schulze provided both a historical view of skepticism and a skeptical critique of modern philosophy from Descartes onwards. From Hegel's own critical reactions we can see that he studied both the ancient skeptics and the modern rationalists for himself. But his own view of the tradition to which Schulze himself belongs (and especially of Hume) probably owes a lot to Schulze. Even Hegel's interpretation of the thinkers whom he seeks to defend (e.g. Sextus Empiricus) is often quite obviously biased by his determination to prove that Schulze is wrong about them. Thus Schulze the commonsensical skeptic, like his opposite number, W. T. Krug, the commonsensical idealist, has a greater negative (irritant) influence on the development of Hegel's speculative idealism, than Hegel himself recognizes.

Critique of Theoretical Philosophy, by Gottlob Ernst Schulze, Court Councillor and Professor in Helmstädt. Hamburg: C. E. Bohn, 1801. Vol. I, xxxii + 728 pp.; Vol. II, vi + 722 pp.

[1]

EIGHT YEARS AFTER Mr. Schulz[e]¹ came forth with great éclat against the Kantian philosophy, especially in the form it had acquired in the "Theory of the Representative Faculty",² he now takes hold of theoretical philosophy in general, in order to set it on fire by means of his skepticism and burn it all to the ground. The whole crew of modern skeptics rightly honor Mr. Sch[ulze] as their leading light, and this sandbag containing four alphabets (just for the present)³ that Mr. Sch[ulze] has hurled against the fortress of philosophy assures him a good right to this first place.

The proper exposition and appreciation of this latest form of skepticism makes it necessary for us to deal with the relationship // of skepticism in general, and of this form in particular, to philosophy; the different modifications of skepticism will define themselves

[2]

automatically according to this relationship, and at the same time the relationship of this latest skepticism, which claims to stand on the shoulders of the ancient tradition so that it can both see further and be more rationally doubtful, will emerge; an explanation of the relationship of skepticism to philosophy, and a cognition of skepticism itself arising from that explanation, seems not without utility for this further reason, that the concepts ordinarily current about it are extremely formal ones, and the noble essence of it, when it is genuine, is habitually inverted into a universal bolthole and talking-point of unphilosophy in these latest days.

- [3] The "Introduction" gives us an account of the *subjective source* of Schulzian skepticism. It develops the following line of thought: "if a *cognition* that is supposed to be generated from Reason alone, cannot secure for itself any universal and lasting assent, but those who labor on it are in constant contradiction with one another [. . .] and every new effort to endow this cognition with the stability of a science comes to grief; [. . .] then the conclusion can be drawn with considerable plausibility that at the basis of the quest for a cognition of this kind [. . .] there must lie an unachievable goal, and an illusion shared by all who work for it. [. . .] The observation of such success, as has always attended the striving of so many // men distinguished for their talents and for the zeal they have shown in the discovery of hidden truths toward the goal of a scientific philosophy, has strongly influenced the author's way of thinking about philosophy too" — and to be universally distrustful of eulogies about the insight and wisdom of Reason is a reproach to no one — "this has given his thought the direction that gave rise to this critique of theoretical philosophy [. . .] Every urge to employ his energies on the working out of whichever one of these systems seemed to him to carry the surest guarantee of truth and certainty, was always repressed once more as soon as he made preparations to satisfy it, *most especially by pondering on the fate* which has befallen every speculative involvement with the ultimate grounds of our cognition of the existence of things; for *his confidence in his faculties has never gone so far*, that he could entertain the hope of actually achieving something, for which so many men endowed with the greatest talents and the most manifold insights had striven in vain."⁴

That is what is called speaking straight to men's faces and out of their very mouths. — The Athenian lawgiver set death as the penalty for political unconcern in the times when unrest broke out in the State; philosophical unconcern, not taking sides, but being resolved in advance to make submission to what may be crowned with triumph and with universal acceptance by destiny, is of itself punished by the death of speculative Reason. If indeed the pondering of fate could

become a [decisive] motive in one's respect for and commitment to a philosophy, then it would have to be not its universality, but rather its non-universality // that was a motive for acceptance; for it is comprehensible enough that the most authentic philosophies are not those that are universally accepted, and that, quite apart from the universal acceptance obtained by bad philosophies, if more authentic philosophies also achieve it, then the aspect of them that is universally accepted is precisely the one that is not philosophical. So that even in the philosophies that enjoy what is called a happy destiny—which ought in truth to be counted as bad luck for them, if we can speak of lucky and unlucky destinies at all in this connection—it is the non-universal aspect that must be sought out in order to find the philosophy.⁵

But if Mr. Sch[ulze] has seen that the result of the striving that so many men distinguished for their talents and zeal have devoted to the discovery of the ultimate grounds of our cognition is equal misfortune all round, this estimate in its turn can only be rated as an extremely subjective point of view. Leibniz, for example, expresses quite a different point of view in the passage that Jacobi chose for one of his epigraphs: "j'ai trouve que la plupart des sectes ont raison dans une bonne partie de ce qu'elles avancent, mais non pas tant en ce qu'elles nient."⁶ The superficial view of philosophical controversies lets only the differences between systems appear, but already the old rule, *contra negantes principia non est disputandum*⁷ leads us to recognize that there is conscious agreement [*Einigkeit vorhanden*] about principles when philosophical systems contend with one another—it is another matter, to be sure, when philosophy is contending with unphilosophy—an agreement which is above all success and historic destiny, one which cannot be [re]cognized from the point of contention, and which escapes the vacant gaze of the man, who always // takes in the very opposite of what is happening before his eyes. In the matter of principles, or of Reason, it has gone well for all those men distinguished for their talents and zeal; and the variation between them is all to be located in the higher or lower [level of] abstraction, with which Reason has expounded itself in principles and systems. If the frustration of speculative truth be not taken for granted, then there is no place for the modest humility and despair of attaining what only a superficial view declares that these distinguished men have been frustrated about; or again if the frustration is taken for granted, if modesty and distrust in one's faculties could make up the turning weight along with pondering on the success [of one's predecessors], still there is no question which modesty is the greater: not entertaining the hope for oneself of reaching that goal for which those men filled with talent and insight had striven in vain; or instead, as Mr. Schulz[e] says has happened to

[4]

[5]

him, falling into the conjecture that there is a certain *original sin* that infects philosophy, which must have been transmitted from one dogmatic concern with it to the next (we shall see later that Mr. Sch[ulze] is only acquainted with skeptical and dogmatic philosophizing); that Mr. Sch[ulze] is confident that he has discovered this original sin, and is expounding what he has discovered about it, in the work we have before us, proves that he thinks as little of the motive of modesty in philosophy for his part, for all his talk of it, as we ought to think of the motive of success.⁸

- [6] The *discovery of the original sin* of all previous speculative philosophies is promised, then, in this work; // and Sch[ulze] says (Vol. I, 610) that all hope of successful speculation is *cut off for the future* by this discovery, since it would be foolish (oh yes indeed!) to hope for a change in the human cognitive faculties. What luckier discovery than this of an original sin of all speculation could be brought before the philosophy-craving community [Volk]?

Either this community continually justifies keeping its distance from speculating—which needs no justification of course, but still here is one—by pointing to the state of strife there; and proclaims itself disposed to adopt a system only when the day comes that a philosophical council or colloquium agrees unanimously on a universally valid philosophy. Or else it runs after all the philosophical systems (among which it reckons every wind egg) but its intellectual chemistry is so unfortunately organized that it has affinity only for the base addition that is alloyed with the noble metal of a mind-minting, and will only combine with that. This community is continually coming to realize that it is only being made a fool of; and it finally hurls itself despairingly into the moral realm, though still not without cares on the speculative flank.

- [7] For both of these parties what more fortunate discovery could there be than that of an original sin in the inmost essence of speculative philosophy itself? For the first group this provides the proof of having been the cleverest, because it never risked anything on speculative philosophy; and the second one finds comfort here for having always been made a fool of, since the blame for this is shifted from its shoulders onto those of philosophy, and its cares on account of speculative philosophy are taken from it. // It is no wonder, therefore, that this skepticism gains widespread if not universal acceptance, and in particular, that such rejoicing has arisen over the weighty elaboration of it that lies before us. A sample of this rejoicing will be found in our “news and notices” section.⁹

Mr. Schulz[e] excludes ethics and aesthetics from his skeptical elaboration of philosophy, and limits himself to the theory of knowledge [*theoretische Philosophie*]. Making an overall judgement, it seems that Mr. Schulz[e] regards only theoretical philosophy as speculative; but

one cannot tell just how he regards the other parts. More precisely, we cannot see anywhere the slightest hint of the Idea of a speculative philosophy, which is neither specifically theoretical, nor practical, nor yet aesthetic. For the rest, Mr. Schulz[e] arrives at this [three-part] division of philosophy by way of empirical psychology; regardless of the fact that he himself excludes this from philosophy, he still uses it, oddly enough, as the source of his division of philosophy; in fact, "some important distinctions" are supposed to "occur between the actual facts of consciousness, they are either cognitions of objects, or utterances of the will, or feelings of pleasure and dislike, among which the feelings of beauty and the sublime also belong; [. . .] our insight into [the facts] goes far enough to tell us that they cannot be reduced to a single class, or derived from a single source" (a remark which we read word for word in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, p. xxii) "but they are essentially distinguished from one another by abiding marks,"¹⁰ and so they give us the above named three parts of philosophy. — Here already, Mr. Schulz[e] diverges essentially from Sextus Empiricus, for in his critique of the //singular parts of philosophy and of the sciences Sextus does not make the division himself but takes it over as he finds it, and attacks it skeptically.¹¹

We have to see, first of all, how Mr. Sch[ulze] comprehends this *theoretical philosophy*, and just what is the character of the enemy that he strikes to the ground. In the first section the essential marks of theoretical philosophy are sought out in a highly methodical way that takes pages and pages, and the following definition is produced: theoretical philosophy is "the science of the *highest and most unconditioned causes of all conditioned things whose actuality we are otherwise certain of*."¹² — This other certainty about the conditioned apart from philosophy we shall learn about later. But the highest and unconditioned causes of things, or better the Rational itself, these Mr. Schulz[e] comprehends as *things* [Dinge] once more, things which lie outside and above our consciousness, something existing that is strictly opposed to consciousness. No idea [Vorstellung] of rational cognition occurs anywhere except this one (repeated *ad nauseam*) that through Reason a cognition of Things [Sachen] is supposed to be acquired — Things which are supposed to lie hidden *behind* the shadow-pictures of things, that the natural human mode of cognition offers us; *existence* is supposed to be made *discoverable* by the aid of abstract principles and of *concepts*; what things may be, taken in their true but hidden *actuality* is to be *reconnoitered*; the tools that philosophy employs for this reconnoitering of things are *concepts*, abstract principles, // conceptual implications; and the bridge to those *hidden things* is built out of nothing but *concepts*.¹³

It is not possible to conceive speculation and the rational realm in a cruder way; speculative philosophy is consistently represented thus,

as if ordinary experience in the unalterable form of its ordinary actuality lay stretched out before it unconquerable, as an horizon of adamant, and speculation surmised and wanted to seek out behind that, the *things* in themselves of its horizon, like the mountain of an equally ordinary actual world, which was bearing that other actuality [of our experience] upon its shoulders; Mr. Sch[ulze] simply cannot represent the rational [reality], the In-itself, to himself in any other way than as a mountainpeak under snow; for the Catholic the Host transforms itself into a living God; but what happens here is not what the Devil asked of Christ, the changing of stones into bread—instead of that the living bread of Reason is transformed forever into stone.

The positive side of Sch[ulze]'s skepticism stands opposed to this speculative philosophy which seeks for a cognition of things that are supposed to *exist outside* of our consciousness; for his skepticism does not just have its negative side which is concerned with the destruction of the brain-children of the dogmatists, and their attempts to achieve cognition of the *existence of hyperphysical* things.

[10] The *positive side* of this skepticism consists, to be precise, in this: that it can be described in general as a *philosophy* which *does not go beyond consciousness*; and verily (p. 51) "the existence of what is given within the compass of our consciousness // has *undeniable certainty*; for since it is present in consciousness, we can doubt the certainty of it no more than we can doubt consciousness itself; and to want to doubt consciousness is absolutely impossible, because any such doubt would destroy itself since it cannot occur apart from consciousness, and hence it would be nothing; what is given in and with consciousness, we call an *actual fact* [Tatsache] of consciousness; it follows that the facts of consciousness are what is undeniably actual, what all philosophical speculations must be related to, and what is to be explained or made comprehensible through these speculations."¹⁴

Now then, may we not ask this philosophy, which posits indubitable certainty in the facts of consciousness, and limits all rational cognition (p.21) to the formal unity which is to be assigned to those facts, just like the most vulgar Kantianism, how it comprehends the fact that man does not content himself with this indubitable certainty which he finds in the perpetual glassy-staring perception of objects, and further how it hopes to comprehend that ordering of perceptions on the basis of perception alone? How is it that man proceeds beyond the bestial level of an existence of this kind, which—to put it Mr. Sch[ulze]'s way—consists in the perception of the real being of things,¹⁵ and comes to the thought of what Mr. Sch[ulze] calls "metaphysics", the thought of a *grounding* of that real being, or of a logical derivation of this real being and of all that belongs to it from a *primal ground*, in order to make it comprehensible?¹⁶ The "conscious-fact" philosophy

has no answer save this // stupid one: that that striving after a cognition that lies beyond and above the real, quite certain being of things, and is thus the cognition of things as uncertain—that striving, too, is a fact of consciousness. Mr. Sch[ulze] puts it thus (Vol. I, p. 21): "Thanks to the original constitution of our mind [*Gemüt*] we have in fact an urge to seek for the ultimate and unconditioned ground for everything that exists *according to our insight* into it *only* in a conditioned way."¹⁷ But if every fact of consciousness has immediate certainty, then this insight that something exists only in a conditioned way is impossible; for 'to exist in a conditioned way' is synonymous with 'not being certain on its own account'. —The author expresses himself in the same way on p. 72, when he makes the transition from that bestial staring at the world with its indubitable certainty, to the problem of theoretical philosophy: "although the *being of things* is *quite certain* according to the verdict of consciousness, this in no way satisfies Reason," (here we shall learn what Reason consists in) "because with the *existing things* of our acquaintance *it is not self-explanatory, that they are, and that they are what they are.*"¹⁸

But what then is the status of that indubitable certainty of the fact in our immediate cognition of the being of things; (p. 57) "there are definitely no degrees in the actuality that we ascribe to the intuited facts, such that one fact would possess more of it than another." P. 62: "The intuiting subject cognizes the objects and their existence directly and as something which exists and subsists in complete independence // of the workings of the presentative power just as the cognitive subject exists and subsists independently."¹⁹

In view of this absolute certainty that things exist (and certainty of how they exist) how can it at the same time, be the case that *it is not self-explanatory that they are and that they are what they are?* Two cognitions are asserted simultaneously: one in which the existence and character of things is self-explanatory and another in which this existence and character is not at all self-explanatory. One could not devise a more complete contradiction between what goes before, and this way of making the quest for a rational cognition comprehensible, or a more oblique and tortuous transition to metaphysics.

After having clarified the positive side of this skepticism, let us pass onto its *negative side*, to which the whole third part of the first volume is devoted. Mr. Schulz[e] himself is sensible that a skepticism which ascribes an indubitable certainty to the actual facts of consciousness is scarcely consistent with the concept of skepticism which the ancient skeptics offer us; we must first hear Mr. Sch[ulze]'s own opinion about this difference. He explains his view of it in the introduction and the first section of the third Part.

To begin with he reminds us that "it has often been the case, that

[11]

[12]

- [13] the man who first fell upon a thought on the way to the truth *understood much less* about its content, grounds, and consequences *than others* who investigated the origin and significance of it carefully after him; until now the true view of skepticism has been for the most part *misunderstood, // etc.*"²⁰

The skepticism that Mr. Sch[ulze] views as *true*, and as more perfect than the ancient one "is *related* to the judgments *peculiar* to philosophy; i.e., those which" (as Mr. Sch[ulze] formulates the final purpose of this science) "define the absolute or at least supersensible grounds of the something that is present in a conditioned way according to the testimony of our consciousness, i.e., the grounds present outside the sphere of consciousness."²¹ But "the judgments belonging only to philosophy are no object to this skepticism; for they express either so-called facts of consciousness, or they are grounded on analytic thinking; hence their truth could be grounded and assured by this skepticism too"; on the other hand this skepticism claims as against theoretical philosophy that "nothing at all can be *known* about the grounds present outside the compass of knowledge", or as the author also puts it, "the grounds of the being of things that are not given in consciousness in the way they exist, or about the things which exist apart from the existing things".²²

- [14] Mr. Sch[ulze] himself allows the objection to be made against this concept of skepticism, that according to it "*nothing* of what *experience teaches*, can be an *object of skeptical* doubt, and in particular *not the sum-total [Inbegriff] of external perceptions*, and *only philosophy among all the sciences* (since none of the others has to do with the cognition of things outside the compass of consciousness)"; the ancient skepticism on the other hand ranged over both [experience and philosophy], and the most ancient extended at least to the teaching of experience.²³ Mr. Sch[ulze] emphasizes especially that "the beginning // and development of skepticism was always determined by the pretensions of the dogmatists"; the ancient skeptics "admit that there is a cognition through the senses and a conviction thereby of the existence and of certain properties of things subsisting on their own account, a cognition by which every rational man has to be guided *in his active life*".²⁴

From the fact that any such conviction was directed merely to the active life, it follows immediately that it has nothing to do with philosophy, that it and the limited consciousness, fulfilled with its 'facts', is not set up as the principle of an indubitable certainty in general opposition to Reason and philosophy, least of all as bragging against them. Rather this conviction was designed as the smallest possible tribute that could be paid to the necessity of an objective determining [world]. We should *not*, said the skeptics, choose this, or avoid that when dealing with things that are within our power, but the things that are not within our power, but according to necessity,

these we cannot avoid, we [simply] hunger, thirst, get cold; for these things won't let themselves be put aside by Reason.²⁵

But the ancient skeptic was far from elevating the consciousness that is involved with these necessary needs to the rank of a knowledge that is objectively asserted; since we cannot be completely inactive, "we live," says Sextus, "taking account of the phenomenon, in accord with the ordinary understanding of life," but without making any [theoretical] commitment [*Meynung*] or assertion.²⁶ For this [ancient] skepticism it is not a matter of a conviction of [the existence of] things and of their properties. The criterion of // skepticism, as Sextus expresses it, is what appears (*phainomenon*), by which we, in fact, understand its appearance (*phantasian autou*) hence the subjective; for since it [the appearance] lies in the conviction (*peisei* but not a persuasion of [the existence of] a thing) and in an involuntary being affected, there is no room for inquiry; it is *azētētos*²⁷ (the German term "Zweifel" [or the English "doubt"] used about [ancient] skepticism is always awkward and inappropriate).

As for the fact that the [ancient] skeptics declared all perception to be mere semblance, instead of ascribing indubitable certainty to it, and that they maintained that one strictly should [*müsse*] assert the opposite of what one has said about the object according to its appearance, one must just as much say the honey is bitter as that it is sweet²⁸ — that, as Mr. Sch[ulze] himself asserts, the first ten authentic "tropes" of the skeptics concerned only this uncertainty of sense perception — Mr. Sch[ulze] gives as the ground for this the fact that even in the earliest period of speculative philosophy sensations were already given out by the dogmatists to be an *appearance*, which had something quite different as its ground; and "an agreement with what was supposed to be *discoverable behind* it as the authentic fact was conferred on the appearance, indeed cognition through sensations was in very many instances affirmed by them as a science of the *object lying hidden behind* sensation."²⁹ // For this reason the skeptics have attacked and denied these doctrines of the dogmatists regarding the certainty of sense cognition — that, by means of the object in sensation, it is possible to cognize with reliability what is supposed to be *behind* this object, as a true thing really standing on its own.

There is here expressed with regard to the ancient philosophers, the same extremely crass view that Mr. Sch[ulze] has of rational cognition; but the line of interpretation — that [ancient] skepticism attacked not sense perceptions themselves, but only the facts placed behind and beneath them by the dogmatists — is quite unfounded. When the skeptic said "The honey may be just as well bitter as sweet," there was then no thing placed behind the honey that was meant (*gemeynt*). —

"The fact that for the skeptics of Greece [. . .] the *propositions of all* [empirical scientific] *doctrines* that lay claim to validity for every human

understanding were also an object of doubt testifies to an ignorance on their part about the true grounds of their doubt."³⁰ And furthermore the particular sources of the cognitions of each science, and the degree of conviction possible in it, had still not been investigated then as they have today; "many doctrines which now set all reasonable urge to doubt at defiance (such as physics and astronomy, for example) were then still only an ensemble of unprovable opinions and groundless hypotheses."³¹ This trait perfects the character of this modern skepticism, and its differentia from the ancient form; apart from the actual facts of consciousness, the physics and astronomy of modern times would thus be the further sciences which set all reasonable skepticism at defiance; doctrines which, setting aside their purely mathematical parts, which

[17] do not belong peculiarly to them, consist of // "forces", "matters" etc., in a science [Wissen] which claims objectivity throughout, yet is purely formal, and derived from a reporting of sense-perceptions, and their amalgamation with the concepts of the understanding.

This is a science, of which one part, the reporting of perceptions, has nothing at all to do with a scientific mode of knowing, and hence falls quite outside the range of skepticism too, so far as nothing but its subjectivity ought to be expressed in the utterance of perception; while the other part of it is the highest peak of a dogmatizing understanding. What would the ancient skeptics have said to a bastard offspring of this kind, a skepticism which can come to terms with the glaring dogmatism of these sciences?

Finally Mr. Sch[ulze] gets to the uncertainty and incompleteness of our information about ancient skepticism. — Certainly we lack precise information about Pyrrho, Aenesidemus and others of the older skeptics who were famous; but, on the one hand, it emerges from the whole record [Wesen] of this skepticism that the polemical aspect of opposition to philosophical systems, which typified the skepticism of Aenesidemus, Metrodorus, and their successors, was absent from the skepticism of Pyrrho, to which the first ten "tropes" belong,³² and on the other hand, it emerges likewise that in the tropes of Sextus Empiricus the universal essence of this skepticism is very truly preserved for us, so that every further development of skepticism could not be anything but the continual repetition in active use of one and the same universal mode.

In general, however, the concepts of skepticism which allow it to be viewed only in the particular form in which it comes on the scene as skepticism pure and simple, disappear in the face of a philosophic standpoint from which // it can be found as genuine skepticism even

[18] in those philosophical systems which Sch[ulze] and others with him can only regard as dogmatic. Without the determination of the true relationship of skepticism to philosophy, and without the insight that skepticism itself is in its inmost heart at one with every true

philosophy, and hence that there is a philosophy which is neither skepticism nor dogmatism, and is thus both at once, without this, all the histories, and reports, and new editions of skepticism lead to a dead end. This *sine qua non* for the cognition of skepticism, this relationship of skepticism to philosophy, not to some dogmatism or other, this recognition of a philosophy that is not a dogmatism, in fine, therefore, the concept of a philosophy as such, this it is that has escaped Mr.Sch[ulze]; and if Mr.Sch[ulze] had not been able to put the Idea of philosophy completely to flight from the battlefield of those philosophies that he examines skeptically, then just the historical aspect of the ancient skepticism must surely have led him to the thought, at least, that philosophy may possibly be something other than the dogmatism which is all that he is acquainted with.

Diogenes Laertius remarks on it himself in his own way, saying that some people name Homer as the founder of skepticism, because he spoke of the same things differently in different relationships; and many dicta of the Seven Sages were skeptical, as for instance: "Nothing too much," and "Commitment goes hand in hand with corruption" (i.e. every bond with something limited contains its downfall in itself); but for good measure Diogenes cites Archilochus, Euripides, Zeno, Xenophanes, Democritus, Plato etc. as skeptics too;³³ in short those whose views // Diogenes repeats had the insight, that a true philosophy necessarily involves a negative side of its own too, which is directed against everything limited, and thereby against the heap of the facts of consciousness, and their indubitable certainty, and against the blinkered concepts ³⁴ in those marvellous doctrines which Mr.Sch[ulze] regards as unassailable by rational skepticism—turned against this whole soil of finitude, upon which this modern skepticism founds its essence and its truth; and thus a true philosophy is infinitely more skeptical than this skepticism.

What more perfect and self-sustaining document and system of genuine skepticism could we find than the *Parmenides* in the Platonic philosophy? It embraces the whole domain of that knowledge through concepts of understanding, and destroys it. This Platonic skepticism is not concerned with doubting these truths of the understanding which cognizes things as manifold, as wholes consisting of parts, or with coming to be and passing away, multiplicity, similarity, etc. and which makes objective assertions of that kind; rather it is intent on the complete denial of all truth to this sort of cognition. This skepticism does not constitute a particular thing in a system, but it is itself the negative side of the cognition of the Absolute, and directly presupposes Reason as the positive side.

Hence, notwithstanding the fact that the Platonic *Parmenides* appears only from its negative side, Ficino, for example, [re]cognizes full well,

[20] that he who draws near to the sacred study of it, must prepare himself in advance through purification of mind [*Gemüth*], and freedom of spirit, before he dares to touch the secrets of the sacred work. But on account of this utterance of Ficino, Tiedemann // only sees in him one who is stuck in the Neoplatonic mud, while in the works of Plato himself he sees nothing but a cloud of passably obscure sophisms, or a heap of passably acute ones (acute for the time of a Parmenides and a Plato though nauseating to a modern metaphysician).³⁵ This weakness so arises from the fact that metaphysical expressions had not yet been correctly defined by exact philosophers; anyone who has had some practice in metaphysical things, would find that concepts that are at opposite poles from one another are exchanged for one another. — In other words those otherwise acute folk, Plato and Parmenides, had not yet penetrated to the philosophy which finds the truth in the actual facts of consciousness, and everywhere else except in Reason, nor had they achieved clarity of concepts, as the understanding and a merely finite thought establishes it in the modern sciences of physics, etc. and expects [*meynt*] to get it from experience.

This skepticism that comes on the scene in its pure *explicit* shape in the *Parmenides*, can, however, be found *implicit* in every genuine philosophical system; for it is the free side of every philosophy; if in any one proposition that expresses a cognition of Reason, its reflected aspect—the concepts that are contained in it—is isolated, and the way that they are bound together is considered, it must become evident that these concepts are together sublated, or in other words they are united in such a way, that they contradict themselves; otherwise it would not be a proposition of Reason but only of understanding.

[21] Spinoza begins his *Ethics* with the declaration: "By cause of itself I understand that whose // essence involves in itself existence; or that whose nature can only be conceived as existing."³⁶ — But now then, the concept of essence or nature can only be posited, inasmuch as existence is abstracted from; the one excludes the other; the one is only definable as long as there is an opposition to the other; let both be posited bound together as one, and their bonding contains a contradiction, so that both are negated together. Or again, when another proposition of Spinoza reads thus: God is the immanent, not the transient cause of the world;³⁷ he has negated the concept of cause and effect. For in positing the cause as immanent, he posits it as one with the effect, — but the cause is only cause, inasmuch as it is opposed to the effect; the antinomy of the one and the many is equally sovereign [over the finite concepts]; the one is posited as identical with the many, substance as identical with its attributes.

In that every such proposition of Reason permits resolution into

two strictly contradictory assertions, e.g., God is cause, and God is not cause; He is one and not one, many and not many; He has an essence which is itself eliminated once more, since essence can only be comprehended in antithesis to form, and His form must be posited as identical with His essence; and so on. Thus the principle of skepticism: *panti logōi logos isos antikeitai* ["against every argument there is an equal one on the other side"]³⁸ comes on the scene at its full strength. The so called "principle of contradiction" is thus so far from possessing even formal truth for Reason, that on the contrary every proposition of Reason must in respect of concepts contain a violation of it. To say that a proposition is merely formal, means for Reason, that it is posited alone and on its own account, without the equal affirmation of the contradictory that is opposed to it; // and just for that reason it is false. To recognize the principle of contradiction as a formality, thus means to cognize its falsity at the same time. — Since every genuine philosophy has this negative side, or always sublates the principle of contradiction, anyone who has the urge can set this negative side in relief and set forth for himself a skepticism out of each of them.

It is quite incomprehensible that all through his study of Sextus the concept never entered the mind of Mr.Sch[ulze], even in the most general way, that apart from skepticism and dogmatism, there was still a third possibility, to wit, a philosophy. Right in his very first lines Sextus divides philosophers into dogmatists, academics and skeptics;³⁹ and if in his whole work he is dealing with the dogmatists, he by no means imagines that he has refuted the Academy too. This relationship of skepticism to the Academy has been convassed enough; it has occasioned a celebrated dispute in the history of skepticism; and this relationship of pure skepticism [to the Academy] with its embarrassment, is its most interesting side.

Not to be unjust to Mr.Sch[ulze], however, we should mention that through reading Sextus he has certainly been made aware of a relationship between the Academy and Skepticism. How then does he apprehend this relationship, and what Sextus says about it? In the note (Vol. I, p. 608) in which he disposes of the matter, Mr.Sch[ulze] says that "in the teaching" of Arcesilaus (the founder of the Middle Academy) "doubting the truth of the teachings of dogmatism was now, indeed, made into a procedure *stripped of all employment of Reason*, since it cancelled itself again, and thereby heeded Reason // no more at all".⁴⁰ Mr.Sch[ulze] goes on to say that "Sextus (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Book I, Chap. 33) wanted to distinguish the teaching of Arcesilaus from skepticism" quite radically because, according to the teaching of Arcesilaus and Carneades, "this proposition too, that every thing is uncertain, must in its turn be understood as uncertain;"⁴¹ a doubting procedure of this kind, adds Mr.Sch[ulze] on his own account, is stripped of all Reason.

So far as the historical side is concerned, in the first place, one can hardly believe one's eyes when one sees such a ground for the exclusion of the teaching of Arcesilaus from skepticism attributed to Sextus. It is, indeed, the skeptics themselves, as Mr.Sch[ulze] himself mentions at the beginning of his note, who express themselves most explicitly on this point, that their habitual declarations (*phōnai*): "All is false, nothing is true;" "the one view has as little truth as the other" etc., apply to themselves as well (*sumperigraphēin*), *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, I, 7) and sublate themselves in turn (*hup'h'heautōn autas anaireisthai emperigraphomenas ekeinois peri hōn legetai* ["they are refuted by themselves, being included in the range of assertions of which they are spoken"]).⁴² This doctrine was strictly necessary for them—apart from the fact that it is implicit in skepticism itself—in their outward commerce against the dogmatists, who threw up against the skeptics the objection that they too had a *dogma*: to decide nothing, or "no view is more true [than the one opposed to it]", and to distinguish themselves from other philosophers too, for example, (Chap. 30) from the school of Democritus, to whom the skeptical dictum: "One no more than . . . the other" belonged (e.g. "the honey is no more sweet than bitter").

[24] The skeptics distinguished their own view by saying that there was an implicit dogma here: "the honey is neither"; while they on the other hand were showing by the // expression: "one no more than the other," that they did not know whether the phenomenon was both or neither of them. It is in this way that Sextus (Chap. 33) distinguishes the skeptics from the New Academy of Carneades too, whose basic proposition consisted in this, that "everything is incomprehensible";⁴³ perhaps, says he, the Academy is distinct just in this one particular, that they formulate this incomprehensibility as an assertion. What Mr.Sch[ulze] says to limit the range of that skeptical expression is "that Sextus only just wanted to teach that the skeptics do not decide anything about the transcendental character of things,"⁴⁴ either in a positive or in a negative manner. But in this there is no antithesis to be seen at all against that assertion of the skeptics and of Arcesilaus, that a skeptical expression includes itself in its own range of application, and so sublates itself; and what could the *transcendental character of things* mean in that case? Does not the transcendental lie precisely in this, that there is neither things nor a character of things?

So Sextus was far removed in every way from distinguishing the teaching of Arcesilaus from skepticism itself. Sextus himself says that "Arcesilaus and the Middle Academy seems to him to agree so well with the Pyrrhonian *logoi* that they are almost one and the same *agoge**

*Sextus explains that skepticism preferred to name itself thus, [as an *agōgē*] rather than as a *hairesis*, because skepticism could only be called a school or a sect in the sense of a *logoi tini kata to phainomenon, akolouthousēs agōgēs* [a "leading that follows a certain view in accord with the phenomenon" (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 17)].

with that of the skeptics:⁴⁵ even if one does not want to say that Arcesilaus declared that the *epochè*⁴⁶ is good *according to nature*, but that assent is evil. This makes the Academic position into an // assertion, while the skeptics, on the other hand, say nothing assertively on this question too.⁴⁷

The distinction, which in the opinion of Sextus can still be drawn, has thus the directly opposite ground; according to Mr.Sch[ulze] the Academy was shown up by Sextus as hyper-skeptical; but as we have seen, Sextus finds it to be *not skeptical enough*. Apart from the distinction we have mentioned, Sextus adds yet another more specious ground, that depends on a scandal: to wit, that Arcesilaus, if we can put credence in what is said about him, was only a Pyrrhonian in his approach, but was in good sooth a dogmatist; that he only used the skeptical method to test whether his students had the capacity for the Platonic doctrine, and on this account he was regarded as a methodic doubter; but to one found capable of it he taught the Platonic doctrine.⁴⁸

Because of this difficult problem that was implicit for skepticism in its relationship with the Academy, Sextus deals very thoroughly with Plato and the Academies.⁴⁹ It is only because Mr.Sch[ulze] is completely oblivious of the concept of the true ground of this difficulty (and of the concept of philosophy) that he can hold himself to be dispensed from taking account of the Academy by the idle chatter that he quotes from Stäudlin's *History of Skepticism* in this very same note.⁵⁰ "It has already been remarked lately by several authors, and especially by Stäudlin," says Mr.Sch[ulze], "that the spirit that animated the Middle and the New Academy was wholly distinct from that which guided the Skeptics in their inquiries; the adherents of the Academy were actually no more than *sophistic chatterboxes* who // produced nothing but *fallacies and verbal illusions*, and used philosophy, along with the whole controversy between the skeptics and the dogmatists as it was then pursued, only as a *means* to their main end, which was the *art of persuading others, dazzling them, and making a sensation; they had no feeling [Sinn] at all for the discovery of the truth for its own sake.*"⁵¹ — Even if such an accusation were not generally as empty and revolting in and of itself as this is, there would still be the earlier Academy and Plato himself, there would still be philosophy in general, which is no dogmatism, and which should have been taken into consideration; but we have not been able to find any further consideration of philosophy than what we have cited from this note.

In antiquity on the other hand there was a highly developed consciousness concerning this relationship of skepticism to Platonism; a great controversy raged about it, in that one party gave Plato out as a dogmatist, the other as a skeptic (Diogenes Laertius, *Plato*, 51). Since the documents of the controversy are lost to us, we cannot judge how far the true relationship of skepticism to philosophy came

[25]

[26]

[27] to utterance in it, and how far the dogmatists, who defended Plato as one of them, as the skeptics did likewise, understood this relationship in the sense that skepticism itself belonged to philosophy, or in the sense that it did not. Sextus refers us to a fuller treatment of the question in his *Skeptical Commentaries* which have not come down to us;⁵² in the *Outlines* I, 222 he says // he intends to report the essence of the matter "according to the view of Aenesidemus and Menodotus who were the principals on the side of the skeptics" in the controversy; Plato was a dogmatist "because when he showed that the Ideas are, or Providence, or the advantage of a virtuous life over a vicious one, he either dogmatizes by recognizing these things as real beings; or else, when he gives assent to the more convincing arguments (*pithanōterois*) he falls away from the skeptical character because he prefers some one view to the other on account of conviction or the failure of it."⁵³

This distinction between Platonism and Skepticism is either a merely formal [*formale*] nicety, complaining of nothing but the form of consciousness involved in the preference affirmed, since the obedience of the skeptic to [natural] necessity and to the laws of his country⁵⁴ was a preference of the same kind, save that it was without conscious assent; or else if it is directed against the reality of the Idea itself, it concerns the cognition of Reason through itself; and here it is the peculiar mark of the pure skepticism that separates itself from philosophy that must display itself.

[28] Sextus comes to this cognition of Reason in his first book *Against the Logicians* (section 310) after having contested first [the possibility of] the criterion of truth generally in view of the dissensions of the philosophers about it, and then particularly, the truth of sense-cognition. What he says here against the proposition that Reason is cognizant of itself through itself (*hoti oud' heautēs epignōmōn estin hē dianoia, ho nous heauton katalambanetai* "that the intellect is not cognizant of itself [nor does] the mind comprehend itself")⁵⁵ is so barren that if modern skeptics want to attack the self-cognition of Reason, they must certainly bring forward something better, unless they find it // more convenient to spare themselves this effort completely by ignoring Reason and its self-cognition altogether, sticking safe behind the Gorgon-shield and so transforming the rational into understanding (subjectively expressed) and objectively into stone, not by any malicious distortion or artifice, not as if they had already seen it, but meeting it face to face; and by calling whatever they suspect of transcending understanding and stone, romantic dreaming and imagination. —

But anyway, Sextus knows of Reason and its self-cognition. What he puts forward about its possibility is the following piece of trite rationalizing which he here supports with just those reflective concepts of "whole and parts", which like Plato in the *Parmenides*, he nullifies

in his books *Against the Natural Philosophers*:⁵⁶ "If Reason comprehends itself, then in comprehending itself it must either be the whole that comprehends itself or not the whole, but it must use a part [. . .] But if it is the whole, that comprehends itself, then both the comprehending and the comprehended are the whole; but if the whole is what is comprehending, then there is nothing left over to be the comprehended; it is however quite irrational, that the comprehending should be, while what is comprehended is nothing. But Reason can also not use a part of itself for this; for how then shall the part comprehend itself? For if it is a whole then nothing is left over as what is to be comprehended; if it again is to be comprehended by a part, how shall this part again comprehend itself; and so on *ad infinitum*; so that the comprehending is without a principle, in that either no first is found, which undertakes the comprehending, or there is nothing which // is to be comprehended."⁵⁷ —One can see that Reason is perverted into something absolutely subjective, which, when it is posited as a whole leaves nothing over as what is to be comprehended. [29]

And now come still better grounds which drag Reason down to its phenomenal appearance in a definite place, just as before it was confined in the concept of whole and parts, and of an exclusive alternative of absolute subjectivity or absolute objectivity: "Again, if Reason comprehends itself, then it will also comprehend therewith *the place* in which it is; for every comprehending includes a definite place within its grasp; but if Reason comprehends together with itself the place in which it is, then the philosophers strictly ought not to be at odds about it, in that some say that that place is the head, others that it is the breast; and in precise terms, some say the brain, others the meningeal area, others the heart, others the gates of the liver, or still some other part of the body; about this the dogmatic philosophers are at odds. Hence Reason does not comprehend itself."⁵⁸

This is what Sextus advances against the self-cognition of Reason; it is a specimen of all the weapons of skepticism against Reason; they consist in the application of concepts to it. After that it becomes easy enough to demonstrate that a Reason transposed into finitude and turned into things, in Mr. Sch[ulze]'s way, is one thing opposed to another, which likewise must be posited, but which is not posited by that singular [finite Reason]. The most familiar weapon of all, i.e., the appeal to the mutual disagreements of the philosophers is expounded at length by Sextus immediately after the passage cited above.⁵⁹ // It is a talking point against speculation that the moral dogmatists share with the skeptics, just as Xenophon already puts it in the mouth of Socrates,⁶⁰ and the superficiality of a view which gets mired down in the verbal disagreements is obvious to anyone. So although this skepticism has already isolated itself and torn loose from [30]

[genuine] philosophy, i.e., the philosophy that includes skepticism within itself as well, still it did recognize this distinction between dogmatism and philosophy — the latter being distinguished under the name of the “Academics” — as well as the great measure of agreement between the Academics and skepticism. The new skepticism, on the contrary, knows nothing of this.

But apart from the Skepticism that is one with philosophy, the skepticism that is self-sundered from it can be divided into two forms, according to whether it is or is not directed against Reason. The genuine ancient skepticism sets itself into striking contrast with the shape in which Sextus presents to us the skepticism that is cut off from philosophy and turned against it. To be sure, the authentic skepticism does not have a positive side, as philosophy does, but maintains a pure negativity in relation to knowledge, but it was just as little directed against philosophy as for it; and the hostile attitude that it adopted later against philosophy on the one hand, and against dogmatism on the other hand, is quite separate. The turning of skepticism against philosophy, as soon as philosophy became dogmatism, illustrates how it has kept in step with the communal degeneration of philosophy and of the world in general, until finally in these most recent times it has sunk so far in company with dogmatism that for both of them [31] nowadays the facts of consciousness // have an indubitable certainty, and for them both the truth resides in temporality; so that, since the extremes now touch, the great goal is attained once more on their side in these happy times, that dogmatism and skepticism coincide with one another *on the underside*, and offer each other the hand of perfect friendship and fraternity. Schulzian skepticism integrates the crudest dogmatism into itself, and Krug's dogmatism carries that skepticism within itself likewise.⁶¹

Sextus presents us with the maxims of skepticism in seventeen tropes, whose diversity signalizes for us quite precisely the distinction between his skepticism and that of the old school. Certainly the older skepticism stood by itself without philosophical knowledge, but at the same time it falls completely within the domain of philosophy, and in particular, it is wholly identical with the older philosophy, which had less to do with subjectivity.⁶²

The first ten of the seventeen tropes belong to this older skepticism. It was the skeptics of much later on — Sextus says simply “the moderns”, while Diogenes specifically names Agrippa, who lived about five hundred years after Pyrrho — added five more. The other two that were added seem to be still later; Diogenes does not mention them at all, and Sextus puts them by themselves; they are not important.⁶³

These ten articles, then, to which the old school was confined, are directed, like all philosophy generally, against the dogmatism of ordinary consciousness itself. They provide a basis for the uncertainty about

the finite situations by which it is unconsciously prepossessed; and for the indifference of the spirit. In the face of this indifference everything that the phenomenal world, or the understanding offers, grows shaky, and in this shaking of everything // finite, according to the skeptics the ataraxia secured by Reason enters, "as the shadow follows the body." Just as Apelles, when he was painting a horse, could not bring off the representation of the foam, until, giving up hope he hurled the sponge which he used to wipe the colours from his brush, against the picture, and in that way achieved the reproduction of the foam.⁶⁴ Similarly, in the muddle of all appearances and thoughts, the skeptics find what is true, or the equanimity that is secured by Reason, the *natural* possession of which constitutes the differentia between beast and man. It was this that Pyrrho once showed to his companions aboard ship, when they were frightened in the raging storm; he pointed calmly to a pig, that was feeding in the ship, with the remark that the wise man must be undisturbed like that.⁶⁵ Thus this skepticism had its positive side wholly and only in character, and in its complete neutrality toward the necessity of nature.

A brief mention of the ten points which provide the basis for the *epochē* of skepticism, will immediately bring out their polemical bearing upon the security of things and of the actual facts of consciousness; the uncertainty of all things and the necessity of the *epochē* is made out: (1) from the diversity of animals; (2) of men; (3) of the organization of the senses; (4) of circumstances; (5) of situations, distances, and places; (6) from muddles (in which nothing presents itself to the senses in purity); (7) from the diverse sizes and properties of things; (8) from the relationships (i.e., because everything stands in relationship to something else); (9) from the frequency or rarity of happening; (10) [from the diversity] of education, // of customs, of laws, of mythical faith, of prejudices.⁶⁶

Sextus himself remarks regarding their form, that all these tropes "can properly be reduced to a triad: one trope of the diversity of the cognitive subject, one of the cognized object, and one of both put together."⁶⁷ So they are necessarily bound to flow into one another in the discussion too—Sextus speaks already of the diversity of organs, which properly belongs to the third trope, in connection with the first two tropes, the diversity of animals and of men; the one with the most extensive range, he remarks, is the eighth, which concerns how every finite thing is conditioned by another, or the way that everything only exists in relationship to something else. We can see that they are raked together haphazardly and they presuppose an undeveloped reflection, or rather an absence of deliberation on the part of reflection in the matter of having a doctrine of one's own, and a clumsiness that would not be present if skepticism had already had to face the task of criticizing the sciences.

[34] But the content of these tropes proves even more clearly how remote they are from an anti-philosophical tendency, and how they are simply and solely aimed against the dogmatism of ordinary common sense; no single one of them is concerned with Reason and its cognition; all of them concern only the finite, and the understanding, or the cognition of the finite throughout; their content is partly empirical, and in that measure it does not apply to speculation *a priori* [*schon an sich*]; partly it concerns relationship in general, or the fact that everything actual is conditioned by another, and in that // measure it expresses a principle of Reason. Consequently this skepticism is in no way directed against philosophy, but against ordinary common sense, and that in a popular mode, not in a philosophical one; against the ordinary consciousness, which holds fast to the given, the fact, the finite (whether this finite is called "appearance" or "concept"), and sticks to it as certain, as secure, as eternal; the skeptical tropes show common sense the instability of this kind of certainty, in a way which is at the same time close to ordinary consciousness; that is, it likewise calls upon appearances and finite cases for help, and [re]cognizes their untruth, by way of their diversity, along with the equal right of all of them to count as valid, i.e. from the antinomy that is to be recognized in the finite thing itself. From this point of view it can be seen as the first stage for philosophy; for the beginning of philosophy must, of course, be elevation above the truth which ordinary consciousness gives, and the presentiment of a higher truth; so we ought to refer the most recent skepticism, with its certainty of the facts of consciousness, above all things, to this ancient skepticism and to this first stage of philosophy; or to common sense itself, which is very well aware [*erkennt*] that all the actual facts of its consciousness, and even this finite consciousness itself, passes away, and that there is no certainty therein; the distinction between this side of ordinary common sense and the [modern] skepticism consists in this, that common sense expresses itself thus: "Everything is transient"; while skepticism on the other hand, when a fact is established as certain, understands how to prove that // that certainty is nothing.—

[35]

Furthermore, in ordinary common sense its skepticism and its dogmatism about finite situations, stand side by side, and its skepticism becomes thereby something merely formal [*formell*]; whereas the dogmatism is sublated by genuine skepticism, and thus the ordinary belief in the uncertainty of the facts of consciousness ceases to be something formal, in that skepticism elevates the whole range of actuality and certainty to the level of uncertainty, and nullifies ordinary dogmatism which belongs unconsciously in the context of particular customs and laws, and of other circumstances, the context of a power (*Macht*), for which the individual is only an object, and which

comprehends him, too, among its single details, in the threads of its causal web. The ordinary dogmatism produces for itself an understanding knowledge of this context, and thereby sinks only ever deeper into servitude under that power. Skepticism elevates the freedom of Reason above this necessity of nature, in that it cognizes this necessity as nothing; but at the same time it honors necessity supremely. For just as, for skepticism, there is no one of the *natural* details in the web that is something certain, but only natural necessity in its universality, so the skepticism *itself* as a single detail, does not transplant itself into the web as an absolute end, which skepticism would have liked to pursue there, as if it knew what is good; —skepticism anticipates in the individual what the necessity displayed serially in the finitude of time carries out unconsciously for the unconscious race. What counts for the race as absolutely One and the same, and as fixed, eternal and everywhere constituted in the same way, time wrenches away from it; most commonly [what does this is] the increasing range of acquaintance with alien // peoples under the pressure of natural necessity; as, for example, becoming acquainted with a new continent, had this skeptical effect upon the dogmatic common sense of the Europeans down to that time, and upon their indubitable certainty about a mass of concepts concerning right and truth. [36]

Well then, since [early] skepticism had its positive side in character *alone*, it did not give itself out for a decided option [*haeresis*] or school, but rather as we said above for an *agōgē*, an education for a way of life, a formative process, whose subjectivity could only be objective in this respect, that the skeptics [each] employed for themselves the same weapons [as the others] against the objective [web of necessity] and their dependence upon it; they [re]cognized Pyrrho as the founder of skepticism in the sense that they were like him not in doctrines, but in these “turnings” against the objective (homotropōs Diogenes Laertius, IX, 70). The “ataraxy” towards which the skeptics formed themselves, consisted in the fact that, as Sextus says (*Adversus Ethicos*, 154), no disturbance (tarachē) could be fearful for the skeptic, “for though it be the greatest possible, the blame falls not on us, who suffer it involuntarily and according to necessity, but upon nature which cares nothing for what men establish, and upon those who through opinion and a will [of their own] draw evil upon themselves.”⁶⁸ From this positive side it is just as obvious that it is not alien to any [true] philosophy. The “apathy” of the Stoics and the “indifference” of the philosophers generally, must [re]cognize themselves in the skeptic “ataraxia”.

Pyrrho was a creative individual [*origineller Mensch*] who, like any other first beginner of a school, became a philosopher off his own bat; but his original philosophy // was not, on that account, something [37]

idiosyncratic, opposed to other philosophies necessarily and in principle; it was not so much that the individuality of his character imprinted itself upon his philosophy; rather his individuality was his philosophy itself, and his philosophy was nothing but freedom of character. How then could a philosophy stand opposed to this skepticism on *that* point? If the proximate pupils of great individuals such as he, adhered especially, as sometimes happens, to what was formally distinctive, then, certainly, nothing but the diversity was manifest; but once the weight of authority of the singular personality became increasingly blurred by time, and the philosophical interest emerged in its purity, the sameness of philosophy could once more be [re]cognized. Just as Plato integrated the Socratic, and the Pythagorean philosophies with that of Zeno, etc., in his own so it was too that Antiochus took over the Stoic philosophy into the Academy—and we have seen above that the latter essentially contained skepticism within itself. Cicero studied with Antiochus and if it were not obvious from his life that he was ruined for philosophy, no very favorable light would be cast on his teacher and on *that* integration of philosophies by Cicero's philosophical productions.

We need hardly say that what is at issue here is an integration that [re]cognizes the most inward heart of diverse philosophies as one and the same, not an eclecticism, that rambles round their fringes, and binds for itself a crown of vanity out of blooms picked at haphazard from all quarters.

- [38] It is an accident of the time, that later on the // diverse philosophical systems went apart from one another completely, and that "apathy" now became opposed to "ataraxy", and the dogmatics of the Porch counted for the Skeptics as their most direct opponents (*Sextus, Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes*, I, 65).⁶⁹ The *five later tropes* of skepticism, which make up the genuine arsenal of its weapons against philosophical cognition, are wholly and exclusively related to this complete separation of philosophies, and the complete fixation of their dogmas and dividing lines, and likewise related to the contemporary orientation of skepticism against dogmatism on one side, and against philosophy itself on the other. To justify our exposition, we shall discuss them briefly now.⁷⁰

The *first of these tropes* of the suspense of judgement, is that of the *diversity*, no longer now of beasts or of men, as in the first ten tropes, but rather of common opinions, and of the teachings of philosophers, both in the opposition of the two groups, and internally within each group; this is a trope about which the skeptics are always very prolix—everywhere they look for and introduce diversity, where they would do better to see identity. The second is *that of the infinite regress*; Sextus uses it often, in the guise in which it has come to the fore in modern times as the "urge toward a ground"; it is the familiar argument that

for one grounding [principle] a further ground is required, for this still another again, and so on *ad infinitum*. —The third was already there in the first ten, namely, the trope of relationship. The fourth concerns *assumptions*,—against the dogmatics who posit something as strictly first, and unproven, in order not to be driven to infinity. The skeptics straightaway // imitate them, by positing with equal right the opposite of that assumption. The fifth is the *circular* argument, when that which is to serve for the proof of another [proposition], itself needs for its own proof, that same [proposition] that is to be proved by its means.—

There are still two other tropes, which Sextus says were also adduced, although Diogenes does not mention them. It is obvious at sight that they contain nothing new, but are only the preceding tropes reduced to a more general form: that what is comprehended, is comprehended either of itself, or through another;—but not of itself, for there is disagreement about the source and the organ of cognition, as to whether it is sense or understanding; nor yet through another, for then we fall either into the trope of infinite regress or into that of circularity.⁷¹

It is evident even in the repetition of some of the first ten tropes, namely (in part) those which are the first and the third of the five, and from their whole content, that the intent of these five tropes is quite distinct from the tendency of the first ten, and that they only concern the later orientation of skepticism against philosophy.

There are no better weapons against dogmatism on finite bases, but these tropes are completely useless against philosophy, since they contain plainly reflective concepts, they have a quite opposite significance when turned in these two different directions; directed against dogmatism they appear from the point of view where they belong to Reason, setting the other term of the necessary antinomy alongside the one asserted by the dogmatism; // directed against philosophy on the other hand, they appear from the side where they belong to reflection. Against dogmatism they must necessarily be victorious therefore; but in the face of philosophy they fall apart internally, or they are themselves dogmatic.

The essence of dogmatism consists in this that it posits something finite, something burdened with an opposition (e.g. pure Subject, or pure Object, or in dualism the duality as opposed to the identity) as the Absolute; hence Reason shows with respect to this Absolute, that it has a relation to what is excluded from it, and only exists through and in this relation to another, so that it is not absolute, according to the *third* trope of relationship; if this other is supposed to have its ground in the first, while at the same time the first has its ground in the other, then there is a circle, and it falls into the *fifth* trope, the trope of reciprocal dependence; if no circle is to be committed, but

this other, as the ground of the first, is grounded in itself—if it is made into an ungrounded assumption, then because it is a grounding [principle] it has an opposite, and this opposite can be presupposed with equal right without being unproved or grounded, once [the problematic character of] the grounding procedure has been recognized, in accordance with the fourth trope (of presuppositions); or alternatively this other ground is again supposed to be grounded in another—but then this first [term] grounded on the infinity of reflection, will be driven to infinity in finite [terms]; so it is once more groundless, in accordance with the second trope. Finally that finite Absolute of dogmatism must also be a universal, but this will necessarily not prove to be the case, since it is a limited thing; and this is where the *first* trope (of diversity) has its place.—//

[41] Sextus employed these tropes with great success against dogmatism, which cannot overcome them; and especially against physical theory, a science which, like applied mathematics, is the veritable storehouse of reflection, of limited concepts, and of the finite—yet for the modern skeptics it counts, to be sure, as a science which bids defiance to all rational skeptical attack; it can be maintained, on the contrary, that the ancient physics was more scientific than the modern, and hence that it was less vulnerable to skepticism.

Against dogmatism these tropes are rational in this respect, that they let the opposite [moment], from which dogmatism has abstracted, come on stage against the finite [moment] of the dogmatism. But as directed against Reason, on the other hand, they retain as their peculiar [character] the pure difference by which they are affected; their rational aspect is already in Reason. So far as the *first trope* (of diversity) is concerned, the rational is always and everywhere, self-identical; pure inequality is possible only for the understanding; and everything unlike is posited by Reason as one [and the same]. Of course, this unity, and that unlikeness too, must not, as Plato says,⁷² be taken in the common, childish way—e.g. that an ox, for instance, is posited as the one, of which it would be asserted, that he is at the same time many oxen. It cannot be proved about the rational, in accordance with the third trope, that it only exists within the relationship, that it stands in a necessary relation to another; for it is itself nothing but the relationship. Since the rational is relation itself, the [terms] stand in relation to each other, which are supposed to ground one another, when // they are posited by the understanding, may well fall into the circle, or into the *fifth*, the trope of reciprocity; but the rational itself does not, for within the relation, nothing is reciprocally grounded. Similarly the rational is not an unproved assumption, in accordance with the *fourth* trope, so that its counterpart could with equal right be presupposed unproven in opposition to it; for the rational has no

opposed counterpart; it includes both of the finite opposites, which are mutual counterparts, within itself. The two preceding tropes both contain the concept of a ground and a consequent, according to which one term would be grounded by another; since for Reason, there is no opposition of one term against another, these two tropes become as irrelevant, as the demand for a ground that is advanced in the sphere of oppositions, and repeated endlessly (in the *second* trope, of the infinite regress). Neither that demand, nor the infinite regress, is of any concern to Reason.

Now, since these tropes all involve the concept of a finite [world], and are grounded on that, the immediate result of their application to the rational is that they pervert it into something finite; they give it the itch of limitedness, as an excuse for scratching it. The tropes are not, in and for themselves, directed against rational thinking; but when they are [willfully] directed upon it—an additional use that Sextus makes of them—they immediately alter the rational. Everything that skepticism advances against the rational can be comprehended from this point of view. We had an example above when it controverted the cognition of Reason by Reason;⁷³ // the skeptical attack makes Reason either an absolutely-subjective, or an absolutely-objective [totality], and either a whole or a part; both [oppositions] are added on by skepticism in the first place. So when skepticism enters the field against Reason, we must at once reject the concepts that it brings with it, and repudiate its bad weapons [as] inept for any attack. —

What our most recent skepticism always brings with it, is, as we saw above,⁷⁴ the concept of a *thing*, that lies *behind* and *beneath* the phenomenal facts. When the ancient skepticism employs the expressions *hupokeimenon*, *huparchon*, *adēlon*, etc.,⁷⁵ they signify thus the objectivity whose essence it is not to be expressed; skepticism remains, on its own account, on the subjective side of appearance. But for skepticism, this phenomenal appearance is not a sensible *thing*, behind which yet other things, to wit the supersensible ones, are supposed to be asserted by dogmatism and by philosophy. Since it holds back altogether from expressing any certainty or any being, it does not, on its own account, have any thing, any conditioned⁷⁶ [being] of which it could have knowledge; and it is not obliged to shove either this [empirically] certain thing, or another one that would be behind it, into the shoes of philosophy, in order to bring about its fall.

Because of the orientation of skepticism against knowing in general, it is impelled, since it sets one thought against another, and so combats the "is" of philosophical thought, to sublimate the "is" of its own thought likewise, and thus to keep itself within the pure negativity which is, *per se*, a pure subjectivity. How sickening the skeptics were about

[44] this, // we have already seen above in the case of the New Academy,⁷⁷ who asserted that everything is uncertain, and that this proposition embraced itself within its own range; yet this is not skeptical enough for Sextus, he distinguishes the Academy from Skepticism, because even in asserting this, they are setting up a proposition and dogmatizing; yet that proposition expresses the height of skepticism so well that Sextus' distinction becomes something entirely empty. At this rate, it must even befall Pyrrho to be given out as a dogmatist by someone.⁷⁸ This formal [*formelle*] semblance of an assertion it is, which the skeptics are regularly teased about; it is thrown back at them, that if they doubt everything, then this "I doubt", "It seems to me" etc., is certain; so that the reality and objectivity of the thinking activity is held against them, since they hold firm to the form of positing in every positing by thought, and in this way show up every expressed activity as involving dogmatism.

In this extreme of supreme consistency, the extreme of negativity, or subjectivity, which no longer limited itself to the subjectivity of character, which is also objectivity, but grew into a subjectivity of knowledge, which directed itself against knowledge, skepticism was strictly bound to become inconsistent; for the extreme cannot maintain itself without the opposite; so pure negativity or subjectivity, is either nothing at all, because it nullifies itself at the extreme, or else it must at the same time be supremely objective; consciousness of this is ready at hand, and it was this that opponents urged; just for that reason, as we mentioned above,⁷⁹ the skeptics made clear that their *phōnai*
 [45] "all is false, nothing true", "neither more than the // other" were self-referential; and that the skeptics, in the utterance of their slogans, were only saying what appeared to them, only uttering how they were affected, not giving an opinion, or making an assertion about an objective being.

Sextus (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 7, and elsewhere, especially chapter 24)⁸⁰ expresses himself thus, that "just as he who utters 'peripatō' says in truth 'I am walking'", so one must in one's mind always add on to what the skeptic says: "'according to us' or 'so far as I am concerned' or 'as it seems to me'". This purely negative attitude that wants to remain mere subjectivity and seeming, ceases *ipso facto*, to be something for knowledge. He who stays holding fast to the vanity of the fact that "it seems so to *him*," "that *he* is of the opinion that . . .," he who wants his utterances never to be taken as objective assertions of thought and judgement at all, must be left where he stands. His subjectivity concerns no one else, still less does it concerns philosophy, nor is philosophy concerned in it.

Summing up briefly, there emerges from this consideration of the different aspects of ancient skepticism, the distinguishing mark and the essence of our most recent skepticism.

To begin with, this modern skepticism lacks the noblest side of skepticism, its orientation against the dogmatism of ordinary consciousness, which is present in all of the three modifications we have pointed out, i.e., whether it is identical with philosophy and is just its negative side, or separated from philosophy but not turned against it, or turned against it. For the most recent skepticism, by contrast, the ordinary consciousness with its whole infinite range // of facts,⁸¹ has an indubitable certainty. Reasoning on the basis of these facts, reflection and classification of them, which constitutes the business of understanding for this skepticism, gives us as its science, an empirical psychology on the one hand, and many other sciences produced by the application of analytical thought to the actual facts, sciences elevated above all rational doubt.

Neither the earlier skepticism, nor materialism, nor even the most vulgar common sense, unless it is completely bestial, has been guilty of this barbarity of placing indubitable certainty and truth in the facts of consciousness; till these most recent times, it was quite unheard of.

Furthermore, according to this latest skepticism, our physics and astronomy, and analytical thought, bid defiance to all rational doubtfulness; and thus it lacks also the noblest side of the later ancient skepticism, i.e. its orientation against limited cognition, against finite knowledge.

What then is left of skepticism in this latest version of it, which places its truth and certainty in the most blatant limitedness both of empirical intuition, and of empirical knowledge, which transforms empirical intuition into reflection, and pretends only to analyse it, *not* to add anything to it? Nothing at all, of necessity, except the denial of the truth of Reason, and the transformation of the rational into reflection, (or of the cognition of the Absolute into finite cognition) to that end. The // basic form of this transformation, however, which is everywhere prevalent, consists in this, that the opposed counterpart of Spinoza's first definition, which was quoted above⁸² (which explains a *causa sui* as that whose essence involves existence at the same time) is made into a principle and asserted as an absolutely basic proposition, to wit that what is *thought* of, since it is thought-object, does not at the same time involve a *being* in itself.

This sundering of the rational, in which thinking and being are one, and the absolute insistence [*festhalten*] on this opposition, in other words the understanding made absolute, constitutes the endlessly repeated and universally applied ground of this dogmatic skepticism. This antithesis, considered on its own account, has the merit that difference is expressed in it in its supreme abstraction and in its truest form; the essence of knowledge consists in the identity of the universal

and the particular, or of what is posited in the form of thought and of being; and science is, with respect to its content, an embodiment of that rational identity, and on its formal side a continual repetition of the same; non-identity, the principle of ordinary consciousness, and of the opposite of knowledge, is expressed in the most definite way in that form of the antithesis; a part of the merit will be taken from this form again, to be sure, because it is conceived only as [the] antithesis of a thinking subject and an existing object.

[48] Considered in its relationship to the latest skepticism, however, the merit of this antithesis vanishes entirely; for the discovery of this antithesis is, in itself, older beyond question than this skepticism. Nor does this latest skepticism deserve any credit // for having brought this antithesis home to the culture of our modern age; for as we all know, it is the Kantian philosophy—which from the limited standpoint from which it is idealism (in its deduction of the categories) does indeed sublate this antithesis; but which is otherwise inconsistent enough to make the antithesis into the supreme principle of speculation; the insistence [*Festhaltung*] on this antithesis comes out most explicitly and with infinite self-satisfaction against the so-called “Ontological Proof” of the existence of God, and as reflecting judgement against Nature; and especially in the form of a refutation of the Ontological Proof it has enjoyed universal and widespread good fortune; Mr. Sch[ulze] has accepted this form for his own use, and has not only made use of it generally, but has even repeated Kant’s own words to the letter (See [Vol. I] p. 71 and elsewhere). Or again, he cries out in Kant’s voice on page 618 of volume I: “If ever a striking effort has been made to link the realm of *objective actuality* immediately to the sphere of *concepts*, and to pass over from this last into the former exclusively through the aid of a *bridge* which is likewise *manufactured* out of *plain concepts*, this happened in the ontological theology; nonetheless recently (how blinded philosophy was then, before these recent times!) the empty subtlety and illusion which we are involved with in this attempt, has been completely exposed.”⁸³

[49] So Mr. Sch[ulze] has done nothing except pick up this recent and most excellent discovery of Kant’s, just as countless Kantians have done. He brings this supremely // simple stroke of wit to bear left and right, in all directions, even against the father of the discovery himself. He attacks and dissolves all of his ingredients with one and the same acid.

The science of philosophy, too, only repeats for ever one and the same rational identity, but new cultural formations spring forth from the former ones in this repetition, out of which it builds itself up into a complete organic world, which is [re]cognized both as a whole and in its parts as this same identity. Whereas the eternal

repetition of that antithesis which leads to organic breakdown and the *nihil negativum*, is on its negative side a perpetual pouring of water into a sieve⁸⁴, and from its positive side, it is the continual and mechanical application of one and the same rule of understanding, wherein no new form comes forth from the old, but always the same mechanical work is done; this application of the rule is like the labor of a woodcutter who ever strikes the same blow, or of a tailor who sews uniforms for an army.

Jacobi's opinion about knowledge in general, comes true here: the Nuremberg caprice-game is played over and over, "so that we get sick of it, once all the moves and turns are known and thoroughly familiar to us."⁸⁵ This skepticism has in its game, only one single move, and one turn altogether, and even that is not its own, but it has borrowed even that from Kantianism. We can make out this character of the latest skepticism most clearly from what it calls its grounds, and by an example of its application.//

It can be [re]cognized adequately from the way in which it has apprehended its object, the interest of speculative Reason—as the problem of *explaining* the *origin* of human cognition of things; to spy out for the conditioned existence, what exists unconditioned.⁸⁶ To begin with, 'things' are opposed to 'cognition' within [the context of] Reason here; and secondly an explanation of its origin [is asked for], and therewith the causal relationship is dragged in; the ground of cognition, then, is something other than what is grounded, the former the concept, the latter the thing, and when once this basically false picture of rational thinking is presupposed, then there is nothing further to be done, except to repeat for ever that ground and grounded, concept and thing are different modes; that all rational cognition aims just to *pluck* a being *out of* thinking, existence out of concepts, (as it is put in words that are likewise Kantian).⁸⁷

According to this latest skepticism, the human cognitive faculty is a thing, which has concepts, and since it has nothing but concepts, it cannot go out to the things that are outside it; it cannot neither *search them out* nor *reconnoiter* them—for both of them (Vol. I, p. 69) are "*specifically distinct*; [. . .] no rational man will be under the illusion that in *possessing* the *image* of something he also *possesses* that thing itself."⁸⁸

Nowhere is this skepticism outwardly disposed to be so consistent as to show that no rational man will be under the illusion that he *possesses an idea* [*Vorstellung*] of something; // for certainly since the idea is also a something, the rational man can only have the illusion of possessing the idea of the idea, not the idea itself; and then again not that either, since this idea of the second power [*Potenz*] is again a something, but only the idea of the idea of the idea; and so on *ad*

infinitum. In other words when once the matter is represented thus, that there are two distinct pockets, of which one contains the somethings that are "ideas", the other those which are "things" one can't see why the former should remain the full pocket, and the latter be the always empty one.

The reason why the first pocket is full, but we only have an illusion that the second one is full, could not be anything else than this: that the first is in the shirt, the second in the jacket of the subject; the idea-pocket is closer to hand, the Thing-pocket is harder to get to; but then the proof would be performed through the presupposition of what is to be proved; for the question at issue is precisely whether the subjective or the objective has the advantage of reality.

This fundamental skeptical assumption [*skeptisches Grundwesen*] that we should only reflect on its being the idea and not the thing that is represented, and not upon their both being identical, is scarcely consistent, to be sure, with what is claimed about the indubitable certainty of the facts of consciousness; for according to Mr. Sch[ulze] (Vol. I, p. 68) "the ideas are true and real, they constitute a cognition, inasmuch as they *completely agree* with that which they are related to, and which is represented through them, or inasmuch as they *offer* to consciousness, nothing else but what is to be found in what they // represent"; and (p. 70) "we continually presuppose an *agreement of this kind* as certain in our *everyday* life, without troubling ourselves in the least about its possibility,"⁸⁹ as the newer metaphysics does.—

[52]

Now what else does Mr. Schulze ground the indubitable certainty of the facts of consciousness upon, then, but the absolute identity of thought and being, of the concept and the thing?—and then again in an instant he explains that the subjective, the image, and the objective, the thing are of different species.

In everyday life, says Mr. Sch[ulze], we *presuppose* that identity; that it is a *presupposition* in everyday life, means that it is not present in ordinary consciousness; the *newer metaphysics seeks to give grounds for the possibility of this identity*.⁹⁰ But to say that the newer philosophy seeks to give grounds for the possibility of the identity *presupposed* in ordinary life is no true word in fact; for it does no more than to express and [re]cognize that presupposed identity; just because that identity is presupposed in everyday life ordinary consciousness always posits the object as something other than the subject: and it posits both the objective and the subjective [world] alike as an infinite manifold of [elements] absolutely distinct from one another; metaphysics brings this identity, which for ordinary consciousness is only presupposed, or unconscious, to consciousness; it is the absolute and unique principle of metaphysics. The identity

would only be susceptible of an explanation, in so far as it is not, as Mr. Sch[ulze] calls it, one that is presupposed in ordinary life, but an actual identity, that is a thoroughly // determinate and finite one; and hence too the subject and object are finite; but an explanation of this finiteness, inasmuch as it once more posits the causal relationship, falls outside of philosophy.—

About this agreement Mr. Schulz[e] says (p. 70) "its possibility is one of the greatest riddles of human nature, and in this riddle there is at the same time the secret of the possibility of a cognition of things a priori, that is a cognition of them even before we have intuited these things".⁹¹—Here we learn then, exactly what a cognition a priori is: the things are out there, inside is the cognitive faculty; when it has cognitions without looking at things, it does so a priori. —So as not to leave anything out from these three pages, 68-70, which contain the true quintessence of the concepts about philosophy offered by this latest skepticism, we must further remark that on the question of "what the authentically positive [aspect] of the agreement of ideas with their real objects consists in " Mr. Sch[ulze] says "that it does not permit of further description or indication in words; every one of my readers must seek to come to terms with it rather in this way, by observing it then when he is conscious of it (the positive [aspect]), and by looking rather closely at what he has perceived and grasped, when through the comparison of an idea that he formed for himself of a Thing in its absence, with the Thing itself, at the moment when it is intuited by him, he finds that the idea completely agrees with the Thing and represents it precisely."⁹² What does this explanation amount to? Does the whole of the agreement (or non-agreement) of the idea with the object come // down again to a psychological distinction between presence and absence, between actual intuition and the remembering of it? Ought the agreement of an idea with the object that is present in perception to elude the readers in the absence of a Thing, and should something else be put before their consciousness, than what can be found in the represented thing?—

To speak in Mr. Sch[ulze's] way, scarcely has the identity of subject and object, in which the indubitable certainty is posited, scarcely has it come into view, before it finds itself, one knows not how, transposed again at once into empirical psychology; it sinks back at times into a psychological meaning, so as to be wholly and completely forgotten in the critique of philosophy itself, and in the skepticism, and leave the field open for the non-identity of subject and object, of concept and thing.

This non-identity reveals itself as principle in what are called the three grounds of skepticism. Just as the ancient skeptics had no dogmas, or basic propositions, but called their forms "tropes" [turnings] —

which, indeed, as we have seen, is what they were; so Mr. Sch[ulze] likewise avoids the expressions, "basic propositions," "principles," and calls them just "grounds," regardless of the fact that they are completely dogmatic theses. The plurality of these grounds could have been dispensed with through a more complete abstraction; for they express nothing save the one dogma: that concept and being are not the same.

[55] They read as follows (Vol. I, p 613 ff.): "First Ground: in as much as philosophy // is to be a science, it needs basic principles that are unconditionally true. But basic principles of that kind are impossible."⁹³

Is this not dogmatic? Does it look like the expression of a skeptical trope? A dogma of this kind: that unconditionally true basic propositions are impossible, requires its proof too. But because this dogmatism has had the wit to call itself a skepticism, the expression "proof" will again be avoided, and the word "clarification" [Erläuterung] is used instead; but how can such an external semblance change the fact?

As always, then, the clarification finds speculative philosophy guilty of believing that it could create from mere concepts its insight into the existence of supersensible things. The proof itself amounts to this: that in a proposition that is a bonding of images and concepts, neither in the bonding (*copula*), nor in the concepts of the proposition is an agreement of the proposition with what is thought by its means given as necessary;—the *copula* is only the relationship of the predicate to the subject in the understanding (hence something purely subjective), and by its very nature has absolutely no relation with anything outside the thought of the understanding;—in the concepts of predicate and subject nothing [is given as necessary],—for with the actuality of the concept in the understanding only the possibility of it is given, i.e., that it is not self-contradictory, but not that it has a relation to something distinct from it. This is just the place where the illusory nature and the empty subtlety of the // Ontological Proof of the existence of God strikes Mr. Sch[ulze]. The "second ground" is nothing but a repetition of this "clarification":

[56]

Second Ground (p. 620): "Whatever the speculative philosopher pretends to have cognized of the highest grounds of what is present in a conditioned way, he has apprehended and thought merely in concepts. But the understanding that is occupied with mere concepts is no faculty for making something to the measure of actuality even only in idea."

In the clarification the author says that, among speculative philosophers or seekers for the existence of things on the basis of mere concepts, the understanding is rated so highly that anyone who casts the slightest doubt on that high rating makes himself liable to the suspicion and accusation of having little understanding or even

none at all. But on this point it is rather the contrary that is true, in that speculation holds the understanding to be thoroughly inept for philosophy. —Mr. Sch[ulze] goes on to say that we must bethink ourselves whether *Reason* can concede this perfect adequacy to the understanding. But what can Reason be doing here? Why has our author spoken in the second ground itself, only of the understanding, of which there is no question in speculation, and not of Reason? As if he was appropriating understanding for philosophy, and Reason for his skepticism. We find, however, that on the few occasions where the word "Reason" occurs, it is only used as an honorific word, one that will make an impression. What this Reason produces is never anything but "The // concept is not the thing". A Reason of this sort is just what is called understanding by speculation. [57]

Third Ground (p. 627): "The speculative philosopher rests his pretended science of the absolute grounds of what exists in a conditioned way quite peculiarly on the inference from the constitution of the effect to the constitution of an appropriate cause. But there is no mode of inferring with any security at all from the constitution of the effect to that of the cause." —

In the *clarification* it is asserted that "unless one claims to have arrived at the cognition of what can lie at the foundation of everything conditioned *through some inspiration*,"^{93a} that cognition can only be one mediated by the principle of causality. —But this assumption about speculative philosophy, that the causality-relationship is peculiarly dominant in it is once again radically false; for on the contrary, the causal relation is wholly banned from speculative thought; if it seems sometimes to occur in the form of producer and product, then it is only the verbal expression for the relationship not the relationship itself that is employed; for the producer and the product are posited as equivalent, the cause is equivalent to the effect, one and the same [substance is posited] as cause of itself, and as effect of itself, so that the relationship is immediately sublated. There is simply no question in speculative philosophy of the unconditioned being *inferred* from the constitution of the conditioned. // [58]

"This then (p. 643) is the schedule and the content of the general grounds upon which the skeptic denies certainty to the doctrines of all the systems of philosophy that have been established so far, or may yet be established in the future, and which lead him to the decision not to concede that any single one of these systems has warranted claims to truth."⁹⁴ But we have seen that these grounds have nothing to do with philosophy inasmuch as philosophy is not at all concerned with plucking a thing out of concepts, nor with reconnoitering a fact that lies beyond the range of Reason, it is not concerned either with

what our author calls "concepts" or with "things", and it does not infer causes from effects.

On these grounds, says Mr. Sch[ulze] (p. 610), when the skeptic "weighs up the authentic goal" of philosophy, and its conditions, "and on the other side the *capacity of the human mind*, to arrive at a real and secure cognition, he finds himself disposed not to be able to see how a cognition of the supersensible could ever come to pass [. . .] as long as the *equipment of the human cognitive faculty does not change*, which *no rational man expects*,"⁹⁵ and which *it would be foolish to nourish any hope for*. Indeed it would be all the more foolish to nourish any such hope, since even with the equipment of the human mind standing as it does in the current year, a philosophy is possible.

[59] These are the weapons with which the systems of Locke, Leibniz and Kant, are combatted; // the systems of Locke and Leibniz specifically as systems of realism, the former sensualistic, the latter rationalistic; Kant's system, however, as a system of transcendental idealism; the later transcendental idealism is reserved for a third volume.⁹⁶

The first volume contains the *exposition* of these systems (Locke's, pp. 113-40; Leibniz', pp.141-172). But pages 172-582 supply us with one more extract of the much-expounded Kantian *Critique of Pure Reason*; what follows to the end of the volume is devoted to the skepticism set forth above.

The second volume contains the critique of these systems in the light of the grounds elucidated above:—the critique of Locke, pp. 7-90; of Leibniz, pp. 91-125; six hundred pages are devoted to the critique of Kant.

As an example of how these skeptical grounds are applied to these systems, we offer the way in which our author controverts the "innate concepts" of Leibniz; this refutation of Leibniz takes the following course (Vol. II, p. 100):—"In general, since Leibniz has set the tone," with his doctrine "that the ground of necessary judgments lies simply in the mind itself, and hence that the understanding already contains a priori cognitions, it has been repeated countless times, of course, that necessary judgments can only originate from the cognitive subject himself; but so far, no single property of this subject has been demonstrated, in virtue of which it is quite specifically qualified to be the source of necessary judgments; and neither in its simplicity, nor [60] in its substantiality, nor even in its cognitive faculties // has the basis for any such qualification been found."⁹⁷

Are the simplicity and substantiality of the soul qualities that this skepticism concedes to it then? —If the assertion of necessary judgments depended only on this, that we can point them out in a quality of the soul, then indeed there is nothing that needs doing except to say, the soul has the quality of necessary judgments.

Our author asserts then that "so far as our insight into our own cognitive Ego goes, we do not find anything in it which determines that it must be a source of necessary judgments;" yet he goes on immediately afterwards to say that "the objects of our thought are sometimes contingent, and sometimes necessary judgments; but one could not say that the necessary ones had more relation to the understanding and its nature, than the contingent, and that it belonged to the essence of our understanding to produce necessary judgments;"⁹⁸ but, indeed, one has only to admit that there are qualities of two kinds in the understanding, one quality being that of contingent judgments, the other that of necessary judgments; in this way the qualification of our mind for necessary judgments is just as well made out as the other qualities in an empirical psychology. Mr. Sch[ulze] certainly admits necessary judgments as an actual fact of consciousness.

"But what Leibniz says about *the truth* of innate concepts and the insights of pure Reason, is in every way more devoid of foundation, and one *must actually marvel*, how the man could have paid so little attention // to the precepts of logic here, seeing that the requirements of a valid proof were by no means unknown to him."⁹⁹ Here, first of all, we learn what it is that Leibniz has failed in, namely attention to logic; and Mr. Sch[ulze] actually marvels at this; but what Leibniz did not fail in, what he had too much of, was genius, as we shall find a bit further on; and that is what one actually must still marvel at, too, that a man has genius.

To be precise: "it is not obvious in itself, that if there are innate concepts and basic principles in our mind, there is also something corresponding to them, outside of them, to which they relate, and which gives them a cognition, just as it is, according to its objective actuality; for *concepts and judgments in us* are certainly not the *objects themselves* which are thought by their means; and with the necessity of the relation of the predicate to the subject in our thought of it, the relation of thought to a real thing existing outside of it is by no means given, being quite different in kind from that."¹⁰⁰

One can see that our author takes the innate concepts in the most blatantly crude way possible; according to his picture, a subject is born, with a packet of letters of exchange in his head, drawn upon a world existing outside of that head; the question then would be whether the letters will be accepted by this bank, whether they are genuine, not forged; or with a heap of lottery-tickets in the soul, about which we shall never find out, whether they are not all losing numbers; for there comes no draw afterwards, by which their fortune is decided. "This," continues the author, "has always been seen and admitted by the defenders of innate // concepts and basic principles in the human

soul, and hence they have tried to give a *proof* of the truth of these concepts and basic principles, or at least to define more precisely *the way* in which these concepts, should be related with real things."¹⁰¹

In his note it is alleged that "according to Plato, the concepts and basic principles which the soul brings with it innately into this present life, and whereby alone we are capable of cognizing the actual as it is, not as it appears to us through the senses, are simple recollections of those intuitions of the things in which the soul [. . .] participated during its sojourn with God. Descartes lets the matter be [. . .] appealing to the veracity of God; [. . .] for Spinoza the thought of our understanding is true because it consists of the ideas and cognitions of the divinity, inasmuch as they are what make up the essence of our spirit; these cognitions of the divinity must completely agree with what is cognized through them, indeed they are one and the same thing with this cognized object."¹⁰² "According to Leibniz the basic principles located in our minds *a priori*, and the ideas they contain, acquired truth and reality, because they are copies of the concepts and truths that are to be found in the understanding of the divinity, concepts which are the principle of the possibility, existence and constitution of all real things in the world."¹⁰³

[63] But even before he gets to criticism Mr. Sch[ulze] has at once distorted the problem by the way that he has presented it. For was it properly the problem at issue for Plato, Spinoza, Descartes, // Leibniz to find a way of proving that a reality corresponds to the innate concepts or to Reason; or to define the way [it corresponds] when these philosophers posit God as the ground of their truth? According to Mr. Sch[ulze] the chain of argument is this: (a) [there are] subjective concepts, that are without reality on their own account; then (b) [there is] a reality lying outside of them; so (c) the question, how it comes together [arises]; (d) the proof of their truth in a [being] that is alien to both the concepts and the reality. Rather [it is the case that] those philosophers have [re]cognized, what Mr. Sch[ulze] calls that identity of concept and reality presupposed in everyday life, and they called it the understanding of God, in which actuality and possibility are one.

"We do not want to investigate," according to the author's judgment of the matter, "whether this argument for the truth and reliability of innate concepts is ultimately bound up with *theosophical fancies* about the kinship of our soul with the nature of God, and could have been derived from that; though one might infer this anyway from what Leibniz taught about the genesis of finite monads from the supreme monad."¹⁰⁴

Now we have got the whole story then! The kinship of our souls with the nature of God is theosophical fancy, and, 'for politeness'

sake no doubt, our author does not want to investigate how closely the argument for the truth of ideas is bound up with it. But these philosophers have laid it down, in accord with truth [*der Sache nach*], that the soul is nothing in itself, but is what it is in God; the shortest way to deal with this in discussion is to stigmatize the philosophy of these philosophers as dreamy enthusiasm and theosophical // fancies.

But Mr. Sch[ulze] puts on airs about wanting to deal with the ground of cognition; "But every one of our readers can certainly see this much," he continues, "that at this point, the question must necessarily be asked: *from what source then, do we know*, that our understanding possesses the exalted privilege of participating in copies of the eternal and real cognitions which are in God's understanding? Since the senses teach us nothing at all about God and his properties, Leibniz can only derive and generate his answer to this question from the understanding and from its *innate insights*; so that is what he did. In consequence, his proof of the truth of innate concepts is drawn round in a circle."¹⁰⁵ Quite right! and if he did not go in a circle, then he would have a causal relationship, and in accordance with the third ground the bridge from effect to cause would be built of plain concepts which have no reality. —

But it was not necessary to separate the truth and reliability of the so-called innate concepts on one side, from the exalted privilege of participation in the copies and the eternal and real cognitions of God on the other, and to make each of these into a particular quality (or whatever one wants to call it); on the contrary the two are one and the same thing. There is no question of proving the first on the basis of the second. So all circularity vanishes, and nothing is left over, but the assertion in two modes of expression, that Reason, according to Leibniz, is an image of the divinity, or that it has true cognition. This runs out into theosophical fancies, to be sure, but it cannot be denied all the same—to put it in the // language of this skepticism—that that kinship of our soul with the nature of God, and the imaging [*Vorstellen*] of the divinity, was a fact of consciousness for those philosophers; but consciousness is for this skepticism the supreme court of certainty and truth; as we saw above,¹⁰⁶ what is present in consciousness can no more be doubted than consciousness itself—for to doubt that is impossible.

So then, since in the consciousness of some philosophers the reality of their Ideas, and the kinship of their nature with the nature of God occurs, while in that of others it does not, there is nothing to be done but to call those philosophers liars, which just won't do,—or else to demand of them that they should make their consciousness comprehensible, which again cannot be required, for the identity of idea

and thing that is presupposed in everyday life is likewise not comprehended by the ordinary consciousness which could make this demand; so there is nothing left but to admit two races of consciousness, one that is conscious of that kinship, and another that explains that sort of consciousness as a theosophical fancy.

[66] Then Mr. Sch[ulze] shows the groundlessness of the Idea that Reason has reality because it is a copy of the divine Reason, from what Leibniz himself says. For Leibniz admits that the concepts of finite essences are infinitely different from the concepts in the understanding of God. But Mr. Sch[ulze] could very easily learn the concept of the Leibnizian antinomy of the finite and the infinite from his exposition // of Leibniz's system (in Vol. I); or rather it is once again Mr. Sch[ulze] who treats the antinomy of finite and infinite as an absolute one; in the exposition of Leibniz's system, section 28, we read that "the properties which constitute the ground of cognitions and of volitional capacity in the created monads, *correspond* to the properties of the divinity"; but in God "they are present in *infinite* degree and in the *highest perfection*; the *corresponding* properties in the created monads on the other hand are mere *likenesses* of them, according to the degree of perfection that they possess". Compare section 34 and the note there.¹⁰⁸

Since perfections of the finite monads correspond to the perfections of the infinite one, the antithesis that Leibniz sets up between the infinite monad and the finite ones is not the absolute antithesis of finite and infinite, in the way that Mr. Sch[ulze] apprehends it—he could very well express his view of it by saying that the two are *specifically distinct*;¹⁰⁹ the fact that Leibniz posits the absolute monad as infinite, and the others as finite, and yet speaks of a likeness between the two, Mr. Sch[ulze] would probably count as one of the cases in which Leibniz has not been attentive enough to the *precepts of logic*.

[67] Furthermore, according to Mr. Sch[ulze], Leibniz's proof "that the necessary judgments of the human understanding must also be present in the understanding of God", is derived from the fact "that those judgments, inasmuch as they constitute eternal truths, must be present from all eternity // as determinations of an understanding that eternally thinks the same thought, and hence likewise exists from all eternity". Mr. Sch[ulze] asks whether "it must first have been made out in advance that an eternally existing understanding that is thinking certain truths without a break *actually* exists before it can be asserted that there are eternal truths valid for all times"; "eternal truths are those which, according to *our* insight, every understanding that is conscious of the judgment must think in just the way that we think them, and this has consequently no relation to the fact that an understanding which actually thinks these judgments has existed from

eternity".¹¹¹ Mr. Sch[ulze] here again apprehends the existence of the divine understanding as an empirical one, and the eternity as an empirical one too.

Finally, we cannot pass over what Mr. Sch[ulze] offers us regarding Leibniz's conception of 'clear and confused presentation'; "the intuition of external things," he says, "is a consciousness of the immediate presence of a *thing*, that is distinct from *our cognizing subject* and from its merely subjective determinations."¹¹² (It seems that Mr. Sch[ulze] distinguishes still between *himself* and *his subject*; one cannot help being curious to have an explanation of this distinction; depending on how it was developed it could certainly lead to theosophical fancies). "Hence the view that intuition arises from the confusion of the manifold characteristics [of the monads] in an image [*Vorstellung*] has no sense and significance at all"; the two are *in no way* // *akin* to one another.¹¹³ (The question would be, what kinship is there then between the Ego and our subject which is to be distinguished from the Ego, and what kinship is there with its subjective and finally with its objective determinations).

"It stands within the power of every man, to bring forth within himself intuitions of things at his pleasure, and if he has thought something clearly, to transform his state of consciousness straightaway into the intuiting of an object. In order to intuit a chiliagon, or a piece of gold, a house, a man, the Universe, the divinity etc., as present nothing would be required, except that one should *properly confuse together* the characteristics found in the *representation* of the chiliagon, of gold etc., after one has turned one's attention aside from their distinctness; while to turn the intuition of a house, a man, a tree into a simple concept, on the other hand, nothing more would be necessary than that one should make clear to oneself the parts that occur in the so-called sense-presentation, by distinguishing them from one another in consciousness. *Hopefully*, however, *nobody* will *seriously* pretend, that *his cognitive subject*" (here we find *nobody* and *his subject*) "is in a position to perform such *unheard of conjuring tricks* through any such arbitrary transformation of the concepts of things into intuitions, and of intuitions into concepts."¹¹⁴ Since Mr. Sch[ulze] does not blench here at dragging the speculative theory of the nature of the presenting activity that Leibniz proposes, // down to the solid soil and homely comfort of empirical presentation, and at dishing up for table against Leibniz trivialities of exactly the same kind that Nicolai and other such leading lights bring forward against idealism, we can be sure that the more recent idealism, to which Mr. Sch[ulze] means to devote a third volume has nothing else to look forward to, but the repetition of these same disgraces on his part.¹¹⁵ This idealism will be given out as the assertion of an arbitrary power of producing things, and of

changing concepts into things, it will be revealed as the most unheard of conjuring tricks.

This treatment of the Leibnizian philosophy by the new skepticism will be a sufficient sample of the way it carries on. And just as the Leibnizian philosophy already deserved in and for itself, to have been dealt with as a rational system, so the *investigation* of the *Kantian philosophy* could be made outstandingly interesting by the fact that this philosophy of understanding is elevated above its own principle, which it finds in reflection. The great Idea of Reason and of a system of philosophy which everywhere lies at its foundation could be dragged out [of the shadows] and set forth [openly, so that it appears] like a magnificent ruin, in which the understanding has claimed squatter's rights.¹¹⁶

[70] The effective presence of this Idea is already visible in the outward scaffolding of its parts; but it also emerges more explicitly at the culminating points of its syntheses, especially in the *Critique of Judgment*. It is the spirit of the Kantian philosophy to be conscious of this supreme Idea, but to set to work expressly to root it out again. Thus we [can] distinguish two types of spirit that // become visible in the Kantian philosophy, one being that of the philosophy which is continually ruined by the system, the other that of the system which aims to do the Idea of Reason to death; this latter spiritless spirit still has, however, also a letter, and Mr. Sch[ulze] warns us that, in accordance with the express declarations of Kant, that his system must be taken according to the letter not according to the spirit, he [Schulze] has held to the letter.¹¹⁷

This then is the way in which he has arrived at the spiritless letter of the spiritless spirit of philosophy. This wholly formal essence, he has criticized with an equally essential formality. The Kantian philosophy is poured out in the crassest way possible, a view of it in which our author was altogether justified by the advance work of the Reinhold theory and of other Kantians; he has conceived it exclusively in the shape of the crassest dogmatism, which has a [realm of] phenomena and Things in themselves which lie *behind* the *phenomena* like wild beasts lurking in the bushes of appearance; and this is not just because the Kantians are to be tormented with this straw man image [*Bild dieser Krassheit*], but because, as we have already satisfied ourselves above, this skepticism, and the system of the indubitable certainty of the actual facts of consciousness cannot conceive it any other way.

For the Kantians who are nailed to the letter, this hard labor and the grim struggle that another formalism takes upon itself with the formalism of Kant, along with the straw man image (if they are still capable of being frightened by that) could have the effect of giving them a good fright. It is not just the image of the Kantian philosophy as it is put before them here [i.e. in Vol. II, part II] [that I mean], but

this image as it is so strikingly represented independently in the whole // continuous run of these four alphabets.¹¹⁸ Another thing that is sufficiently demonstrated for them is the inability of the Kantian formalism to deduce or to produce its own forms. But they would seek in vain here for the concept of philosophy; for this has slipped away in the press of the "actual facts" and of the "things" sought for behind the "facts". Philosophy gets the blame for this quest, and in that way the whole business of this skepticism ceases to bear upon it in the slightest.

[71]

Finally we cannot refrain from picking out one piece of the empirical psychology of this skepticism, namely the way in which it represents the relationship of genius and fancy to philosophy. In the Preface (p. xxiv) Mr. Sch[ulze] explains, with reference to his own mode of writing, that "flowers of rhetoric are quite out of place in discussing the questions of speculative philosophy, since they lead Reason [. . .] astray, and get the fancy involved in its concerns; so that even if it had been in his power to enliven the exposition of this *Critique* more with eloquence and a ready flow of metaphors, and thus make it more attractive, he would have made no use of such means."¹¹⁹

About Leibniz our author says (pp. 91 f) that "if the concern of Reason in philosophizing consisted in *surpassing even* the highest flights that fancy can ever dream of, by bold and *delightfully* entertaining poetic fictions about a *pretended* transcendental world *lying hidden behind* the world of the senses, and giving these // poetic fictions unity and consistency with the aid of concepts that are certain, then [. . .] no other philosopher even approached Leibniz, not to speak of outdoing him; [. . .] it seems that nature meant to show in him, [. . .] that the attainment of the highest goal of the cognitive powers [. . .] was not *merely* a matter of the possession of *great natural gifts*, and that a thinker *less favored by nature*, if he just used his powers appropriately, *could not only equal the genius in this field, but often probably even surpass him*."¹²⁰ It is the opinion of Mr. Sch[ulze] that even if Leibniz had developed his philosophical aphorisms into a system himself, nothing much would have come of it save perhaps for "Neoplatonic daydreams."¹²¹

[72]

About Kant, on the other hand, Mr. Sch[ulze] speaks with the greatest respect, declaring that "the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the product of a strenuous effort of the power of thought, one that shirks no obstacles, and arises only from the free resolution of its author, and that *genius* and *lucky chance* cannot claim the *slightest credit* in the execution of the plan that lies at its foundation"¹²² (as if there could be a lucky chance for anyone else except a genius!).

Looking at this contempt for genius and great natural gifts, this opinion that the fancy supplies nothing else save flowers of rhetoric

[73] to the exposition of philosophy, as if Reason made fictions in the sense in which newspaper-lies, for instance, are invented fictions, or when it does offer inventions that pass beyond the range of ordinary actuality, it produced castles in the air, religious dreams, or theosophical fantasies, that it // can surpass fancy itself in poetic invention, even in fancy's highest flights, one does not know which is more outrageous—the ingenuous barbarity with which it applauds the absence of genius, or the vulgarity of the concepts. When we call contempt for superior natural gifts barbarity, we are not thinking of the natural barbarity that lies outside of the range of culture; for the natural barbarian honors genius as something divine, and respects it as a light that penetrates the obscurity of his consciousness. We mean the barbarity of culture itself, a savagery that is made, one that creates an absolute boundary for itself, and despises the unbounded range of nature from within this fenced enclosure; where it speaks cognitively it is understanding. As for the concepts, they stem from the sort of empirical psychology that disperses the spirit into mutually external qualities, and hence finds no whole, no genius and no talent among these qualities, but describes them as if they were a sack full of "faculties", each of which is quite particular, one being a "Reason" that is without intuition, and separate from the fancy; another a fancy that is without Reason, one whose emptiness can only be filled with "facts" [*Sachen*] at the cost of heavy labor, and which only has its proper worth in factual and thing-filled fulfilment. The understanding too abides there among the other faculties that dwell in the soul-sack of the subject, the most eminent among them, because it understands how to change everything into "facts"—concepts on one side, things on the other. Hence this understanding runs also through the two alphabets of criticism, with its monotonous process of tearing everything up into concepts and things existing outside of them (just as it sets forth alien "facts" in the two prior expository alphabets).¹²³

[74] The process lacks // all the quickening vitality of an Idea of Reason; it carries on without the touch of fancy or of fortune, in a resounding, sense-clouding, sleep-inducing, overwhelming tone, producing the same effect as if one was wandering through a field of henbane in bloom, the stupefying scent of which no efforts can withstand, and where one is not aroused by any enlivening beam, not even in the shape of an impending nemesis.

Notes

1. In spite of the correct heading Hegel only spells Schulze's name correctly once in the whole essay (below p. 52). For the most part he abbreviates it to "Sch."—but where he spells it out, he omits the final vowel. Perhaps the heading of the review was only added to the manuscript when it was otherwise ready in final form for the printer. But since Hegel may also be evincing a satirical contempt for the "facts of consciousness" I have made his abbreviations and omissions visible to the reader.

2. The reference is to *Aenesidemus*. For an excerpt from this work, see pp. 105-33 above.

3. Printers then (as now) used the letters of the alphabet to mark their sheets—each of which folds (in octavo as here) into sixteen printed pages. An "alphabet" contained twenty-three sheets. Schulze's *Critique* contained "four alphabets for the present" because it was not yet complete. He promised a third volume which never materialized.

4. All of this paragraph is freely quoted (in oblique form) from the direct text of Schulze (Vol. I, pp. 3, 6-7; quotation marks added).

5. A case very much in Hegel's mind here is that of Fichte. In the "Preface" to the *Difference* essay he says "one cannot say of Fichte's system that fortune has smiled on it"; he ascribes this partly to what he regards as its weaknesses and partly to "the unphilosophical tendencies of the age." But he also says that it "has caused so much of a stir . . . that even those who declare themselves against it . . . still cling to its principle." He believes there that "fortune's smile" is a sign that the system that receives it answers "some widespread philosophical need" (*Difference*, pp. 82-83). But in *Faith and Knowledge* he sets out to show that the principle that has made Fichte's work so widely acceptable is only the un-philosophical principle of *finite* subjectivity. The *speculative* or philosophical side of Fichte is there said to be despised even by Fichte himself (p. 167). The attitude expressed in the present essay is close to that of *Faith and Knowledge*.

6. "I have found that most sects are right in a good part of what they maintain, but not so much in what they deny." (*Trois lettres à Mr. Rémond de Montmort*, 1741). Jacobi put this motto on the title page of his *Letters on the Teaching of Spinoza* (1789).

7. "One must not dispute with those who deny principles," Aristotle maintained this only with respect to logical principles, especially contradiction (*Metaphysics*, Gamma, 4). It is more likely that Hegel understood Aristotle's position, than that he knew much of the Scholastic application of it to principles of all kinds. It was certainly from the disputes of the medieval schools that the Latin axiom descended to the logic books of Hegel's time. But from the way he goes on to use it as a support for the postulate of one true philosophy at the foundation of all "systems" we can see that Hegel thought of it as applying to the transcendental logic in terms of which all "systems" have to be interpreted.

8. The barb of Hegel's irony—here unveiled though still nameless—is that Adam's sin of disobedience was identified in traditional moral theology as the sin of *pride*. In his claim to have discovered the original sin of philosophers generally, Schulze is assuming

God's role in Adam's story. The promised demonstration that Schulze is not acquainted with *speculative* or *transcendental* philosophy is given below (pp. [17-26], [50-4], [69-71]).

9. At the end of each issue of the *Critical Journal* Schelling and Hegel planned to have, and usually did have a "news sheet" (*Notizenblatt*). Their object in this section was to satirize authors and works which they thought unworthy of serious attention, and sometimes (as here) to supplement their serious criticism with satire. One of their favorite techniques in the *Notizenblatt* was to quote passages which they found particularly amusing from books or reviews of books (either without comment, or with obviously ironic asides). In the case of Schulze they reprinted an ironic "blurb" composed by Hegel himself and printed (anonymously) in the *Oberdeutsche Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung* of Munich.

10. *Kritik*, Vol. I, 52; Kant *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, trans. Meredith, p. 15. (Hegel's reference is probably to the first edition, 1790; see Academy Ed. V, 177). Schulze wrote "Some important distinctions occur between the actual facts of our consciousness, and so far as we have investigated these distinctions till now, and learned to know them, these facts are either *cognitions of objects*, or *utterances of the will* or *feelings of pleasure and dislike*. But although these facts have a variety of standing connections with one another; still our insight into them goes far enough to tell us that they cannot be reduced to a single class, or derived from a single source, but are essentially distinguished from one another by abiding marks. Upon this distinct variety in the facts of our consciousness then, the division of philosophy into *theoretical*, *practical* and the *philosophy concerned with feelings* is grounded; this last, in so far as it deals with the feelings of the beautiful and sublime has had the name of *Aesthetics* in Germany."

11. See *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* II, 1; and *Against the Logicians* I, 1.

12. *Kritik*, I, 26-27. Schulze's formula says simply "the highest and unconditioned causes" and contains no "otherwise".

13. Hegel is not quoting directly but weaving together a tissue of Schulze's favorite expressions.

14. *Kritik*, I, 51. The quotation is not marked and is not quite word perfect.

15. See *Kritik* I, 56.

16. Compare *Kritik* I, 72-73. Hegel's language (and Schulze's) seems to indicate that the "metaphysics" most immediately in question is that of Reinhold, who was also a theorist of the *Tatsachen des Bewusstseins*, and the primary architect of the language. (Compare especially *Difference*, pp. 105, 178-86).

17. The quotation was abbreviated by Hegel (who did not use quotation marks for it).

18. This quotation (though not marked as such) is almost word perfect (the italics are Hegel's).

19. These two (unmarked) quotations are abbreviated.

20. *Kritik* I, 585. Unmarked by Hegel but almost word perfect.

21. *Kritik* I, 588. Again unmarked but almost exact.

22. See. *Kritik* I, 589 and 590-91 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine).

23. *Kritik* I, 593 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine). The French translator Fauquet claims that Hegel is in the wrong here and that truth is more on the side of Schulze. But he seems to me to have missed Hegel's point. It is not "the existence and presence of sense-presentations and feelings" that the ancient skeptics are here said to have

doubted but "what experience teaches". The question is about the attitude of ancient and modern skepticism toward two kinds of *knowledge*: empirical knowledge and rational (or speculative knowledge). Hegel claims that Pyrrho doubted at least the former, and the later sceptics doubted both; while Schulze doubts only the latter, and wishes to maintain the validity of the former. (See further the introductory essay, sections 3-5).

24. *Kritik* I, 595, 596-7 (not quite verbatim; italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine). Schulze refers to Sextus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 10. But compare *ibid.* I, 8.

25. Diogenes Laertius IX, 108: "for in matters which are for us to decide but happen of necessity; such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape, for they are not to be removed by force of reason." (trans. R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, II, 519).

26. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, xi, 23; compare also I, xi, 21.

27. *ibid.*, I, xi, 22: "Therefore we say that the criterion of the skeptical school is the phenomenon, and potentially we call the image (*phantasia*) of the [actual] phenomenon, the criterion. For since it lies in a conviction (*peisei*) and affection that is involuntary it cannot be questioned (*azētētos*)." Clearly Sextus means that as a matter of psychological fact we cannot doubt the phenomenon that presents itself. But to the eye of skeptic reason it *remains* a mere phenomenon. We cannot help accepting it as the guide for our actions, but it may mislead us; our inescapable psychological conviction is no guarantee of truth. "That which cannot be questioned" is *not* equivalent to "that which cannot be doubted".

28. Hegel cites this from Sextus below. See *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* II, vi, 63. The origin of the example is in Atomism. See Democritus D.-K A. 135, p. 119, line 11; and Theophrastus *De sensibus*, 69.

29. *Kritik*, I, 593-4. Unmarked but almost word perfect.

30. *Kritik*, I, 599. Unmarked but almost word-perfect, except that Schulze wrote *Quellen* ("sources") not *Gründen* ("grounds"). The italics are Hegel's.

31. *Kritik*, I, 599. Hegel wrote "had been then" for Schulze's "were then" (which I have restored). Otherwise the quotation is almost word perfect though unmarked. The italics are Hegel's. The sentence between these two direct quotations is a paraphrase of the intervening context in Schulze.

32. Hegel's attempted reconstruction of the history of the "school" is almost certainly mistaken. There was probably little or no historical connection between the earlier skepticism of Pyrrho and the genuine "school succession" of Aenesidemus, Metrodorus etc., and the earliest *tropoi* certainly belong to the later school.

33. Diogenes Laertius IX, 71-73.

34. Either "welche" must be deleted (as earlier editors decided) or a verb must be supplied here. Buchner and Pöggeler supply "vorkommen". I have accepted the deletion rather than this amendment. The reader can see how little difference it makes which way the problem is dealt with by reading the sentence with "that come up" inserted.

35. I have distributed the elements of what I take to be a deliberate chiasmus here. Hegel wrote: "nothing but a heap and a cloud of passably obscure, and for the times of a Parmenides and a Plato passably acute, but to a modern metaphysician nauseating sophisms."

Dietrich Tiedemann was the general editor of the edition of Plato that Hegel owned and habitually used (12 Vols., Zweibrücken, 1781-86). This edition provided Ficino's Latin version at the foot of the page. The Ficino quotation and Tiedemann's comment

come from the supplementary *Dialogorum Platonis argumenta* supplied by Tiedemann.

36. *Ethics*, Part I, Def. I. Hegel did not use quotation marks.

37. *Ethics*, Part I, Prop. XVIII: "God is the immanent not the transient cause of all things."

38. Sextus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 12, 18, 202-5.

39. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, i, 4.

40. *Kritik* I, 608 note. Not marked by Hegel (and somewhat free at the end).

41. *loc. cit.* Only the clauses that I have placed in quotes come directly from Schulze's text, but Hegel printed it all in spread type as shown.

42. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, I, 206; cf. I, 14

43. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, I, 226: *akatalēpta einai panta* i.e. no phenomenon is grasped by a "cataleptic phantasm", or no experience is self-certifying as knowledge beyond the possibility of doubt.

44. *Kritik* I, 607 note. Almost word perfect but not marked by Hegel.

45. Sextus (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 232) of course, wrote "seems to me" and "same *agōgē* as ours". Otherwise Hegel is translating his text directly though he did not mark the quotation.

46. The *epochē* is the skeptical suspense of judgement.

47. From his later reference back to this passage, it appears uncertain that Hegel has rightly understood *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 233:

"He [Arcesilaus] also says that *epochē* regarding particulars is good, but assent regarding particulars is bad. Only one might say that whereas *we* make these assertions according to what appears to us and not positively, *he* asserts them as according to nature, so as to say that *epochē* is in itself good, and assent is evil." In point of fact Sextus was *wrong* about this (see the Introductory essay); but Hegel is, in any case, quite correct in maintaining as he now does, that, if we are to follow Sextus, as both sides claim to be doing, Schulze has got the official distinction between the Academic skeptics and the Pyrrhonian tradition completely backwards. It is the Academics who are said to be *dogmatically* skeptical—trusting their own reasoning and the Pyrrhonians who are skeptically skeptical (or "stripped of Reason" as Schulze prefers to say).

48. Compare *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 33, 234.

49. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 220-35. Sextus allows for the distinction of no fewer than five Academies: The Old Academy (Plato); the Middle Academy (Arcesilaus); the New Academy (Carneades); The Fourth Academy (Philo of Larissa); and the Fifth (Antiochus of Ascalon). He discusses the *skeptical* credentials of the first four. (See further the introductory essay).

50. C. F. Stäudlin: *Geschichte und Geist des Scepticismus* (Vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf Moral und Religion), 2 vols Leipzig, 1794. Schulze refers in the following quotation to Vol. I, 306. (It is worth remembering that the Stäudlins were old friends of the Hegel family—see my *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 59, 81, 116.)

51. *Kritik*, Vol. i, 608. Schulze wrote "which was to persuade others, etc. through their art . . ." (the italics are Hegel's, the quotation marks mine). The French translator Fauquet (p. 43, note 61) asserts that "On the precise point evoked by Hegel, Stäudlin has the authority of the texts on his side against Hegel." But Hegel is saying that *all* such criticism is worthless. And he is right. Fauquet *ought* to acknowledge (in any case) that the best texts are on Hegel's side (see the introductory essay).

52. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 222. Hegel learned from the note of Fabricius (whose edition of Sextus he owned and used) that the work Sextus refers to was one that had perished. But Sextus may mean the five books *Adversus Mathematicos* VII-XI (two books *Against the Logicians*, two *Against the Physical Philosophers* and one *Against the Ethical Philosophers*).

53. *Kritik* I, 222. Hegel did not mark this as a quotation but he has translated the Fabricius text of Sextus quite closely.

54. See for instance *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 237 and Diogenes Laertius, IX, 108; also *Against the Ethical Philosophers*, 166

55. *Adversus logicos* I. 310.

56. Hegel probably means *Parmenides* 127a. Fauquet compares also Simplicius' account of Zeno in *D-K*. 29 A. In Sextus see *Adversus Physicos* I, 258-64; 308-58. (There are similar discussions in other works, but Hegel's reference points to these).

57. *Adversus logicos* I, 310-312. Hegel did not use quotation marks but his translation is fairly close.

58. *Adversus logicos* I, 313. *The italics are Hegel's, the quotation marks mine.*

59. See *Adversus logicos* I, 317-319.

60. See *Memorabilia*, I, 1, 13-14.

61. See Hegel's essay on Krug "How common sense etc."

62. We know from the earlier discussion that the philosophy with which true ancient skepticism is "identical" is Platonism. But Hegel seems here to have the Presocratic roots and sources of Platonism in mind. Compare Hegel's reference to the long history of "Skepticism" from Homer onwards, above. Socrates is certainly the turning point in the matter of "concern with subjectivity".

63. On the first ten tropes see note 32 above, and the introductory essay. For the ancient texts on which Hegel depends see Sextus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, I, 36-179 and Diogenes Laertius IX, 79-88. (What he says here about the insignificance of the last two tropes is not borne out by his own later discussion).

64. This story, and the image of body and shadow, comes of course from Sextus—see *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 28-29. The image itself may have come from Pyrrho.

65. This story comes from the "life of Pyrrho" in Diogenes Laertius, IX, 68.

66. Hegel takes this list directly from *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, I, 36-37. He has inserted one or two explanations of his own.

67. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 38. The quotation marks are mine.

68. Actually this is from *Adversus ethicis*, 155-6. Hegel does not use quotation marks, but he is trying to translate the passage accurately into his own terms. Thus Sextus says that "Nature cares nothing for *nomos*." Hegel cannot render this directly because he does not accept the reflective opposition of *phusis* and *nomos*. To write that "Nature cares nothing for *Sitten* (or *Gesetze*)" would be absurd, because the *Sitten* are natural, and Nature is a system of *Gesetze*. So he has to use the periphrasis "dasjenige, was die Menschen festsetzen" which expresses what the *skeptics* meant by *nomos*. (It is interesting that *kata krisis* in Sextus becomes "durch einen Willen").

69. Hegel's claims about early Stoicism are mistaken; and Antiochus must be counted as a mere "eclectic" by his standards, (see the introductory essay). Stoic "dogmatism" was always the primary target of skeptical attack.

70. See *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 164-171, for Sextus' discussion of them.

71. Hegel paraphrases this from *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 178-9.

72. See *Philebus* 14d-15a. Compare *Parmenides* 127e-128.

73. See [28-29]

74. See [8-9]. But there Hegel calls the transcendent *Sache* a *Ding*; he returns to this use in what follows here. *Sache* is intended as a rendering of the Greek *pragma*. For this see rather [15-6].

75. The expression *adēlon* (which comes from Anaxagoras) was used by the Academics. Hegel's view of what *they* meant is defensible. The other, more Aristotelian expressions which we find in Sextus refer to "things outside us" in much the same sense that Schulze speaks of them. I do not think that a distinction between Sextus and the modern Aenesidemus can be defended.

76. "kein Ding, keine bedingtes"—the verbal echo should always be remembered though it cannot be rendered in English without extreme artificiality.

77. Actually the earlier discussion referred to Arcesilaus and the Middle Academy [24-25]. Hegel simply refuses to admit that Sextus was biased and mistaken. He wants (at least at this point) to make all of ancient skepticism *noble*. So he makes Sextus claim a distinction without a difference. But in fact Sextus falsely asserted a difference in order to make a distinction. (I think that perhaps Hegel misunderstood the Greek in the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, 233—see note 47 above).

78. Compare Diogenes Laertius IX, 88.

79. See [23].

80. More precisely: Book I, 13-15 and 198-199. The quotation I have marked comes from the latter passage. Hegel's "in Wahrheit" translates *dunamei* (implicitly); and he misunderstood, and so misplaced *kath' hēmas*. We should read: "always (according to us) add on to what the skeptic says: So far as I am concerned etc."

81. Translated literally, Hegel's text says: "its whole range of infinite facts." But it is clear that Hegel means the "bad infinite" of understanding—i.e. "its whole range of innumerable facts" (cf. Fauquet, p. 62); thus the right sense is given by making the infinity a character of the *range*.

82. See [20-21].

83. Hegel marked this quotation himself. Except for the parenthetical interjection it is fairly exact. (Compare also the *Critique of Pure Reason*, B. 618).

84. Compare *Difference*, p. 193.

85. *Jacobi an Fichte*, *Werke* III, 29-30 (the quotation marks are mine). The *Nürrenberger Grillenspiel* is a form of solitaire.

86. Formulations of this kind are frequent in Schulze's *Kritik* from the Introduction onwards.

87. See *Kritik* I, xxi. The expression *herauszuklauben* is Kantian (see KRV A 603, B 631).

88. The italics are Hegel's; the quotation marks mine.

89. The first quotation is exact, the second not quite. Schulze says "In everyday life, then, we continually presuppose, the actuality of an agreement of this kind et." Except for "completely agree", the italics are Hegel's; the quotation marks are mine.

90. The quotation above (at note 89) continues: "The newer metaphysics, on the other hand, contains several attempts to investigate and give grounds for this possibility [i.e. of an agreement of our images with what they represent]".

91. *Kritik*, Vol. I, p. 70 (The italics are Hegel's, the quotation marks mine.)

92. *Kritik*, Vol. I, 69-70. (The italics are Hegel's, the quotation marks mine.)

93. The quotation is exact. The spread type comes from Schulze also. He prints his three "grounds" in a larger font as headings.

93a *Kritik*, I, 627-8 (quotation marks mine).

94. Hegel himself uses quotation marks here (but he leaves the first three words outside the citation).

95. This much is direct quotation from *Kritik* I, 609-10. Schulze goes on to say simply "and upon which he [the rational man] will therefore also not ground the hope of the possibility of a science". A little further on he adds: "it would be foolish for any one to nourish the slightest hope" that the *Hauptzweck* of a scientific philosophy would be more successfully attained in the future than hitherto. (The italics are Hegel's, the quotation marks are mine).

96. This third volume never appeared.

97. Hegel has rearranged this verbatim quotation—*Kritik* II, 100 (quotation marks added).

98. *Kritik* II, 100-101 (quotation marks added)

99. *Kritik* II, 104 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine)

100. *loc. cit.* (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine)

101. *Kritik* II, 104-5 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine).

102. *Kritik* II, 105n. (Not quite verbatim. Quotation marks added).

103. *Kritik* II, 105 (Not quite verbatim. Quotation marks added).

104. *Kritik*, Vol. II, 105-6. (Italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine).

105. *Kritik*, Vol. II, 106. Almost word-perfect. (Italics Hegel's; quotation marks mine).

106. See [10].

107. See *Kritik*, II, 107-8.

108. *Kritik*, I, 160 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine). The note is on p. 163 and it simply refers us to *Monadology*, sections 58-61.

109. Compare [50].

110. *Kritik* II, 108 (quotation marks added)

111. *Kritik* II, 109 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine).

112. *Kritik* II, 112 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine).

113. *Kritik* II, 112 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine).

114. *Kritik* II, 113-4 (italics Hegel's, quotation marks mine).

115. Friedrich Nicolai (1733-1811) was one of the "leading lights" (*Gelichter*) of the German Enlightenment and its "popular" philosophy (which Hegel abominated, just as Goethe abominated the simplistic attitude of such "lights" toward literature). He satirized current or recent philosophical views by embodying them in the characters of his novels.

116. Hegel has here characterized briefly the object of his own critical reconstruction

of "Kantian Philosophy" as a rational system in *Faith and Knowledge*. Compare pp. 67-96.

117. See for instance *Kritik* I, xxvii; II, 506-7

118. See note 3 above.

119. Not quite verbatim (quotation marks added).

120. *Kritik* II, 91-2 (not quite verbatim); italics are Hegel's, quotation marks mine.

121. See *Kritik* II, 93-4 (quotation marks added).

122. *Kritik*, II, 137. The quotation is exact. (The italics are Hegel's, the quotation marks mine).

123. See note 3 above.