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Review Article

Hegel, A Non-Metaphysician? A Polemic
Review of H T Engelhardt and Terry Pinkard (eds), *Hegel Reconsidered*
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I: The Absolute Stumbling Block

Since the 1960s the main problem confronting the rehabilitation of Hegel's philosophy has been his metaphysics. Hegel's talk about the 'absolute', 'spirit' and the 'idea' has alienated him from most contemporary philosophers, especially those of an analytic persuasion, for whom metaphysics is a dead subject. This is a problem that is not likely to disappear with the rise of 'post-modernism', which can be characterized by its disenchantment with all forms of metaphysics. Hegel, it seems, is in more danger of obsolescence than ever.

Faced with this problem, Hegel scholarship can go in three directions. First, it can defend Hegel's metaphysics, showing that it is not as irrational as many contemporaries would have us believe. This has been the strategy of Richard Kroner, Charles Taylor and J N Findlay, who have tried to explain the rationale behind Hegel's metaphysical project, though they do not always endorse it themselves.¹ Second, it can reject Hegel's metaphysics, salvaging from Hegel's system only those remnants that match contemporary interests. This has been the approach of Richard Rorty, who dismisses Hegel's metaphysics but finds the early Hegel valuable for his 'ironic narrative'.² Third, and most drastically, it can simply deny that his philosophy is a metaphysics in the traditional reprehensible sense of the term. This has been the approach of Klaus Hartmann, whose interpretation of Hegel has been widely influential since the 1960s.³

According to Hartmann's 'non-metaphysical' interpretation, Hegel's philosophy consists in 'a theory of categories' which define the general structure of being as being. Hegel's notorious dialectic does not consist in some force in matter or in history, but in simply 'the immanent rationale of a categorical hermeneutic'. Hegel's philosophy is therefore 'non-metaphysical' in at least two important senses: it does not speculate about transcendent entities, and it does not talk about particular things at all. Rather, all that it attempts to provide is the general conceptual structure or framework that makes it possible to talk about things. If Hegel's philosophy is a metaphysics at all, then it is only in the sense recommended

by Kant: an ontology or a general system of the concepts of objects in general. Hartmann therefore sees Hegel's philosophy as continuous with the Kantian tradition, as an attempt to achieve Kant's ideal of a transcendental philosophy, a system of all the conditions of possible experience.

Hegel Reconsidered is a posthumous Festschrift for Hartmann, a tribute to the enduring and wide influence of his interpretation of Hegel.⁴ Almost all the contributors were students of Hartmann, and most defend or develop his non-metaphysical approach to Hegel. There are essays by Stephan Bungay, Tom Rockmore, Klaus Brinkmann, Thomas Bole, George Kusch and Deborah Chaffin which discuss Hartmann's interpretation of the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, and articles by Terry Pinkard, Dick Howard and Tristram Engelhardt which interpret Hegel's political philosophy from Hartmann's point of view. An essay by Reinhold Aschenberg extends Hartmann's approach to Hegel's aesthetics.

Since most of the contributions to this volume apply or extend Hartmann's interpretation of Hegel, we can assess its merits only by first considering the general problems of his interpretation. The value of this volume depends on whether it sheds any light on these problems and gives us any more reason to accept Hartmann's approach.

Surely, there is something to be said in behalf of Hartmann's interpretation of Hegel. It has helped to discredit the popular image of Hegel as a grand metaphysician who flaunts the Kantian limits upon knowledge and indulges in reckless speculation about transcendent entities. Hartmann is right to stress some of the important points of continuity between Hegel and the Kantian tradition: that Hegel, no less than Kant, was concerned about the possibility of metaphysics, and that he attempted to continue Kant's project of transcendental philosophy. It is also important to emphasize, as Hartmann has done, that Hegel accepted much of Kant's critique of rationalist metaphysics, and that he did not want to restore the old demonstrations about the existence of God, providence and immortality.

All these points are not, however, as original as Hartmann's followers would like to claim. They are to be found in some of the classical interpretations of Hegel, in the works of Karl Rosenkranz, Rudolf Haym, Ernst Cassirer and Richard Kroner, who all stressed Hegel's return to the Kantian tradition during his break with Schelling. The contributors to this volume like to talk about 'the common metaphysical interpretation' of Hegel's philosophy. But this is an Aunt Sally, whose only purpose is to foster the sense of identity of an academic clique. While there is indeed a popular image of Hegel as an uncritical metaphysician, most

scholars have quickly distanced themselves from it. The introductory article by Tristram Engelhardt identifies McTaggart, Royce and Peirce as the culprits.⁵ But this only reinforces the impression that they are lambasting a bogeyman. Peirce was not a Hegel scholar; Royce's interpretation is much more historically and philosophically sophisticated than assumed here⁶ and McTaggart too did not think that Hegel was a reckless metaphysician. In general, the British Hegelians did not have a naive interpretation of Hegel's metaphysics, and their own views have striking similarities with Hartmann.⁷

To defend the tradition of Hegel scholarship from caricature is not to disparage Hartmann's originality. Although most Hegel scholarship has recognized the basic points about Hegel's disenchantment with traditional metaphysics, there is still something new and original in Hartmann's approach: his additional claims that Hegel's project is anti-metaphysical, and that it intends to be nothing more than a system of categories. It is precisely these claims, however, that are the most problematic in Hartmann's interpretation.

It should be obvious that it is possible to accept all the usual points about Hegel's rejection of traditional metaphysics and yet to reject Hartmann's central claim that Hegel's project is anti-metaphysical. Surely, it is possible that Hegel disapproved of the methods and conclusions of traditional pre-Kantian metaphysics, but that he did so only to vindicate a metaphysics of his own. Furthermore, it is also conceivable that Hegel spurned speculation about transcendent supernatural entities yet that he advocated knowledge of the universe as a whole. Finally, it is also feasible that Hegel appropriated Kant's project of a transcendental philosophy for his own metaphysical ends.

The argument behind Hartmann's interpretation therefore rests upon a false dilemma: if we do not make Hegel a category theorist, then we have to see his philosophy as metaphysics in the pre-Kantian sense or reduce it down to ironic narrative. This dilemma is not questioned but only emphasized by Hartmann's students.⁸ Yet traditional Hegel scholarship already had a perfectly viable middle path between it: that Hegel attempted to base his metaphysics upon a critical foundation by showing how Kantian-style epistemology, through its own immanent dialectic, leads to absolute knowledge.

The main problem with Hartmann's interpretation is obvious. It cannot account for one basic, straightforward and indisputable fact about Hegel's philosophy: that its aim is to know the absolute, the infinite or the unconditioned. Hegel tells us in his *Differenzschrift*, his first philosophical publication, that the aim of philosophy is to know the absolute through

reason.⁹ Never did he depart from this early conception of the task of philosophy. In the introduction to the *Wissenschaft der Logik* – the work that seems to correspond most with Hartmann’s interpretation – Hegel explains that the subject matter of philosophy is God, nature and spirit, and that logic deals with them only in abstraction.¹⁰ All the categories of logic, Hegel reminds us in his *Enzyklopädie*, are only so many metaphysical definitions of God.¹¹

In postulating the existence of the absolute, Hegel did not simply reaffirm the concept of the unconditioned or the infinite in the metaphysical tradition. But nor did he reject it. Rather, he *reinterpreted* it. He accepted the concept of the infinite in the broad Spinozian sense as that of which nothing greater can be conceived, or that which cannot be limited by anything.¹² If we admit this definition of the absolute, Hegel argued, then the absolute cannot be some supersensible reality behind appearances, or some supernatural entity beyond the realm of nature. Were this the case, the absolute would be limited, or the infinite would be finite, because then there would be something beyond it to limit it, something outside it in relation to which it would have to be conceived. Instead, the absolute must be the whole of all that exists, the totality of all of nature itself, for only that has nothing outside it to limit it. As knowledge of the absolute, then, the task of metaphysics is to provide knowledge of the universe as a whole, the totality of all of nature. It was mainly for this reason that philosophy has to be systematic: only a system of all essential concepts can be adequate to its object, the universe as a whole.

If we accept that the main aim of Hegel’s philosophy is to know the absolute, then it is necessary to admit that it is a metaphysics in a perfectly clear and straightforward sense of that term. This is the sense laid down by Kant in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: that metaphysics is the attempt to know the unconditioned or the infinite through pure reason.¹³ We do not have to interpret the unconditioned in a pre-Kantian manner to engage in metaphysics in this sense. Whether we conceive the unconditioned as a supernatural entity beyond nature or as the whole of nature itself, the attempt to know it still amounts to metaphysics.

That Hegel was engaging in metaphysics of this kind, and therefore challenging Kant’s limits upon knowledge, becomes clear when we consider Hegel’s many critical remarks about these limits. Hegel scoffed at Kant’s restriction of knowledge to appearances, his confinement of judgement to a regulative role, his refutation of the ontological argument, his failure to recognize the positive role of the antinomies. All these points are well-known; but they are

hard to reconcile with Hartmann's claim that Hegel's ambition was only to develop a system of categories, an ontology in the sense prescribed by Kant. Hegel did not want to break Kant's strictures upon knowledge, but nor did he intend simply to comply with them. Rather, he wanted to explode them by showing how they broke down through their own immanent dialectic.

One of the most serious drawbacks of Hartmann's approach is that it cannot do justice to one of the guiding intentions behind Hegel's philosophy: to provide a rational foundation for religious belief. Hegel stresses time and again that his philosophy differs from religion only in its form and not in its content, that it shares the same object with religion. The task of philosophy, Hegel stresses, is to provide a conceptual articulation and demonstration for what religion only believes or intuits darkly. If we place Hegel's system in its historical context, then it becomes clear that his aim was to provide a new rational defense of religion in the face of the Kantian critique of knowledge and the resurgence of Humean skepticism. Hegel's metaphysics was his middle path between that dilemma first posed by Jacobi in his *Briefe über die Lehre von Spinoza*: either a rational nihilism or an irrational leap of faith. The dialectic was Hegel's middle path between the horns of this dilemma, a method that did not fall prey to all Kant's objections against metaphysics.

If this interpretation of Hegel's intentions is correct, then it is necessary to conclude that Hartmann's interpretation runs counter to the very spirit of his philosophy. If Hegel's aim were to construct only a system of categories in the Kantian sense, then how could he claim to know the absolute? How could he claim to save the content of religious belief against skepticism and the Kantian critique of knowledge? Surely, any interpretation of a philosopher that cannot account for his main goals and aspirations is gravely inadequate. But let us not rush to conclusions and give Hartmann the benefit of every doubt.

II: Underneath the Carpet

Someone might well say that the points I have made about Hegel's metaphysics are basic, even banal. Surely, Hartmann must have some response to them, some means of explaining Hegel's language about the absolute, his attempt to preserve the content of religious belief, and his conflict with the Kantian limits upon knowledge.¹⁴ How do Hartmann's students deal with these apparent problems?

It is one of the remarkable blindspots in the present volume that its contributors overlook the most plausible sense in which Hegel's project can be regarded as metaphysical. Although the contributors sometimes distinguish various senses of the term 'metaphysics', they do not consider the term in its most straightforward and classical Kantian sense. According to them, metaphysics consists in either speculation about transcendent entities or in claims about the existence of some entity. Since Hegel does not do either, it therefore follows that he is not a metaphysician at all, or only in the minimal Kantian sense. That is the sum of the case for the 'non-metaphysical' reading of Hegel's philosophy.

In a sometimes incisive but also sometimes obscure article, 'Hegel's Critique of Kant and Pre-Kantian Metaphysics', Klaus Brinkmann considers the question of Hegel's challenge to the Kantian limits upon knowledge. He analyzes how Hegel differs from Kant in ascribing objectivity to the categories, and he explains why Hegel does not want to limit their validity to appearances. Though Brinkmann treats his subject well, he leaves it much too quickly. Hegel broke with Kant not only in ascribing objectivity to the categories, but in stressing a constitutive role for teleological judgement, in reinvoking the idea of an intuitive understanding, and in developing new proofs for the existence of God and providence. Although Brinkmann admits that 'Hegel absorbed into his own system the main topics of metaphysics', he insists that this did not bring him into conflict with Kant because 'his methodological treatment of them changed their character from being the transcendent objects of reasoning to becoming the subject matter of self-explicating thought' (p 58). Here Brinkmann simply ignores that fact that Hegel made *constitutive* claims about these topics, and that in this regard he does come into conflict with Kant.

When it comes to the concept of the 'absolute', there is a similar failure to deal with the issues. Some of the contributors are simply blind to the problem. They write about the absolute in the conventional way, as if it poses no problem for Hartmann. Others see the difficulty, but then they do their best to sweep it under the carpet. This is the strategy preferred by Stephen Bungay in his confused opening article, 'The Hegelian Project'. He explains that Hegel's system is a reconstruction of the absolute because "it reconstructs those concepts which...do not have something beyond them to which they refer"; in other words, these concepts construct the absolute because "their validity is absolute" (p 22). Hence the absolute now becomes an attribute of the system itself, and not something outside it to which

it refers. Thanks to this linguistic trick, Bungay succeeds in depriving the Hegelian system of its main object and content. Here, truly, is a philosophical magician of the first-order!

The same strategy is apparent in T J Bole's article, 'The Cogency of the *Logic's* Argumentation'. Bole admits that Hegel does talk about the absolute; but this is not a metaphysical absolute, like Spinoza's substance, he explains, because it is 'not only the object of reflection but also that which is the organ of critical reflection'. This means, Bole then adds in a *non sequiter* of breathtaking proportion, that the absolute 'can be detached from the ontological claims that the absolute idea or spirit exists', and hence we can interpret it simply in terms of 'the argument that constitutes it'. Here again, then, the absolute becomes a second-order attribute of the system itself and simply disappears. Another magician, though an even less convincing one.

There is, however, some method to the madness. Bungay and Bole attempt to eliminate the absolute from Hegel's philosophy because they are convinced that it is a superfluous ontological posit which is not necessary to make the system true. The truth of Hegel's system, they argue, rests entirely upon its own internal coherence, upon reason's 'immanent hermeneutic'.¹⁵ The system of categories is indeed only a second-order reflection upon our concepts of the world, and does not use these concepts to make claims about the world. Hence any interpretation of the system of categories that makes it refer to some kind of entity – whether ships, shoes, sailing wax, or, heaven forbid!, the absolute – rests upon a simple category mistake.

But this line of argument simply rests upon a confusion: because the rationale of Hegel's system rests upon its internal coherence, because it does not depend upon its correspondence with anything outside itself, it does not follow that it does not refer to anything at all. This is a point that Bungay seems to recognize, when he says that the truth of the system also depends upon the *actuality* of its claims (p 34). But then his whole account totters on incoherence because we are told that the system both requires and excludes correspondence as a condition of its truth (pp 22-3, 34). In general, the whole subject of how Hegel's system is true is treated in an obscure, apparently inconsistent, manner throughout this volume.

In facing some of the patent inadequacies of Hartmann's interpretation, some of the contributors do the only honest thing: they look through the telescope. Then they make the most embarrassing confessions. Bungay sees a problem for Hartmann's interpretation

concerning Hegel's attempt to salvage the content of traditional religious belief in his system. But then he reminds us that there is after all 'a bad old Hegel', whom we unfortunately meet at odd intervals (pp. 35-6, 38). The most striking – and revealing – confession is made by George Khushf in his article 'The Meta-Ontological Option'. Khushf too admits that there is indeed a metaphysical Hegel, and he even says that much of Hartmann's philosophizing is against Hegel. But he then attempts to save face by maintaining that all Hartmann attempts to provide is 'a minimal interpretation' that rescues the philosophical sense of Hegel's system (pp 128, 133).

When the reader hears admissions like these, he is justified in concluding that there is little interest in Hartmann's school in providing an accurate *historical account* of Hegel, an explanation of what he did mean in the context of his time. Rather, their aim is to provide a *philosophical reconstruction*, a prescription about what he ought to have meant if he had the benefit of the wisdom of a Hartmannian transcendental philosopher. Yet it is one of the chief problems with this volume that, despite the occasional embarrassing concessions, the contributors all too often conflate their philosophical Hegel with the historical one, as if there were no discrepancy at all. What Hegel ought to have said that he did say, or at least meant, even if it was only obscurely.

III: Of Good Intentions and Bad Scholarship

But my objections are still only striking the surface, someone might say, because they do not deal with the motivations behind Hartmann's interpretation. It is when we consider these that his interpretation becomes much more attractive.

The motivation behind Hartmann's non-metaphysical reading, as George Khushf explains, is that it seems to avoid some of the common objections made against Hegel (pp 119-122). Schelling, Kierkegaard, Feuerbach and Marx all criticized Hegel for confusing the realms of essence and existence, the universal and the particular. Hartmann agrees with these critics about the need to make such distinctions; but he does not think that Hegel is guilty of conflating them. Since Hegel's project is to construct a system of categories, there is no such conflation, because a category only orders our thought about the world and does not make claims about the particular things that exist in it. If *per contra* we hang onto the old metaphysical interpretation, then we have to admit that Hegel was guilty of some very basic philosophical mistakes – indeed so basic that he is not worth taking seriously philosophically.

But it is necessary to ask in the first place whether Hartmann's interpretation really does avoid the charges made against Hegel. They clear Hegel of the crudest charges of inferring existence from essence, the particular from the universal. But the main point behind all these objections remains: that Hegel's system cannot be absolute, or all-comprehensive, because it leaves out the particular and the realm of existence. For it follows from Hartmann's interpretation that Hegel's system will have a merely formal validity, that it will stand apart from all the particulars of the empirical world. Ironically, Hegel is now guilty of the very same charge that he once made against the systems of Fichte and Schelling.

Hartmann's distinctions between essence and existence, or the categorial and the empirical, are completely alien to the requirements of Hegel's system. They make it impossible for there to be continuity and organic unity between the realms of logic, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit. Since the system of pure categories is supposed to have a priori validity, the whole empirical realm now falls outside the system. All the particular data of natural science, history and politics can be incorporated into the system only by making assumptions outside it: that there are such things as nature, history and the state, and that they have these determinations rather than some other.

Of course, there can be a philosophy of spirit and of nature on Hartmann's reading, since these consist in only the categories for these disciplines, which are more specific cases of the general categories of the logic. Nevertheless, their content must be given and contingent for the general a priori standpoint of transcendental philosophy, so that there is again a caesura in the system.

The violence that Hartmann's distinctions do to Hegel's system are most apparent from his comments upon the philosophy of history. Hartmann and his students turn a blind eye to the preeminent place of history in Hegel's philosophy, its central role in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and the philosophy of spirit.¹⁶ They have difficulty in explaining this because it amounts to a category mistake, a confusion of the purely logical categorial determinations of the system and the particular and contingent data of history. In the face of this problem, Hartmann admits that Hegel's system is historical in the simple sense that it applies to historical material; but he seems to recognize that Hegel wants more than this, and in this case he simply denies his system any legitimacy at all.¹⁷ But here Hartmann simply rides roughshod over what many have seen as one of Hegel's central insights: that reason itself is historical, that it is in a process of development, that it embodies itself throughout history in

the state and spirit of a nation. Surely, the problem of Hegel scholarship is to understand this doctrine, not simply to deny it all legitimacy.

The main problem with Hartmann's reading is again that old stumbling block of the Hartmannian school: the absolute. If we take a close look at this monster, then we find that we cannot accept the distinctions between essence and existence, universal and particular. According to Hegel, the very nature of the absolute dissolves these distinctions. There is no distinction between essence and existence since the absolute is *causi sui*, that whose essence involves existence. There is also no distinction between universal and particular because the absolute is self-determining, making itself determinate through a process of development.

Admitting that Hegel denies these common distinctions should not, however, discredit him. We need to ask why Hegel questioned them in the first place, why he believed himself justified in abolishing them. The answer to these questions requires a deeper understanding of Hegel's Jena years – a crucial period for his intellectual development which is almost entirely ignored in this volume. During their collaboration in Jena from 1801 to 1803, Hegel and Schelling defended an organic interpretation of the universe against Fichte's idealism and the old mechanist paradigm. For such an explanation of nature, it is not possible to maintain a distinction between essence and existence, universal and particular, since the very essence of the organic is that it is self-generating and self-differentiating. If, then, we are to understand Hegel metaphysics, we need to do much more to understand the rationale behind Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* in the early Jena years.

IV: The Owl of Minerva Flies Again, Laughing

Someone might argue that all these objections against Hartmann's reading are beside the point. Hartmann himself admits that there is a metaphysical Hegel, and that his interpretation does not cover every aspect of his thought.¹⁸ He also insists that Hegel himself was at times confused about the purport of his project and that he claimed too much for it. What Hartmann is trying to do is to provide a *philosophical reconstruction* of Hegel, an account of the most valuable features of his system. It stands to reason, then, that there will be a large measure of historical inaccuracy in the reconstruction, and that some elements of Hegel will have to be consigned to the philosophical dustbin.

The crucial question is whether Hartmann has provided what he pretends: a ‘minimal interpretation’, one that captures the main aspects of his system, even if it is not in accord with them all.

It should be obvious from the above, however, that Hartmann has not provided even a decent minimal reading. It is not simply that Hegel says more than Hartmann allows, that he sometimes makes metaphysical or extra-categorical claims. Rather, Hegel flies in the face of Hartmann’s interpretation, contradicting its main assumptions on point after point. Hartmann’s reading imposes distinctions – those between essence and existence, universal and particular – contrary to the requirements of Hegel’s system. It also cannot do justice to Hegel’s main ambition, to what Hegel wanted to do most: provide a philosophical rationale for religious belief.

If Hartmann persists with his claim that, despite the vast discrepancy with the historical Hegel, he has still provided an account of the philosophically plausible aspects of his system, then it is necessary to admit that we have now quit the realms of history and scholarship entirely. There are no longer any restraints on what counts as a proper interpretation of Hegel. Almost anyone, even those who do not share Hartmann’s philosophical sympathies, can claim to give a philosophical reconstruction of Hegel’s system, so that there are as many reconstructions of Hegel as there are philosophical standpoints. This kind of reply sanctions an interpretive free-for-all which lets us to go through Hegel’s system and pick and choose according to our philosophical inclinations.

On a purely philosophical level, it is worthwhile raising the question whether Hartmann has an effective strategy for rehabilitating Hegel. This too seems extremely doubtful, and much of Hartmann’s philosophy seems as dated as Hegel himself. Many contemporary philosophers – those who deny the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, or those who affirm the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes – will be skeptical of a system of pure categories. Much of Hartmann’s stock-in-trade – his distinction between categorical and empirical questions, and the quaint jargon of category mistakes – sounds like the linguistic philosophy of the 1950s, which is now passé. For most philosophers of the post-modern era, Hartmann’s ontological option is not an option at all, and it will sound like only another form of the ‘metaphysics’ they eschew. In short, Hartmann has not given any contemporary philosopher much reason to look at Hegel. Yet the irony is that the very

aspects of Hegel that are most likely to appeal to them – his historicism – are those most ignored and dismissed by Hartmann and his disciples.

My final verdict on Hartmann's interpretation is that it is profoundly, indeed blatantly, anachronistic, forcing Hegel into the mould of modern preconceptions, now dated by post-modern standards. It does not mark an advance but a decline in Hegel scholarship, a deep drop in standards of historical accuracy and philosophical sophistication. There is nothing to be lost, and much to be gained, by simply ignoring it.

Hegel Reconsidered is sad testimony for this conclusion. It is a volume written by and for Hartmann students, and it is unlikely to convince anyone who is not already part of the club. It does not resolve the problems of Hartmann's interpretation but only makes them all the more apparent. Whenever the going gets rough they are likely to resort to the same obscure language as their *Denkmeister*. It is not a contribution to the rehabilitation of Hegel but the very opposite, indulging in all the old vices of Hegel scholarship that once gave it such a bad reputation in the English-speaking world: a use of esoteric terms with little attempt to explain them, a failure to stand outside Hegel's system and to account for its problems in straightforward and plain terms, a general lack of rigour and a tendency to explain the obscure by the more obscure. The contributors forfeit the only intellectual virtue their subject can claim for those who will remain skeptical of Hegel's philosophical ambitions: thorough and detailed scholarship, an historical understanding of one of the most influential philosophical systems of the modern age.

Where, then, lies the way forward? Along an old-fashioned path, one now largely forgotten but travelled more than a century ago by Rosenkranz, Haym, and Dilthey: to reconstruct Hegel's philosophy from a detailed study of his historical context and intellectual development. Whatever philosophical content there is in Hegel's system should emerge as the result of such research; it should not be imposed upon it a priori from some arbitrary contemporary perspective. We should now try to prejudge what any future decade or age will find of value in Hegel's system. After all, as every student of Hegel knows, the owl of Minerva only flies at dusk.

- 1 See Richard Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921); Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1975), and J N Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-Examination* (London: George, Allen & Unwin, 1958).
- 2 Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp 78-9.
- 3 On Hartmann's writings on Hegel, see especially 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in Alasdair MacIntyre, ed *Hegel: A Collection of Essays* (Garden City, N J: Doubleday, 1971), pp 101-24; 'Die ontologische Option', in *Die Ontologische Option* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1976), pp 1-31; and 'On Taking the Transcendental Turn', in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988), 192-219.
- 4 *Hegel Reconsidered: Beyond Metaphysics and the Authoritarian State*, edited by H T Engelhardt and Terry Pinkard (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), pp x + 258, Hb £73.
- 5 *Hegel Reconsidered*, 'Introduction', p 1.
- 6 See Royce's *Lectures on Modern Idealism*. This is still one of the best introductions to the subject.
- 7 See Robert Stern, 'British Hegelianism: A Non-Metaphysical View?', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 2 (1994), pp 293-321.
- 8 See the introduction by Engelhardt, p 1, and the article by Thomas J Bole, 'The Cogency of the *Logic's* Argumentation', p 103.
- 9 Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed H Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927) I, 49.
- 10 *Ibid*, IV, 24.
- 11 §84; *Werke* VIII, 201.
- 12 In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel said that Spinoza's substance is the starting point of philosophy. See *Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke* XIX, 376.
- 13 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B, 395.
- 14 Unfortunately, it is necessary to rely on Hartmann's students since Hartmann's own explanation of this problem is very obscure. See 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in *Studies in Foundational Philosophy*, pp 281-2: "His [Hegel's] position on God and religion...is one that 'places' God and the religious congregation; it offers as their categorial account that unity of spirit which, as absolute, is not subject to plural...instantiation and thus transcends the real. The ontologist need not claim that God exists apart from the congregation forming a unity with them. The category would be sufficiently instanced by 'religion', a concrete universal leading up to, and surpassed by, philosophy". The reader will want to know how God can be God if he does not exist apart from the congregation believing in his existence. This would make God into a regulative faith *a la* Kant and Fichte, which Hegel explicitly eschewed time and again in his Jena writings. Hartmann warns us, however, that his solution is "subtle", so perhaps there are untold depths here which his students understand.
- 15 Cf pp 22-3, 105, 107, 114.
- 16 See Hartmann, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', pp 285-6. Cf Bungay's and Khushf's comments on Hegel's philosophy of history, in *Hegel Reconsidered*, pp 36-7, 133.
- 17 See 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', pp 285-6.
- 18 *Ibid*, pp 281, 286.

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